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And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son 
 into our hearts, crying “Abba! Father!”  
So you are no longer a slave but a child, and if a child then also an heir,  
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In Washington in 1990, Joseph Ratzinger posed what he understood to be a 
fundamental question about the human condition: “what is freedom and where does man find 
that road which doesn’t just go anywhere, but leads to true freedom, to the real ‘promised 
land’ for human existence?”1 Twenty years earlier, he voiced a similar concern fo  freedom 
and its full and proper flourishing: “[t]here is a cry for liberation from the prison of 
positivism, as there is too, for liberation from a form of faith that has allowed itself to become 
a burden instead of a vehicle of freedom.”2 At all times, both in those years and up to the 
present day, he has explored and promoted an answer to the question that considers the 
Church as Raum der Freiheit – as “locus” or “sphere” of freedom in terms of divine-human 
relationality,3 the liturgy,4 reconciliation,5 faith,6 hope,7 theological endeavour,8 and society.9 
                                                          
1 Joseph Ratzinger, “God and Freedom: Jesus, the Way, the Truth and the Life,” Origins 19 (1990): 591.   
2 Joseph Ratzinger, Faith and the Future (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 29. On another ccasion he 
observed that the Church and theology waste too much time on small background skirmishes, without investing 
enough time in asking the basic questions. See Joseph Ratzinger & Marcello Pera, Without Roots: The West, 
Relativism, Christianity, Islam, trans. Michael F. Moore (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 126-7. 
3 See Joseph Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche (St. Ottilien: EOS, 1992), xiv; 
Komm Heiliger Geist! Pfingstpredigten (Donauwörth: Verlag Erich Wewel, 2005), 53; “Warum ich noch in der 
Kirche bin,” in Auferstehung und Ewiges Leben, ds. Rudolf Voderholzer et al., vol. 10 of Joseph Ratzinger 
Gesammelte Schriften, eds. Gerhard Ludwig Müller et al. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2012), 1182 (hereafter 
GS:AEL); Dogma und Verkündigung (Donauwörth: Erich Wewel, 2005), 217-18; Eschatologie: Tod und ewiges 
Leben (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2007), 185-86; Schauen auf den Durchbohrten: Versuche zu einer 
spirituellen Christologie (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1984), 34; Wendezeit für Europa? Diagnosen und Prognosen 
zur Lage von Kirche und Welt (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1991), 126; Gott und die Welt. Glauben und Leben in 
unserer Zeit: Ein Gespräch mit Peter Seewald (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2005), 160, 311; Der Geist 
Der Liturgie in Theologie der Liturgie, eds. Rudolf Voderholzer et al., vol. 11 of J seph Ratzinger Gesammelte 
Schriften, eds. Gerhard Ludwig Müller et al (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2008), 42 (hereafter GS:TL); Weg 
Gemeinschaft des Glaubens: Kirche als Communio (Sankt Ulrich Verlag GmbH: Augsburg, 2002), 21, 250-51; 
Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan bis zur Verklärung (Freiburg: Herder, 2007), 
113. 
4 See Joseph Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik: Neue Versuche zur Ekklesio ogie (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 
1987), 232; Ein neues Lied für den Herrn: Christusglaube und Liturgie in der Gegenwart (Freiburg im 
Breisgau: Herder, 2007), 108, 159. 
5 See Joseph Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott. Vier Predigten über Schöpfung d Fall: Konsequenzen des 
Schöpfungsglaubens (Einsiedeln, Freiburg: Johannes, 2005), 75; Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen: Kirche heute 
Verstehen (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005), 99, 132; Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem bis zur 
Auferstehung (Freiburg: Herder, 2011), 261; Benedict XVI, Licht der Welt. Der Papst, die Kirche und die 
Zeichen der Zeit: Ein Gespräch mit Peter Seewald (Freiburg: Herder, 2011), 165.  
6 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Das Ende der Zeit” in Ende der Zeit: Die Provokation der Rede von Gott. 
Dokumentation einer Tagung mit Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger, Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann, und 
Eveline Goodmann-Thau in Ahaus, ed. Tiemo Rainer Peters & Claus Urban (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 
1999), 91; Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 106; Gott und die Welt, 390. 
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It is a rich and dynamic expression intended to acknowledge the nuanced and multifaceted 
challenge existing today for ecclesiologists who wish to reflect on the concept of freedom in 
its relation to (modern) religious man.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to consider howc gently Ratzinger presents the 
case for the Church’s presence in the world as a liberating force for humanity. It asks: how 
does Ratzinger characterise the Church as a sphere beneficial to humanity’s yearning for 
liberation in a time when disgruntlement towards it has, arguably, increased exponentially?10 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 See Joseph Ratzinger, Aus meinem Leben: Erinnerungen 1927-1977 (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
1998), 47; Ein neues Lied für den Herrn: Christusglaube und Liturgie in der Gegenwart (Freiburg im Breisgau: 
Herder, 2007), 72.  
8 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Zum Begriff des Sakraments” in GS:TL, 231-32; Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie: 
Versuche zu ihrer Ortbestimmung im Disput der Gegenwart (Einsiedeln, Freiburg: Johannes, 1993), 92-93; 
“Das Ende der Zeit,” 92. 
9 See Ratzinger, Salz der Erde. Christentum und katholische Kirche im 21. Jahrhundert: Ein Gespräch mit Peter 
Seewald (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1996), 176; Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 48,167, 175; 
Christlicher Brüderlichkeit in Kirche – Zeichen unter den Völkern, eds. Rudolf Voderholzer et al., vol. 8 of 
Joseph Ratzinger Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rudolf Voderholzer (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2010), 93 
(hereafter GS:ZV).  
10A disgruntlement and unease, it must be noted, that does not originate outside the Church. There is a growing 
realisation within the Church that, on the one hand, the most disaffected people can often be the Church’s own 
members while, on the other hand, some of the greatest evils perpetrated in the name of the Church today have 
been done by some of its own members. In his Tübingen lectures of 1967, Ratzinger expressed this reality: “for 
many people today the Church has become the main obstacle to belief. They can no longer see in her anythi g 
but the human struggle for power, the petty spectacle [das kleinliche Theater] of those who, with their claim to 
administer official Christianity, seem to stand most in the way of the true spirit of Christianity.” His analysis and 
response to this internal danger would become a consiste t mark of this theology: “the Church is most present 
not where organising, reforming and governing are goin  on but in those who simply believe and receive from 
her the gift of faith that is life to them. Only someone who has experienced how, regardless of changes i  h r 
ministry and form, the Church raises men up, gives th m a home and a hope, a home that is hope – the pa  to 
eternal life – only someone who has experienced this knows what the Church is, both in days gone by and now” 
(Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, trans. J.R. Foster [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004], 340, 
344). With regard to the obstacles to faith that can emanate from within the confines of the Church itself, a 
series of five homilies and addresses by Benedict XVI during Spring 2010 are of note. He offered these 
meditations on the nature of the Church when he was under scrutiny himself for his approach to child-
safeguarding during his tenure as Archbishop of Munich and Freising from 1977 to1982. The apocalyptic tone 
of these homilies comes from the mind of someone trying to make sense of a deep crisis in the Church. See 
Pope Benedict XVI, Homily for Celebration of the Palm Sunday of the Passion of the Lord (28 March 2010): 
AAS 102 (2010), 221-226;  Homily for Eucharistic Concelebration with Members of the Pontifical Biblica 
Commission (15 April 2010): AAS 102 (2010), 276-80;  Homily for Eucharistic Concelebration for Pastoral 
Visit to Turin, 2 May 2010, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2010/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_hom_20100502_torino_en.html (accessed 19 September 2011); Homily for the Solemnity of Pentecost (23 
May 2010), AAS 102 (2010), 331-335);  Regina Caeli Address for the Solemnity of Pentecost, 23 May 2010,  
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/angelus/2010/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_reg_20100523_pentecoste_en.html (accessed 19 September 2011). Luis Gonzáles-Carvajal, Professor of 
Moral Theology at Comillas Pontifical University (Madrid) attempts to capture the problematic of contemporary 
ecclesial membership by identifying three types of disenfranchised believers: Christians disappointed by the 
Church, those who believe without belonging (believers wielding an expressive individualism), and those who 
belong without believing (i.e. cultural Christians). See “Christians without a Church,” Concilium 2011 (2): 95-
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In doing so, it will be necessary to consider his understanding of how the contemporary 
cultural and philosophical attitude toward freedom e erged, to research and present the 
tenets of his anthropology of liberation, and finally, to study how his presentation of 
ecclesiology may be fruitful in realising growth in authentic human freedom.  
The nucleus of his approach is found in his desire to r concile the form of faith as a 
statement of meaning with a scientific, technological worldview which, at its heart, is a 
positive development but incapable of imparting the spirit of selfless service that keeps 
humanity true to itself: 
[Die Menschheit] braucht einen Sinnzusammenhang, der die Kraft des Dienens gibt, 
der innere Freiheit von der Welt schafft und dadurch die Fähigkeit verleiht, in der 
Absehung von sich selbst zu leben und zu wirken, weil di  Hoffnung des Menschen 
tiefer gründet, als die Hoffnungen seiner äußeren Karriere reichen. All das kann aber 
auf die Dauer nicht bestehen ohne die Mächtigkeit eines in sich selber zweckfrei 
lebendigen Glaubens. Insofern ist Dienst am Glauben auch heute und gerade heute 
eine Existenznotwendigkeit für den Menschen. Der Techniker, der um neue 
Möglichkeiten materiellen Überlebens ringt und der Gläubige, der im Dienst am 
Glauben steht und neue Wege spirituellen Überlebens sucht, arbeiten an den zwei 
Seiten einer einzigen gemeinsamen Aufgabe. Sie sollten sich nicht gegeneinander 




                       
                                                                                                                                                                                    
100.  A typical ecclesiological question that captures this membership-dilemma, so to speak, was formulated in 
a German newspaper on 24 February 2011: “Is the Church still experienced as a place where God is openly 
effective – not only in the aesthetics of its rites or a vague longing for transcendence, but in its liberating 
power?”[translation mine] (Hans Kessler, Eberhard Schockenhoff and Peter Walter, “Die Kirche steht sich 
selbst im Weg,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 24 February 2011, http://www.fr-online.de/kultur/debatte/die-kirche-
steht-sich-selbst-im-weg/-/1473340/7406240/-/index.html (accessed 19 September 2011).   
11 Ratzinger, Dogma und Verkündigung, 257 (“Mankind needs a framework of meaning that imparts the strength 
to serve, which creates an interior freedom from the world and thereby gives individuals the ability to live and 
work unselfishly, because a man’s hope is more deeply rooted than his external career aspirations. Yet all that 
cannot last without the mighty force of living faith that is in itself disinterested. In this regard, service to the 
faith is an existential need for man, even today and especially today. The technician who strives to find new 
possibilities of material survival and the believer who is at the service of the faith and seeks new ways of 
spiritual survival are working at two different sides of one and the same common task.  They should not allow 
themselves to be played off against each other but, rather, should extend to each other a helping hand with the 
one project to which they are committed” [Joseph Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian 
Doctrine to Daily Life, ed. Michael J. Miller, trans. Michael J. Miller & Matthew J. O’Connell (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2011), 227]).    
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0.1.    Relevance of the Topic – A Cultural Perspective with Ecclesial Ramifications  
 
A shift in western culture over the past 500 years exacts a need to reengage with the 
topic of human freedom. From an ecclesiological pers ctive, the Church’s visible 
institutional presence is destined to be probed by the new cultural trends within western 
society. Today, the West tends to pride itself on the maintenance of a liberal democratic 
polity with a value-system comprised of (at a minimum) individual liberty, privacy, free 
speech, due process of law and equality before the law, representative and transparent 
government, and a regime of equal rights and entitlments for all. And even if this set of 
values is not always fully realisable, it serves as the western world’s defining aspiration.  
Anthony Clifford Grayling (b. 1949), former professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck 
College, University of London and long-time associate of the neo-atheist movement in the 
UK, says this aspiration has been the result of a singular process of “enfranchisement.”12 To 
his mind, the progress made in human “enfranchisement” has necessitated the final breaking 
of the hegemony of a single Church over the lives of individuals, as well as the overriding of 
absolute monarchy, replacing it with more representative systems of government and citizen 
participation. He says: “[b]oth processes were occasionally revolutionary but mostly 
evolutionary, plagued by setbacks, made slow and difficult by the reluctance of both religious 
and temporal powers to give anything away. Many died in furthering these processes – in fire 
at the church’s stake, in chains in royal dungeons,  the battlefield.”13 On the other hand, 
                                                          
12 Anthony Clifford Grayling, Towards the Light: The Story of the Struggles for Liberty and Rights that Made 
the Modern West (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 2. Grayling defines “enfra chisement” as consisting of “the 
increasing liberty of the individual, the growth of the idea that individuals have rights and claims and the 
freedom to assert them even against the constituted authority of the land” (ibid.). See also his The Good Book: A 
Secular Bible (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), where Grayling takes the broad outline structure of the Judeo-
Christian Bible but replaces the text with so-called non-religious material from the history of thought. In 
September 2010, Grayling joined fifty-five other public figures in opposing Benedict XVI’s state visit to 
Scotland and England. See “Harsh Judgements on the Pop and Religion.” The Guardian, 15 September 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/15/harsh-judgments-on-pope-religion (accessed 15 March 2012). 
13 Grayling, Towards the Light, 3. Grayling acknowledges the demonstrable progress made whereby the twenty-
first century western citizen enjoys many freedoms in pite of the cost and sacrifice made in attaining them: “it 
remains true that today’s ordinary western citizen is, in sixteenth-century terms, a lord: a possessor of rights, 
entitlements, opportunities and resources that onlya  aristocrat of that earlier period could hope for” (2). While 
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and particularly from the perspective of the twentith century, the world has experienced an 
unparalleled series of ideological and bloody misuse  of freedom. Paradoxically, the same 
century was marked by an unprecedented cry for freedom to be definitively procured. 
According to former professor of Moral Theology at Maynooth’s Pontifical University, 
Vincent Twomey, by the time Pope Paul VI (1897-1978) published Humane Vitae in 1968 
entire populations were motivated by the condition of freedom’s possibility: 
Freedom was the new catchword – freedom from the constraints of the past, freedom 
from alienating authorities (Church, State, and trai ional families), freedom from the 
limits imposed on us by our bodies, freedom of exprssion, including sexual 
expression. Anything goes. Within the Church, the reforms of the Second Vatican 
Council were being implemented with haste, above all through the introduction of the 
new rite of Mass. They engendered a sense of freedom from what was perceived as 
the shackles of tradition. Change was in the air, not least in the field of moral 
theology, which the Council had stressed was in need of a radical rethink, which it 
was.14 
In the intervening time, much has happened, with historical causality increasingly 
being blamed for the continuing vulnerability of the western way of life. Even someone like 
Grayling muses on the present troubled state of western culture: the phenomenon of 
terrorism, the changing demographics of western populations in decline, and a general 
malaise towards the price paid for freedom by our predecessors. He believes that the gains of 
previous generations are so precious and yet so precariously at risk that only an affirmative 
answer must be given to the last part of his question: “Do we record the fact that the age of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the struggle for freedom has, by no means, confined its lf to the modern democratic movement, there is 
certainly no doubt that the struggle for freedom has grown in intensity to a point hitherto unknown sice the 
twilight of the European feudal order and its hierarchical restrictions. From such a perspective, Grayling can be 
said to be representative of the perceived narrative, as it were, of institutional revolution over the course of the 
preceding five hundred years of Western civilisation. For an account of how European society has interac d 
with the concept of freedom from the earliest times, see Christian Meier, Kultur, um Freiheit willen. 
Griechische Anfänge – Anfang Europa? (München: Siedler, 2009); David Wengrow, What Makes Civilisation? 
The Ancient Near East and the Future of the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). For a somewhat 
more polemical account of the role the Catholic Churc   played in the roots of Western society from the Dark 
Ages onwards, see Thomas E. Woods, How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilisation (Washington D.C.: 
Regnery Publishing, 2005). This latter book, albeit polemical in tone, is an example of some writers in the 
United States at present who believe themselves bound to respond to an anti-Catholic bias which consider  the 
story of Catholicism to be solely one of enforced ignorance, repression and stagnation. Woods strives to correct 
the historical record through the lens of Catholicism’s contribution to monasticism, education, science, 
architecture, law, economics, social works and morality. 
14 D. Vincent Twomey, Moral Theology after Humane Vitae: Fundamental Issues in Moral Theory and Sexual 
Ethics (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010), 9. 
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liberty might have passed its best point, after so brief a period of flourishing, or do we fight to 
keep all that the struggle to win it gained for us?”15  
There are others, however, who are not so uncritical of the modern concept of human 
freedom. Writing in 1950, Romano Guardini (1885-1968), a professor of philosophy and 
theology at the University of Munich, felt that in the preceding thirty years, humanity had 
come to distrust its own nature and, had begun to search for liberation in opposition to the 
Judaeo-Christian heritage that creation was created goo  by God who is good.16 Analogous to 
the shift in the perception of nature, Guardini beleved that the new sense of the finite would 
bring a changed attitude to the understanding of person and subjectivity, the outcome of 
which would lead to “the not-human man” and the “not- atural nature.” This would bring 
humanity towards an existence consisting of the fredom to further their lordship of creation, 
even to its last doomed consequences:  
This mastery will be open to him because he has permitt d himself utter freedom: the 
freedom to determine his own goals, to dissolve the immediate reality of things, to 
employ its elements for the execution of his own ends.  These things he will do 
without any consideration for what had been thought inviolate or untouchable in 
nature. He will ignore that strong sense of the sacredness of nature which had endured 
within mankind’s earlier vision.17   
Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor (b. 1931), whohas arguably produced the most 
important recent study on subjective relationality and culture, uses more contemporary 
terminology to capture the shift in perspective which has taken place. He asks about the belief 
structures of western society: “why was it virtually impossible not to believe in God in say, 
1500 in our western society, while in 2000 many of us ind this not only easy, but even 
                                                          
15 Grayling, Towards the Light, 11. See also Grayling’s Liberty in the Age of Terror: A Defence of Civil 
Liberties and Enlightenment Values (New York: Bloomsbury, 2009) where he re-examines the grounds for the 
western value of liberty in the face of governmental responses to the phenomenon of terrorism.   
16 See Romano Guardini, The End of the Modern World, trans. Joseph Theman et al. (Delaware: ISI Books, 
2001). At one point he suggests that “[n]ature is no longer experienced wondrously as a rich source bestowing 
harmony on all things, as wisely ordered of itself, as benevolent with its favours” (53). 
17 Ibid., 74.  
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inescapable?”18 For him, the rise of the “secular age” is a unique ph nomenon within the 
history of western civilisation. Though notoriously difficult to define, for him “a secular age 
is one in which the eclipse of all goals beyond human flourishing becomes conceivable; or 
better, it falls within the range of an imaginable lif for masses of people.”19 It is the result of 
a societal principle which declares human flourishing to be no longer a good, but the good, 
beyond which no ultimate goal exists. For the first time in history, he says, a self-sufficient or 
“self-sufficing humanism” has come to be widely available which carries no allegiance to 
anything else beyond this flourishing.20 
                                                          
18 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 2007), 25. Taylor’s starting 
point in this book is an investigation of how, in respect of the belief structures of western society, unbelieving is 
more problematic than believing in the year 1500, while believing is more problematic than unbelieving  the 
year 2000. 
19 Ibid., 19-20.  
20 See ibid., 14-22. As one would expect, there are vious prognoses available in respect of the effects and 
impact of “modernity” upon the western mindset. Forhis part, Taylor tends to be largely representative of a 
scholarly consensus that believes “modernity brings about secularity” and “[it] is the fruit of new inventions, 
newly constructed self-understandings and related practices, and can’t be explained in terms of perennial 
features of human life” (21-22). Taylor is personally interested in the phenomenon of secularity from three 
perspectives: secularised public spaces, the decline of belief and practice, and the new conditions of belief. 
Boston College Theology Professor, Michael J. Buckley has a similar approach to Taylor, in that the modern 
secular milieu is of a new variety, not seen before in the history of humanity. His evidence begins at the time of 
the 18th dynasty Pharaoh Akhenaten and his son Tutankhamun (c. 1341- 1323BC). See At the Origins of Modern 
Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 1-36; Denying and Disclosing God: The Ambiguous 
Progress of Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). Two helpful and significant 
contributions towards understanding this phenomenon of the “secular” (which is derived from the Latin 
saeculum meaning “generation” or “age” and has become shorthand for the ideology that shapes contemporary 
society without reference to the divine) include thwork of Eric Voegelin (1901-85), who reflected upon the 
behavioural revolution in political science in pre- and post-World War II Europe and America; and David 
Walsh, who produced a series of books in the 1990s which sought to recover the spiritual foundations of 
freedom. He observed that the reality of God and the validity of perennial philosophy and Christian teaching are 
dramatically reaffirmed in light of the spiritual disarray wrought by the modern experiment of secular 
humanism. See Eric Voegelin, Modernity without Constraint: The Political Religions, The New Science of 
Politics, and Science, Politics and Gnosticism, Manfred Henningsen, ed., (vol. 5 of The Collected Works of Eric 
Voegelin, eds. Paul Caringella et al.[Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2000]); David Walsh, After 
Ideology: Recovering the Spiritual Foundations of Freedom (New York: Harper Collins, 1990); The Growth of 
the Liberal Soul (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1997); The Modern Philosophical 
Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). I should also mention  
James McAdams, ed., The Crisis of Modern Times: Perspectives from The Review of Politics, 1939-1962 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), a collection of essays on the views of American and European 
émigré intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s  who, reflecting on the emergence of the dictatorial regimes in 
Germany and Russia and the looming threat of even more devastating European warfare, believed in the need to 
rethink the reigning philosophical perspectives of the time. They provide an important view of the situation 
facing the West at the height of the twentieth century’s cultural crisis. For a positive appraisal of secularism as 
something born from and requiring Christianity, seeGraeme Smith, A Short History of Secularism (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2008).     
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Representative of those who are severely critical of the trajectory of the modern 
understanding of freedom in the West is the Orthodox theologian, David Bentley Hart (b. 
1965).  Responding to what he sees as the sinister arrative of the anti-religious polemic of 
neo-atheism, he argues that being entirely modern – which few he concedes actually are – is 
to believe in nothing:  
Modernity’s highest ideal – its special understanding of personal autonomy –requires 
us to place our trust in an original absence underlying all of reality, a fertile void in 
which all things are possible, from which arises no impediment to our wills. . . We 
trust, that is to say, that there is no substantial cr terion by which to judge our choices 
that stands higher that the unquestioned good of free choice itself, and that therefore, 
all judgement, divine no less than human, is in some sense an infringement upon our 
freedom.21 
For Hart, the ethos of modernity has become nihilism, not in the sense of a rejection of 
various truths that can be identified within the world but rather a rejection of the notion that 
there is some total of eternal “Truth” beyond the world governing our reality. While most 
people, believers and unbelievers (in God) alike, acknowledge the placing of desirable limits 
upon the exercise of human free-will, Hart point out that the chief value of the age remains 
the “inviolable liberty of personal volition.” If we conform authentically to the age in which 
we live, we place ourselves, not at the disposal of God or gods or the Good, “but before an 
abyss, over which presides the empty power of our isolated wills, whose decisions are their 
own moral index. This is what it means to have become perfect consumers: the original 
nothingness of the will gives itself shape by the us it makes of the nothingness of the world 
– and thus we are free.”22 
 Such a “shift,” or at least a version thereof, could not be ignored by the Church, as it 
was bound to impact on the outlook of the believing community. For the Roman Catholic 
                                                          
21 David Bentley Hart, Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fa hionable Enemies (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009), 21. 
22 Ibid., 22-3. Out of respect to Hart, it is important to point out that he acknowledges that this scenario is “a 
wilfully extreme formulation of the matter, and life is rarely lived at the extremes. For most of us, the forces of 
conformity that surround and seduce us – political, religious, patriotic and popular – are necessary shelters 
against the storm of infinite possibility” (23). Nevertheless, what he depicts assists us coming to an
understanding of the probabilities built into the modern notions of freedom and autonomy.  
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Church, the twentieth century has been a period of intense reflection upon the theme of 
freedom. Jesuit theologian, Avery Dulles (1918-2008), recently described as the “dean of 
Roman Catholic ecclesiologists,”23 observes that a new stimulus to a theology of freedom 
was provided by the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). It strove to bring forms of ecclesial 
life abreast of the cultural developments of the West since the Enlightenment: “[t]he Council, 
through such approaches to the question of Christian freedom, contributed to make this 
subject a priority item on the agenda of the post-cnciliar Church.”24 In light of this, Dulles 
describes his own vision for the Church as that of a “liberating agency.”25 To his mind, “[t]he 
Church [being] par excellence the place where Christ is at work through his Spirit, carrying 
on his liberating task, [. . .] the Christian is therefore both a person being liberated and one 
taking part in the liberation of many others.”26  
However, Dulles equally acknowledges the contemporary context and is not blind to 
“the situation of the Church as an institution gives cause for concern,”27 while the former 
President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, Walter Kasper (b. 1933), 
says that‘[t]he excess of regimentation and bureaucracy in the contemporary Church very 
often buries the freedom of the children of God andmakes the idea of creative love wither 
                                                          
23 See Thomas P. Rausch, Towards a Truly Catholic Church: An Ecclesiology for the Third Millennium 
(Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2005), xii.
24Avery Dulles, A Church to Believe In: Discipleship and the Dynamics of Freedom (New York: Crossroads, 
1982), 67.  
25 Ibid., 71. The Council’s perceptiveness is instanced in the declaration Dignitatis humanae (DH) and the form 
of religious freedom which the State ought to ensure fo  each person in society. Valuable attention to human 
freedom can also be found in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern world Gaudium et spes 
(GS), under the subheadings “The Situation of Man Today” (GS, 4-10), “The Excellence of Freedom” (GS, 17), 
“Communitarian Nature of Man’s Vocation: Design of God” (GS, 24), “Rightful Autonomy of Earthly Affairs” 
(GS, 36), “Human Activity Infected by Sin” (GS, 37), “Mutual Relationship of Church and World” (GS, 40-45). 
Nevertheless, work remains to be done on studies dedicat d to the Church’s role in bringing about the fullness 
of authentic freedom.  The issue of Liberation Theology in the twentieth century also called the Magisterium to 
reflect on the contemporary Christian understanding of freedom. The initial magisterial reflection prompted by 
this issue came from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in its 1984 Instruction on Certain Aspects of 
“Theology of Liberation” Libertatis nuntius (LN). This was followed in 1986 with the Instruction on Christian 
Freedom and Liberation Libertatis conscientia (LC). These documents were designed to set out the framework 
for a Christian understanding of freedom.      
26 Dulles, A Church to Believe In, 71. 
27 Ibid., 2. At another point Dulles says “[t]he Church is understood in terms of dogmas, laws, and hierarchical 
agencies which impose heavy demands of conformity. To be a good Catholic, according to the popular view, s 
simply to adhere to the beliefs and practices demanded by the office-holders” (3). 
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away.’28A commonly held perception today is that the Catholic Church itself is anything but 
a place of freedom. Today, it is clear to both detractor and devotee alike that the Church is 
not immune from having questions asked of it regarding the attitudes towards liberation 
which it evinces in its daily witness.  
Conceivably, one could speculate in several directions as to why some have come to 
recognise the Church as an oppressive institution. F r his part, Ratzinger begins his search for 
an answer by interpreting the shifting cultural dynamics of western society at large. In his 
analysis, the Catholic Church will very much be part of this story. In the past, a large part of 
western theological history emphasised freedom in relation to the question of free-will and 
the moral agent’s striving to carry out the precepts of the God of Christendom.29 However, as 
a consequence of the increasing emphasis on the integrity of the autonomous individual, the 
modern secularising ethos has seen the emphasis on freedom gradually shift away from the 
human “act” and towards the freedom of the human person per se.30 Ratzinger engages with 
this emerging new emphasis on freedom at the level of personhood and works towards an 
                                                          
28 Walter Kasper, Faith and the Future, trans. Robert Nowell (Burns and Oates: London, 1985), 60. See also his 
Theology and Church, trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 19-108. 
29 From a moral theology perspective, the encyclical etter Veritatis splendor (VS) puts forward the “free-will” 
question which today is expressed in terms of the alleged conflict between freedom, the law, conscience and 
truth. It briefly recalls the essential characteristics of freedom in discerning obedience to the moral law: 
“freedom of conscience is never freedom ‘from’ the ruth but always and only freedom ‘in’ truth” (VS, 64). The 
Belgian Dominican priest, Servais Pinckaers (1925-2008), has traced the history of moral theology, pinpo ting 
in particular the impact of the fourteenth century F anciscan School critique of Thomas Aquinas (1225-74). 
Through the influence of William of Ockham (1288-1349), a “freedom of indifference” comes to supersede the 
longer established “freedom for excellence”. The latter –  the power to engage in excellent actions as a free 
choice proceeding from both will and reason –  was exchanged for freedom as the first faculty of the human 
person whose act does not originally depend on anything but one’s own choice. This new approach as the power 
to choose indifferently between contraries means that nature is no longer the source of freedom but rathe  nature 
is now subordinated to freedom. In this view, law becomes the source of morality, and human actions are now, 
by nature, indifferent. Because law becomes wholly dependent on God with no prior basis in nature, no reason 
exists other than the divine will itself. Were God’s will to change, then so would the precepts of the moral law. 
Therefore morality becomes a legal obligation to be followed rather than the discovery of, and formation in, 
happiness. See Servais Pinckaers, Morality: The Catholic View, trans. Michael Sherwin (South Bend, Indiana: 
St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), 65-81; The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Mary Thomas Noble (Edinburgh: T 
& T Clark, 1995), 240-53; 327-468.   
30 See Karl Rahner, Gnade als Freiheit: Kleine theologische Beiträge (Freiburg: Herder, 1968); Eunan 
McDonnell, The Concept of Freedom in the Writing of St Francis de Sales (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009); David B. 
Burrell, Learning to Trust Freedom: Signs from Jewish, Christian and Muslim Traditions (Scranton: University 
of Scranton Press, 2010).   
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“ontology of freedom.”31 While by no means disregarding the free action of the moral agent, 
he prioritises the application of fundamental theology in his discussion of authentic freedom. 
Only from this starting point, to his mind, can theactions of the free agent take on their full 
significance.    
0.2. From a Philosophy of Freedom to a Liberation Ecclesiology? 
As a study of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology from the pers ctive of his christocentric 
anthropology, this dissertation may be viewed as the expansion of his philosophy of freedom 
into a “liberation ecclesiology.” While it is not the first time the latter attribution has been 
applied to Ratzinger, it is not a term he himself has ever used.32 Therefore, a cautionary note 
is required to preclude this dissertation itself from being misconstrued as a comparative study 
with Latin American liberation theology.33 On the other hand, the term “liberation 
ecclesiology” itself was used in 1996 by the Mexican Jesuit and Professor of Ecclesiology at 
the Theological Institute in Mexico city, Alvaro Quiroz Magaña (b. 1942), to describe the 
Church as the sacrament of historical liberation, as the sign and servant of the Reign of God.  
Magaña also said it promoted the need to overcome divisions in the Church and the 
importance of new forms of service and ministries, along with new forms of Church 
structure.34 What is of note from the Latin American experience is Magaña’s encounter with 
                                                          
31 Ratzinger uses this phrase when referring to neo-chalcedonian christology in Behold the Pierced One: An 
Approach to a Spiritual Christology, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Pres, 1986), 92. 
32 John Allen has explored the idea that Pope Benedict XVI’s preaching does incorporate a liberation theology. 
See “The Pope’s lonely liberation theology,” The Irish Catholic, 24 November, 2011, 19.    
33 The liberation theology debate as it emerged in Latin America is an important one and has been documented 
and researched by others. See James V. Schall, ed., Liberation Theology in Latin America (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1982); Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology (Tunbridge Wells: Burns 
& Oates, 1987); Rosino Gibellini, The Liberation Theology Debate (London: SCM Press, 1987); Ian Linden, 
Liberation Theology: Coming of Age? (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1997). In recent 
times, liberation theology has been invoked as the inspiration for other movements in theology such as bl ck, 
feminist, praxis, environmental and political theologies. See Ivan Petrella, The Future of Liberation Theology 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004); Christopher Rowland, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology, 
2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
34 See “Ecclesiology in the Theology of Liberation” i Readings in Church Authority: Gifts and Challenges for 
Contemporary Catholicism, eds. Gerard Mannion et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 78-86. Gerard Mannion is 
one of the people most prominently advocating a form f Liberation Ecclesiology in the Anglophone world at 
the present time. See Gerard Mannion, “Liberation Ecclesiology,” in The Routledge Companion to the Christian 
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the oppression of the poor: “[w]e went to them to bring them the gospel of liberation, and we 
discovered that we were being evangelised by them.”35  
Nonetheless, Magaña has an awareness of the universal aspect of the nature of 
freedom when he says one of the tasks of an ecclesiology of liberation is “to continue to 
demonstrate to the greater church the legitimacy of this way of being church. . . . A greater 
openness on the part of the church in the difficult times of this winter of faith may be decisive 
if the people are to have life.”36 Magaña’s acknowledgement of the universal ecclesial 
participation in the search for freedom can be considered significant from a Western 
perspective if one recognises that the paralysis oppressing people in western societies is 
largely of a different order. It can therefore be argued that if Christ is the liberator of the 
entire cosmos, then an ecclesiology of liberation ca not be something confined to the 
subjugated countries of the world who, by and large, have been paralysed by the 
pervasiveness of capitalism.37  
To the extent, then, that “liberation ecclesiology” is cognisant of the western dilemma 
of freedom and constraint, it provides an acceptable term to describe the reflections which 
Ratzinger makes on the Church as sphere of growth in freedom. His primary motivation is the 
understanding that there is poverty in Western societies, albeit of a different order, but 
nonetheless an oppression of the human person ensnar d i  a “winter of faith.” He sees the 
western cry for additional freedom as both an essential part of human nature and a symptom 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Church, eds. Gerard Mannion and Lewis Mudge (New York: Routledge, 2008), 421-442. See also T. Howland 
Sanks and Brian H. Smith, “Liberation Ecclesiology: Praxis, Theory, Praxis,” Theological Studies 38 (1977): 3-
38. 
35 Alvaro Quiroz Magaña, “Ecclesiology in the Theology of Liberation” in Mannion et al., Readings in Church 
Authority, 80. 
36 Ibid., 86. 
37 The Radical Orthodoxy movement in contemporary theology, through Daniel M. Bell’s reflection on the 
present state of liberation theology, points out tha global capitalism has effectively triumphed in the world 
despite the resistance of Latin American Liberationists in the twentieth century. While both capitalism and its 
Christian resistance are both movements built on human desire, Bell is convinced that only the refusal to cease 
suffering liberates human desire from its capitalis captivity. Bell says this will be the future legacy of the rise 
and “failure” of Latin American liberationists. See Daniel M. Bell, Liberation Theology after the End of 
History: The Refusal to Cease Suffering (London: Routledge, 2001). 
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of the denial of the truth about humanity’s destiny. I  this context, his motivation is precisely 
that of an ecclesiological liberationist: to liberate the Church in the West from its Babylonian 
Exile.38      
0.3.  Focus of Dissertation Research 
Various scholars have compiled introductory studies of Ratzinger’s life and work but 
research dedicated specifically to his ecclesiology from the perspective of freedom remains to 
be undertaken. In terms of the general topic of liberty in the Church, Ratzinger’s writings 
have largely been assimilated by theologians from the perspective of his (and his 
Congregation’s) interface with the emergence of liberation theologies, and the topic of 
academic freedom within catholic theology.39 One of Ratzinger’s own former students, and 
now retired professor of fundamental theology at Freiburg University, Hansjürgen Verweyen, 
                                                          
38 The exilic theme is one that attracts Ratzinger, as this dissertation will demonstrate below. 
39 Particularly during his tenure as Perfect at the CDF, there is a body of opinion critical of a perceived heavy-
handedness in dealing with theological “dissent” and with liberation theology. See Juan Luis Segundo, Theology 
and the Church: A Response to Cardinal Ratzinger and a Warning to the Whole Church, trans. John W. 
Diercksmeier (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985); Harvey Cox, The Silencing of Leonardo Boff: The Vatican 
and the Future of World Christianity (Oak Park, Illinois: Meyer-Stone Books, 1988);  John Allen, Pope 
Benedict XVI (London: Continuum, 2005); Michael Fahey, “Joseph Ratzinger as Ecclesiologist and Pastor,” 
Concilium 141 (1981): 76-83. With regard to the topic of theological “dissent,” for example, John Allen 
suggests that Ratzinger jettisoned academic freedom fro  theology: “By insisting so strongly on the need for 
theologians to bind themselves to the Church, many believe Ratzinger has eclipsed the even more fundamental 
need for both to bind themselves to the gospel” (John Allen, Pope Benedict XVI, 294). Another has described 
Ratzinger’s years as Curial Cardinal as an “era in which many theologians were very discouraged” (James 
Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger: Wise Cautions & Legitimate Hopes [New York: Paulist Press, 2009], 80).  See also 
the following series of articles, James Corkery, “Speak Freely – but Watch your Back,” John Wilkins, “Bishops 
or Branch Managers? Collegiality after the Council,” and Philip Cremin, “From Peritus to Pope: Benedict XVI 
and the Council,” in Doctrine and Life 62 (December 2012): 10-46. In regard to the Liberationists in South 
America, the charge is made that Ratzinger sought to debate an “immanentism” in liberation theology that 
actually never existed. See Juan Luis Segundo, Theology and the Church, 152-56. Segundo also claims that 
Ratzinger’s mind-set “seemed to come from a European who reads European phenomena and tendencies into a 
non-European context” (ibid., 3). Another charge made gainst Ratzinger is that his personal theological views 
exercised an influence on the positions taken by his (t en) Congregation in Rome. Allen says many believ  that 
Ratzinger “functioned not as a neutral arbiter of ‘orthodoxy’ . . . but as an advocate of the reaction against the 
post-conciliar period that took shape in journals such as Communio” (John Allen, Pope Benedict XVI, 260). For 
an account of the charge that Ratzinger used his position as Prefect in this way, see James Massa, The 
Communion Theme in the Writings of Joseph Ratzinger: Unity in the Church and in the World through 
Sacramental Encounter (PhD diss., Fordham University, 1996), 3-7. When Ratzinger himself was pressed on 
this issue, his response was that the Perfect and the Professor are the same person but with differing 
responsibilities – “in that sense then, there is a difference but no contradiction” (Joseph Ratzinger, Pilgrim 
Fellowship of Faith: The Church as Communion, eds. Stephan Otto Horn and Vinzenz Pfnür, trans. Henry 
Taylor [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005], 229-30). 
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is perhaps typical in this regard.40 Verweyen surveys the historical emergence of liberation 
theology in Latin America in general, and in Chile in particular. Then, while acknowledging 
the correctness of Ratzinger’s analysis of this situation in principle, Verweyen decries the 
strangeness of the intervention of a European intellectual perspective which is not only alien, 
but perhaps even obscurantist to concrete indigenous efforts to tackle structural injustice in 
South America. Verweyen points out that indicative of Ratzinger’s approach is his call to 
represent the “logic of faith” in terms that embody a real response to lived experience, as 
opposed to any notion that seeks to build the kingdom of God on earth solely through human 
strength.41 Inevitably, however, introductory studies like Verw yen’s cannot be expected to 
capture the theological rationale behind the academic positions which Ratzinger has 
articulated in his writings. The focus of this dissertation research will be to pinpoint and 
analysis the core rationale that informs Ratzinger’s understanding of freedom.  
In the first instance, Peter Hoffmann, professor of dogmatic and fundamental theology 
at the Catholic Institute of Kloblenz-Landau University, makes the general observation that 
there is a “mozartische Ton” (“mozart-like tone”) to Ratzinger’s work which appeals to 
people who tend towards an ontological or universal vision of the Christian mystery.42 
Hoffmann suggests that Ratzinger develops his vision through the collective context of 
objective statements of faith – one tenet of faith points to all others and therefore cannot be 
understood in isolation from them. Hence there is an echo of a symphonic perichoresis, so to 
speak, whereby all doctrinal formulas are equally close to the centre. Hence, faith is not 
defined so much by individual concepts but remains  incomprehensible mystery. In effect, 
Hoffman maintains, Ratzinger has confidence in the premise that exploring the Christian faith 
                                                          
40 See Hansjürgen Verweyen, Joseph Ratzinger-Benedikt XVI. Sie Entwicklung seines Denkens (Darmstadt, 
Primus, 2007), 117-25.  
41 Ibid., 121. Verweyen avoids mentioning that many of the leading figures in Latin American liberation 
theology either spent time living and studying in northern Europe or took some of their inspiration from 
European intellectuals such as Jürgen Moltmann and Johann Baptist Metz. 
42 Peter Hofmann, ed., Joseph Ratzinger: Ein theologisches Profil (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008), 9. 
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does not lead to a reductio in mysterium but that when “recognised as a whole, faith develops 
is own ratio.”43 The overarching locus of Ratzinger’s vision is the mystery of God. To carry 
forward Hoffmann’s analogy, God is the “composer” of a living symphony. Michael 
Schneider, professor of dogma and liturgy at the Sankt Georgen Graduate School of 
Philosophy and Theology in Frankfurt am Main, reitera s this point in Ratzinger’s work:  
“Everything in human existence is determined by how J seph Ratzinger stresses the question 
of God.”44 Given that Ratzinger’s frame of reference for his treatment of freedom over the 
years has been precisely through this divine-human spectrum, an in-depth study of the issue 
represents a good example of how to penetrate and access his universal vision of the 
Christian mystery. This dissertation is dedicated to coming to terms with how Ratzinger links 
his understanding of freedom with the overall Christian mystery.   
Schneider’s also makes another key observation which informs virtually every strand 
of Ratzinger’s presentation of the Christian understanding of freedom: “The question of truth 
and the question of freedom go together in human life. But the question of truth, as well as 
the reality of man, is based on the question of God. The reason for this is found in the early 
Christian confession that Jesus is ‘substantially equal with the Father’.”45 The theme of the 
inseparability of truth and freedom (cf. John 8:32) is key to understanding Ratzinger’s 
proposal for an ecclesial understanding of human freedom. Other theologians, including 
Laurence Paul Hemming, research fellow at Lancaster University, and Robert Tilley, lecturer 
in Biblical Studies at the Catholic Institute of Sydney have, each in his own way, addressed 
Ratzinger’s search for truth but neither of them sufficiently discussed the challenge to the 
Church’s mission posed by modern understandings of freedom. Nor did they sufficiently 
                                                          
43 Ibid., 10. 
44 Michael Schneiders, “Primat des Logos vor dem Ethos Zum theologischen Diskurs bei Joseph Ratzinger” in 
Hofmann, Joseph Ratzinger: Ein theologisches Profil, 15. 
45 Ibid., 21 
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address the presuppositions upon which Ratzinger builds his arguments.46 Hence, the first 
task of this thesis will be to demonstrate that freedom is a theme that emerges from 
Ratzinger’s examination of the philosophical cross-pressures within western societies in 
general, and the Church in particular. The dissertation will be particularly concerned with 
identifying the nature of the suspicion with which the Church is presently viewed. Reflection 
upon the impasse that emerges here helps Ratzinger identify a way forward. 
The work of Irish-born theologian, Gerard Mannion, has been very much concerned 
with the present-day situation of postmodernity.47 In the course of presenting his analysis of 
the modern cultural narrative of western society, he identifies a form of neo-exclusivism 
which is becoming increasingly problematical. To his mind, neo-exclusivism has grown up in 
response to postmodernity’s shunning of absolutes, and a discourse that engages positively 
                                                          
46 See Laurence Paul Hemming, Benedict XVI: “Fellow Worker for the Truth,” (London: Burns & Oates, 2005); 
Robert Tilley, Benedict XVI and the Search for Truth (Leominister: Gracewing, 2007). A notable aspect of 
Ratzinger’s analysis of cultural trends in more recent times has been his association with the idea of a 
“dictatorship of relativism” and, from his perspective, the “content” of truth is fundamental to addressing it. This 
was particularly evident in a homily delivered on 18 April 2005. See Joseph Ratzinger, Homily for Mass pro 
eligendo romano pontifice, 18 April 2005, http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-
pontifice_20050418_en.html (accessed 13 February 2012). On that occasion he said the goal of true humanism 
is friendship with Christ, which gives the criterion by which “to distinguish the true from the false and deceit 
from truth.” The proceedings of a symposium which took place in America in response to this homily were 
subsequently published. See “A ‘Dictatorship of Relativism’? Symposium in Response to Cardinal Ratzinger’s 
Last Homily,” Common Knowledge 13 (2007): 214- 455. Unfortunately, the issue of freedom rarely appeared in 
any great detail, and no paper in ecclesiology was delivered. The contributions considered Ratzinger’s call for 
public discussion with secular intellectuals on matters of significant general concern on personal, social and 
political life. It was largely critical of Ratzinger’s anti-relativistic position. Since then, Gediminas T. Jankunas 
has offered an in-depth study of how Ratzinger views the relativistic mentality and his proposals for overcoming 
it. While he comprehensively goes into the causes of relativism, and Ratzinger’s engagement with them, there is 
little by way of presentation of how the Church is a constitutive part of growth in authentic human freedom 
based on the truth of human nature. See Gediminas T. Jankunas, The Dictatorship of Relativism: Pope Benedict 
XVI’s Response (New York: St. Paul’s, 2011). See also Thomas R. Rourke, The Social and Political Thought of 
Benedict XVI (New York: Lexington Books, 2010). An interesting doctoral dissertation, undertaken by Pablo 
Blanco Sarto in 2005, combined a thematic and chronological approach to situate Ratzinger in the milieu of a 
post-reformation Lutheran-Germanic context. Sarto’s main interest was to consider theology as Ratzinger do s – 
as faith reasoned. Sarto finds that the modern assumption of a dichotomy between truth and its perceived 
opposites of history, freedom and culture is resolved through the proper understanding of the role of reason in 
theology. See Pablo Blanco Sarto, Fe y razon en el pensamiento de Joseph Ratzinger (PhD diss., Universidad de 
Navarra, 2005), http://search.proquest.com/docview/305361257?accountid=12309 (accessed 20 September 
2011).   
47 See Gerard Mannion, Ecclesiology and Postmodernity (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2007). 
Mannion’s chief thesis is the promotion of the positive aspects of virtue ethics (personal and communal 
motivation) in order to “empower” a pastoral and praxis-orientated ecclesiology and create a virtuous 
community: “the key question in forming any vision f the church should be how to enable the enhancement of 
justice, freedom and love within and outside the Christian community, but never one without the other” (172; cf. 
206). See also Lieven Boeve and Gerard Mannion, eds. The Ratzinger Reader: Mapping a Theological Journey 
(London: T & T Clark, 2010). 
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with relativist thought. From the perspective of Catholicism, he believes that the Vatican is 
experiencing a rise in neo-exclusivism which, born ut of a fear of postmodernity, 
endeavours to impose an ecclesiological unilateralism that stems from a universalist 
communio ecclesiology48: “[w]hat Vatican II intended to be guiding and facilitative teaching 
is turned into more rigid, fixed, and determined dogma.”49 With Ratzinger’s writings on 
Vatican II’s ecclesiology of communion to the fore of his critique, Mannion says “a 
pessimistic assessment of the state of contemporary culture and the contemporary world vis-
à-vis the Church has been one of the most consistent el ments of [Ratzinger’s] writings.”50 
Calling for resistance to this burgeoning neo-exclusivism, Mannion suggests its popularity is 
associated with an anti-pluralistic polemic that is ultimately counterproductive in the post-
modern environment.51  
Despite his critique of Ratzinger however, it seems to me that Mannion’s core 
question is not one Ratzinger would dismiss. In fact, s this dissertation demonstrates,  it is 
one which Ratzinger addresses: “What sort of ecclesiological methodology might be 
developed in light of such ‘postmodern critical consciousness,’ and how could an 
ecclesiology embrace and respect, indeed celebrate the other as other, while remaining 
                                                          
48See Mannion, Ecclesiology and Postmodernity, 44, 67-71.   
49 Ibid., 50; cf. 47-49, 58-63, 67-71, 109-124. Mannion believes Lumen gentium is read too narrowly and 
Gaudium et spes i  not read at all by some of those interpreting Conciliar theology. 
50 Boeve and Mannion, The Ratzinger Reader, 82. In the end, however, it is difficult not to think that Mannion 
writes almost with Ratzinger in the background as his “foil” against whose ecclesiology he proposes his own. 
Mannion’s energy is directed towards critiquing Church leadership and down-playing the necessity of authority. 
Ratzinger is one of his moving targets throughout. See Mannion, Ecclesiology and Postmodernity, 118, 236. 
51  Mannion, Ecclesiology and Postmodernity, 147, 162. An interesting contribution here is the recent 
dissertation by Sean Christopher Paul who researched the work of Ratzinger and Walter Kasper in an attempt to 
develop a theology of “ecclesial fruitfulness.” Paul was seeking a more adequate way of defining “Churc ” over 
against the current impasse of Catholic ecumenical e clesiology’s inability to attribute the term “Church” to 
those communities traditionally understood to posses  an invalid Eucharist and ministry. Essentially, “ecclesial 
fruitfulness” is theologically rooted in the Holy Spirit. He draws out the contribution to ecclesiology of both 
theologians, proposing in the end, that the Church is t e sign and icon of the Spirit of the Risen Christ, who is 
the fruitfulness of God in and to the world. The “fruitfulness” of the Church is the Spirit effectively realizing the 
mystery of God’s salvation given in Jesus Christ through the preaching of the Word, the celebration of the 
sacraments (particularly the Eucharist), and through fostering communion among all local churches and 
ecclesial communities. See Sean Christopher Paul, By their Fruits you shall know them: Ecclesial Fruitf lness 
as a Standard of Protestant and Anglican Ecclesiality drawing on the works of Joseph Ratzinger and Walter 
Kasper (PhD diss., Boston College, 2011). 
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comfortable in the celebration of fundamentals of its own tradition?”52    
In terms of specific studies of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology, attention can be drawn to a 
number of studies, including James Massa’s research at Fordham University in 1996.53 Massa 
shows how Ratzinger’s interpretation of communio is a fruitful instrument for addressing a 
multiplicity of theological problems, particularly, ecumenical issues of unity. However, while 
there is an ecumenical urgency to Massa’s work, there is a cultural imperative behind this 
study. In a milieu where Ratzinger feels freedom has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis 
into a form of isolation and personal enslavement, this thesis focuses on how Ratzinger 
envisages ecclesiology responding to such cultural developments.  
In 1998, Miroslav Volf (b. 1956) conducted a three-way ecclesiological study of 
catholic, orthodox and “free church” tradition using Joseph Ratzinger to illustrate the 
viewpoint of Roman Catholic theology.54 Volf points out that the key to Ratzinger’s approach 
is that of Christus totus. This concern for the “whole” expresses itself in a “spirituality of 
divestment” that corresponds to Ratzinger’s basic understanding of communality.55 Christian 
“divestment” – which could also be described as self-dispossession in the name of Christian 
discipleship – is related to the “whole” of the human person’s reality.  The goal of 
ecclesiology, which Volf attributes to Ratzinger, is for the human being to become an anima 
ecclesiastica: “a person who has come to herself and who at the sam  time stands as a free 
                                                          
52 Mannion, Ecclesiology and Postmodernity, 159. 
53 James Massa, The Communion Theme in the Writings of Joseph Ratzinger: Unity in the Church and in the 
World through Sacramental Encounter (PhD diss., Fordham University, 1996). 
54 See Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998), 29-7. 
55 Ibid., 60-1. Ratzinger’s focus on the “whole” has its counterpart in a principle of personal responsibility that 
answers on behalf of the whole. This is above all true in the case of the Bishop of Rome. A fundamental  
principle of Ratzinger’s highlighted by Volf is that in the Church the law of totality and of personality both hold 
true: “As opposed to any individual or communal particularism, Ratzinger underscores the totality: A Christian, 
a local Church, and also a bishop are always constituted in terms of the whole and are directed toward the 
whole. It cannot be otherwise, since the primary category of his ecclesiology is Christus totus. It follows from 
this that the totality is to be understood in terms of the principle ‘individual.’ This principle has a soteriological 
and christological basis. . . . An ecclesiology of universal communion therefore calls for an ecclesioogy of the 
responsible personality – not least of all on the leve  of the individual who answers for the totality” (Miroslav 
Volf, Trinität und Gemeinschaft: Eine ökumenische Ekklesio og e [Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1996], 
55).    
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being in communion with fellow human beings and with the triune God.”56 A spirituality of 
divestment is an important theme which Ratzinger develops in his ecclesiology through the 
notion of the purification of man’s image into its true form. How Ratzinger develops what 
Volf has highlighted in a cursory way as “divestment” forms an important part of this thesis. 
It will mean exploring more fully the theme of relationality and the safeguarding of personal 
freedom in the midst of the Church’s social – and therefore, institutional – setting.      
Dennis M. Doyle, professor of Religious Studies at the University of Dayton, Ohio, 
conducted an examination of communion ecclesiologies which led him to the conclusion that 
Ratzinger’s particular interest in communio lies in a just vision of the human person and 
society. Doyle points out that for Ratzinger, the Church is the “event” whereby human history 
is drawn into the sphere of the divine and “as the place where the transcendent enters the 
world, [the Church] must warn the world about its own pretensions to wholeness, and must 
urge the world to accept what is humanly possible while it looks beyond itself for its ultimate 
fulfilment.”57 However, Doyle doesn’t explore how Ratzinger envisages the Church assuming 
this responsibility to be vigilant on behalf of, or f  the sake of human civilisation. Indeed, 
from the perspective of authentic human freedom, one needs to ask why is it the case that the 
Church finds itself in a position of needing to “warn”? What is the content of this “warning”? 
And finally, how should it perform, if at all, this task of “warning”? This dissertation will 
look at how Ratzinger’s ecclesiology visualises the pastoral need for vigilance on the part of 
the Church when faced with the reality of the possibilities and limitations of human nature. 
Against the backdrop of the Constitution on the Churc , Lumen gentium, Cistercian 
monk and Abbot of Heiligenkreuz Abbey in Austria, Maximilian Heinrich Heim (b. 1961), 
measures Ratzinger’s work against the intention of the Council.58 Alongside dealing with the 
                                                          
56 Volf, After Our Likeness, 66. 
57 Dennis Doyle, Communion Ecclesiology: Vision and Versions (New York: Orbis, 2000), 114-15. 
58 Maximilian Heinrich Heim, Joseph Ratzinger – Kirchliche Existenz und existentielle Theologie (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2005).  
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Church’s hierarchical constitution, Heim studies Ratzinger’s view of the Church as 
sacrament, as the “Body of Christ” and as the “People f God.” 59 What emerges is a 
“eucharistic communio ecclesiology”60 and a sophisticated view of Church as sacrament 
which Heim suggests is a “synthesis of [Ratzinger’s] ecclesiology corresponding to the 
theological axiom lex orandi – lex credendi. It is true, according to this rule, that the Church, 
which by her nature is constituted by the Eucharist, must recognise God’s primacy as her 
extra nos, on which she lives.”61 In other words, the Church becomes itself through the 
acceptance of its orientation from outside of itself. This seems to carry Volf’s awareness of 
Ratzinger’s spirituality of divestment onto the explicitly ecclesial level. Ratzinger himself 
sheds light on the proper orientation of ecclesiology in the Foreword to Heim’s work: 
In der Konstitution Lumen Gentium redet die Kirche letztlich nicht von sich selbst, 
bespiegelt nicht sich selber, wie man bei einer obeflächlichen Lektüre meinen 
könnte. Der erste Satz des Textes lautet: “Christus  das Licht der Völker.” Dieses 
Licht spiegelt sich auf dem Antlitz der Kirche. Sie ist – wie die Väter sagen – der 
Mond, der sein ganzes Licht von der Sonne, von Christus nimmt. Die Kirche hat, 
recht verstanden, ihr Wesen nicht in sich selbst, sondern im Verwiesensein und im 
Verweisen über sich hinaus. Pater Heim zeigt diese christologische Struktur der 
Kirchenlehre des Konzils auf, die notwendigerweise ine theo-logische Struktur ist: In 
Christus ist der Mensch, die menschliche Natur, mit Go t vereint. Das Menschsein ist 
durch ihn hineingenommen in die trinitarische Dynamik: Der Sohn führt zum Vater 
im Heiligen Geist. Es geht um Gott, und nur so handel  wir recht vom Menschen.62     
 
Heim’s exhaustive work focused on Ratzinger’s fundamental ecclesiology. The task 
of carrying such fundamental orientations forward from particular perspectives remains. For 
example, Ratzinger’s own comments make the connection between ecclesiology and 
                                                          
59 Ibid., 231-397. 
60 Ibid., 480. 
61 Ibid., 475-76. 
62 Ibid., 7 (“In the Constitution Lumen gentium the Church does not speak of herself in the final a lysis, does 
not reflect on herself, as one might conclude from a superficial reading. The first sentence of the document 
reads: “Christ the light of humanity.” This light is reflected upon the face of the Church. She is – as the Fathers 
of the Church say – the moon that receives all of its light from the sun, from Christ. Correctly understood, the 
Church’s essence is found, not in the Church herself, but rather in her orientation [Verwiesensein] and her 
referring [Verweisen] to one beyond herself. Father H im shows this christological structure of the Council’s 
teaching about the Church, which is necessarily a theo-logical structure: In Christ, man – human nature, is 
united with God. Through him, humanity has been taken up into the Trinitarian dynamic: The Son leads to the 
Father in the Holy Spirit. It is about God, and only i  this way do we treat the subject of man correctly” [ Joseph 
Ratzinger: Life in the Church and Living Theology. Fundamentals of Ecclesiology with Reference to Lumen 
Gentium, trans. Michael J. Miller [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007], 1-2]). 
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anthropology. This dissertation takes up one of Ratzinger’s ecclesiological perspectives – 
namely from the point of view of human freedom. When Heim speaks of freedom in his 
study, he only touches relatively briefly on issues r lating to conscience, truth, and liberation 
theology.63 At one point he alludes to the fact that Ratzinger believes the situation of 
humanity cannot be resolved solely from within its hi torical setting: 
Ratzinger’s own response to the distress of poverty is guided by a comprehensive 
vision of man, which formulates what is distinctive n the Christian idea of freedom in 
a perspective that is historical and yet also goes beyond history. He is convinced that 
man’s freedom “can only exist in the correct mutual allocation of these freedoms, and 
this is possible only if they all take the freedom f God and his truth as their 
criterion.”64 
 
All the time, in the background to Ratzinger’s ecclsiology, Heim detects a mindfulness of 
the problematical position of modernity in intellectual history. A chief component of this 
problematic is modernity’s perception of freedom and it will be on this issue that this 
dissertation begins its engagement with Ratzinger. 65 From this starting point, it will trace 
Ratzinger’s search for a way of presenting the Church as a place of liberating meaning. 
Emery de Gaál who, as a Catholic Priest of the Diocese of Eichstätt, Bavaria and 
associate professor at the University of St Mary of the Lake, Archdiocese of Chicago, is  
acquainted with both Anglophone and Germanic theological traditions.66 He says that from 
the perspective of Catholic theology, the newness of the anthropological shift that comes to a 
climax in the twentieth century was in need of both direction and substance. In this context, 
de Gaál believes Ratzinger is the “anti-Nietzsche”67 who plays a significant role in initiating 
an epochal christological shift: 
                                                          
63 Ibid., 154-59, 202-03, 207-12. 
64 Ibid., 210, quoting Joseph Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe? The Church in the Modern World: 
Assessment and Forecast, 2d. ed., trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010), 79. 
65 See Heim, Joseph Ratzinger– Kirchliche Existenz, 467-75, where Heim says that the central issues of 
intellectual history influenced Ratzinger’s reception of the Council and any one of them would be deserving of a 
monograph of its own. Freedom is such an issue and I will propose that it deeply impacts his approach to 
ecclesiology.   
66 See Emery de Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christological Shift (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillian, 2010). 
67 De Gaál borrows this phrase from the German author Botho Strauß in the German daily newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 20 October 1994. 
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Benedict XVI is challenging modernity to a revision f the suppositions and 
assumptions Nietzsche had instilled in such a sustained and lasting manner. A loss of 
purpose and of values has become the norm for many people. Nihilism has become 
the practical worldview, altering all areas of life. Nietzsche claimed, “Christianity is 
the greatest misfortune that had befallen humankind.” Benedict XVI’s response is 
“Jesus Christ is the greatest fortune imaginable for humankind.” 68 
 
De Gaál backs up this view of Ratzinger’s contribution to personalist christology through the 
prism of a freedom lived within the sacramental life of the Church: 
[Ratzinger’s] concern is not primarily an academic or cerebral one but is rather the 
result of a personal encounter with Jesus Christ as a believer living the sacramental 
life of the Catholic Church. For Ratzinger, God is the reality of charity that constitutes 
a human being in freedom. God’s invitation to covenantal relationality actuates full 
freedom in the individual human being. . . . In theChristian Redeemer, the unity and 
the whole of reality become tangible. God’s only begotten Son, Jesus Christ, 
demonstrates for every age again what genuinely fulfilled human existence is. 
Ratzinger perceives this as a predicatory figuration of the central call of human 
beings, namely, as being called to freedom. Jesus Christ points to the central reality 
that every human being is called to consciously conform himself or herself to and find 
fulfilment in the acceptance of oneself as proexistnce, that is, as existence “for” 
others. The proexistence of Jesus Christ’s crucifixion makes concrete charity possible. 
Thus, genuine and edifying change in this world occurs not by modifying structures 
but by transforming human persons towards genuine freedom.69   
 
From a sacramental starting point, De Gaál sets out to explore the nature of Christian 
brotherhood, evangelisation and worship, demonstrating Ratzinger’s belief that Christ gives 
the world identity and meaning. While sharing De Gaál’s motivation to explain the positive 
message of liberation to be found in Ratzinger’s work, the focus of this dissertation diverges 
from De Gaál by examining the significant emphasis placed on ecclesiology in Ratzinger’s 
treatment of freedom. Against the background of a cultural context that has become 
increasingly disillusioned, suspicious – and even hostile – to the possibility that the Church 
supports and fosters human freedom, this dissertation researches Ratzinger’s presentation of 
the Church as a liberating force for humanity today. 
One of the foremost Ratzingerian experts from Ireland nd associate professor of 
theology at Milltown Institute in Dublin, James Corke y undertook graduate studies on the 
                                                          
68 De Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI, ix-x.  
69 Ibid., 1. 
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Bavarian in 1991.70 Highlighting two tenets in Ratzinger’s theology as “unmakable” salvation 
and “receiving” anthropology, Corkery laments that, apart from the principle of love, a 
greater overall soteriological coherence was not achieved by him – at least up to that point. 
This dissertation, by studying Ratzinger’s ecclesiology from the perspective of human 
freedom, seeks to determine to what extent his vision of the Church can reduce this 
soteriological deficit. In the context of the question-mark that is said to hang over the 
Church’s ability to be a positive force for human liberation today, the relevance of this 
question for ecclesiology seems all the more pressing. In this task, we have the benefit of an 
additional twenty years of maturation in Ratzinger’s own theological reflection. In light of his 
numerous publications since 1991 – not least through his Jesus of Nazareth series71 – I will 
deepen and update Ratzingerian research in the area of the human person’s aspiration to the 
fullness of freedom.  
Interestingly, in a more recent publication, Corkery seems to have come to the view 
that it will be through ecclesiology that the requisite coherence in Ratzinger’s anthropology 
will emerge. He notes that Ratzinger’s primary motivation is to be a pastor f the Church and 
his writings are oriented towards that end: “[they] are focused on showing to the men and 
women of his time that the Church’s faith is the pathway to genuine humanity.”72 In other 
words, the Christian Creed, in the broadest sense, is the metaphysical key to human 
flourishing. In describing Ratzinger’s approach as an “ecclesial hermeneutic of trust,”73 
Corkery does sound a note of caution: “[f]undamental hope in the Church will remain pivotal 
for [Ratzinger’s] entire theological journey. . . This method is rooted in his history and leads 
                                                          
70 See James Corkery, The Relationship between Human Existence and Christian Salvation in the Theology of 
Joseph Ratzinger (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 199). 
71 Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan bis zur Verklärung (Freiburg: Herder, 2007); 
Von Einzug in Jerusalem bis zur Auferstehung (Freiburg: Herder, 2011); Jesus von Nazareth. Prolog: Die 
Kindheitsgeschichten (Freiburg: Herder, 2012). 
72 James Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions & Legitimate Hopes (New York: 
Paulist Press, 2009), 37. See Joseph Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth: Christianity and the Catholic Church at the 
End of the Millennium: An Interview with Peter Seewald, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1997), 259. 
73 See Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger: Wise Cautions & Legitimate Hopes, 136  139. 
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him at times to too much scepticism regarding the world and too much idealism regarding the 
Church.” 74 However, despite Corkery’s cautionary note, he concedes that “even today – long 
after the dispute over liberation theology – [Ratzinger] still, when writing about initiatives to 
improve material well-being, emphasises the soul, the whole person, integral liberation.”75 
This dissertation seeks to come to terms with Ratzinger’s overall approach to the pastoral 
care of persons and their freedom, and how he linksthis with the mission of the Church.76 
The overarching orientation of Ratzinger’s approach is t at the human person cannot survive 
long without “truth” – without accepting the truth of their nature.77 
                                                          
74 Ibid., 23. 
75 Ibid., 92. 
76 Mary A. Ehle undertook a comparative study of the anthropologies of Joseph Ratzinger and Leonardo Boff in 
Marquette University, Wisconsin, in 2002 which showed that both share a concept of the person as relational. 
The two theologians represent what Ehle discerns as the two definable trajectories in missiology in the period 
since the Second Vatican Council. The first is an evangelical, spiritualising mission that aims to draw ll people 
into ecclesial communion (Ratzinger) while the second emphasizes the socio-political character of the C urch’s 
mission which works for liberation and justice (Boff). Ehle contends that these are not inimical to one a other. 
She introduces the Trinitarian theology of Bernd Jochen Hilberath who, working with an understanding of the 
divine person as Selbstand (or Autonomie) in relation, provides a communicative concept of the person which 
sees the divine person in its proper distinctiveness while maintaining the unity of the three in communicative 
relation. She maintains that the imbalance of seemingly opposing missiologies is addressed when the person is 
allowed to exist in freedom and in dynamic relation. See Mary A. Ehle, A Trinitarian Ecclesiology of 
Communion and the Mission of the Church: Beyond the Debate between Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and 
Leonardo Boff: The Contribution of Bernd Jochen Hilberath (PhD diss., Marquette University, 2002). 
77 We can note here the ecclesiologically oriented attitude of contemporary Popes to the issue of the truth about 
the person and their liberation. It became an explicit part of papal teaching in the wake of the challenge which 
Latin American liberationists directed towards the universal Church, particularly in western capitalist 
strongholds. After the Synods of Bishops in 1971 on justice in the world, and in 1974 on the relationship 
between freedom from oppression and full freedom, or salvation of mankind, Paul VI issued the Apostolic 
Exhortation Evangelii nuntiandi (EN) to clarify the connection between the evangelical mission of the Church 
and human liberation or advancement. Blessed John Paul II based his address to the third general confere ce of 
the Latin American Episcopate of 28 January 1979 on Evangelii nuntiandi’s emphasis on the distinctive 
character of the Gospel – a character of divine origin (cf. EN 32). See John Paul II, Address to the Third General 
Conference of the Latin American Episcopate: AAS 71 (1979), 188-196. He insisted that the three pillars upon 
which any authentic theology of liberation rests are: “truth about Jesus the Saviour” (I, 2), “truth about the 
Church,” (I, 9; III, 1) and “truth about mankind” (I, 9). The key ecclesiological point of the address wa  that 
“[t]hanks to the Gospel, the Church has the truth about man. This truth is found in an anthropology that t e 
Church never ceases to fathom more thoroughly and to communicate to others” (III, 1). In 1984, the CDF 
recalled this teaching in LN, V, 8 and XI, 5. Overall, the debate on human freedom and liberation in the world 
caused the Pontiffs to re-evaluate the nature of the C urch in relation to the liberation movements springing up 
everywhere. The direction Paul VI took at that time can already be seen when he addressed the United Nations 
in 1965 with the belief that the Church is the "the expert in humanity." See Paul VI, Address to the United 
Nations, 4 October 1965, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-
vi_spe_19651004_united-nations_fr.html  (accessed 17 December 2012). The phrase was used s bsequently in 
the CDF Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church 
and in the World which was issued on 31 May 2004, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_collaborati
n_en.html (accessed 17 December 2012). Pope Benedict XVI return d to this phrase in the Sunday Angelus 
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In light of the foregoing interpretations and readings of Ratzinger’s approach to 
freedom by various scholars, I propose that this dis ertation proceed in a threefold manner. In 
the first instance, it considers how Ratzinger deals with the shifting cultural context that 
challenges the Church’s mission. Second, it seeks to draw out from Ratzinger’s writings the 
foundations upon which he builds a Christian understanding of authentic freedom. Finally, it 
elucidates the proposal for the Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom that emanates 
from his ecclesiology. 
0.4.  Methodology          
 In order to assist the reader with the material tht follows, it is important to clarify 
some points with regard to methodology. Due to the prolific nature of his writings, Joseph 
Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI presents the researcher with a theological quandary: what 
constitutes his personal, speculative writings as opposed to his magisterial pronouncements? 
For the purposes of the present research, his books, articles, occasional speeches and lectures 
up until his election as Pope in 2005 constitute the primary research texts whereas all official 
Church documents and pronouncements made in his name as Bishop of Rome constitute 
secondary, albeit important sources for the purpose of interpretation.78 In what follows, 
references to ‘Benedict XVI’ or ‘Benedict’ will apply only to statements which he made in 
the course of his pontificate.   
I considered whether a chronological study of his writings would be advantageous due 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
address of 12 July 2009, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/angelus/2009/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_ang_20090712_en.html (accessed 20 September 2011). 
78 Others have made the same and, in my opinion, necessary distinction, even if on occasion it becomes 
impossible to avoid some overlapping on certain questions. See D. Vincent Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI: The 
Conscience of our Age. A Theological Portrait (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 34-35; Heim, Joseph 
Ratzinger: Life in the Church and Living Theology, 14-15. Indeed it is possible here to be guided by the 
distinction Ratzinger himself makes. In the Foreword to the first volume of Jesus of Nazareth, he said: “It goes 
without saying that this book is in no way an exercise of the Magisterium, but is solely an expression of my 
personal search ‘for the face of the Lord’ (Ps. 27:8). Everyone is free, then, to contradict me. I would only ask 
my readers for that initial good will without which t ere can be no understanding” (Benedict XVI, Jesus of 
Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration, trans. Adrian J. Walker [London: 
Bloomsbury, 2007], xxiii-xxiv). 
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to the length of his theological career, but, ultimately, I found myself concurring with the 
consensus of other commentators who conclude that a “fundamental continuity is noticeable” 
in his work which demonstrates “a firm internal consistency throughout fifty years.”79 
Therefore, I believe it is more beneficial to research the principal tenets underpinning his 
approach.80  
The research is presented in three major sections spread out over eight chapters, 
concluding with an overall evaluation of the findings. Section I looks at the contemporary 
issue of freedom in light of Ratzinger’s life and theology. From a biographical perspective, 
Chapter 1 sets out how Ratzinger’s theological vision comes to be marked by a discernible 
sensitivity to the theme of human freedom. Chapter 2 details how Ratzinger has paid close 
                                                          
79 See Lieven Boeve and Gerard Mannion, eds., The Ratzinger Reader: Mapping a Theological Journey 
(London: T&T Clark, 2010), 11-12, 83, 87. Boeve points out that as early as 1978, Robert Tura was suggestin  
the existence of un primo Ratzinger and un secondo Ratzinger. See Robert Tura, “Joseph Ratzinger,” in P. 
Vanzan and H.J. Schultz, eds., Lessico dei Teologi del seculo XX (Brescia: Mysterium Salutis, 1978), 750-752.  
Nevertheless, the majority view of both admirer anddetractor alike is that Ratzinger’s theology has remained 
remarkably consistent. See also Hofmann, Joseph Ratzinger: Ein theologisches Profil, 9; Volf, After Our 
Likeness, 31; Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 29; Mannion, Ecclesiology and Postmodernity, 
121. Most also acknowledge that there has been somedevelopment in him, in that “at the time of the Council 
[he] took positions that he later no longer holds” (Boeve and Mannion, The Ratzinger Reader, 11). This seems 
perfectly reasonable for a theologian in the course of half a century of reflective engagement with issues of faith 
and culture. His life demonstrates that consistency and openness to change are not mutually exclusive. The 
pastoral and cultural issues have naturally evolved, but not the heart of the Judeo-Christian and biblical tradition 
which he draws on to respond to them. In general tems, one might say that  in the fifties, the issue for him was 
the fundamental nature of Christianity as a whole; in the sixties, it was the nature, value and direction of reform; 
in the seventies and eighties, it was the understanding of the relationship between theology and the Magisterium, 
the global issues of clashing ideologies and the future of human existence; in the nineties, issues of theological 
dissent continued along with questions about Europe, ecumenism and  the moral dilemma of ever-increasing 
discoveries in bioethical sciences; in the new millennium, issues of internal Church corruption and abuses,  as 
well as religious freedom and increasing  instances of Christian persecution. Finally, one might say that the 
exposition of the fundamental nature of Christianity as a whole, and christology in particular, has returned and 
accompanies Ratzinger’s Petrine ministry.  
80 Throughout the dissertation, when quoting substantial portions of Ratzinger’s writings, I indent them, using 
the original German, Italian or English texts where applicable. In the corresponding footnote, I will include the 
published English translation, where available, but subject to occasional and acknowledged correction on my 
part where necessary, for the sake of greater accury. For the sake of coherency for the reader, shorter 
quotations in the main text will be in English unless the point being made requires otherwise. Throught t e 
text that follows, in the vast majority of cases, I have preferred to use short titles as opposed to acronyms for 
Ratzinger’s works. However, where practicable, I have vailed of the Gesammelte Schriften i itiative which is 
underway in Regensburg. It is a project begun in 2008 under the patronage of Bishop Gerhard Ludwig Müller at 
the Institut Papst Benedikt XVI in Regensburg. It is envisaged that a sixteen volume set of his edited writings 
will be published. See http://www.institut-papst-benedikt.de/joseph-ratzinger-gesammelteschriften-jrgs.html 
(accessed 17 December 2012). These will take the form of an abbreviated acronym in the dissertation’s 
footnotes. With regard to inclusive language I try to maintain a consistent usage throughout the study b t it is 
not always possible when the materials used predate the current sensitivity to the inclusive form. For the sake of 
authenticity, I do not alter material which I quote directly. Occasionally, “man” will be used in the s nse of 
human civilisation as a whole. This form is used solely because it furnishes more efficient syntax.   
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attention to the evolving perception of the concept of freedom in western society. This 
informs his view of how the present cultural situation has come about in society in general 
and in the Church in particular. He argues that one cannot be isolated from the other because 
every Church member lives in – and is influenced by – the societies with which they are 
associated. When society at large is suffering a crisis of meaning in respect of freedom, 
Christian believers are not impervious to the broad spectrum of cultural trends and 
inclinations.  
In this section we see that Ratzinger’s life, given the times in which he lived, led him 
to a deep concern with the idea of freedom. In his wr ting, he undertakes a philosophical and 
cultural analysis of the modern era, the roots of which he attributes to a one-sided and 
uninhibited form of “anarchic freedom” that has increasingly become dominant in society. In 
practice, Ratzinger visualizes this in terms of a tripartite synthesis of belief in progress, the 
canonisation of science and the promise of perfection for humanity within history. The 
distrust towards authority and the imposition of constraints which are the fruits of this 
synthesis convince him that anarchic freedom has left its mark on Christianity, causing a 
range of emotions from disappointment and resentment to anger and indignation with 
hierarchical and authoritarian ecclesiologies. 
Section II examines Ratzinger’s presentation of a Christian understanding of freedom 
and the role of the Church as a sphere where it can be realised in the human person. Chapter 
3 examines Ratzinger’s christology and its concentration on the concept of authentic freedom 
that reaches back into the story of God’s people in Israel, and forward through to the 
Church’s ecumenical Councils and teachings. Of particular significance for Ratzinger, in this 
regard, is neo-chalcedonian christology. By incorporating Ratzinger’s anthropological 
outlook, Chapter 4 extends and completes the preparations for identifyi g true freedom. 
What emerges is a christocentric anthropology, with Christ as the centre of possibility for 
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human freedom. Chapter 5 sets out how Ratzinger’s ecclesiology integrates his vision of 
being human and the possibility of encounter with the liberating Christ. The Church, as the 
sphere that renders this encounter possible, leads to the proposal of the existence of a 
liberation ecclesiology in Ratzinger’s writings. This embraces the four dimensions of 
sacrament, faith, hope and love. This section concludes that authentic freedom consists of a 
sincere human posture with regard to God, in which the Church, as the place of encounter 
with the Crucified, empowers the human person to esabli h and develop the authenticity of 
their posture.     
 Section III comprises three succinct chapters proposing the Church as sphere of 
growth in authentic human freedom. They are “manifestations” for learning and practicing 
the Christian understanding of authentic freedom to which Ratzinger devotes significant 
reflection: the Church at worship as the school of human freedom (Chapter 6), the Church’s 
role of oversight (Chapter 7) and the Church as witness (Chapter 8). The themes coincide 
with three key ecclesial relationships: the individual believer and God; the communal 
gathering of believers with Christ and with one another; the outreach of the believer to the 
other. In the exposition of these relationships, the cross-pressures of dealing with the 
temporal and supernatural aspects of ecclesiality come into focus. None of these 
“manifestations” is enough on its own. Therefore, the Church cannot afford to neglect any of 
them. While each of them may present a distinctive aspect of ecclesial life, all three are 
interrelated in a way that promotes a freedom granting the human person the opportunity to 
live and grow in accordance with the truth of their nature. The expectation is that, through the 
Church, each person can come to trust the Christian understanding of the human person, and 
can also come to accept the possibilities and constrai ts of freedom that coincide with human 
nature. The dissertation concludes with an appraisal of Ratzinger’s overall contribution to the 
theology of human freedom, as well as indications for some future areas of research. 
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SECTION I: CONTEXTS 
 
The opening section of this dissertation shows how the formative influences on Joseph 
Ratzinger as a theologian and pastor feed into his responses and approaches to the issue of 
freedom. While he is undeniably influenced by growing up in twentieth-century Germany, 
fraught as it was by harsh abuses of freedom, he isalso someone persuaded by the intellectual 
and spiritual riches of Europe, the liturgical heritage of Roman Catholicism, and the security 
of a stable family environment. As a result of this combination of influences, Ratzinger 
represents a significant voice in the study of the C urch as it endeavours to respond to 
humanity’s thirst for freedom. He is troubled by the one-sidedness of the contemporary 
understanding of freedom and remains convinced that only the full expression of the truth 
about authentic freedom such as is found in the catholic tradition can remedy the deficiencies 
that beset present understandings of liberation. In order to dialogue comprehensively with 
























CHAPTER 1: Discovering the Importance of Freedom: Formative Influences on Joseph   
     Ratzinger and his Theology 
 
1.0.  Introduction 
Joseph Ratzinger and his generation were born into a European society compelled to 
reflect deeply on the complexities associated with the issue of human freedom. In large 
measure, this was a consequence of the rise and fall of Nazi and Communist supremacy in the 
twentieth-century. While a person or a generation ca not be determined exclusively by the 
circumstances of life-experience, these undoubtedly xert a major influence on the 
consciousness of one’s reality. The aim of this chapter will be to demonstrate how both 
Ratzinger’s personal circumstances and scholarly endeavour evolved in a way that gave him 
reason to be mindful of freedom as a theological issue in the modern era.1 In order to show 
that a legitimate case can be made for understanding Ratzinger as a theologian responsive to 
the theme of freedom, this chapter examines a number of areas – his formative years and his 
attitude to ideology, the impact of his initial academic studies in university, his views on the 
human person and the steady refinement of his theological method.  
1.1.  A Life Marked by the Theme of Freedom  
Born on 16 April 1927 at Marktl am Inn in the Bavarian region of Germany, Joseph 
Aloisius Ratzinger was the son of a police officer whose career was curtailed by his quiet 
resistance to the anti-Catholicism of local Nationalist officials. The Concordat signed 
between the Vatican and the Nazi State in 1933, supposedly to secure the Church’s freedom, 
soon gave way to the severest political and social tensions.2 Conscripted in 1943 with 
                                                          
1 The intention therefore is not to produce a comprehensive biography or to conduct an exhaustive survey of his 
published works. A helpful recent addition to Ratzinger studies, chronicling his published works up to the point 
of his election as Pope, is Vinzenz Pfnür, ed., Das Werk: bibliographisches Hilfsmittel zur Erschließung des 
literarisch-theologischen Werkes von Joseph Ratzinger bis zur Papstwahl (Augsburg: Sankt Ulrich, 2009). 
2 For Ratzinger’s personal account of life in the “Shadow of the ‘Third Reich’” see Milestones: 
Memoirs 1927-1977, 13-40. See also Georg Ratzinger, Mein Bruder, der Papst (München: F.A. Herbig, 2011) 
for autobiographical information on the Ratzinger family. For further biographical details, in addition to the 
books on Ratzinger mentioned in the Introduction, I would draw attention to Heinz-Joachim Fischer, Benedikt 
XVI – Das Porträt (Freiburg: Herder, 2005); David Gibson, The Rule of Benedict: Pope Benedict XVI and His 
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classmates, he served in an anti-aircraft corps that defended Munich, and dug trenches near 
the Hungarian border. In April 1945, as his country descended into chaos, Ratzinger deserted, 
only to find US troops billeted in his home. He was held as a prisoner-of-war for about a 
month.3 These years influenced Ratzinger’s view of the rolof the Catholic Church in 
society. Amid the turmoil generated by the rise of National Socialism in Germany, the 
Ratzinger family in the traditionally Catholic state of Bavaria imparted to the young Joseph 
what Heim calls an existential ecclesiality – “the habit of life in the Church that is prior t 
and indispensable for all ecclesiological reflection.”4  
In his biography of Ratzinger, John Allen says the Bavarian theologian would come to 
understand the twelve years of the Third Reich as a “trial by fire” for the Catholic Church.5 
However, Allen argues that Ratzinger’s written reflections on die Nazizeit end to be more 
philosophical than personal. “One gets the impression”, he observes,  “that the Third Reich 
has meaning for Ratzinger today primarily as an object lesson about church and culture, and 
only the details consistent with that argument have passed through the filter of his memory.”6 
In any case, the years of growing up in this environment would have a permanent impact 
upon the theologian of later years. He recalls the atmosphere in Germany at the end the war 
and the collective consciousness of the time that the Church was the place of resistance to an 
ideology that brought such devastation: 
Die folgenden Monate der wiedergewonnenen Freiheit, die wir nun erst so recht zu 
schätzen lernten, gehören zu den schönsten Erinnerug n meines Lebens. . . . 
Niemand zweifelte, daß die Kirche der Ort unserer Hoffnungen war. Sie war trotz 
mancher menschlicher Schwachheiten der Gegenpol zu der zerstörerischen Ideologie 
der braunen Machthaber gewesen; sie war in dem Inferno, das die Mächtigen 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Battle with the Modern World, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2007); Peter Se wald, Benedikt XVI: Ein 
Porträt aus der Nähe (Berlin: Ullstein Buchverlage, 2007).       
3 See Fergus Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoschlasticism to Nuptial Mysticism 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 183-187.  
4 Heim, Joseph Ratzinger: Life in the Church and Living Theology, 146. 
5 See Allen, Pope Benedict XVI, 23. For a critical appraisal of the role of German Catholicism during the rise of 
National Socialism and its impact on the young Joseph Ratzinger, see ibid., 9-33. 
6 Ibid., 17. See also Aidan Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI, 2nd ed. (London: Burns & Oates, 2007), 
5-11; Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI, 12-15.  
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verschlungen hatte, stehengeblieben mit ihrer aus der Ewigkeit kommenden Kraft. Es 
hatte sich bewährt: Die Pforten der Hölle werden si nicht überwältigen. Wir wußten 
nun aus eigener Anschauung, was das ist – “die Pforten der Hölle” –, und wir konnten 
auch mit unseren Augen sehen, daß das Haus auf dem Felsengrund gehalten hatte.7  
 In November 1945, the 18-year-old Ratzinger began seminary formation for the 
Archdiocese of Munich and Freising and was ordained to the priesthood on 29 June 1951. By 
1957, he had researched and completed both his doctoral thesis on St. Augustine (354-430), 
and his professorial dissertation on St Bonaventure (1221-74), in the department of 
fundamental theology at the University of Munich. 8 He has since held academic positions at 
the University of Bonn (1959-1963), the University of Münster (1963-1966), the University 
of Tübingen (1966-1969), and the University of Regensburg (1969-1977). 9  
                                                          
7 Ratzinger, Aus meinem Leben, 45-47 (“The months that followed were full of a sense of newly won freedom, 
something we were only now learning really to treasure and this period belongs to the most beautiful memories 
of my entire life. [. . .] No one doubted that the Church was the locus of all our hopes. Despite many human 
failings, the church was the alternative to the destructive ideology of the brown rulers; in the inferno that had 
swallowed up the powerful, she had stood firm with a force coming to her from eternity. It had been 
demonstrated: The gates of hell will not overpower h r. From our own experience we now knew what was 
meant by ‘the gates of hell,’ and we could also see with our own eyes that the house built on rock hadstood 
firm” [Ratzinger, Milestones, 40-42]). His assessment of the Nazi regime is primarily based on the logic of 
Christian belief and the conviction of its adherents. Both of these appealed to him. Two key factors in this were 
firstly, the example of his parents, especially his father, who criticised the direction in which National Socialist 
policies were headed and secondly, the Christian resistance to the unfolding events. “My father,” Ratzinger 
writes in his memoirs, “was one who with unfailing clairvoyance saw that a victory of Hitler’s would not be a 
victory for Germany but rather a victory of the Antichrist that would surely usher in apocalyptic times for all 
believers, and not only for them” (Ratzinger, Milestones, 27). The major impact of those who bore witness to 
Christ was characterised for him in the spirit of German Catholics in the immediate post-war period: “Despite 
the extreme differences of our experiences and perspectives, we were bound together by a great sense of 
gratitude for having been allowed to return home from the abyss of those difficult years. This gratitude now 
created a common will to make up finally for everything we had neglected and to serve Christ in his Church for 
new and better times, for a better Germany and for a better world” (ibid.). 
8 Joseph Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche, rev. ed. (St. Ottilien: EOS, 1992); 
Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura, rev. ed. (St. Ottilien: EOS, 1992). 
9 One of the popularly highlighted events in the lifof Ratzinger was his call to Tübingen University. Hans 
Küng was the dean of the catholic faculty of theology at Tübingen who proposed calling Ratzinger from 
Münster to take up Tübingen’s second chair in dogmatic theology. Küng recalls the motivation for his pro osal: 
“[a]lthough he is only 37, he enjoys great respect, as his career so far shows. He has his own direction of 
research and at the same time is very open to contemporary questions – the basis for a good collaboration. I had 
also found him personally congenial at the time of the Council. So he seems to me an almost ideal appointment. 
And this is the argument which, contrary to all custom, I present right at the beginning of the meeting of my 
faculty. As dean and at the same time occupant of the parallel chair, I feel justified in doing so. With resounding 
success. My proposal is accepted unanimously: Joseph Ratzinger – and this is very unusual – is to be put on the 
list for the call unico loco (in other words, without mentioning a second or thid candidate)” (Hans Küng, My 
Struggle for Freedom in vol. 1 of Memoirs, trans. John Bowden [London: Continuum, 2003], 453). Küng spoke 
at that time of their “like-mindedness” as colleagues, acknowledging that he was aware that Ratzinger was more 
steeped in the neo-scholastic tradition than himself, while he also attached more importance to the authority of 
the Fathers. Before the chair was offered to Ratzinger, Küug was asked by colleagues in July 1965 whether 
these differences were a risk. He replied that different emphases and directions of research can only be an 
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In his thirties he attended the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) as a peritus to Josef 
Cardinal Frings (1887-1978) of Cologne. In those years he was representative of a younger 
generation of scholars who were frustrated by what t ey called the roman school of theology 
– a form of neo-scholasticism that did not allow much room for the use of conceptual 
frameworks other than scholastic categories that were characterised by an intense interest in 
logical and linguistic analysis, and the systematic presentation of Christian beliefs.10 He was 
created bishop and cardinal by Pope Paul VI in 1977 and appointed Prefect of the CDF by 
Pope John Paul II in 1981. On April 19 2005, in his seventy-ninth year, Joseph Cardinal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
advantage. Moreover, Ratzinger’s chair was “dogmatic theology and the history of dogma,” whereas his own
was “dogmatic and ecumenical theology” (454). Ratzinger spent only three years at Tübingen which was 
something that Küng regretted for he felt he was losing “the best possible colleague.” Küng maintained that 
“shaken by his negative experiences in the student revolts, Ratzinger decides to leave Tübingen. This is made 
easy for him since he has a call to Regensburg in Bavaria up his sleeve” (Hans Küng, Disputed Truth in vol. 2 of 
Memoirs, trans. John Bowden [London: Continuum, 2007], 122-23). Although he is careful not to intrusively 
over-analyse Ratzinger’s actions in the restless years of the 1960s, Küng considers it something of a tragedy that 
Ratzinger retreated from the turbulent atmosphere of Tübingen. He thinks that Ratzinger was attracted by the 
prospect that under the conservative Bishop Graber of Regensburg he would have all that he needed for 
peaceful, honest scholarly work: “The one thing that is certain is that Ratzinger retreated from Tübinge , 
beyond doubt in the front line of scholarship, into theologically well-behaved Regensburg and the province of a 
reactionary German bishop, representative of Marianism and curialism” (ibid., 127). Ratzinger and Küng are 
often pitted as rivals. However, Küng’s Memoirs speak of Ratzinger in generally respectful tones. And it is 
reasonable to conclude the feeling to be mutual, for Ratzinger speaks of Küng’s “winning openness and 
straightforwardness” although their paths would diverge considerably in later years (cf. Ratzinger, Milestones, 
135). Küng’s lament about Ratzinger’s “retreat” from frontline scholarship – often portrayed as a turning toward 
a position of conservatism – is contradicted somewhat by his assertion that in fact there is little if any difference 
between the Ratzinger of 1958 who committed himself to writing a dogmatics (which never materialised) and 
the 80-year-old Pontiff who presents a spiritual and meditative christological volume, Jesus of Nazareth, in
2007. Küng says that fundamentally, Ratzinger could have written that volume in Tübingen (cf. Küng, Disputed 
Truth, 134). It is of note that Ratzinger’s Tübingen colleagues, Küng and the Lutheran Jürgen Moltmann both 
highlight a similar reaction on his part to the revolutionary demonstrations at Tübingen. Ratzinger is ba ically 
frightened by the abyss of nihilism which the world faces were it to continue on its present course. Küng 
describes Ratzinger as harbouring “an almost apocalyptic anxiety” (120), while Moltmann says that “for 
[Ratzinger] the apocalyptic vision of the future of Christianity’s little flock in the great dangers of the world 
apparently remained” (Jürgen Moltmann, A Broad Place: An Autobiography, trans. Margaret Kohl [London: 
SCM Press, 2007], 162). For critical commentary on the theology of these Tübingen colleagues, see Hermann 
Häring’s Hans Küng: Grenzen durchbrechen (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1998) and Theologie und 
Ideologie bei Joseph Ratzinger (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 2001). Ratzinger, for his part, has always disputed 
the contention that he has changed, although he does confirm that the “exhausting controversies” of these years 
in Tübingen did “change his attitude” to the attraciveness of the call to the new Bavarian university which had 
been in the offing since its foundation in 1962 (Ratzinger, Milestones, 140). He strongly emphasizes the 
continuity of his vision in Milestones, 132-151. An informative account of the charge thatR zinger changed 
from a pre-Conciliar liberal thinker to the Catholic Church’s chief protagonist of conformism is provided by D. 
Vincent Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI: The Conscience of Our Age(San Francisco: Ignatius Press), 44-50.  
10 For his own personal recollection of his formative th ological studies, see Ratzinger, Milestones, 46-60. For 
an account of his frustration with the scholastic academic climate, see Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith: The 
Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5-10.  
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Ratzinger was elected to succeed John Paul II as bishop of Rome, taking the name Benedict 
XVI.   
Ratzinger’s life story and temperament is such that i  gives him a sense of the need to 
reach out in dialogue based on truth, and particularly the truth of faith. His desire to dialogue 
in this way was often overshadowed by the regulatory r le he held at the CDF. However, as 
Pope his motives in this regard came to light in a cle rer way. Ratzinger has always been 
attracted and motivated by the scholarly life and it is from here that he has had the greatest 
impact. When the literary agent John Thornton reflects on Ratzinger’s way of life, he 
describes it in terms of having “survived the horrors f Nazi Germany and the turbulence of 
the Marxist revolution of the sixties, always serving the Church he loves with unwavering 
will, profound intelligence, and great heart and soul, in a life marked by joy and gratitude.”11 
Thomas Rausch, professor of catholic theology at Loyola Marymount University in Los 
Angeles, expresses the distinctive form of Ratzinger’s desire for dialogue by contrasting it 
with the “hegemony of the post-modernist ethos so present in the academy today.” He points 
out that for Ratzinger, “dialogue must always be a se rch for the truth, not simply a modus 
vivendi.”12 Without the common search for truth, Ratzinger believ s intellectual life – and 
ultimately human civilisation – will be enslaved in a process of de-absolutisation.13  
                                                          
11 John F. Thornton and Susan B. Varenne, eds., The Essential Pope Benedict XVI: His Central Writings and 
Speeches (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), xv. See Joseph Murphy, Christ our Joy: The 
Theological Vision of Pope Benedict XVI (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), who has conducte  a study of 
the theme of “joy” as a leitwort acting as an entry point into Ratzinger’s thought.  
12 Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI, 37-38. Such an approach, Rausch points out, allowed Benedict’s papacy gain a 
significant level of respect from other religious leaders in a rather unexpected way. Rausch goes on the say that 
Benedict XVI wanted a dialogue with Islam, but, “unlike his predecessor, he calls for reciprocity in 
relationships, that is, religious freedom for Christians in Muslim countries (a mosque in Rome but not a church 
in Riyadh), not as a quid pro quo but as the honouri g of a basic human right. In an address to the Roman Curia 
in December 2006, he said that the Muslim world is faced with the same tasks that the Enlightenment imposed 
on the Catholic Church and which it addressed fruitfully at the Second Vatican Council, namely, that it must 
welcome what he called ‘the true conquests of the Enlightenment, human rights and especially the freedom of 
faith and its practice, and recognize these also as being essential elements for the authenticity of religion’” (38). 
See Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Memb rs of the Roman Curia at the Traditional Exchange of 
Christmas Greetings (22 December 2006): AAS 99 (2007), 34-35. Rausch continues by saying that Benedict 
was a realist whom other religious leaders, particularly in Islam, found credible in a world where there is a lot of 
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A Pope’s platform is an international one and it was during his apostolic voyages that 
Benedict XVI’s desire to engage in dialogue was most in evidence. On these trips, he made a 
conscious effort to reach out to representatives from the various worlds of culture, politics 
and education to speak with them about the relationship between reason and faith in society, 
the dignity and freedom of nations and their peoples, and the purpose and formation of just 
laws. Among his more significant apostolic voyages in terms of highlighting the issue of 
freedom in a materially rich but often spiritually impoverished world were those to France 
(September 2008), the Czech Republic (September 2009), Portugal (May 2010), the United 
Kingdom (September 2010), Germany (September 2011) and Benin in West Africa 
(November 2011).14  
The convergence of scholarship and experience in Ratzinger’s life is highly 
significant. George Weigel describes him as “a man thoroughly convinced that ideas have 
real-world consequences and that decent human societies cannot be built on a foundation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
scepticism shown towards westerners in leadership roles. Hence, Rausch concludes by saying that Benedict’s 
“style is blunt, with a professorial instinct to isolate real issues and address them directly. While t is has cost 
him, it is not a bad thing. Even his controversial address at Regensburg in 2006 managed to lift up these 
questions of reason and faith, and thus of human rights and religious authority in Islam, as well as Islam’s 
attitude toward violence done in its name. In a moment in history when most Muslims perceive Europe as 
completely secular, if not irreligious, Pope Benedict is perhaps the one world leader who can command their 
respect, raising these issues, precisely because he peaks as a leader who is also a believer. While his style as 
pope is far more pastoral and positive, he has no intention of compromising what he understands as the truth of 
the faith” (Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI, 39).  
13 “De-absolutisation” is not a word used by Ratzinger himself but it has been used by the Irish journalist John 
Waters to describe the shift in culture which we idntified in § 0.1. Waters believes it is a more accurate word 
than “secularisation” to describe the cultural change that is taking place in Ireland and further afield. It denotes 
that “our societies are being reconstructed to obscure from sight any possibility of a consciousness of an infinite, 
eternal or absolute dimension. The idea of mystery is being abolished in the construction of a new ceiling 
calculated to create the illusion that human beings can function within a self-defined, even a self-created space” 
(John Waters, Beyond Consolation [London: Continuum, 2010], 152).   
14 These talks and homilies are available from 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/travels/2008/index_francia_en.htm  (accessed 14 July 2010); 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/travels/2009/index_repubblica-ceca_en.htm (accessed 14 July 
2010); http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/travels/2010/index_portogallo_en.htm (accessed 15 July 
2010); http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/travels/2010/index_regno-unito_en.htm (accessed 27 
February 2012);  http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/travels/2011/index_germania_en.htm  
(accessed 27 February 2012); http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/travels/2011/index_benin_en.htm 
(accessed 17 December 2012).  
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falsehoods.”15 The memory of the devastation of his homeland that he carries from his youth 
motivates him to bring the fruits of his scholarship to the work of evangelisation and the 
exposition of the Christian faith. Vincent Twomey’s evaluation of Benedict’s papacy is that, 
even in this office, his pastoral outreach remained, as before, motivated by the desire to teach 
and to further the Church’s mission to liberate the world. In a sense, the Papacy has liberated 
him for this mission:  
[. . .] the customs officer is now at home, where he can take off his uniform and be 
himself with his family. . . . His election as Pope, therefore, will bring about one 
important change. He can now speak on his own terms to the Church and to the world 
as pastor and theologian – for him both terms are almost interchangeable, since 
theology is about the ultimate truth of our existence that heals and sets us free, inner 
liberation being the end of all pastoral activity.16    
  
1.2.  Theological Attitude towards Ideology 
For Ratzinger, a very significant aspect of the existence of the Church in society 
stems from his belief that growth in authentic freedom depends on the relative absence of 
ideology, something which the experience of National Socialism and Marxist Communism 
did not afford him or his fellow Germans. For him, religion has an important role in the 
public space. He believes that the world of reason and the world of faith need each other and 
must not be afraid of entering into a robust dialogue for the good of civilisation as a whole. 
Benedict XVI’s address to British civil society in 2010 represents one of the most succinct 
renderings of this issue that he has ever given. In it he describes “a two-way process” that 
results from asking the question of where do legislators find the ethical foundations for 
political choices. On the one hand, it is beyond the competence of religion to provide 
concrete political solutions but on the other hand, “[t]he Catholic tradition maintains that the 
objective norms governing right action are accessible to reason, prescinding from the content 
                                                          
15 George Weigel, God’s Choice: Pope Benedict and the Future of the Catholic Church (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2005), 217.  
16 D. Vincent Twomey, preface to Murphy, Christ our Joy, xi-xii.  
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of revelation.”17 In the two-way process envisaged by the Pope, religion purifies and 
illuminates reason in the discovery of objective moral principles, while at the same time 
reason purifies and restructures distorted forms of religion such as sectarianism and 
fundamentalism. He believes that such an ordering of the dynamics of the polity respects the 
nature of being human, both individually and collectively, and represents the best chance 
society has of precluding the malice of ideological ntent going unchecked.18  
 Some believe that contact with suppressive ideological regimes has resulted in 
Ratzinger’s evaluation of modernity being “ambiguous at best.”19 There can be little doubt 
that the memories of his youth, coupled with his academic studies, have influenced his view 
of historical and social realities. This is perhaps nowhere more readily observable than in his 
approach towards ideology. The destructive Nazi ideology attracted him to the logic of the 
Augustinian tendency to contrast the wisdom of the world with that of the Church, while the 
student revolts of the principally Marxist-inspired vents of 1968 led him to a re-examination 
of the limitations of all worldly progress. Corkery says that Ratzinger has an Augustinian 
heart which means he writes passionately, but with a passion that counters.20 The historical 
events in Europe provided him with much material for reflection, making him very wary of 
                                                          
17 Benedict XVI, Meeting with the Representatives of British Society, including the Diplomatic Corps, 
Politicians, Academics and Business Leaders (17 September 2010): AAS 102 (2010), 637. The key passage 
from the perspective of this dissertation is the following: “This ‘corrective’ role of religion vis-à-vis reason is 
not always welcomed, though, partly because distorted forms of religion, such as sectarianism and 
fundamentalism, can be seen to create serious social problems themselves. And in their turn, these distortions of 
religion arise when insufficient attention is given to the purifying and structuring role of reason within religion. 
It is a two-way process. Without the corrective supplied by religion, though, reason too can fall prey to 
distortions, as when it is manipulated by ideology, or applied in a partial way that fails to take full account of the 
dignity of the human person. Such misuse of reason, after all, was what gave rise to the slave trade in the first 
place and to many other social evils, not least the otalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century. This is why I 
would suggest that the world of reason and the world f faith – the world of secular rationality and the world of 
religious belief – need one another and should not be afraid to enter into a profound and on-going dialogue, for 
the good of our civilization.” 
18 To Ratzinger’s mind, human freedom is respected when t e State does not attempt to regulate and control 
everything. This is a point which Benedict XVI made in his 2005 encyclical, Deus caritas est in the context of 
the role of the Church: “[. . .] the formation of just structures is not directly the duty of the Churc , but belongs 
to the world of politics, the sphere of the autonomous use of reason. The Church has an indirect duty here, in 
that she is called to contribute to the purification of reason and to the reawakening of those moral fces without 
which just structures are neither established nor pr ve effective in the long run” (29). 
19 Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI, 56. See also Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI, 17-44; Corkery, Joseph 
Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 24-36.      
20 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 25.
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any ideological tendencies in society.  
To Ratzinger’s mind, Christian faith is distinct from the perversion of truth that is 
ideology. In particular, he highlights the enslavement unleashed upon a society when a 
critical mass of its members succumbs to an ideological mindset. One of his most poignant 
reflections on the fragility of the human way of life was his address in the Cathedral of 
Bayeux to an ecumenical gathering that was remembering D-Day on 6 June, 2004:  
Damals – vor 60 Jahren – ging es darum, Europa und die Welt von einer 
menschenverachtenden Diktatur zu befreien: Der Mensch wurde zertreten, gebraucht 
und missbraucht für den Wahn einer Macht, die eine neue Welt schaffen wollte. Von 
Gott wurde zwar gesprochen, aber er war nur ein Etikett, um dem eigenen Willen 
Absolutheit zu verleihen. Nicht der Wille Gott zählte, sondern allein der eigene Wille 
zur Macht, und darum war im Menschen nicht mehr das Bild Gottes zu erkennen, vor 
dem wir in Ehrfurcht stehen müssen, sondern nur noch das “Menschenmaterial,” mit 
dem man arbeitete, das man verachtete, wie man in Wirklichkeit Gott selbst 
verachtete. Eine ungezählte Schar von Menschen wurde dafür in den 
Konzentrationslagern wie Material “verbraucht.” Und eine nicht weniger große Zahl 
junger Menschen ist auf den Schlachtfeldern gefallen, d ren Gräber wir heute ehren.21   
Towards the end of the address, Ratzinger spoke on the question of humanity’s future and 
how it is essential to constantly grapple with ethos and responsibility even – and especially – 
in the midst of the misuse of freedom. He juxtaposes human freedom and openness to the 
future as a tension which must remain, irrespective of whether or not one inhabits the most 
unjust of all possible worlds: 
Da ist dann über diese Geschichte zum einen die Vorhersage, dass die menschliche 
Freiheit immer wieder missbraucht werden wird und daher immer wieder das Unrecht 
Macht erlangen wird in der Welt. . . . Obwohl Gott der Freiheit zum Bösen viel Raum 
lässt (allzu viel kommt uns immer wieder vor), lässt er die Welt niemals ganz aus 
seinen Händen fallen. . . . Es gibt nicht die Magie des Fortschritts, die ein für alle Mal 
richtig eingerichtete Welt, die dann ja auch eine Wlt ohne Freiheit wäre. Gott hält die 
                                                          
21 Joseph Ratzinger, Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs: Des Herausforderungen der Zukunft bestehen (Freiburg im 
Breisgau: Herder, 2005), 138 (“Sixty years ago the great task was to liberate Europe and the world from a 
dictatorship that despised man: man was trampled upon, used, and misused in the service of a madness that 
wanted to create a new world. The ideology did indeed speak of God, but his name was only a label usedto 
confer absoluteness on its own will. It was not the will of God that counted but only the party’s will for power. 
This meant that the image of God, before which we must stand in reverence, was no longer recognised in man. 
All that existed was the ‘human material’ with whic the ideology worked, but which it despised – justas in 
reality it despised God. An innumerable host of peopl  were ‘used up’ as material in the concentration camps, 
and a no less numerous host of young men died on the battlefields; we honour their graves today” [Joseph 




Welt, aber er hält sie wesentlich auch durch unsere Freiheit, die wir als Freiheit zum 
Guten der Freiheit des Bösen entgegenstellen müssen. Der Glaube schafft nicht die 
bessere Welt, aber er weckt und festigt die sittlichen Kräfte, die Dämme gegen die 
Flut des Bösen bauen; er weckt und stärkt die Freiheit des Guten gegen die 
Versuchung, unsere Freiheit zum Bösen zu missbrauchen.22  
For the most part, Ratzinger’s writings on ideology are based on the western cultural 
experience, or at least have their foundations there.23 For him Christianity in Europe is bound 
to the fate of Europe itself.24 He sees the recovery of an authentic understanding of freedom 
as necessary for upholding Europe’s cultural identity and to avoid plummeting yet again into 
the shadow of irrational ideology. One of the developments of western culture which 
Ratzinger resists in his opposition to contemporary ideologies is the emergence of an 
autonomous human reason that not only comprises an overstated confidence in its own ability 
but becomes “inhumane and hostile to creation.” Listening for the ethos of creation, as we 
will come to see in this dissertation, is an important element of his rationale for determining 
the parameters for authentic freedom: 
Die Ambivalenz der Neuzeit beruht darauf, daß sie zusehends die Wurzeln und den 
Lebensgrund der Freiheitsidee verkannte und zu einer Emanzipation der Vernunft 
drängte, die dem Wesen der menschlichen Vernunft als einer nicht-göttlichen 
Vernunft von innen her widerspricht und darum selbst unvernünftig werden mußte. 
Als Inbegriff der Neuzeit erscheint schließlich zu Unrecht jene vollkommen 
autonomisierte Vernunft, die nur noch sich selbst kennt, damit aber blind geworden ist 
und in der Zerstörung ihres Grundes inhuman und schöfungsfeindlich wird. . . . So 
                                                          
22 Ratzinger, Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs, 141-42 (“[. . .] we have the prediction about thehistory of our 
world, that human freedom will continually be misused and that injustice will seize power again and again in the 
world. . . . [But] although God allows the freedom to choose evil considerable space in the world [too much 
space, we are often inclined to think], he never lets the world fall completely out of his hands. . . There is no 
magic progress, no world correctly regulated once and for all, for that would be a world without freedom. God 
holds the world in his hands, but he does so to no small extent by means of our freedom, and we must use it – as 
a freedom to choose the good – to oppose the freedom of evil. Faith does not create a better world, [but it 
awakens and strengthens the moral forces that build dams against the flood of evil], it does call forth and 
strengthen the freedom of the good against the temptation to misuse our freedom to do evil” [Ratzinger, Values 
in a Time of Upheaval, 121]). The clause in italics does not appear in this English translation. While it does not 
materially change the point Ratzinger is making, I have added my own translation of the missing words which 
are found in the original German text.   
23 Many of these are occasional writings that were subsequently compiled into anthologies. They include Joseph 
Ratzinger, Faith and the Future; Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New Essays in Ecclesiology (trans. Michael 
J. Miller et al.; San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008); A Turning Point for Europe; Truth and Tolerance: 
Christian Belief and World Religions, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004); Values in a 
Time of Upheaval; with Godfried Cardinal Danneels, Franciszek Cardinal Macharski and Archbishop Dermot J. 
Ryan, Handing on the Faith in an Age of Disbelief, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2006); Europe: Today and Tomorrow, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007).    
24 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 209-222. 
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müssen von der Neuzeit als wesentliche und unverzichtbare Dimensionen des 
Europäischen die relative Trennung von Staat und Kirche, die Gewissensfreiheit, die 
Menschenrechte und die Eigenverantwortung der Vernunft übernommen, zugleich 
aber gegenüber ihrer Radikalisierung die Gründung der Vernunft in der Ehrfurcht vor 
Gott und vor den grundlegenden sittlichen Werten, die aus dem christlichen Glauben 
kommen, festgehalten werden.25 
 
1.3. Encounter with Augustinian Ecclesiology: Self-Surrender in Love 
In a 1992 foreword to a new edition of his doctoral thesis, Ratzinger spoke about an 
exegesis of the Church Fathers which consisted of a tension between spirit and letter. To his 
mind, this points the way towards a process of Christologisierung, or “Christolification,”26 by 
which he means that talk of the People of God, in terms of the Church in the economy of 
salvation, can only occur in a “christological transposition or, as we may say, in a 
pneumatological interpretation.”27 The Church as a concrete gathering not of “some ind fi ite 
community of all honest men,”28 but rather  
                                                          
25 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 207 (“The ambivalence of the modern era is based on the fact that it 
obviously failed to appreciate the roots and the real-life basis of the idea of freedom and urged an emancipation 
of reason that intrinsically contradicts the nature of human reason [which is not divine] and therefor necessarily 
became unreasonable itself. The epitome of the modern era appears – wrongly, in the final analysis – to be that 
completely autonomous reason which no longer recognises anything but itself and has thereby gone blind a , 
through the destruction of its own foundations, becomes inhumane and hostile to creation. . . . Thus, we must 
adopt from the modern era, as an essential and indispensable dimension of what is European, the relativ  
separation of Church and state, freedom of conscience, human rights, and reason’s responsibility for itself, while 
resisting its radicalisation by holding fast to thefoundations of reason in reverence to God and for the 
fundamental moral values that come from the Christian faith” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 218-
19]). To understand further how providential Ratzinger considers the encounter between faith and reason to be, 
see Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 193-222; Truth and Tolerance, 85-109; Christianity and the Crisis of 
Cultures, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,2006), 47-53. In the context of liberation theology, 
we can see how Ratzinger applies this theory in practice. He sees the emergence of liberation theology as by no 
means a native or spontaneously home-grown product of Latin America but that “[o]riginally at least it was the 
creation of intellectuals, and intellectuals who were born or educated in the rich West. . . .  [It] is part of that 
‘export to the Third World of myths and utopias which have been worked out in the developed West...’.” 
Ratzinger describes the potential of the West to influe ce the wider world as a modern-day form of imperialism: 
“It is as it were an attempt to test, in a concrete sc nario, ideologies that have been invented in the laboratory by 
European theoreticians. In a certain respect, therefore, it is a kind of cultural imperialism, even if it is portrayed 
as the spontaneous creation of the disenfranchised masses” (The Ratzinger Report, 186-187). Some liberation 
theologians were frustrated with Ratzinger’s theory on this. See Allen, Pope Benedict XVI, 137-141, for a 
critical account of the liberationist’s view of Europe’s theoretical interest in their work. For analysis on 
Ratzinger’s reflections on the topic of Europe and the Christian heritage, see  James V. Schall, The Regensburg 
Lecture (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine Press, 2007), 69-89; Dale T. Irvin, “Benedict XVI, the Ends of 
European Christendom, and the Horizons of World Christianity,” in William G. Rusch, ed., The Pontificate of 
Pope Benedict XVI: Its Premises and Promises (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B Eerdmans, 2009), 1-20; 
Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 105-122. 
26 Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, xvii. 
27 Ibid., xiv. 
28 Ibid., xvii. 
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Volk Gottes wird Kirche, wenn es von Christus und vom Heiligen Geist neu 
versammelt wird. Erst durch eine christologisch-pneumatologische Lektüre und nicht 
in seiner buchstäblichen Direktheit wird Volk Gottes zu einem Begriff für Kirche. . . . 
Kirche ist Volk Gottes nur im und durch den Leib Christi.29 
This view of the giving of the self over to Christ’s Body as the concrete place of encounter 
with God and his people is a discovery made by Ratzinger through his contact with the 
writings of Augustine and has remained a constant theme. For him sacramental encounter is a 
real encounter. He has consistently promoted the concept of encounter throughout his lifetime 
by vigorously representing it as a self-surrendering of one’s person to the person of Christ – 
surrender into true freedom.    
In his own Memoirs, Ratzinger expressed the deep impression which Henri d  
Lubac’s book Catholicisme had upon him.30 To his mind “De Lubac was leading his readers 
out of a narrowly individualistic and moralistic mode of faith and into the freedom of an 
essentially social faith, conceived and lived as a we – a faith that, precisely as such and 
according to its nature, was also hope, affecting hstory as a whole and not only the promise 
of a private blissfulness to individuals.”31 While, in the twentieth century, de Lubac’s 
promotion of the social dimension of dogma countered a narrow-minded individualistic 
Christianity, Ratzinger maintains that today, its adv ntage lies in offsetting the danger of a 
sociological horizontalism which views the sacraments as merely celebrations of the 
community, while discounting –  to the point of ridicule – a personal dialogue between God 
                                                          
29 Ibid., xiv (“[P]eople of God are Church, when they are assembled by Christ and the Holy Spirit. Only through 
a christological and pneumatological reading, and not in a direct immediacy, is the people of God a term for 
Church. . . . Church is people of God only in and through the Body of Christ” [own translation]).  
30 See Henri de Lubac, Catholicisme: les aspects sociaux du dogme (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1947).   
31 Ratzinger, Milestones, 98. In a 1988 Foreword to an English translation of de Lubac’s Catholicism, Ratzinger 
acknowledged that he was very influenced by the French theologian’s trinitarian theology, saying that “the idea 
of the community and universality, rooted in the trini arian concept of God, permeates and shapes all the 
individual elements of Faith’s content. The idea of the Catholic, the all-embracing, the inner unity of I and Thou 
and We does not constitute one chapter of theology among others. It is the key that opens the door to the proper 
understanding of the whole” (Joseph Ratzinger, forew d to Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of 
Man by Henri de Lubac, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard & Elizabeth Englund [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1988], 11). Furthermore, Ratzinger acknowledges that de Lubac’s 1939 book Corpus Mysticum imparted to him 
a new understanding of the unity of the Eucharist and the Church. This opened up insights beyond those e had 
already received and prepared him for “the required dialogue with Augustine, something I had already been 
attempting for a long time in different ways” (Ratzinger, Milestones, 98).   
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and the individual. Under the direction of his much-loved Professor, Gottlieb Söhngen (1892-
1971), Ratzinger undertook his doctoral studies in Augustine’s ecclesiology, which according 
to his 1992 foreword, was a providential preparation for the central ecclesiological debates of 
the post-Conciliar era:  
Was die Beziehung zur heutigen theologischen Debatt angeht, so hat das Buch, wie 
mir scheint, gerade im nachkonziliaren Disput um die Kirche eine unerwartete 
Aktualität gewonnen. Das Konzil hat, wie man weiβ, dem Begriff Volk Gottes neues 
Gewicht gegeben und ihm ein ganzes Kapitel der Konstitution über die Kirche 
gewidmet. Liest man dieses Kapitel im Kontext des gamten Textes, so sieht man, 
daβ die Volk-Gottes-Aussagen in einem untrennbaren und organischen 
Zusammenhang mit allen übrigen groβen Leitworten der ekklesiologischen 
Überlieferung stehen und mit ihnen zu einer Synthese v rschmolzen sind, in der ich 
eine vollständige Bestätigung der wesentlichen Ergebnisse meines Buches, eine 
völlige innere Einheit der grundlegenden Sehweise von Kirche finde. Die Benennung 
der Kirche als Sakrament, die das Zwiete Vatikanum a s der vorangehenden 
Theologie der Zwischenkriegszeit aufgenommen hat, bezeichnet klar die 
christologisch-pneumatologische Transposition des Volk-Gottes-Begriffs; auch für 
das Zweite Vatikanum ist Ekklesiologie unlöslich an Christologie und Pneumatologie 
gebunden, womit zugleich der trinitarische Charakter von Gottes Handeln in der 
Geschichte angesprochen ist, den die Kirchenkonstitution herausstellte und der dann 
noch entschiedener und konsequenter im Dekret über die Missionen (Ad gentes) 
durchgeführt ist.32 
Ratzinger undertook his doctoral studies on Augustine from a historical theology 
perspective. By taking Augustine’s life in three stages, Ratzinger situated the North African’s 
                                                          
32 Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, xviii-xix (“As for the relationship to contemporary theological debate, the 
book has I think, precisely in the post-conciliar Church debates, gained the unexpected topicality. 
The Council has, as we know, given new weight to the term People of God and devoted an entire chapter of he 
Constitution on the Church to it. If one reads thischapter in the context of the entire text, one sees that the 
statements about the People of God have an inseparable and organic connection with all the other great 
Leitworten from the ecclesiological tradition. It fuses them into a synthesis, a complete interior unity that 
expresses the fundamental mode of seeing of Church. In it I find an acknowledgement of the main findings of 
my [own] book. The designation of the Church as sacrament, which Vatican II absorbed from the preceding 
inter-war period in theology, refers clearly to thechristological-pneumatological transposition of the People of 
God concept. And the Second Vatican Council's ecclesiology linked indissolubly christology and pneumatology, 
while also addressing the Trinitarian nature of God's action in history. This emerged in the Constitution on the 
Church and then more decisively and consistently in the Decree (Ad gentes) on the missions” [own translation]). 
From the time of this research onwards, the indispen able resource of the Fathers of the Church was clearly a 
priority for Ratzinger. From the perspective of eccl siology, it allowed him to come to terms with the m aning 
of the term εκκλησία: “It was quite clear . . . that the main emphasis in the study that I was assigned to write 
would be on the People of God as a new hermeneutical key for the purpose of clarifying the patristic view of 
what the Church is. . . . It became evident that Augustine (like the Fathers of the Church in general) w s 
completely in line with the New Testament, in which the expression ‘People of God’ appears mostly in 
quotations from the Old Testament and almost exclusively designates the people of Israel and, thus (if you will), 
the Church of the Old Covenant. The new community called together by Christ, in contrast, was named 
Ecclesia, which means assembly, a term having both an eschatological and a cultic aspect” (xiii). For a more 
recent discussion of this philological point, see Ratzinger’s Called to Communion, trans. Adrian Walker (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 29-40.    
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growing comprehension of the nature of the Church against two historical situations: 
dogmatically, against the Catholic sect of the Donatists and, apologetically, against the 
declining pagan culture of the Roman west.33 These two perspectives helped Ratzinger to see 
that self-surrender in love is God’s will for the human person’s response to the divine 
invitation to communion in the Church.  
The pagan response to the weakening supremacy of Rome was to call for the 
restoration of the traditional sacrificial offerings to the gods which were necessary for the 
blessedness (beatitudo) of the State. Augustine’s theological response was th t human 
beatitudo consists precisely in loving union with the one God. Love (amor) is the power by 
which man is thrust towards beatitudo. And beatitudo is possible only through self-surrender. 
Love, in this way, becomes the foundational principle of the Church. Ratzinger points out 
                                                          
33 Ratzinger finds that the early Augustine is attraced to the universally accessible claim which the Curch 
makes, proposing to mediate to the many what was to the philosophically minded of his day a completeness of 
salvation attainable only by very few (cf. Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, 2-12). Great emphasis is placed on 
the “infirmity” which Augustine felt was man’s plight. Man himself could not sustain or re-create the 
momentary vision of God which once came to him (cf. Conf. VII. 10, 16). Although Augustine’s early writings 
are largely philosophical, Augustine “snatches up the Bible again – and understands it anew” (Ratzinger, Volk 
und Haus Gottes, 9). Since man, on his own, is unable to bear the pur form of divine “food,” the Word of God 
mingles itself with flesh. In the Church, divine humility has provided a medicine by its own example for the 
sickness from which no person is immune. Ratzinger can be seen to be warming to a Christian Platonism for he 
cautions against presuming that Augustine’s neo-platonic beliefs –  that this world is an Abstrahlung (reflection) 
of a more real and truly intelligible world beyond our own –  are incompatible with the Gospel (cf. Ratzinger, 
Volk und Haus Gottes, 16). The journey which Augustine made from Neo-Platonism to biblical faith was 
fostered by contact with the thought of north African ecclesiology in the work of Tertullian, Cyprian d 
Optatus of Milevis. Ratzinger researches their thought (cf. 48-123) and from this begins to draw out Agustine’s 
understanding of the meaning of the Church as the “people” and “house” of God. Remarking that Augustine’s 
theology, like every great theology, grew out of “polemic against error” (against the Donatist controve sy), 
Ratzinger says that without error “movement of a living, spiritual kind is hardly thinkable” (124). The shifting 
of focus in Augustine’s writing, as Ratzinger understands it, is the movement from an intellectual emphasis to a 
concrete expression of caritas. Whereas previously, salvation may have been calculated in terms of intellectual 
insight, it now means that being in the Church is simultaneously a being-in-love. The Church is now situated 
within the mundus intelligibilis which had been heretofore the preserve of non-corporeal realities. The Church 
has a “revelation-character,” being the “factual appearing of the Invisible in this world” (153). The mature 
Augustine’s theology is formed from the debate with the last representatives of pagan culture. While also found 
in his sermons on John’s Gospel and on the Psalms, it finds its most detailed expression in De civitate Dei. 
Thomas Rausch captures, in summary, the approach whi  Ratzinger adopted in his dissertation: “In it he 
contrasted the ancient Roman ‘city of the gods’ and its cult with the true City of God now revealed in the 
Church where true worship takes place. True worship means human life lived according to God’s will and 
God’s revelation. . . . But in a pagan state or secular society, when human activity is no longer governed by a 
proper relationship with God, the demonic takes over. When God’s law is not honoured, life is no longer h ld 
sacred, materialism and consumerism rule, and the autonomous self emerges with all its self-aggrandisig 
tendencies” (Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI, 47). See also Lewis Ayres, “Ordered, transformed universe,” The 
Tablet (24 July 2010): 10-11, for a discussion on the value of viewing Ratzinger as an Augustinian thinker.   
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that it is along these lines that Augustine is able to oppose to “the ancient Roman city of the 
gods and their cultus, the City of God now revealed in the Church as the site of lawful and 
saving worship. The fundamental constitution which forms it from within is love.”34 For 
Augustine the principal meaning of sacrificial worship is human life itself, lived according to 
God’s will. It is through sin that human contact wih God is no longer capable of governing 
one’s being or behaviour. Union with a mediator who s ares mortality with us, in addition to 
beatitudo with God, becomes the way Christ is revealed in the scriptures as the Saviour of the 
world. Hence, as Aidan Nichols points out, it is out f Christ’s “own misericordia, ‘mercy,’ 
[that he] will assume our miseria, ‘wretchedness,’ to withdraw us from subjection to demons, 
and replace us in relationship to God.”35 Augustine’s analysis of love as self-surrender, in 
contrast with some form of self-sufficiency as a defence mechanism, becomes a key feature 
of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology and the Church’s role as sphere of growth in freedom.     
From the ecclesiological perspective,  the question that emerges is how does the 
mediator’s sacrifice become that of other human beigs whose flesh he has assumed (Rom. 
1:3), whose first-fruits he has become (1Cor 15:23), whose voice he has made his own as the 
head of the body, the Church (Col 1:18)? In continuity with other apologetical and patristic 
writers from the tradition,36 Augustine says we are united to Christ through the Spirit that 
dwells within us. Christ’s Spirit is the caritas of Christ which the Holy Spirit implants in the 
human heart. With this caritas, the autonomy of the individual is breached, and the realm of 
the community of Christ’s body, the Church, is formed. Although the corpus Christi is not 
directly accessible to us, we may seek and find its pre ence in the sacrament of the Eucharist, 
                                                          
34 Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, 190-191. See for example, Civ. X, 1-7.  
35 Aidan Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI, 2nd ed. (London: Burns & Oates, 2007), 31. 
36 See Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, 197-205 where he surveys early Church apologists like Irenaeus, Melito 
of Sardis, Methodius of Olympus; the anti-Arian thinkers, Athanasius and Hilary of Poitiers; as well as John 
Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria.        
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its sign in space and time.37 The close connection which Ratzinger discovers betwe n 
Augustine’s christology and ecclesiology will continue to influence him throughout his life as 
a theologian. The Church is the place where human self-sufficiency is overturned in favour of 
an environment where authentic communio can be endorsed and supported. As the body of 
Christ, the Church is the universal House of God through which authentic freedom is realised.      
With regard to the presence of the Civitas Dei – or God’s citizenry38 – in the world, 
Ratzinger supports the value of the Roman legal and philosophical tradition. He says that 
when historical theology speaks of the Fathers uniting classical western antiquity and biblical 
thought, it is generally understood as referring to the Christian reception of Hellenistic 
philosophy. He suggests that this is a somewhat false dichotomy which emphasises the genius 
of Greek over Roman thought. To his mind, on the other hand, the Latin concern for law and 
the State is extremely valuable but all too rarely noticed. For him, the contact which the 
Church’s Latin-speaking apologists made with Roman philosophy makes it an “inner factor 
in Christian theology.”39 On this point, Aidan Nichols suggests that implicitly here, Ratzinger 
“is claiming that the historical theologian, and notably the student of the Latin Fathers, is well 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 209-210. This is also an essential theme in Ratzinger’s ecclesiology which will be founded on a 
communio principle. In this area, the work of Henri de Lubac is pioneering, for he was the first in modern times 
to systematically formulate what can be described as ‘eucharistic ecclesiology.’ See Henri de Lubac, The 
Splendor of the Church, trans. Michael Mason (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), esp. 15-50; 126-160; 
Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man , 67-81; 93-105. See also Paul McPartlan, Sacrament of 
Salvation: An Introduction to Eucharistic Ecclesiology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995).  For a comprehensive 
account of the gradual evolution of eucharistic ecclesiology, see Dennis M. Doyle, Communion Ecclesiology 
(New York: Orbis, 2000).       
38 Ratzinger says Augustine and the Fathers in general do not use the term Civitas Dei to mean a theocracy but 
rather a “Bürgerschaft Gottes,” or a citizenry of God. (Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, xvi). What he 
discovered in his study of Augustine was that the image of the Church as “house of God” acts as a complement 
that offsets purely sociological interpretations of the Church understood as “people of God.” It also dmits of 
several possible ecclesiological categories – famili l, spiritual and cultic: “Because ‘house’ means die Sippe [the 
clan, the family] in the language of the ancients – and points back towards the basic form of the archaic ‘people’ 
concept, ‘people’ is the extended family, the tribe. If church is called ‘house,’ it may be available even before an 
early form of the people of God concept, and allows for an unfolding in different directions. . . . Regarding the 
importance of family, alongside the word ‘house of God,’ the sanctuary or temple comes into view and with it a 
ritualistic or cultic view of church, which may also be a spiritualization of the cultic concept: The actual temple 
is for those who believe in Christ, the community of people called by God. The idea of sacrifice, which belongs 
to the temple motif, is connected to the living God, so that, from an examination of the concept, one could 
expect the beginnings of a theology of the liturgy” [own translation] (xiii).  
39 Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, 187. 
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equipped to enter into debate about the relationship between Church and State, politics and 
the Gospel. In due course Ratzinger will make his own contributions in this area, in the form 
of a theology of political ethics.”40  
1.4.  Coming to Terms with Salvation History through Bonaventure  
Ratzinger’s post-doctoral research into Bonaventure’s (1221-74) theology of history 
had a major, almost providential influence on his life as a twentieth-century theologian.41 In 
the mid-twentieth century the idea of salvation history was moving to the centre in catholic 
theology. In Ratzinger’s own words, “[r]evelation now appeared no longer simply as a 
communication of truths to the intellect but as a historical action of God in which truth 
becomes gradually unveiled.”42 The issue to his mind was that of the connection between 
salvation history and metaphysics. In other words, how could eternal “Being” or that which is 
particular, be accessible in history and time? And from the Christian perspective: in what 
sense is it possible to reconcile the metaphysical concept of eternity with the temporal realm 
of experience without enslaving either one or both of them? He presents the question which 
critics of metaphysics ask:    
Has not the “Hellenization” of Christianity, which attempted to overcome the scandal 
of the particular by a blending of faith and metaphysics, led to a development in a 
false direction? Has it not created a static style of thought which cannot do justice to 
the dynamism of the biblical style?43  
When Bonaventure was Minister General of the Franciscans in the thirteenth-century, 
he was confronted with serious divisions within the Order. Some of this conflict arose 
                                                          
40 Aidan Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI, 30. I am indebted to Nichols’ research for alerting me to 
this aspect of Ratzinger’s exploration of Augustine.  
41 See the foreword to the American edition in Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, 
trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), xi.  
42 Ratzinger, Milestones, 104. His Doktorvater, Gottlieb Söhngen had determined that because Ratzinger had 
concluded his work in patristic theology it made sense to turn to the Middle Ages. Ratzinger himself also knew 
of Söhngen’s interest in Bonaventure so for him, the Franciscan minister general of the thirteenth-century 
seemed to present a logical development in his theological endeavours: “since the [doctoral] dissertation had 
dealt with an ecclesiological theme, I was now to turn to the other great thematic area of fundamental theology, 
namely, the concept of revelation” (ibid.).  
43 Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, xi. 
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through the influence of Joachim of Fiore (1135-1202). 44 While Bonaventure found much 
about the Joachimite doctrine problematic, not least the tensions which it created within the 
Franciscan order, he nevertheless saw St. Francis (1181-1226) as a sign of the possibility that 
a new age had indeed dawned. Ratzinger, for his part, found himself unable to accept the 
subtle dualism this set up between the time of Christ and the final consummation of history. 
Through his Habilitationsschrift research of the thirteenth-century Franciscan controversies, 
and the Collationes in Hexaemeron, which was Bonaventure’s response to the problem posed 
by Joachim, Ratzinger reproached forms of eschatology that were disposed to “a new inner-
worldly messianic hope,” “a new salvation of history,” and “an inner-historical 
transformation of the Church.” Ratzinger says that such views reject “that with Christ the 
highest degree of inner-historical fulfilment is already realised so that there is nothing left but 
                                                          
44 Aidan Nichols views Ratzinger’s encounter with thirteenth-century Franciscan controversies as a prophetic 
preparation for the future circumstances of Ratzinger’s own theological engagements. The Joachimite doctrine 
taught that “prior to history’s entry into God’s eternity there will be a ‘last age’ in which the poverty of the 
Church’s Jerusalem beginnings will blossom again in a reign of the poor on earth. Before the name ‘libration 
theology’ was ever heard of, Ratzinger had to arrive at some judgement about this uncanny thirteenth-century 
anticipation of liberationist eschatology” (Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI, 43). Heim takes a similar 
position by saying that Bonaventure resisted efforts to divide Christ and the sacramentally ordered Church from 
the pneumatological and prophetic Church of the poor. The division was intended as a utopian promise for the 
subjugated. Such issues would emerge again with the question of liberation theology. See Heim, Joseph 
Ratzinger – Kirchliche Existenz, 162-63. Bonaventure’s theology of history was largely precipitated by the 
Joachimite question which Bonaventure was caught up in after his election as Minister-General of the 
Franciscan order in 1257. The trinitarian doctrines of the charismatic Cistercian abbot from Calabria, Joachim of 
Fiore (1135-1202) were, at the time, inspiring a group of Franciscans who came to be known as the “Spirituals.” 
At the same time, Bonaventure found himself at the head of this relatively young religious order which was 
strained to breaking point by the claims of Joachim’s sympathisers. The “Spirituals,” already considered the 
most spiritual of the new mendicant orders, saw themselves as representing the beginning of a new age of the 
Spirit arising out of the tribulation of the last days. Joachim himself had claimed that the third age – the age of 
the Spirit introduced by St. Francis and his community – would dawn in the mid-thirteenth century. Joachim of 
Fiore’s trinitarian doctrine was condemned by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 although his reputation for 
sanctity was safeguarded (cf. Norman Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I- Latern V 
[vol. 1 of Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils; ed. Norman Tanner; London: Sheed & Ward 1990], 231- 3). 
Joachim’s view that history could be divided into consecutive epochs found its model in the Trinitarian view of 
God. The Age of the Father would give way to the agof the Son and later the Spirit. This latter age was to be 
lived in the liberty of the spiritualis intellectus proceeding from the Old and New Testaments and would see the 
rise of new religious orders to convert the whole world and usher in the “Ecclesia Spiritualis.” Joachim never 
advanced his doctrine of the third age to a point of endangering ecclesiastical authority, but his expectations 
concerning history had a far-reaching influence in the following centuries among groups who carried his ideas 
to revolutionary conclusions, notably certain Franciscans and Fraticelli. See The Oxford Dictionary of the 




an eschatological hope for that which lies beyond history.”45 He believes that the vehicle 
through which revelation is imparted to us is via history as time and space but that the content 
of revelation itself can in no way be blurred. Therefo e, he advocates a christocentric view of 
reality which has a distinction but no dualism betwen the content and mode of revelation, as 
opposed to the competitive antagonism that one finds between inner-worldly progressivist, 
and other-worldly metaphysical eschatologies. At its core, Ratzinger found himself unable to 
accept that the desire for progress could be satisfied olely from within history. Viewing the 
potential of human dignity and freedom in that way does not reflect the truth of human nature 
nor is it in line with the pattern of eschatology in the New Testament because: 
Denn hier ist in gewissem Sinn ein neues, zweites Ende neben Christus aufgerichtet, 
und wenn er auch noch immer als Mitte alle Dinge trägt und hält, so ist er doch nicht 
mehr einfach das Telos, in dem alles mündet und in dem die Welt beendet und 
überwunden ist.46 
A dualistic view of reality could never satisfy the uman desire for happiness and, as such, 
according to Ratzinger, Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaemeron represented “a battle 
against a self-sufficient philosophy standing over against faith.”47 From his research, 
Ratzinger concluded that “philosophy must be integrated into the truth coming from 
Revelation.”48   
For his own part, the encounter with Bonaventure’s eschatology would enable 
Ratzinger to appropriate the christocentricity that w s becoming a major theme of Catholic 
dogma in the middle of the twentieth-century.49 Bonaventure presses God’s revelation to the 
point where Christ occupies the very centre of all time and activity, even of all the sciences. 
Christ is the medium distantiae, or defining centre, in his Crucifixion:   
                                                          
45 Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, 13-14.  
46 Ratzinger, Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura, 117 (“For here, in a sense, a new, second end 
adjacent Christ is erected, and although he still bears and holds all things, he is no longer simply the telos in 
whom everything flows, and in whom the world is endd and overcome” [own translation]). 
47 Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, 160. 
48 Ibid. 
49 A particularly helpful handbook to Bonaventure’s christology is Ilia Delio, Simply Bonaventure: An 
Introduction to His Life, Thought, and Writings (New York: New City Press, 2001).    
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Die verlorene Mitte eines Kreises findet man wieder urch zwei rechtwinklig sich 
schneidende Geraden, d.h. durch ein Kreuz. Das will sagen: Christus hat durch sein 
Kreuz die Geometrie-Aufgabe der Weltgeschichte endgültig gelöst, hat mit seinem 
Kreuz die verlorene Mitte des Weltenkreises konstruiert und damit der Bewegung des 
Einzellebens zunächst, aber dann auch der Menscheitgeschichte überhaupt ihre 
Richtung und ihren Sinn wiedergegeben.50 
Captivated by this christocentric insight, Ratzinger says “the theory of the cycle of time is 
exposed as the primordial heresy” which is tantamount to reducing human freedom to 
falsehood because it would, of necessity, be cyclical and destined to mechanical repetition. 
Christ as the defining centre, on the other hand, was able to bring resolution to an 
Aristotelianism which held to a philosophical doctrine of the eternity of the world, 
symbolised most frequently as an eternal circle.51  
                                                          
50 Ratzinger, Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura, 147 (“The lost centre of the circle can be found 
again by means of two intersecting lines at right angles, that is, by a cross. That is to say that Christ, through his 
cross, solved the geometry object of the history of the world. With his cross, Christ has finally constructed the 
lost middle of the cyclical world, and thus renders direction and meaning, firstly, to the movement of he 
individual life, but then also to the history of mankind” [own translation]). By presenting Christ as the centre – 
the medium distantiae – Ratzinger draws the conclusion that Bonaventure regards the doctrine of the eternally 
cyclical character of the world to be a philosophical error. See ibid., 144-48 for a full discussion on the circular 
and linear concept of time in Bonaventure. From his engagement with the medieval theologian, Ratzinger 
understands that the concepts of time and history find resolution in the message of Christianity, even if i  
Bonaventure it may be expressed in a way that seems so ewhat primitive for the modern mindset: “Actually, it 
is not a question of a returning movement, but of aunified, progressive, ascending movement. But the ascent of 
this movement is realised in such a way that the basic structural law of the earlier level is repeated on the higher 
level. So we might be justified in speaking of a spiral, and here we would find an indication of the connection 
between the idea of a circle with the idea of a progressive line. Bonaventure always remains conscious of the 
unique and unrepeatable character of that which takes place in history” (Ratzinger, The Theology of History in 
St. Bonaventure, 147).     
51 See Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, 148. The greater part of the final chapter of 
Ratzinger’s, Habilitation, entitled “Aristotelianism and the Theology of History,”  is a discussion of the 
influence of Christian revelation upon Aristotelian metaphysics. Latin Averroism, the mid-thirteenth century 
introduction into Europe of the thought of Aristotle hat changed the predominantly Platonic understanding of 
theology, promulgated that it was possible to arrive at twin truths, namely one reached through reason nd the 
other through faith. In Ratzinger’s view, Bonaventure’s endeavour to work out the relationship between history 
and metaphysics by viewing theology as “nothing other an the understanding of Scripture,” (67) was an 
attempt to halt the influence of Aristotelian ideas. Philosophy was becoming increasingly self-sufficient as an 
autonomous discipline based on natural reason. For all the positive insights, Ratzinger concludes that
Bonaventure’s thought not only developed in an anti-Aristotelian direction, but developed “into a general anti-
philosophical attitude” (160). See Rik Van Nieuwenhove, “Catholic Theology in the Thirteenth Century and the 
Origins of Secularism,” Irish Theological Quarterly 75 (2010): 339-354, which amends the view that medieval 
Catholic theology was uniform in its response to Aristotelianism. Nor is it the case that the introduction of 
Aristotle’s works, per se, caused the separation of faith and reason, theology and philosophy. In fact, Van 
Nieuwenhove suggests it was Bonaventure’s lack of trust in reason that indirectly contributed to the separations. 
The thomistic response, on the other hand, placed a greater trust in reason. Ultimately, Van Nieuwenhove 
concludes, the ability to recognise the untenable nature of autonomous reason, together with the capacity to 
acknowledge the integrity of philosophy are important elements to be kept in balance in any modern theological 
response to secularism. 
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In subsequent years Ratzinger continued to warn agai st the tendency to measure 
history, without qualification, by the progress made from within it. In the Preface to a 
compilation of writings which were first published in 1982, he restated the importance of 
understanding the value of history for the present: “A frequently recurring problem in the 
intellectual climate of our age is that of reconcili g history with the present – of transforming 
the events and words of a time now past into the realities and needs of the present.”52 In a 
passage where he interprets the human consciousness of hi tory as the immediate form of all 
religious experience, he claims there is an important sense in which salvation comes to 
humanity through history. It is incumbent therefore n every new generation to struggle with 
establishing the right societal form for humanity. History ensures “the individual is no longer 
exposed alone to the abyss of his own existence but sees himself as the member of a race, a 
nation, a culture that bestows directly upon him the form and direction of that existence, that 
guarantees him safety, freedom, life – that is ‘salvation’.”53 Ratzinger claims that people are 
interested in the faith of the Church to the extent ha  it transmits an explanation for the 
meaning of existence. This faith proves its trustwor hiness by demonstrating within history 
the credibility of the truths it promulgates: 
Der Mensch vertraut sich unmittelbar nicht deswegen d m Glauben der Kirche an, 
weil er durch historische Beweise zu der Überzeugung gekommen ist, daß die im 
Neuen Testament berichteten Ereignisse das unwiderlegliche Zentrum aller 
Geschichte sind, sondern deswegen, weil er in der vom Glauben geformten und 
gefüllten Welt den tragenden Boden seines Lebens findet, der ihm Sinn und Heil und 
Heimat gibt. . . . [D]ies alles gewährt ihm die ruhige Sicherheit, die ihn sein Dasein 
erfüllen läßt und die er auch mit dem Preis mancher Mühsal zu bezahlen bereit ist; die 
konkret anwesende christliche Geschichte gibt ihm Form und Freiheit seines Lebens 
und wird deswegen als Heil hingenommen.54 
                                                          
52 Joseph Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, trans. Mary 
Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), . 
53 Ibid., 153. 
54 Joseph Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre: Bausteine zur Fundamentaltheologie (Donauwörth: Eric 
Wewel, 2005), 160-61 (“Man directly entrusts himself to the faith of the Church, not because he came, by 
historical evidence, to the conclusion that the events in the New Testament are the irrefutable centre of all of 
history, but because he finds the sustaining basis of his life in a world shaped and completed by faith, one that 
gives him meaning and salvation and a home. . . . [A]ll this allows him the quiet assurance that lets him fulfil his 
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Nevertheless, theory cannot guarantee success. Whenthe Church fails to give 
expression to the meaning of existence, doubts about the capacity of religious history to 
uphold human salvation precipitates a humanitarian crisis and an absence of freedom: 
Erst wo diese Geschichte anfängt, in Widerspruch zu fundamentalen Erfahrungen 
seines Lebens zu treten, wo sie, statt den Menschen zu bergen, ihn zerteilt und 
zerreißt, wo sie, statt einen Weg zu geben, das Dilemma der Existenz ins 
Unerträgliche steigert, wo sie endlich in ihrer eigenen Gestalt zu schwanken beginnt 
und sich selbst fraglich macht, da wird solche Geschichte zum Problem. Es entsteht 
der Verdacht, daß die Geschichte nicht zum Wesen hinführt, sondern es betäubt, daß 
sie nicht Heilung, sondern Opium ist, nicht Weg zum Eigentlichen, sondern die Form 
der Entfremdung. Wo solchermaßen das Geschichtsbewußtsein erschüttert ist, gerät 
der geschichtlich seiende Mensch selbst in die Krise, er muß fragend und handelnd 
sich einen neuen Weg bahnen.55 
In such a scenario, an impulsive desire to reject history portrays “progress” as the 
norm and goal of human behaviour and as its highest moral qualification. Ratzinger is 
distinctly uncomfortable with a vision of history which views progress – namely, the dealings 
of humanity with the material world – as the way to bring forth a new humanity or a new 
society. The human person, born in history, cannot be reduced to an evolutionary process 
whose only measure is found in its contribution to a future as yet unknown.  
Progress is no doubt a positive part of integral human development but Ratzinger says 
that every person is a reminder of the boundary limits to progress, closing the door to a false 
escape into the future. The danger with an overstatd philosophy of secular history, with its 
faith in progress, is that human freedom becomes negligible. Rather than the creation of a 
unique person of possibility, each individual merely joins a process of securing progress. On 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
existence, and for which he is ready to pay the price of many hardships. The concrete presence of Christian 
history gives shape and freedom to his life and is therefore accepted as salvation” [own translation]). 
55 Ibid., 161 (“But when this history begins to enter into conflict with the fundamental experiences of his life, 
when it cuts and tears him rather than shelters him, when instead of offering a way it makes the dilemma of 
existence increasingly unbearable, [and] when, finally, it begins to falter in its own form and makes itself 
questionable, then such history become a problem. There is then the suspicion that history does not lead to 
being, but is deafens, that it is not healing but opium, not a way to the essential, but a form of alienation. When 
historical consciousness is shaken in such a way, the historically existent man gets himself into a crisis, and he 
must question and struggle to carve a new path” [own translation]). 
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the other hand, a philosophy of salvation history respects human freedom and humanity’s 
quest for liberation, now no longer seen as the pursuit of “ideal” historical conditions:        
Der Mensch als Mensch bleibt sich in primitiven wie in technisch entwickelten 
Situationen gleich und steht nicht einfach deshalb öher, weil er mit besser 
entwickelten Geräten umzugehen gelernt hat. Das Menschsein beginnt in allen 
Menschen neu. Deswegen kann es die endgültig neue, fortgeschrittene und heile 
Gesellschaft nicht geben, auf die nicht bloß die großen Ideologien gehofft haben, 
sondern die – nachdem die Hoffung auf das Jenseits abgebaut wurde – immer mehr 
zum allgemeinen Hoffnungsziel wird. Eine endgültig heile Gesellschaft würde das 
Ende der Freiheit voraussetzen. Weil aber der Mensch immer frei bleibt, in jeder 
Generation neu beginnt, darum muss auch die rechte Form der Gesellschaft immer 
neu in den je neuen Bedingungen errungen werden.56  
 
1.5.   Exploring the Truth of Being Human 
 Ratzinger’s ideas on the human person cannot be describ d satisfactorily merely as an 
anthropology. For him what is at issue is the Christian vision of the person taken as a whole, 
encompassing the individual person’s creation and relationship with their creator, their 
presence in the world and relationship with others, their destiny and religious identity. His 
own participation in the deliberations of the Council, and his observations regarding the 
reception of the Council’s teachings on being human, demonstrate his striving to understand 
“the totality of the self” which marks his approach.57 
During the course of the debates on Schema XIII that led to the drafting and 
promulgation of the Conciliar Constitution Gaudium et spes, Ratzinger says the Council 
Fathers began debating the idea a new way of speaking which, for authoritative decrees, 
                                                          
56 Ratzinger, Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs, 23-24 (“Man, precisely as man, remains the same both in primitive 
and in technologically developed situations. He does not stand on a higher level merely because he has learned 
to use more highly developed tools. Mankind begins a ew in every single individual. This is why it is not 
possible for the definitively new, ideal society to exist – that society built on progress, which not only was the 
hope of the great ideologies, but increasingly became the general object of human hope once hope in a life fter 
death had been dismantled. A definitively ideal society presupposes the end of freedom. But since man remains 
free and begins anew in every generation, we have to struggle in each new situation to establish the right 
societal form” [Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 25-26]).    
57 See Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 393.  
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might substitute a missionary orientation focused on proclamation.58 However, he detected in 
the Schema a structural problem, namely, the dichotomy between biblicism and modernity, 
whereby biblical citations were little more than ornamental, while theological statements 
were largely divorced from their own origins. Even though the draft text began with the 
honourable motive of avoiding a systematic and one-sid d neo-scholasticism in order to 
speak to modern man, Ratzinger believed the result was that “the Bible is pushed back even 
more than it was by [the drafters] scholastic predec ssors.”59 In the urgency “to replace 
authoritarian disposition with dialogue,”60 an impression was given which led one to ask, 
“what does it all mean for people, when everything can be described perfectly well without 
theology?”61 The dichotomy prompted Ratzinger to stress the fact that 
Es gibt da außer dieser doch recht einleuchtenden Vorstellung vom Menschen als 
einem Wesen, das zur Herrschaft über die Welt berufen ist und das sich frei über sein 
Schicksal zu entscheiden vermag, auch noch die Christologie, die besagt, dass der 
Mensch nur von Christus erlöst werden kann.62 
The impression which the drafters of the text gave was that  
[. . . ] die Verfasser selbst das Christologische, di  zentralen christlichen und durchaus 
nur im Glauben anzunehmenden Aussagen, für eine zweite Welt ansahen, die neben 
der ersten des ordentlichen, gewöhnlichen Lebens einherläuft und mit der man die 
Menschheit nicht vorzeitig und nicht unnötig behellig n sollte.63 
To Ratzinger’s mind, the danger of faith becoming a ideology looms large here. If 
faith had only to do with a “second world,” then those who seek refuge there would be 
seeking asylum from reality. Ratzinger says that either faith in Christ really concerns the 
                                                          
58 See Joseph Ratzinger,“Die letzte Sitzungsperiode des Konzils” in Rudolf Voderholzer et al., eds. Zur Lehre 
des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils, vol. 7 of Joseph Ratzinger Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Gerhard Ludwig 
Müller (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2012), 547-552 (hereafter GS:LVK). Translations from this text are my 
own. 
59 Ibid., 544. Ratzinger says the French drafters of the document wanted to speak to contemporary man by not 
beginning immediately with ultimate theological considerations. They were motivated by the need to leave the 
theological ghetto and avoid scholarly jargon.  
60 Ibid., 540. 
61 Ibid., 545. 
62 Ibid. (“Besides this rather obvious idea of man as a being who is called upon to rule the world and able to 
decide freely about his fate, there is also still christology, which says that man may only be redeemed by 
Christ.”) 
63 Ibid. (“[. . .] that christological, and central Christian statements are anticipated only in faith and that this is a 
second world running next to the first and immediate world of regular, common life, and people need not be 
prematurely and unnecessarily bothered with it.”) 
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centre of human existence in such a way that the one who accepts it is the one in a position to 
begin describing the human mode of existence realistically, or else the world of faith is a 
world separate from the ordinary world of experience. Ratzinger tries to liberate theology 
from the error of proposing that the human person traverses two separate worlds. He 
describes this issue of contact between faith and the world of today as “the dilemma between 
the claim of faith and the claim of freedom in dialogue.”64 On the one hand, there is an 
obvious need for dialogue but this ought not to be at the expense of the person of faith 
holding to the true content of their beliefs. Indee, he said, to proceed on the basis of the 
Schema – that faith is “a conversational search into obscure matters” – would be dishonest, 
for it would be to suggest that for a person of faith, the act of sifting through the experience 
of modernity is enough to unearth the meaning of human existence. To portray the faith 
community as a parallel stream of consciousness, as if it did not equally consist of frail 
human beings as much as the general population, “as if the ‘People of God’ were one 
sociological group, among others, which then seeks to be combined with other groups,” is 
equivalent to a situation whereby “the spiritual claims of faith [are] scaled so large as to be 
profoundly over-reached.”65 As Benedict XVI said in 2012 about the nature of dialogue: 
“[w]e do not possess the truth, the truth possesses u : Christ, who is the truth, has taken us by 
the hand, and we know that his hand is holding us securely on the path of our quest for 
knowledge."66 Therefore the person of faith is not so much claiming to make a contribution to 
the anomalies outstanding in society, as they are witnessing to the very meaning which 
upholds the human person and society in the first instance. Only this can underpin the true 
nature of the dialogue between faith and the world f today. Hence, Ratzinger says  
                                                          
64 Ibid., 546. 
65 Ibid., 547. 
66 See Benedict XVI, Address to the Members of the Roman Curia at the Traditional Exchange of Christmas 
Greetings, 21 December 2012, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2012/december/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20121221_auguri-curia_en.html (accessed 21 December 2012). 
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Aber der Partner weiß ja in Wirklichkeit doch, dass der Glaubende die Sache gar nicht 
für so dunkel halt und halten kann, wenn er wahrheit glaubt. Er fühlt sich leicht durch 
den Anschein des Suchens und Fragens hintergangen, wen  er bedenkt, dass der 
Glaube den Zweifel nicht zum Inhalt, sondern zum Gegensatz hat.67 
Ratzinger believes that the Schema, while motivated by the desire for dialogue, was 
driven by “an almost naïve progressivist optimism, which was hardly aware of the 
ambivalence of all external progress.”68 And progress, as we saw from his study of 
Bonaventure, is something Ratzinger views as having “a  almost eerie two-facedness” – as 
having the capacity to make possible both human self-destruction and genuine 
humanisation.69 Here one meets the Rubicon of the Christian view of the one and whole 
human person as both a material and spiritual being. To Ratzinger’s mind, the dignity of 
creaturehood implies belonging to the universe and,t the same time, being in relation to 
God. In an interview given in 2000, Ratzinger speaks of “the double nature of man” which 
refers to the “something” more which does not come from the earth and which has not simply 
been developed, but rather is completely new – God’s wn breath (cf. Gen 2:7): 
Der christliche Glaube sagt, daß das, was hier über den ersten Menschen mitgeteilt 
wird, von jedem Menschen gilt. Daß jeder einzelne Mensch einerseits biologisch 
entstanden ist, andererseits aber mehr ist als nur ei  Produkt vorhandener Gene und 
einer DNA, sondern etwas, was direct von Gott herkommt. Der Mensch hat den Atem 
Gottes. Er ist gottfähig, er kann das Materielle, das Geschaffene überschreiten. Er ist 
einmalig. Er steht in Gottes Augen und ist in einer b sonderen Weise auf ihn 
zugeordnet. In ihm ist tatsächlich ein neuer Atem, das göttliche Element, in die 
Schöpfung hereingetragen. Dieses besondere Geschaffensein von Gott zu sehen ist sehr 
wichtig, um die Einzigkeit und Würde des Menschen und damit den Grund aller 
Menschenrechte zu erkennen. Es gibt dem Menschen die Ehrfurcht vor sich selber und 
vor dem anderen. In ihm ist Gottes Atem da. Er sieht, daß er nicht nur eine 
Kombination von Bausteinen ist, sondern eine persönliche Idee Gottes.70   
                                                          
67 GS:LVK, 546 (“However, the partner in dialogue knows that, in reality, the believer does not hold to things so 
obscurely. The believer could not if he truly believes. The partner feels slightly cheated by the apperance of 
searching and disputing, when he considers that doubt is not the content, but the opposite of faith.”) 
68 Ibid., 549. 
69 Ibid., 556. See this dissertation § 1.4. 
70 Ratzinger, Gott und die Welt, 66-67 (“The Christian faith says that what we learn here about the first man is 
true of every man. That each and every human being has, on the one hand, a biological origin and yet, on the 
other, is more than just a product of the available genes and DNA, but comes directly from God. Man has within 
him the breath of God. He is capable of relating to God. He can pass beyond material creation. He is unique. He 
stands in the sight of God and is in a special sense directed toward God. There is indeed a new breath within 
him, the divine factor that has been introduced into creation. It is most important to see this special creation by 
God in order to perceive the uniqueness and value of man and thereby, the basis of all human rights. [It gives the 
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Ratzinger approaches his study of the human person in relational terms between Creator and 
creature. To his mind, respecting God’s will for creation safeguards against misunderstanding 
the truth about human nature. In his vision, the relationality present between Creator and 
creature respects the truth that “[e]very person comes, of himself, out of the freedom of God 
and stands in that freedom as of his own right.”71   
The essential tension in human existence, as Ratzinger expresses it, is that with the 
greatness of humanity comes the danger of falling from greatness. This tension, however, 
ought not to lead to a dualistic anthropology designed to neutralise the truth about being 
human by splitting up the material and spiritual nature of creaturehood. For Ratzinger, such a 
move would mean not merely capitulating to a false understanding of humanity but would 
undermine human freedom, which is, being created fre and being free to be creative.72 
Corkery says that Ratzinger’s view of the person includes a “normed freedom”: 
So our true situation is as follows: we have a respon ibility to shape our lives, always 
in fidelity to what we have received as created beings. This means that our dialogue 
with our Creator is a genuine dialogue in which we are neither cut loose in history 
without a compass to guide us nor so rigidly pre-sktched that we have no freedom of 
our own. Our freedom is a normed freedom – not blind and directionless, but guided by 
the light of what is given to us with our creation. And our history is a struggle between 
living in line with the “pull” of this created, relational freedom or else rejecting this 
“pull” and striking out, in an attempted independenc  of all relationships, towards a 
relationless existence that is, ultimately, a refusal to love.73   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
people reverence for themselves and for others.] God’s breath is within him. He sees that he is not just a 
combination of biological building blocks, but a personal conception of God” [Ratzinger, God and the World: 
Believing and Living in Our Time, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 76-77]). The 
clause in italics does not appear in this English translation. I have added my own translation of these missing 
words which are found in the original German text. 
71 Ratzinger, God and the World, 137. 
72 See Benedict XVI, Address to the Members of the Roman Curia at the Traditional Exchange of Christmas 
Greetings, 21 December 2012, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2012/december/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20121221_auguri-curia_en.html (accessed 21 December 2012). 
73 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 41-42. One of Ratzinger’s key lines of enquiry is the 
connection he draws between freedom and love. He bas s his argument on an anthropology – which, to his mind 
is inadequate – that maintains that dependence is a perversion of love because it leads to an untenabl 
infringement on one’s autonomy: “God did not create a god of evil; he did not make an alternative counter-god. 
What he did create was freedom and the state of affairs that our judgement is often unable to hold firm under the 
pressure of that freedom. . . . And the threat always develops in this way: the greater a being is, the more it 
wants to determine its own life. It wants to be less and less dependent and, thus, more and more itself a kind of 
god, needing no one else at all. This is how the desire arises to become free of all need, what we call pride. 
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A particularly significant insight into Ratzinger’s view of the human person came in a 
1985 response to questions about Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1712-1778) Enlightenment view 
that the human person is good by nature and is only corrupted by false education and by 
social structures in need of reform (i.e. a change of “system” would allow a person to live 
peaceably with oneself and others). Ratzinger said th t if he was ever freed from his curial 
responsibilities, he would devote himself to the thme of original sin and the rediscovery of 
its authentic reality, for this is critical to the Christian understanding of the human person: 
[. . .] wenn man nicht mehr versteht, daß sich der M nsch in einem Zustand der (nicht 
nur ökonomischen und sozialen und folglich in einer mit seiner eigenen Anstrengungen 
allein nicht lösbaren) Entfremdung befindet, versteht man nicht mehr die 
Notwendigkeit des Erlösers Christus. Die ganze Struktu  des Glaubens ist somit 
bedroht. Die Unfähigkeit, die “Erbsünde” zu verstehen und verständlich zu machen, ist 
wirklich eines der schwerwiegendsten Probleme der gegenwärtigen Theologie und 
Pastoral.74  
In all of this, a criticism sometimes levied against Ratzinger’s understanding of the 
Church-world binary is that it contains a disproportionately negative view of the human 
person inspired by a neo-platonic-Augustinian repudiation of worldly experience in favour of 
a petrified and secure otherworldliness.75 As we saw previously, Augustine’s vision of a 
weak human countenance does influence Ratzinger’s appro ch to ecclesiology and the need 
for a mediator to heal humanity of its nfirmitatem aspectus (frailty of face/being).76 Indeed, 
one commentator writes that “Ratzinger’s thought remains deeply influenced by the 
pessimism about the human evident in Augustine. The confidence one finds in Aquinas 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
There is always a certain temptation intrinsic in all spiritual being. It consists in a kind of perversion by which 
love is seen as dependence and no longer as the only gift that can truly bring me alive. So that one se  this 
relationship no longer as life-giving, but as a limitation of one’s own independence” (Ratzinger, God and the 
World, 125). See this dissertation § 5.3.  
74 Joseph Ratzinger, Zur Lage des Glaubens: Ein Gespräch mit Vittorio Messori (München: Neue Stadt, 1985), 
79-80 (“[I]f it is in fact no longer understood tha man is in a state of alienation [that is not only economic and 
social and, consequently, one that is not resolvable by his efforts alone], one no longer understands the necessity 
of Christ the Redeemer. The whole structure of the faith is threatened by this. The inability to understand 
‘original sin’ and to make it understandable is really one of the most difficult problems of present-day theology 
and pastoral ministry” [Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report, 79]). 
75 See Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 49-51; Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI, 49-52; Gibson, The 
Rule of Benedict, 156-62; Allen, Pope Benedict XVI ,35-6. 
76 Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, 9. See Conf. VII. 10.16: “. . . et reverberasti infirmitatem aspectus 
mei, radians in me vehementer. . .” (“. . . you beat back the infirmity of my being, radiating your light forcibly 
upon me . . .”). See this dissertation § 1.3.  
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concerning the integrity of human knowing and willing is absent in Ratzinger.”77 James 
Corkery, too, identifies a pessimistic outlook in Ratzinger, describing his approach to the 
person as being built on a “spirituality of discontinuity” where “the Christian is the human 
turned around.” Thus Ratzinger has a “stark, reversing, radically self-emptying (and rather 
Balthasarian) anthropology.”78  
While he may be accused in this way of an outmoded pessimism, it is precisely 
Ratzinger’s unsentimental approach to the human person that leads him to focus on the issue 
of human freedom in an ecclesiological context. In 1975, some years after his first 
commentary on the Council, he acknowledged that while Gaudium et spes was entirely in 
keeping with the Church’s tradition by forming “a kind of summa of Christian 
anthropology,”79 he was nevertheless uneasy about its concept of “world” (particularly in the 
document’s Preface and despite many attempts to clarify it in sub-section two) which, to his 
mind, was pre-theological and which precisely in that form had exercised a marked influence 
on contemporary ecclesiology: 
                                                          
77 Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI, 50. In Rausch’s view, Ratzinger’s instincts in relation to the accomplishments of 
modernity draw him towards the somewhat more pessimi tic view of the human person in Calvin and Luther 
rather than the confident view of human nature found in Aquinas and many modern commentators. Hence, 
Ratzinger “frequently quotes Luther, and, like Luther, he emphasises a theologia crucis, a theology of the cross 
that stresses the priority of grace over human achievement, philosophical reason, or ecclesial power” (50). This 
dissertation will contest the notion that the integrity of knowing and willing are absent in Ratzinger. See this 
dissertation §§ 2.2.4., 4.2. and 9.1.4.  
78 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 50-51. Corkery gives an accessible and informative account 
of Ratzinger’s basic anthropological stance in a chpter entitled “On Being Human.” See ibid., 37-51. While his 
judgement is characteristically respectful, it nonetheless considers Ratzinger’s outlook on the human person to 
be deficient: “Overall, I incline away from the starkness of the Ratzinger anthropological approach. This may 
reflect a failure in spiritual insight on my part, not least about the seriousness of human sinfulness and the depth 
of our need for repentance. Yet, an excessive concentration on the need to be changed can miss other things – 
and can even cause the stimulus to repentance that comes with seeing other things to be missed. For example, 
what of the ordinary goodness encountered in everyday life – not only those who will one day be saints 
(Ratzinger’s ‘simple, humble’ believers) – but also in those who live the drudgery of existence with some 
grumbling, to be sure, but mostly with graciousness and, if not quite with that, certainly with humour and 
generosity” (50). There is a remarkable consistency between Corkery’s current position on this and the 
standpoint he took on the issue in his doctoral dissertation in 1991. See Corkery, The Relationship between 
Human Existence and Christian Salvation, 470-493.       
79 Joseph Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 379. 
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Mit “Welt” ist im Grunde der Geist der Neuzeit gemeint, dem gegenüber sich das 
kirchliche Gruppebewußtsein als ein getrenntes Subjekt erfuhr, das nun nach heißem 
und kaltem Krieg auf Dialog und Kooperation drängte.80 
His concern is that the weakening of ecclesial identity which this document leaves itself 
liable to in its attempt to dialogue with the world, paradoxically manages to isolate the 
Church in the very place in which it does not want to find itself: 
Die Konstitution versteht unter “Welt” ein Gegenüber zur Kirche. Der Text soll dazu 
dienen, beide in ein positives Verhältnis der Kooperation zu bringen, dessen Ziel der 
Aufbau der “Welt” ist. Die Kirche kooperiert mit der Welt, um die Welt aufzubauen – 
so könnte man die prägende Vision des Textes charakterisieren. Undeutlich bleibt 
dabei, ob die kooperierende Welt und die aufgebaute Welt ein und dasselbe sind; 
undeutlich bleibt, was in jedem Einzelfall mit Welt gemeint ist. Jedenfalls aber kann 
man feststellen, daß die Verfasser, die sich selbst a s die Sprecher der Kirche wissen, 
von dem Gefühl ausgehen, selber nicht Welt, sondern ihr gegenüber und bisher auch in 
einem unbefriedigenden Verhältnis oder noch in gar keinem Verhältnis zu ihr zu 
stehen. Demgemäß könnte man eine Art von Getto-Komplex konstatieren: Die Kirche 
wird als geschlossene Größe erfahren, drängt aber dazu, iese Situation zu überwinden. 
Unter Welt sind anscheinend die gesamte wissenschaftli -technische Realität der 
Gegenwart und alle Menschen verstanden, die sie trag n bzw. in ihrer Mentalität 
beheimatet sind.81  
Ratzinger is distinctly uncomfortable with the suggestion that the Christian has nothing 
in common with “modern” man unless both believe. To his mind, belief does not exclude the 
believer from the modern world which, ultimately, is the only world into which mortals are 
born. Therefore, the Christian is bound to present the intrinsic authority of God’s truth by 
proclamation of the Gospel without directly impeding, but rather enhancing the good that is 
                                                          
80 Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, 400 (“‘World’ is basically the spirit of the modern age, over against 
the Church’s group consciousness of being a separate subject, which now, after a hot and cold war, is urged to 
dialogue and cooperation [own translation]). 
81 Ibid., 397 (“The Constitution defines ‘world’ as a counterpart to the Church. The text is intended to bring both 
into a positive relationship of cooperation, which aims to build the ‘world.’ The Church cooperates with the 
world, to build up the world – one might characteriz  thus the defining vision of the text. It remains u clear 
whether the world that cooperates and the world that is being constructed are one and the same; it is ind tinct as 
to what is meant by the world in each case. In any case, however, one can find that the authors, who know 
themselves as the spokespersons for the Church, operate from the feeling of not being the world, but as standing 
in opposition to it, and that even up to now they were in an unsatisfactory relation or even in no relation to her. 
Accordingly, one could find a form of ghetto complex: The Church is experienced as an enclosed reality, but is 
pushing to overcome this situation. Under the term ‘world,’ the document appears to mean the entire sci ntific 
and technological reality of the present and all the people who are located in such a mentality” [own 
translation]). The sense of the German word gegenüber is difficult to convey here. It could also be translated as 
something akin to “counterpart.” Ultimately, Ratzinger conveys the idea that the logic behind the drafting of GS 
is that a world-Church dichotomy be acknowledged as a negative presumption that has dogged intellectual 
history. Therefore the time for a r pprochement has come. Ratzinger takes issue with both the idea that the 
Church and the world be perceived as parallel universes, and the idea that they become subsumed into one 
another until all definition of the supra-historical goal of creation is lost. 
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within modern culture. Faith ought not to obstruct what is good in the world but rather to 
inform each human person of the possibilities and limits of their God-given nature. For 
Ratzinger, on-going personal and internal conversion to truth is the dialogue which brings 
about improved relationships with God and amongst the human family.   
Ratzinger’s discomfort with naive optimism towards the “world” is something that will 
come to dominate his thought more and more as he mov s from the university setting to 
Rome. While on the one hand, he couldn’t be accused of having an overly optimistic view of 
human nature, on the other hand, with regard to the issue of whether his anthropology merits 
designation as a form of Augustinian pessimism or sincere Christian realism, the overriding 
factor is his pastoral concern for humanity. As James Corkery says, there is a “pastoral 
concern that marks his writing – particularly his writings on the human being. These are 
focused on showing to the men and women of his timehat the Church’s faith is the pathway 
to genuine humanity.”82 Tracey Rowland is even pithier in her medicinal analysis:  
For Ratzinger, the whole point of Gaudium et spes, correctly interpreted, is that a 
“daring new” Christocentric theological anthropology is the medicine that the world 
needs, and that it is the responsibility of the Churc  to administer it. He is critical of 
interpretations which would transform Christianity into what he provocatively calls a 
“poorly managed haberdashery that is always trying to lure more customers.”83  
                                                          
82 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 37. 
83 Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 46. The extended quotation from Ratzinger helps to broaden out the context of 
Rowland’s words: “[w]hat Christian renewal should mean in the concrete depends on how we answer the 
question: ‘What does “Christian” really mean?’ – not the question: ‘What does contemporary society demand?’ 
Unfortunately, although Christianity is not a department store that must anxiously gear its advertising to the 
tastes and desires of its clientele because it has merchandise to sell off that it neither wants nor needs, it is all too 
often compelled to act as though it were. But if this were its nature, we could confidently predict its imminent 
bankruptcy. Actually, however, the Christian faith is rather (to use the admittedly one-sided and weak im ge) 
the divine medicine that would never adapt itself to the wishes of its clientele and to what pleases th m, for that 
would be to destroy them utterly. Its role must be o require them to turn away from imaginary need, which is in 
reality their sickness, and to entrust themselves to the guidance of the faith. In terms of this imagery we can 
distinguish true from false reform by saying: true eform is that which is concerned with the hidden rality of 
Christianity, which allows itself to be challenged and formed by it; false reform, on the contrary, is that which 
does not lead but trails behind and so transforms Christianity into a poorly managed haberdashery that is lways 
trying to lure more customers. It should be noted that his is by no means a criticism of what we calltoday ‘on-
going pastoral care’” (Joseph Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes: Entwürfe zur Ekklesiologie [Düsseldorf: 
Patmos-Verlag, 1969], 95-96; repr. in Co-Workers of the Truth: Meditations for Every Day of the Year [San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992], 340-41). 
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While the issue of pessimism or realism in Ratzinger may remain a matter of debate 
amongst scholars, his theology is impossible to comprehend without acknowledging the 
direction in which it lies – namely, a pastoral conern calling for a close connection between 
anthropology and ecclesiology. His experiences of the Council and its reception, coupled 
with his own studies, make him cautious of the pitfalls associated with the promise of inner-
worldly perfection without personal conversion. As we shall see in the following chapters, 
further examination of his anthropology and ecclesiology from the perspective of human 
freedom confirms the close link between these two areas of Ratzinger’s theology. 
1.6.  Emergence of a Christological Hermeneutic 
  
 In the final subdivision of this survey of Ratzinger’s formative influences, I want to 
draw attention to a selection of lectures and reflections that date from 1967 to 2011.84 They 
track the development of his theological method and show a maturing and a refinement of the 
rationale behind his theology. It can be identified as the “christological hermeneutic” of 
Ratzinger’s theology.  
Firstly, it is significant that Ratzinger periodically re-examines his approach to 
theology in tandem with his observations on contemporary biblical and hermeneutical 
scholarship. The scenario of a widening gap between ex gesis and dogma has exercised 
Ratzinger for years. This impasse, the corollary of which is an increasing polarity between 
history and faith, has led to a situation of “isolated biblicism,” on the one hand, and 
                                                          
84 This important set of texts includes Ratzinger’s 1967 commentary on Dei verbum “Dogmatische Konstitution 
über die Göttliche Offenbarung” in Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil. Konstitutionen, Dekrete und Erklärungen: 
Kommentare (Freiburg: Herder, 1967), 498-528, 571- 583; his 1978 lecture at the catholic theology faculty of 
the University of Eichstätt, “Zum Begriff des Sakraments” in GS:TL, 215-32; his 1989 lecture at the Lutheran 
Centre for Religion and Society in New York, “Biblical Interpretation in Conflict” in God’s Word: Scripture-
Tradition-Office, eds. Peter Hünermann and Thomas Söding, trans. Hery Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2008), 91-126; his 1990 presentation “On the ‘Instruction concerning the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian’” 
in Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie: Versuche zu ihrer O tbestimmung im Disput der Gegenwart (Einsiedeln, 
Freiburg: Johannes, 1993), 89-95; and the Forewords to the two volumes of his Jesus of Nazareth series, Jesus 
von Nazareth: Von der Taufe, 10-23; Jesus von Narareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 10-14.      
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“ecclesio-monism” on the other. 85 His particular approach matures as a consequence of th
need to liberate exegesis and dogma from suspicion of e another and bring them into a 
renewed relationship of complementarity. For him the very future of catholic theology 
depends on overcoming this dialectical opposition which, explicit from the time of the 
Reformation, has been exacerbated by epistemologica theories since the advent of the 
Enlightenment.86 Investigating the causes of the suspicion between ex gesis and dogma is 
beyond the scope of this study. What I want to trace is how Ratzinger, over the course of 
many years, refines his vision for “doing” theology in a way that overcomes a dilemma 
which, to his mind, is a crisis in the meaning of sacrament.  
For Ratzinger, grasping the nature of sacrament entails a certain relationship to 
scripture as the referential context for Christ. This requires that scriptural texts be read not 
merely rückwärts [backwards] in order to fix them in their respectively oldest sense 
(important as this process is), “but that we learn, t the same time, to read them vorwärts 
[forwards] from the dimension of the future perspective towards their wholeness and unity – 
in the difference and unity between promise and fulfilment.”87 Ultimately, Ratzinger says, 
“the decision as to whether catholic theology is posible is based on the idea of the unity of 
Scripture.”88 
                                                          
85 See Ratzinger, “Dogmatische Konstitution über die Göttliche Offenbarung,” 575, 511 (respectively). 
86See ibid., 506-28; “Zum Begriff des Sakraments,” in GS:TL, 231; “Biblical Interpretation in Conflict,”111-14. 
87 Ratzinger, “Zum Begriff des Sakraments,” in GS:TL  231. 
88 Ibid. Ratzinger’s belief in the unity of the biblical tex allows him to say that the “christological” and 
“typological” in theology can be interpreted in the same way when mysterium, typus and sacramentum are 
viewed as equivalents. For him, this way of approaching Scripture brings out the new that occurs in Christ and 
gives guidance for understanding the Christusgehalt [christological content] of the biblical text. This 
sacramental approach keeps the unity of the Scriptures in view. Indeed “[w]hoever holds that such a manner of 
dealing with the Bible is illicit, might perhaps gain a literal understanding of the Old Testament but, with that, 
the New Testament and his understanding of the Old are spurned from its roots” (225). Ratzinger refers his 
readers to Henri de Lubac, Histoire et esprit: L’Intelligence de L’Écriture d’après Origène (Paris: Éditions 
Montaigne, 1950); Jean Daniélou, Sacramentum futuri: Etudes sur les origins de la typologie biblique (Paris: 
Beauchesne 1950); Maximino Arias-Reyero, Thomas von Aquin als Exeget: Die Prinzipien seiner 
Schriftdeutung und seine Lehre von den Schriftsinnen (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1971). 
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While the historical critical method’s reading of biblical texts backwards, without 
recourse to the event to which they ultimately point, presents difficulties for theology, 
Ratzinger holds that the solution does not lie in de ying or banning it. Rather, “the method 
should be set within the context of the faith of the Church.”89 For Ratzinger, sacrament is a 
reality that renders to history its truest meaning: “[i]n sacrament the whole continuum of 
history is existent: past, present and future. It must extend down into the roots of the m moria 
of overall salvation history, so that the people of today, whose nature it is to be open to a 
future beyond death, meet in the present the presenc  of salvation.”90 This broad sacramental 
view of historical realities continuously informs his reflections on the challenges facing 
theological methodology in light of the discovery of critical biblical interpretation.    
In 1967, while speaking of Article 24 of Dei Verbum which is devoted to the role of 
Scripture in theology, Ratzinger says the Council cons iously avoided an “isolated biblicism” 
fascinated with a literal immediacy of the words – a fascination that cannot avoid 
enslavement to the interpreter’s own particular intellectual tradition. To prevent isolated 
biblicism, Ratzinger says it must be recognized that Scripture “is the word of God only as and 
in the human word; it also includes an element of mediation and cannot be dissolved into a 
direct immediacy of the divine.” Hence, Scripture’s special importance “is ultimately based 
on the fact that it is as a whole, the word of revelation, because it is inspired, which cannot be 
said of any other document of the Christian past, and thus proves Scripture to be the 
fundamental  form of ‘tradition’.”91  
In 1978, Ratzinger further elaborated on his discomfort with an exegesis which 
subordinated or even dismissed the concept of “event,” while relying upon the “words” of 
                                                          
89 Ratzinger, “Dogmatische Konstitution über die Göttliche Offenbarung,” 576.  For example, one finds 
Ratzinger using phrases such as the “ecclesial nature of exegesis” and the “inner tension of Church exeg sis,” to 
describe this view (cf. ibid., 575-76). For him, a faith perspective cannot be removed and must be acknowledged 
as a tension within the work of exegesis. 
90 Ratzinger, “Zum Begriff des Sakraments,” in GS:TL, 232. 
91 Ratzinger, “Dogmatische Konstitution über die Göttliche Offenbarung,” 578-79. 
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Scripture as the sole category for interpretation. He also articulated the need to uphold the 
inner unity of scripture. In the early Church, Scripture was understood as a unity, whose 
words, by means of typologisch-sakramental, were not merely open to the past, but 
transparent to the future. 92 To his mind, the possibility of a catholic theology depends on 
overcoming the dialectic of word and event, in favour f an analogia scripturae.93 In other 
words, a discontinuity which dismisses the event to which the words point must be countered 
by a teleological principle, which holds to the interior claim of the biblical text itself. 
Ratzinger’s principle is, as we have seen him express it, “Die Schrift ist im ganzen 
Sacramentum” [“Scripture is throughout Sacramentum”]. 94  
In 1989, Ratzinger further clarified the importance, as he saw it, of the unity of 
“word” and “event.” When separated in a dualistic schema, “the biblical word [is cut] off 
from creation and abolishes the interrelationship of meaning between the Old and New 
Testaments in favour of a principle of disconnectedness."95 On the other hand, from 
Ratzinger’s perspective, revelation must ultimately be greater than the news about it: "The 
biblical word bears witness to the revelation but does not contain it in such a way that the 
revelation is completely absorbed in it and could now be put in your pocket like an object. 
The Bible bears witness to the revelation and yet th  concept of revelation goes beyond 
that."96 It follows from this that, "[t]here is a surplus of meaning in an individual text, going 
beyond its immediate historical setting, and that is why there was the possibility of taking it 
up in a new historical context and setting it within a wider matrix of signification – the right 
                                                          
92 See Ratzinger, “Zum Begriff des Sakraments,” in GS:TL, 230. 
93 Ratzinger, “Biblical Interpretation in Conflict,” 121. 
94 See Ratzinger, “Zum Begriff des Sakraments,” in GS:TL, 223. 
95 Ratzinger, “Biblical Interpretation in Conflict,” 121. One of clearest examples of the unity of Scriptu e in 
practice in Ratzinger’s theology is his exegesis of the biblical texts relating to Mary. See Joseph Ratzinger, 
Daughter Zion: Meditations on the Church’s Marian Belief, trans. John M. McDermott (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1983), 9-29, 75; Mary: God’s Yes to Man: John Paul’s Encyclical Redemptoris Mater, trans. Lothar 
Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 11-21;  Joseph Ratzinger and Hans Urs von Balthasar, M y: The 
Church at the Source, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 84-93. See  
96 Ratzinger, “Biblical Interpretation in Conflict,” 122-23. 
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of ‘rereading’ it [emphasis added].”97 At the same time, Scripture as a whole has its own 
status: "[i]t is more than a text pieced together from what the individual authors may have 
intended to say, each in his own historical setting."98 This “right of rereading” does not 
diminish Ratzinger’s regard for Scripture, but, in fact, substantiates the “typological-
sacramental” approach: “[t]he text as a whole is ‘our master.’ In its entirety, it expresses a 
purpose that goes beyond what we may suppose were the intentions of the individual 
sources.”99 
As important and necessary as historical methods are, Ratzinger has always been 
consistent in maintaining they are not able to “reconstruct” or create faith. To attempt to do 
so would involve “the absurdity of making faith the function of historical research and expose 
it to scientific criteria, the certainty of which cannot go beyond a very moderate form of 
probability and is on quite another level from that of faith.”100 Something more is required to 
liberate Christ from the immediate historical consciousness. He says two processes of 
interpretation are required for a legitimate scriptural exegesis:  
[c]ertainly, texts have to be referred back to their istorical setting and interpreted in 
their historical context. Then, however, in a second process of interpretation, they 
must also be seen from the perspective of the movement of history as a whole and of 
Christ as the central event. Only harmony between th  two methods results in 
understanding the Bible. . . . One of the tasks of any appropriate interpretation is that 
of recognising the inner self-transcendence of the historical word in question and 
thereby the inner correctness of rereadings in which the Bible event and meaning are 
progressively intertwined with one another. Methods can and must be found that 
correspond to this task. 101  
Between 2007 and 2011, thoughts distilled over many years reach their culmination 
for Ratzinger when he introduces the methodological intention of his Jesus of Nazareth 
series. Finally, he says, he is able to classify his approach as equivalent to a “christological 
                                                          
97 Ibid., 123.  
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., 124. 
100 Ratzinger, “Dogmatische Konstitution über die Göttliche Offenbarung,” 525.  
101 Ratzinger, “Biblical Interpretation in Conflict,” 121-22. 
66 
 
hermeneutic.” In line with previous remarks, Ratzinger holds to the concept of the inner unity 
of the Scriptures which point to Christ as the key to the whole, and as the centre of history. 
With this hermeneutic, a sacramental understanding of Scripture resolves, without dissolving, 
the tension between promise and fulfilment, between Old and New Covenant. Through a 
christological hermeneutic, the words of scripture a  not merely sacramenta futuri – sketchy 
or figurative drafts of the future, but rather depictions or illustrations of the present, the 
expression and fruit of the Christ event. In Christ, the µυστήριον of God in person (Col 1:27), 
the difference between word and event is overcome and “the right of ‘rereading’” Scripture is 
acknowledged as a concrete form of theology in the present tense.102 Furthermore, Ratzinger 
says that while the unity of Scripture cannot be the conclusion of a purely historical process, 
neither can it be inimical to historical reason. This unity, unfolded in light of Jesus Christ, 
introduces us to the God of revelation who coincides with the God who is reason: “[t]his 
Christological hermeneutic which sees Jesus Christ as the key to the whole and learns from 
him how to understand the Bible as a unity, presupposes a prior act of faith. It cannot be the 
conclusion of a purely historical process”103 
                                                          
102 Ratzinger believes a revelatory religion is a dialogical religion. It elicits a response on the part of the one 
receiving the revelatory gift:  “[T]he dialogue with God is always carried on in the present; his address ‘no 
longer do I call you servants . . . but . . . friends’ (John 15:15) is given here and now with the intntion of forcing 
us to reply. Thus we can see how the idea of revelation lso outlines a conception of man: man as the creature of 
dialogue who, in listening to the word of God, becomes contemporaneous with the presentness of God and in 
the fellowship of the word receives the reality which s indivisibly one with this word: fellowship with God 
himself” (Ratzinger, “Dogmatische Konstitution über die Göttliche Offenbarung,” 525). In the Foreword to 
volume one of Jesus of Nazareth, e develops his rationale for an exegesis based on respecting the unity of 
Scripture  – a technique known as canonical exegesis. For him, canonical exegesis – the reading of individual 
texts of the Bible in the context of the whole – “does not contradict historical-critical interpretation, but carries it 
forward in an organic way toward becoming theology in the proper sense” (Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From 
the Baptism in the Jordan, xix). 
103 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, xix. In the Foreword to this book Ratzinger 
reveals in further detail his methodology for interpreting the figure of Jesus. What he says of the Gospels could 
also be applied to his view of Revelation as the source for theology: “The main implication of [a christological 
hermeneutic] for my portrayal of Jesus is that I trus  the Gospels. Of course, I take for granted everything that 
the Council and modern exegesis tell us about literary genres, about authorial intention, and about the fact that 
the Gospels were written in the context, and speak within the living milieu, of communities. I have tried, to the 
best of my ability, to incorporate all of this, and yet I wanted to try to portray the Jesus of the Gospels as the 
real, ‘historical’ Jesus in the strict sense of the word. . . . I believe that this Jesus – the Jesus of the Gospels – is a 
historically plausible and convincing figure” (xxi-xii). See also an address he gave to German-speaking 
bishops on the eve of the solemn inauguration of the Second Vatican Council regarding the schema On the 
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  He took the opportunity in the Foreword to the second volume of Jesus of Nazareth 
to clarify this. Confirming his task as an attempt to be faithful to the methodological 
principles of exegesis called for in Dei verbum 12, Ratzinger is guided by a “hermeneutic of 
faith,” while at the same time adopting a responsible attitude towards historical reason, which 
is a necessary component of that faith. “Scholarly exegesis,” he says, “must recognise that a 
properly developed faith-hermeneutic is appropriate to the text and can be combined with a 
historical hermeneutic, aware of its limitations, so as to form a methodological whole.”104 
Hence, in his “christological hermeneutic,” Ratzinger advances a new synthesis of faith and 
history, predicated on a broad sacramental understanding of reality.105   
Ratzinger has long held that faith is a gift which occurs in the Church or not at all. 
Just as a person cannot believe on their own, neither can one believe through one’s own 
power but “only when there is an authorisation to believe that is not within my power and 
does not come from me but rather goes before me.”106 The act of “collective listening,” found 
in the “christological hermeneutic,” not only sets the parameters for theology, it avoids the 
danger of “ecclesio-monism” and makes of theology an ecclesial action:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sources of Revelation, De fontibus revelationis (cf. Acta Synodalia I/3, 14-26). Ratzinger’s address can be found 
in Jared Wicks, ed., “Six Texts by Prof. Joseph Ratzinger as peritus before and during the Vatican Council,” 
Gregorianum 89 (2008): 269-275, 295-309. This lecture highlights some of Ratzinger’s earliest thoughts on the 
relationship between Scripture and tradition, the qu stion of biblical inspiration and inerrancy which ncludes 
the question of scriptura in ecclesia, the relationship between the Old and New Testaments, a d the correct way 
to integrate both into the whole of salvation and secular history.      
104 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week: From the Entrance into Jerusalem to the Resurrection, xv. 
105 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Biblical Interpretation in Conflict,” 114-26, where Ratzinger sets out the basic 
elements of the biblical hermeneutics he proposes. By his own admission, the work of another generation of 
critical scholarship will be required to fully work out the correct relationship between the hermeneutics of faith 
and history (cf. ibid., 113-4). Nevertheless he outlines, in skeletal format, five basis elements of the new 
synthesis. These include treating the text on its own terms – as theological in the strict sense – and not by the 
standards of the natural sciences; allowing for the possibility that God can enter into history in a wy that 
respects the radicalism of the Bible; seeking a newrelationship between event and word  which recognises the 
inner self-transcendence of the historical word; abiding by a concept of revelation which transcends the 
historical word; and finally, a reappraisal of all that has occurred in the methods of exegesis over the last 
hundred years, in particular the realisation that exeg tes do not stand on neutral ground outside history or the 
Church. See also Luis Sánchez-Navarro and José Granados, eds., Escritura e interpretación. Los fundamentos 
de la interpretación bíblica (Madrid: Ediciones Palabra, 2003) for a series of reflections by Scripture scholars 
occasioned by Ratzinger’s 1989 lecture in New York. It reflects on the way forward for theology in the light of a 
situation whereby the historical-critical interpretation of Scripture has made its contribution but has all but run 
its course in both Protestant and Catholic exegesis.     
106 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1180. 
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In der Verbindung der zwei Hermeneutiken . . . habe ich versucht, ein Hinschauen 
und Hinhören auf den Jesus der Evangelien zu entwickeln, das zur Begegnung werden 
kann und sich im Mithören mit den Jüngern Jesus aller Zeitern doch gerade der 
wirklich historischen Gestalt vergewissert [emphasis added].107  
In 1990, Ratzinger had already outlined the contours f this new synthesis of faith and 
history in his commentary on the magisterial document Donum veritatis. By means of two 
observations, Ratzinger insists on the ecclesial perspective of theological method. At the 
heart of Donum veritatis is the insight that faith precedes theology. If theology were to 
abandon the ground of what God has said and thought before us, it would annul its own 
constitution. For the people of God – as recipient of the gift of faith – theology remains a task 
which is never completely fulfilled in history, nor through the private ideas of a theologian: 
Die Wahrheit des Glaubens ist nicht dem isolierten einzelnen gegeben, sondern Gott 
hat mit ihr Geschichte und Gemeinschaft bauen wollen. Sie hat ihren Ort in dem 
gemeinschaftlichen Subjekt des Volkes Gottes, der Kirche. . . . [Die Kirche] ist als 
gemeinsames, die Enge der einzelnen überschreitendes Subjekt die Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit, daß Theologie überhaupt wirksam werden ka n.108 
A second important presupposition is the ecclesiolog cal frame used to deal with the 
theologian’s mission. Rather than opting for a simpl stic magisterium-theology dualism, 
Ratzinger says Donum Veritatis presented “the framework of the triangular relationship 
defined by the people of God, understood as the bearer of the sensus fidei and the common 
                                                          
107 Benedict XVI, Jesus von Narareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 13 (“In the combination of the two 
hermeneutics . . . I have attempted to develop a way of observing and listening to the Jesus of the Gospels that 
can indeed lead to personal encounter and that, t rough collective listening with Jesus’s disciples across the 
ages can indeed attain sure knowledge of the real historcal figure of Jesus [emphasis mine]” [Ratzinger, Jesus 
of Nazareth. Holy Week, xvi-xvii]). It is interesting the note, particular y in light of the ecclesiology of 
communion, that the concept of encounter as a stand-alone concept in christology is inadequate for coming to 
understand the sacramental life of the Church. Encou ter with Christ in the Church leads to communion with 
Christ and with one another. “Encounter” and “communion” are mutually inclusive dynamics in the life of 
believers. The encounter with Christ leads to communion in his Body, the Church. One highly commendable 
study of the ecclesial implications of Christ as the sacrament of God and as the primordial sacrament is Edward 
Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, trans. Paul Barrett (New York: Sheed and 
Ward, 1963). This book has lost none of its profundity, despite the relative lapse in time since publication.  
108 Ratzinger, Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie, 92-93 (“The truth of faith, in fact, is not bestowed upon the 
isolated individual, for God has willed instead to build history and community with it. It has its place in a 
common subject: the people of God, the Church. . . . Insofar as the Church is a corporate subject which 
transcends the narrowness of individuals, she is the condition which makes theological activity possible” 
[Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology: Essays to Orient Theology in Today’s Debates, trans. Adrian 
Walker, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 104-5]).      
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locus of all faith, the Magisterium and theology.”109 This living environment, as it were, 
means that “the Church, as a living subject which endures amidst the changes of history, is 
the vital milieu of the theologian.”110 It follows that theology remains historically relevant 
only by acknowledging this triangular matrix. By inserting oneself into it, and participating in 
the organic structure of it, the “Church is not an organisation which the theologian must 
regard as alien and extrinsic to thought.”111 Understanding the Church as the konkreten Ort 
[concrete location] or subject of theology is a sacramental reality and only within the living 
community does theology fulfil its task of contemplating the things of God.112  
In essence, the act of being bound to the faith of t e Church liberates the individual 
theological ego because “the subject who pursues theology is not the individual scholar but 
the Catholic community as a whole, the entire Churc.”113 This is how Ratzinger sees his 
work and the authority under which theologians are licensed to operate. Abiding in the “we” 
                                                          
109 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 104-5. Ratzinger says that the development of dogma in the 
course of the last two centuries is an example of how closely this triangular relationship works. The dogmas that 
were solemnly proclaimed in this period became possible because the sensus fidei discerned them, whereas “the 
Magisterium and theology followed its lead and tried slowly to catch up with them” (105). In 1967, Ratzinger 
had previously stressed the importance of understanding that the progress of the “word” in the time of the 
Church is not simply a function of the hierarchy, but is anchored in the whole life of the Church. As locus for 
theology, the Church is capable of bringing faith and history into necessary dialogue: “The whole spiritual 
experience of the Church, its believing, praying and loving intercourse with the Lord and his word, causes our 
understanding of the original truth to grow and in the today of faith extracts anew from the yesterday of its 
historical origin what was meant for all time and yet can be understood only in the changing ages and in the 
particular way of each. In this process of understanding, which is the concrete way in which tradition proceeds 
in the Church, the work of the teaching office is one component (and, because of its nature, not a productive 
one), but it is not the whole” (Ratzinger, “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation,” in vol. 3 of 
Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler; trans. William Glen-Doepel [New York: 
Crossroads, 1989], 186). When he says the teaching office is not a “productive” element in the growing 
understanding of the words and realities that have been handed down to us in the Church, he is referring to the 
fact that the Magisterium does not necessarily, nor i  all cases, take the pneumatological initiative in the life of 
the Church. Insofar as it operates at the collectiv le el of the discernment of spirits in purifying and discerning 
authentic pneumatological action, the Magisterium mostly operates retrospectively, confirming, so to speak, the 
authentic work of the Holy Spirit.   
110 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 105. 
111 Ibid. 
112 By 1978, his focus on bringing faith and history into fruitful dialogue was already touching upon theorder of 
a sacramental, and consequently, ecclesial viewpoint: “The understanding of sacrament therefore requirs the 
historical continuity of God’s action and its konkreten Ort [concrete location] as the living community of the 
Church which is the sacrament in the sacraments. In other words: the biblical word can only bear and be present 
if it is not only word, but has a living subject and if it belongs to a living context which will be dependent on it 
and, in turn, borne by it” (Ratzinger, “Zum Begriff des Sakraments,” in GS:TL, 231-32). 
113 Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report, 71. 
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of the Church ensures that its dogmas are “not walls that prevent us from seeing. On the 
contrary, they are windows that open upon the infinite.”114 For him, it is the Church as 
“Theologian” rooted in the Scriptures that guarantees the legitimacy of theology’s scientific 
enquiry because “she will not be turned into an instrument of destruction for the Word of 
God, but remains the mother, the living agent, within whom the Word is alive.”115 This can 
only remain the case under certain conditions and all those in positions of responsibility in 
the Church are subject to those conditions: “[t]hey are not allowed to impose their own 
opinions on the Church as doctrines, but must see th mselves within the great community of 
faith, and at its service, and must learn to listen to the Word of God. They must allow 
themselves to be judged and purified by this Word, in order that they may be able to convey 
it correctly.”116  
In short, Scripture has a major formative influence on Ratzinger’s theological outlook. 
A remark that indicated his approach to theology via the prior act of faith, and the listening to 
“history” in the broadest understanding of “the right to reread” it, came in 1997 when he 
emphasised a scriptural starting point not dependent on individual subjective interpretation 
but rather grounded in the faith of the Church and in ialogue with contemporary thought. He 
is convinced that such an approach liberates the individual theologian from being overly 
subjective and protects the Church from false philosophies:   
Ich habe nie versucht, ein eigenes System, eine Sondertheologie zu schaffen. 
Spezifisch ist, wenn man es so nennen will, daß ich einfach mit dem Glauben der 
Kirche mitdenken will, und das heißt vor allem mitdenken mit den großen Denkern 
des Glaubens. Das ist keine isolierte, aus mir selbst herausgezogene Theologie, 
sondern eine, die möglichst breit sich öffnet in deg meinsamen Denkweg des 
Glaubens hinein. Deshalb war für mich die Exegese immer sehr wichtig. Ich könnte 
mir keine rein philosophische Theologie denken. Der Ausgangspunkt ist zunächst 
                                                          
114 Ibid., 72.   
115 Ratzinger, God and the World, 356. 
116 Ibid., 356-57. One of Ratzinger’s ways of living up to this criterion for theologians is the sentiment which he 
regularly expresses at the beginning of many of his works. He commonly says that his writings “are a mere 
sketch, more question than answer. But perhaps it is precisely the incomplete character of these . . . that may 
provide a spur to further thinking on these subjects” (Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 7-8).    
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einmal das Wort. Daß wir das Wort Gottes glauben, daß wir versuchen, es wirklich 
kennenzulernen und zu verstehen und dann eben mitdenken mit den großen Meistern 
des Glaubens. Von daher hat meine Theologie eine etwas biblische Prägung und eine 
Prägung von den Vätern, besonders von Augustinus. Aber ich versuche natürlich, 
nicht Halt zu machen in der alten Kirche, sondern die großen Höhepunkte des 
Denkens festzuhalten und zugleich das zeitgenössische Denken mit ins Gespräch 
hereinzuziehen.117 
 
1.7.  Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown how the theme of freedom marks Ratzinger in a personal and 
professional way. Witness to the terror and destruction inflicted upon society by unchecked 
perversions of truth, he has reflected over many years on the delicate balance between the 
ideal and the real in human nature. His experience of ideology produces a tension in his 
writing between the potential for good and the danger of wickedness accompanying the 
endowment of the human person with freedom. This helps xplain why he has such a strong 
sense of theology’s role in the search for truth and it is equally the reason why he points out 
that theology is not a self-governing academic exercis  of autonomous reason. In fact, 
theology gains its legitimacy from within the collective subject of Christ in his Church. This 
insight, in itself, liberates theology from the temptation to override the “christological 
hermeneutic” – that collective listening with the Church which dialogues not only with the 
Scriptures, but also with historical reason. The method of “listening” which Ratzinger 
advocates in his own work, allows him to take, as it were, a panoramic view of a theological 
issue without ignoring present-day challenges or the fundamental truths that must inform 
                                                          
117 Joseph Ratzinger, Salz der Erde, 70 (“I have never tried to create a system of my own, an individual 
theology. What is specific, if you want to call it that, is that I simply want to think in communion with the faith 
of the Church, and that means above all to think in communion with the great thinkers of the faith. The aim is 
not an isolated theology that I draw out of myself but one that opens as widely as possible into the common 
intellectual pathway of the faith. For this reason exegesis was always very important. I couldn’t imagine a 
purely philosophical theology. The point of departure is first of all the word. That we believe the word f God, 
that we try really to get to know and understand it and then, as I said, to think it together with the gr at masters 
of the faith. This gives my theology a somewhat biblical character and also bears the stamp of the Fathers, 
especially Augustine. But it goes without saying that I try not to stop with the ancient Church but hold fast to the 
great high points of thought and at the same time to bring contemporary thought into the discussion” [Joseph 
Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, Christianity and the Catholic Church at the End of the Millennium: An Interview 
with Peter Seewald, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 66]).  
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future illumination. His scholarly encounters with Augustine and Bonaventure prepared him, 
on the one hand, for the intense twentieth-century sc utiny of the place of the Church in the 
modern world while, on the other, it made him cautio s of inner worldly promises of 
liberation. His contact with these two theologians would cement in his mind the challenge for 
the catholic theologian to present a credible link between ecclesiology and anthropology. For 
Ratzinger, the modern understanding of freedom is where this link has been severely tested. 
Now that we can see why Ratzinger has cause to be sensitive to the issue of the Church and 
human freedom, Chapter 2 will look at his analysis of the theoretical understandings of 















CHAPTER 2: Reading the Contemporary Cultural and Ecclesial Dynamics 
                         of Freedom  
 
2.0.      Introduction 
Ratzinger’s point of departure regarding the relevance of discussing the theme of 
freedom is that the issue “gets its specific contours from the modern era, which begins with 
the Enlightenment.”1 In fact, he maintains this historical period “claims to be in a special way 
the history of freedom, in which the nature of freedom comes to light for the very first time.”2 
To his mind, one must study “the question of what freedom is and what it cannot be within 
the panorama of this history” because  in it, “for the first time, [man] no longer has to accept 
history as an unalterable fate but can guide his own destinies and thus shape history as a 
process of liberation.”3 At the same time, Ratzinger is under no illusions about the 
complexities of the topic. Something of its “problematic and inscrutable nature” rapidly 
surfaces, he says, when one considers how remarkable it is that the experience of freedom 
and constraint applies even to Western societies “which with good reason can call themselves 
‘free’.” 4 The outcome of the contemporary (western) way of life, he says, has been that an 
                                                          
1 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 176. 
2 Ibid. See also his Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, 25-38, where he looks at the foundations of the 
Enlightenment as being substantially defined by the right to liberty above all else. In the course of his writings, 
he specifically dedicated two reflections to the modern intellectual history of freedom. See Joseph Ratzinger, 
“Freiheit und Bindung in der Kirche,” Verein der Freunde der Univeristät Regensburg 7 (1981): 5-21 (repr. in 
Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 165-82; and “Freiheit und Wahrheit,” Internationale katholische Zeitschrift 
Communio 24 (1995): 562-42 (repr. in Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz: Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen 
(Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2004), 187-208. The former first appeared at the pinnacle of Ratzinger’s 
professorial career and before his appointment in the Vatican, while the latter came after fifteen years in the 
high-profile posting as Cardinal Prefect at the CDF. 
3 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 176. 
4 Ibid., 175. Referring to the predominantly Western fascination with non-stop modernisation, he feels that
western societies have, to a great extent, relinquished the ties of custom and tradition that formerly helped 
determine the shape of the polity: “[o]nly now, with his emancipation from the constraints of nature and 
superstition, does man himself begin to become the acting subject of history” (176). Indeed, while “a hitherto 
almost unimaginable freedom of movement” has resultd, so has “a centralisation of services and anonymity of 
ordinances” entered into the daily lives of people to such an extent that “one may have doubts about whe her the 
modern history of freedom has really produced an appreciable increase in freedom and whether the area of 
freedom and the area of compulsion have not just shifted” (175). Paradoxically, the centralising of services and 
the faceless, impersonal nature of so many of the prescriptions of modern civil authorities are causing  people to 
experience their daily lives as far more constraining and restricted than they feel necessary: “from the 
determination of the slope of the roof to rules about gravestones, from traffic regulations to an establishment for 
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“abundance of regulations, reaching into everyday life, produces an odd sense of restriction, 
boredom with institutionally organised freedom and  cry for a better, radical, anarchic 
freedom.”5 He maintains that the sensation has increased of feeling hemmed in by an excess 
of institutionally organised freedom. This cry for reedom anticipates – consciously or 
subconsciously – the revolutionary abolition of institutional forms because they are believed 
to be what inhibits progress in history.   
This chapter has a three-fold intention. Firstly, it examines Ratzinger’s etiology of 
freedom in modern intellectual history. This is to facilitate, secondly, an analysis of how 
Ratzinger’s understanding of freedom has contributed to his interpretation of the broad 
cultural dynamics present in contemporary western societies. The prevailing societal 
mentality, in turn, cannot but in some way impact upon believers’ perception of 
contemporary ecclesial dynamics. Thirdly, therefore, this chapter investigates Ratzinger’s 
evaluation of the impact of the modern expression of freedom upon the Church’s self-
understanding, part of which will involve briefly summarising Ratzinger’s basic orientations 
regarding the question of freedom in contemporary ecclesiology. 
 
    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
universal education that harnesses teachers and students to a network of legal prescriptions resulting from – 
what else? – efforts to safeguard the citizens’ rights to freedom” (ibid.).   
5 Ibid., 175. Simon Oliver, in his essay “What is Radic l Orthodoxy?” in The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, d. 
John Milbank and Simon Oliver (London: Routledge, 2009) 6-12, shows the change which has taken place in 
modernity regarding views of the social, political and, indeed, the whole cosmic body. The governing princi le 
of modern thought tends to be power, with all the forces of nature and society governed by competing claims to, 
or expressions of, power. The medieval world knew po er struggles also, but these were considered to be
intrusions into a created order in which peace formed the ontological norm. Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite (c. 
500AD) and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) were advocates of a world view where hierarchy was crucial because it 
embodied the different talents, skills, characters, tc, which make up a body whose parts are mutually 
enhancing. In a view that is alien to the modern midset, a hierarchically instituted society was a place of 
security for its adherents whereas the weakening of the institution increases the potential for abuses of power: 
“the more complex a hierarchy the more it contains within itself checks and balances in relation to power. 
Different parts of the political, ecclesial or cosmic body balance each other and ensure a measure of equality. To 
the extent that hierarchies become simple and ‘flat,’ the opportunity for the accumulation and abuse of power in 
just one part of the hierarchy duly emerges” (8).          
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2.1.  Freedom as a “One-Sided” Idea in Modern Intellectual History: From Luther   
    to Sartre 
    
Ratzinger’s prioritisation of the issue of freedom stems from his belief that “the crisis 
in the history of freedom in which we find ourselves arises from an unclarified and one-sided 
conception of freedom.”6 Because of his belief that the modern concept of freedom owes 
much of its genesis to the European Enlightenment era, he poses the question: “Are the 
foundations of the European Enlightenment, upon which our path to freedom is built, false – 
or at least, defective?”7 In the background of Ratzinger’s considerations are his personal 
memories of totalitarian ideologies: “[w]e recall how many opinions and systems have 
already laid claim to the concept of truth; how often he claim of truth in that way has been 
the means of limiting freedom.”8 This experience convinces him that the concepts of freedom 
and of truth are intimately bound to one another. To search for truth in an unsceptical manner 
– almost to the point of being dispassionate for the sake of truth itself – is true freedom. Only 
then can the prospect of ideological intolerance be minimized. From this perspective, 
Ratzinger says that coming to an authentic understanding of freedom obliges us to put these 
two questions “what is freedom?” and “what is truth?” anew, and also to renew our search for 
the relation between the two.9  
Ratzinger holds that “people have narrowed down the concept of freedom to 
individual rights and freedoms and have thus robbed it of its human verity.”10 This is the 
broad general context for Ratzinger’s presentation of the theoretical foundations of the 
present situation and one can discern that his appro ch takes the form of a “timeline” from 
                                                          
6 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 245. 
7 Ibid., 235. In fact, he feels so strongly that the id a of freedom has evolved into a position of such dominance 
in our day that it is the very reason which justifies calling the present age “modern” in the first ina ce. 
Ratzinger’s belief that freedom is the issue that defines the modern era is significant: “[T]he era tht we call 
modern times has been determined from the beginning by the theme of freedom; the striving for new forms of 
freedom is the only basis upon which to justify such a division into periods” (236). 
8 Ibid., 231. 
9 See ibid., 235-36. 
10 Ibid., 245.  
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Martin Luther (1483-1546) in the sixteenth century through to Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) in 
the twentieth.  
Ratzinger believes that the publication of Luther’s Von der Freiheit eines 
Christenmenschen i 1520 marks a decisive moment in the shifting relationship between 
authority and individual conscience.11 It was a document that struck up a cry for freedom and 
precipitated a mass movement which transformed the face of the medieval world. By 
advocating salvation by means of personal faith in Christ rather than via the order of the 
community, the professed irrelevance of the whole ordered system of the medieval Church 
became the stimulus for greater freedom. Hence, fredom of conscience was set against the 
authority of the Church, and the order which had exist d to support and save was called into 
question as a burden devoid of redemptive value: 
Daß plötzlich das ganze Ordnungssystem der mittelalterlichen Kirche letzlich nicht 
mehr zählte, wurde als ein ungeheurer Befreiungsschub empfunden. Die Ordnungen, 
die eigentlich tragen und retten sollten erschienen als Last; sie binden nicht mehr, das 
heißt sie haben keine Erlösungsbedeutung mehr. Die Erlösung ist Befreiung, 
Befreiung vom Joch der überindividuellen Ordnungen.12 
Ratzinger stresses that while it would be wrong to talk of an ethos of individualism at the 
time of the Reformation, the new significance of the individual and the transposition of the 
relationship between individual conscience and authority was “a characteristic trait.”13 In a 
second phase of modern history, Ratzinger believes this new understanding took concrete 
shape.   
 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), corresponding to the growing emphasis on personal, 
individualistic faith, brought forth his apere aude – dare to use your reason – which urged 
                                                          
11 See Martin Luther, The Freedom of a Christian, trans. Mark D. Tranvik (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008). 
12 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz, 191 (“The fact that, suddenly, the whole institutional system of the 
medieval Church no longer ultimately counted for anything was felt to be an enormous liberating thrust. The 
institutions that were actually supposed to support and save people appeared to be a burden; they were no longer 
obligatory, which meant they no longer had any significance for redemption. Redemption is liberation, being 
liberated from the yoke of supra-individual institutions” [Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 236-7]). 
13 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 237. 
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individual reason to break free from the bonds of unquestioned authority.14 People should no 
longer be satisfied with a juvenile standing in the world but should seek a fully developed 
status as is their entitlement. The time for blind submission to authority and tradition is 
exposed as incompatible with the ability of people to make use of their own reason: 
Freiheit zeigt sich hier als Befreiung von der normativen Kraft der Überlieferung: 
Nicht Wille und Einsicht eines anderen können mehr binden, sondern nur die eigene 
Einsicht weist dem Willen den Weg. Vernünftigkeit ist zugleich Selbstbestimmung, 
die die von den Autoritäten her kommende Fremdbestimmung ablösen will.15  
All authority must be under scrutiny and only what is reasonably verifiable is allowed 
validity. Kant’s philosophical program is also a political one for if reason is to reign, no other 
authority is admitted other than that of reason – what is not accessible to reason cannot be 
binding. Nevertheless, Ratzinger makes the point that i  was never Kant’s intention to simply 
replace constraint with a lack of constraint. Rather, the aim was to release people from the 
shackles of “external determination and replac[e them] with reasonable constraint, namely, 
with the constraint that follows from insight.”16 Therefore the spirit of the Enlightenment has 
nothing to do with arbitrariness because rationality itself constrains; irrationality does not 
represent a realistic alternative to that. Clearly, Ratzinger says, it is seen that “freedom is 
constraint” in that it leads to the binding force of the truth that has been understood. 17  
Ratzinger notes the friction that arises when the new dissatisfaction with authority and 
tradition encounters the challenge of coping with the social dimension of freedom – 
something which it must do if it is to stand up to scrutiny. Up to then, the traditions which 
                                                          
14 See Immanuel Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?,” Berlinische Monatschrift 4 (1784): 
481-94. Kant says that the “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is 
the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. The immaturity is self-incurred if 
its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of 
another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!” 
(quoted in Hugh Barr Nisbet, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” in Immanuel Kant’s 
Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], 54). 
15 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik,167 (“Freedom manifests itself here as liberation fr m the normative 
force of tradition: the will and insight of another can no longer constrain; only one’s own insight shows the 
individual will the way. Rationality is at the same time self-determination, which intends to take over from 
external determination by the authorities” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 177]). 
16 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 177. 
17 See ibid.  
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reason desired to emancipate itself from had been th  tried and tested means of regulating 
human coexistence. Indeed, peaceful co-existence had depended on observing those 
traditions. However, the result of the new confidence in reason was a watershed moment in 
human self-understanding: 
[Autorität und Überlieferung] gaben die Rollen vor, in denen Menschsein ausgelegt 
war und sich sinnvoll leben ließ. Der Grundgedanke der Aufklärung war 
demgegenüber ganz einfach: An die Stelle ererbter Sozialregeln muß die Einsicht 
treten; die vernünftige Gesellschaft wird eine Gesellschaft der Vernünftigen sein.18 
As a result, a heretofore unknown clarity is brought to the question of human self-
understanding by an innovative and concentrated reflection upon the issue of freedom: 
Erst die Aufklärung hat die alten Freiheiten der Stände, die vielfältigen 
Gliederungsgestalten der alten Gesellschaft mit ihren Freiheitsräumen beseitigt und 
sich bei dieser Zerstörung gewachsener Freiheiten als Exekutor der höheren Freiheit 
gewußt, die die höhere Einsicht verleiht.19 
Ratzinger maintains that the “strange ambiguity of all the liberation processes that 
would repeatedly manifest themselves over the course of history becomes unmistakably clear 
here for the first time.”20 Within this will to emancipation, he discerns two diverse, even 
                                                          
18 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 167 (“[Authority and tradition] provided the roles in which human 
existence was interpreted and could be lived meaningfully. The fundamental idea of the Enlightenment was in 
contrast, quite simple: insight must step in to replace inherited social rules; the reasonable society will be a 
society of reasonable persons” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 177]). 
19 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 167 (“The Enlightenment was the first social movement to do away 
with the old freedoms of the various states of life, th  manifold and diversified forms of old society with their 
respective spheres of freedom, and in destroying these well-developed freedoms, it considered itself th  
executor of the higher freedom that higher insight bestows” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 177]). 
20 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 177. Debates in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century had 
centred on the issue of whether grace destroys human freedom. For example, the Jesuits and Dominicans argued 
about the right approach. The balance – never satisfactorily resolved – rests in respecting and affirming both 
God’s absolute omnipotence and the freedom of the human will. When challenged by this dilemma, the 
Protestant Reformers and Jansenists tried to resolv it by denying the freedom of the human will. In Catholic 
theology there has been no agreement on what makes an actual grace efficacious. This is exemplified in the 
dispute between the Dominican, Dominic Báñez (1528-1604) and the Jesuit, Luis de Molina (1525-1600). In 
Báñezian theory, the efficacy of a grace depends on the character of the grace itself. In the Molinist theory, 
grace is given to each individual under circumstances that God foresees to be congruous with the dispositions of 
the one receiving the grace itself. Given that there is a difference between efficacious and sufficient grace, the 
issue is whether the difference is found in the grace itself or in human freedom. If the difference is in the grace, 
it means that grace is efficacious by its own intrinsic power. If it is found in human freedom, then grace 
becomes efficacious by the extrinsic activity and assent of the will. Despite the dilemma, in every Catholic 
theory, theologians agree that efficacious grace does n t force the will, nor destroy human freedom. In fact it is 
defined Catholic teaching from the Council of Trent that the human will remains free under the influence of 
efficacious grace and therefore, efficacious grace is not irresistible. See DS, 1554. In 1653, Pope Innocent X 
condemned the proposition of Bishop Jansenius (that“in the condition of fallen nature interior grace is never 
resisted”) as anathema. See DS, 2002. In 1748, Pope Benedict XIV stated that the views of the Dominican, 
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antithetical, social philosophies and political programs. On the one hand, an Anglo-Saxon 
current which consists of a predominantly natural-rights orientation and a tendency towards 
constitutional democracy as the only realistic system of freedom. And secondly, at the other 
end of the spectrum, the radical approach of Roussea  which aims ultimately at autarchy.21 
 “ Natural Rights Thinking” holds that from creation the human person has rights 
which must be enforced if there is to be justice: “Freedom is not granted to man from 
without; he has rights because he was created free.”22 Ratzinger says that such thinking gives 
rise to the idea of human rights for it points to rights that are naturally present in man himself 
prior to all legal constructs. As well as being a revolutionary idea that opposes the absolutism 
of the State and the caprice of positive legislation, t is also a metaphysical idea that exerts an 
ethical and legal claim upon being itself. Thus within human nature itself, there is a dignity 
that bestows not only a juridical claim on our liberation but also its measure. This is in line 
with the Stoic concept of nature, as found in Romans 2, which, when placed within the 
context of the theology of creation, suggests that t e Gentiles know the law “by nature” and, 
as such, are a law unto themselves (Rom. 2:14). Nevertheless, Ratzinger highlights the 
specific element that changes when this idea moves into modernity: the juridical claim of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Jesuit and some other schools can safely be held evn while not explaining the problem completely 
satisfactorily. See DS, 2564-2565. It was an exercise in the Pope’s desire for the freedom of theological schools. 
Other schools of thought which were  not explicitly mentioned by Benedict XIV’s decree are voluntarism, a 
school of thought that regards the will as superior to the intellect and emotion, and determinism, which, n broad 
terms, believes everything that happens is predestined or caused by antecedent conditions. Ultimately, he truth 
that the human will remains free under the influence of grace must be retained for it is also the presupposition 
for the meritoriousness of good works. 
21 Autarchy is not to be mixed up with autocracy. The word "autarchy" is from the Greek: αὐτάρκεια, which 
means "self-sufficiency" (derived from αὐτο-, "self," and ἀρκέω, "to suffice"). Most commonly it implies 
economic independence, but Ratzinger seems to be indicating some form of radical self-governance. It is 
sometimes confused with autocracy (αὐτoκρατία), namely, a system of government by one person with absolute 
power. 
22 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 238. For a recent and very thorough survey of human rights in the modern 
era of moral reasoning which looks at three theorists which are representative of different traditions, see Michael 
Shortall, Human Rights and Moral Reasoning. A comparative invstigation by way of three theorists and their 
respective traditions of enquiry: John Finnis, Ronald Dworkin and Jürgen Habermas (PhD diss., Editrice 
Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 2009). The three traditions studied by Shortall are the natural law tradition 
(Finnis); the liberal tradition (Dworkin); and the critical tradition (Habermas).    
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nature vis-à-vis the existing forms of government demands, above all, that the State and other 
institutions respect the rights of the individual: 
Als Natur des Menschen wird es vor allem angesehen, daß er Rechte gegen die 
Gemeinschaft hat, Rechte, die vor der Gemeinschaft zu schützen sind: Die Institution 
erscheint als der Gegenpol zur Freiheit; als Träger von Freiheit erscheint das 
Individuum und als ihr Ziel die volle Emanzipation des Individuums.23  
The complexities and constrains inherent in the democratic embodiment of freedom 
led to a second development in intellectual circles, namely a basis for an autarchy of freedom.  
Ratzinger, in this regard, mentions two philosophers from the modern era. Firstly, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) whose influence, although more radical than modern natural- 
rights thinking, finds a point of contact with it, because they both contend that the human 
person’s nature means that he has rights against society, rights that have to be protected from 
society. And secondly, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), whose intellectual 
conception of freedom took practical historical shape, Ratzinger says, in Karl Marx (1818-
1883) and Marxism. Ratzinger suggests that both Hegel and Rousseau influenced Marxist 
ideas because they altered the anthropological self-understanding of humanity. Thus their 
contributions are important for the way freedom has come to be perceived today.    
  Rousseau’s concept of nature is anti-metaphysical and correlative to his dream of 
total, absolutely unregimented freedom. For him everything created by reason and will is a 
corruption and contradiction of nature.24 As such, the concept of nature is not itself shaped by 
the idea of justice, so that the law of nature preced s all our institutions. In its place, the order 
of society which has evolved over time, and which authority and tradition have placed upon 
society, is deemed to go against humanity’s natural capacities. Ratzinger see this radical line 
                                                          
23 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz, 193 (“It is seen as being the nature of man, above all, that he has 
rights against society, rights that have to be protected from society: the institution appears as the opposite pole to 
freedom; the individual appears as supporting freedom and as its goal, the emancipation of the individual” 
[Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 239]). 
24 See Kimmo Kontio, “The Idea of Autarchy in Rousseau's Natural Education: Recovering the Natural 
Harmony?” in Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 47 (2003): 3-19. 
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of thought, “which ultimately aims at complete freedom from any rule”25 as continued by 
Nietzsche, who sets a beguiling Dionysian dynamic in opposition to an ordered Apollonian 
one. The ordered activity of reason that Apollo stands for spoils the free and unimpeded 
intoxication of nature.26 In Ratzinger’s own expression, “Der Schrei nach Freiheit” now 
begins to exert itself in an extreme form.27  
 Hegel’s approach was an understanding of history as a whole as the history of 
freedom. History makes its way dialectically even through things that are opposed to 
freedom. In such an analysis, Ratzinger says, “one must say that anyone who sides with the 
logic of history serves freedom. Actions taken contrary to this logic are detrimental to 
freedom, because they are opposed to the process of freedom.”28 While Ratzinger says this 
understanding of freedom remains somewhat sketchy in Hegel, it becomes fully operative in 
the writings of Karl Marx: 
[. . .] daß freiheitsgemäß handelt, wer sich dem Gefälle der Geschichte anschließt, das 
auf die klassenlose Gesellschaft mit innerer Notwendigkeit zutreibt. Das Einstimmen 
in diese Notwendigkeit ist Handeln für die Freiheit.29  
                                                          
25Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 238.  
26 Nietzsche’s first work, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (1872), sets out his theory that Greek 
tragedy is built upon a wedding of two principles which he associates with the deities Apollo and Dionysus. See 
Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996): “The Apollonian principle, in keeping with the characteristics of the sun 
god Apollo, is the principle of order, static beauty, and clear boundaries. The Dionysian principle, in contrast, is 
the principle of frenzy, excess, and the collapse of boundaries. . . . Greek tragedy, as he saw it, confronted the 
issue of life’s meaning by merging the perspectives of the two principles’ (22). Ratzinger himself makes 
references to P. Köster, Der sterbende Gott, Nietzsches Entwurf übermenschlicher Größ (Meisenheim: Hein, 
1972) and R. Löw, Nietzsche Sophist und Erzieher (Weinheim: Acta humaniora, 1984).     
27 See Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 165. 
28 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 180. 
29 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 170 (“[T]he person who acts in freedom is the one who aligns 
himself with the momentum of history, which is driven by an inner necessity toward the classless society. 
Joining in with this necessity is acting on behalf of reedom” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 
180]). Ratzinger offers two examples of the perilous fascination of this viewpoint for humanity. In Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn’s novel, The First Circle, the old communist, Lev Rubin, even in prison believed the organs of the 
party were “the positive forces of history” and “whoever undermined it stood objectively in the way of progress. 
And had to be swept away” (The First Circle, trans. Thomas P. Whitney [New York, Harper and Row, 1968], 
193-198, citation on 196). Ratzinger also highlights pp. 32-37; 378-86; 408-15. The second example refers to 
Ernesto Cardenal’s book, In Cuba, trans. Donald D. Walsh (New York: New Directions Publishing, 1974), 
which contains the conviction that anyone who wants to be a true Christian today must also be a Marxist. 
Cardenal even believed that the kingdom of God coincided with the Castro regime. Ratzinger says that, by 1978, 
Cardenal “self-critically noted that he had gradually become ‘partisan’: partisanship is the decisive perspective, 
and only someone who is conditionally ‘partisan’ liberates” (Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 181).         
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Because he holds that Marx sets out Hegel’s vision in very practical terms, Ratzinger 
identifies a Marxist vision in which the proletariat s the bearer of future history. 
Consequently, the bearer of the logic of history is the proletariat party – the Communist 
party. Accordingly, “the history of freedom becomes identical to the history of the party; it is 
partisan history.”30 Ratzinger believes such logic has an impact on anthropology:  
Praktisch ausgedrückt: Wer im Sinne der Parteilogik handelt, und nur wer dies tut, 
handelt freiheitsgemäß. Wenn die Logik der Partei Verhaftungen und Terror verlangt, 
ist selbstverständlich auch dies freiheitsgemäßes Handeln, weil es ja in der auf die 
Freiheit zuführenden Logik steht.31  
The Marxist partisan interpretation of freedom, to Ratzinger’s mind, is accompanied 
by a specific anthropology which is penetrating, to an ever greater extent, the present day 
significance of human education. It is so, he believ s, because even if comprehensive 
vigilance against partisanship is difficult to regulate, its concomitant anthropology, promising 
unrestrained freedoms, can be very attractive. He beli ves it amounts to a “pedagogy of 
freedom,” which brings Enlightenment thinking to its irrational yet logical conclusion: 
Den Menschen zu konkreten Werthaltungen zu erziehen, erscheint als eine 
Versklavung seines Wesens, ja, Erziehung überhaupt ist Vergewaltigung unter die 
Herrschaft von Autorität und Überlieferung. Nur eine einzige Pädagogik scheint 
angemessen und scheint wirklich Pädagogik der Freiheit: die Erziehung zur Rebellion 
gegen alle vorgegebenen Werte, die unbegrenzte Freimachung des Menschen, der sich 
“kreativ” erst selber entwirft.32 
In summary, Ratzinger’s contention is that, in an ever-increasing way over the last two 
hundred years, various forms of the Enlightenment’s cry for freedom have repeatedly erupted 
against a democratically constituted form of freedom. Ratzinger suggests that the 
paradigmatic example of this is the after-effect of the French Revolution: although it began 
                                                          
30 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 181. 
31 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 170 (“In practical terms, those who act according to party logic, and 
only those, act in keeping with freedom. When party logic demands arrests and terror, then it goes without 
saying that such action is in keeping with freedom because, after all, it is consistent with the logic that leads to 
freedom” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 181]). 
32 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 171 (“Educating a human being to cherish specific values seems to 
be an enslavement of his nature; indeed, education in general is violence under the rule of authority and 
tradition. Only one pedagogical method seems appropriate, a real pedagogy of freedom: education to rebel 
against all preconceived values, the unlimited liberation of the human being, who is himself the first to design 
himself ‘creatively’” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 181]). 
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with the idea of a constitutional democracy, it soon cast off these fetters and set out on the 
path of Rousseau’s conception of autarchy, inevitably becoming a bloody dictatorship.33  
To Ratzinger’s mind, Marxism in particular continued in this radical vein, deriving its 
fascination from the premise that it promises a grander and bolder freedom than can be 
realised in democratic society. In his estimation, two aspects of Marxism are relevant to the 
concept of freedom in the modern period and to the question of freedom’s relationship with 
truth. First and foremost, the existence of freedom requires the establishment of equality. 
Once tied to equality, freedom is indivisible, existing, as such, only when freedom has been 
achieved for all. The solidarity of those strugglin for the freedom of all comes before the 
vindication of individual liberties: “[t]hat means that in pursuit of the goal of complete 
freedom, some renunciation of freedom is required.”34 Hence, while the future promise of 
unbounded freedom is made, the present struggle demands the temporary subordination of 
freedom to equality and the rights of the individual to those of the community.  
Secondly, and consequently, the freedom of the individual depends upon the structure 
of the whole. Therefore the struggle for freedom requires the changing of the world’s 
structure rather than primarily securing the rights of the person. For Ratzinger, Marxism is an 
intellectual construct which cannot honour its promises but ends up taking refuge in 
mythology. He says that “a blind man could see that none of the structures that have been 
constructed, for the sake of which the renunciation of freedom is demanded, truly renders 
freedom possible.”35 The myth is that a new structure would yield a new humanity and that 
these structures will only work with new people who are entirely different from what they are 
now. There is a lie in Marxism that exposes the falsehoods within it: 
                                                          
33 See Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 239-41. 




Wenn in der Forderung der Solidarität und in der Ide er Unteilbarkeit der Freiheit 
der moralische Charakter der Marxismus liegt, so wird in seiner Ankündigung des 
neuen Menschen eine Lüge deutlich, die auch den moralischen Ansatz paralysiert. 
Teilwahrheiten sind einer Lüge zugeordnet, und daran scheitert das Ganze: Die 
Freiheitslüge hebt auch die wahren Elemente auf. Freiheit ohne Wahrheit ist keine 
Freiheit.36 
The final consequence of the priority of partisanship promoted under the guise of human 
solidarity is that the promise of human freedom requires a rebellion on the part of the human 
person against preconceived authority and tradition n favour of innovatively designing new 
structures that at some indeterminate future point would guarantee freedom. Ratzinger’s 
portrayal of the modern intellectual context of freedom brings to light a fundamental irony: a 
belief that freedom is best served by the orderly st uctures of authority and tradition in 
society is exchanged for a promise that structures – new and different ones – will bring about 
the definitive but, also, elusive, emancipation of humanity.     
However much the values of autarchy and self-interes  are advanced by Marxist 
philosophy, they are even more to the fore, according to Ratzinger, in the work of the 
twentieth-century existentialist philosopher Jean-Pul Sartre (1905-1980). Because Sartre 
views the human person in terms of pure existence, without a predetermined essence, what 
one is and what one ought to be are not pre-determin d. Ratzinger’s understanding of this 
philosophical approach is that humanity must be defined anew “out of the nothingness of an 
empty freedom.”37  
Sartre’s philosophy epitomises for Ratzinger the present-day cultural milieu. Sartre 
says that in contrast to animals, man has no nature. Animals live out their existence according 
to the laws they are born with, not being required to eliberate on the meaning of their life. 
                                                          
36 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz, 195 (“If the moral character of Marxism lies in prom ting 
solidarity and in the idea of the indivisibility offreedom, in its heralding of a new man a lie could be seen that 
also paralyzed the initial moral effort. Partial truths are made subordinate to a lie, and thus the whole t ing 
comes to grief: the lies about freedom cancel out the elements of truth. Freedom without truth is no freedom” 
[Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 242]). 
37 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 182. 
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Man’s essence, on the other hand, is undetermined ad, as such, is an open question. Man 
must set about discerning what he understands by “humanity,” what he wants to do with it 
and how he wants to fashion it. Ratzinger observes that Sartre regards man as condemned to 
freedom and as such “man has no nature, but is simply freedom. He has to live his life in 
some direction or other, yet it runs out into nothingness even so. His meaningless freedom is 
man’s hell.”38 What Ratzinger finds most disturbing about this is the separation of freedom 
from truth and the way Sartre brings it to its most radical conclusion: truth has no measure. 
Ratzinger defines this extreme version of a one-sidd understanding of freedom – which is 
untethered and groundless – as anarchic freedom:    
Die Freiheit hat keine Richtung und kein Maß. Aber di se völlige Abwesenheit von 
Wahrheit, die völlige Abwesenheit jeder auch sittlichen und metaphysischen Bindung, 
die absolut anarchische Freiheit als Wesensbestimmung des Menschen enthüllt sich 
für den, der sie zu leben versucht, nicht als höchste Steigerung der Existenz, sondern 
als Nichtigkeit des Lebens, als absolute Leere, als die Definition von Verdammnis.39  
The anthropological presupposition underpinning such a definition, Ratzinger believes, must 
be anathema for a Christian world-view. The human person is not a meaningless thing 
launched out into the world in order to construct the meaning of life: “being freed from truth 
does not engender pure freedom; rather it abolishes it. The anarchistic freedom, taken to a 
radical conclusion, does not redeem man; rather, it makes him into a faulty creation, living 
without meaning.”40  
With the thought of Sartre, Ratzinger presents the culmination of the transformation 
which the issue of freedom underwent over the last five hundred years. From a belief that 
authority and tradition, personified, so to speak, in societal institutions,  best understood and 
                                                          
38 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 244. Ratzinger refers to “Kreatürlichkeit und menschliche Natur: 
Anmerkungen zum philosophischen Ansatz von Jean-Paul Sartre,” in Josef Pieper’s Über die Schwierigkeit 
heute zu glauben (Munich: Kösel, 1974), 304-21.   
39 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz, 197 (“Freedom is without direction or measure. Yet this complete 
absence of truth, the complete absence also of any kind of moral or metaphysical restraint, the absolute anarchic 
freedom of man constituted by his self-determination, s revealed, for anyone who tries to live it out, not as the 
most sublime exaltation of existence, but as a life of nothingness, as absolute emptiness, as the definition of 
damnation” [Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 244]).  
40 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 245. 
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protected the freedom of citizens, an extremist form f freedom has emerged which is not 
merely emancipation from tradition and authority but emancipation from one’s very nature. A 
metamorphosis in anthropology has taken place: where once people trusted that their 
emancipation came through trusting in civilisation’s institutions, there now stands distrust, 
even towards human nature itself. Logically, humanity seems destined to release itself even 
from the truth of its own essence. For Ratzinger, this amounts to a severance of truth from 
human freedom which can never satisfy or bring happiness and purpose to humanity: 
Die Idee der Freiheit ist hier bis zu ihrer letzen Radikalität vorangetrieben, nicht mehr 
bloß Emanzipation aus Überlieferung und Autorität, sondern Emanzipation auch aus 
der Schöpfungsidee “Mensch,” Emanzipation vom eigenen Wesen, völlige 
Indeterminiertheit, die für alles offensteht. Aber g rade diese Freiheit erscheint 
zugleich als die Hölle; frei sein heißt verdammt sein. So schlägt die radikale 
Freiheitsidee um in die Parteilichkeit, die an die St lle des verlorenen Wesens tritt und 
dem Menschen Halt und Richtung geben soll.41 
From an overall perspective, Ratzinger concludes that “ e political, the philosophical 
and the religious problems of freedom have become an indissoluble whole” and “anyone 
looking for ways forward into the future must keep the whole of this in view and cannot 
make do with superficial pragmatic action.”42 Ratzinger’s “timeline” of freedom “from 
Luther to Sartre” is premised by his sensitivity to the anarchic potential accompanying the 
debasement of institution and tradition within intellectual history. He perceives a shift in the 
understanding of man’s essence and nature, as well as in the expectations associated with 
human freedom in the course of this period. All of this impacts upon contemporary cultural 
and ecclesial dynamics. To these we now turn.  
 
                                                          
41 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 171-72 (“The idea of freedom here has been taken to its most radical 
extreme: no longer mere emancipation from tradition and authority, but now emancipation from the idea of 
“man” as a creature, emancipation from one’s own nature, complete indeterminacy that is open to everything. 
But this very freedom appears simultaneously to be hell; to be free means to be damned. Thus the radical i ea of 
freedom abruptly turns into partisanship, which replaces the lost essence and is supposed to give man stability 
and a sense of direction” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 182]).     
42 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 243-44.  
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2.2.  Contemporary Cultural Dynamics of Freedom 
 
The dilemma which Ratzinger believes the issue of human freedom faces today is that 
it has become “a magical word”; the yearning for it rings out throughout the world which has 
had the taste of freedom but which has also experienced the feeling that it is threatened and 
restricted on every side.43 This uneasy tension forms the background for his optimism, as well 
as his suspicion, towards the contemporary cultural dynamics of freedom. Three broad lines 
of exploration feature in his writings and these fed into what he terms the “modern 
synthesis.” They can be described as the limitations of scientific reason; a growth in 
scepticism in the aftermath of the Enlightenment’s unfulfilled promises of progress and 
freedom; and an increasing sense of weariness with unaided reason and the majority 
principle. 
2.2.1. The Limitations of Scientific Reason  
 Today, technological culture affects the religious sensibilities of human beings in a 
manner different from that of previous cultural epochs. In the past, direct encounters with the 
natural world were important starting points for religious experience because God is known 
through the things he makes (Rom 1:20). However, in a world that appreciably bears the 
mark of human work and organisation, this source of significant religious experience in 
nature is declining. Ratzinger does not demonise technology, since God gave the earth to 
humanity to be subdued (Gen 2:15, 1:28); nevertheless, while “science can serve humanity . . 
. it can also become an instrument of evil. Indeed, it is science that has the potential to make 
evil truly terrible.”44  Hence, while technology is not the only hazardous activity of humanity 
– for one can say that every human initiative bears within itself a certain risk and the potential 
for destruction – Ratzinger still suggests that technology can lead to worship of the human 
itself because the progress made feels like the conquering of the uncultivated forces of nature. 
                                                          
43 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 175. See also Truth and Tolerance, 231-36. 
44 Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 45, 32.  
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With such confidence in human ability, “the world has become irreversibly profane and 
humans appear worthy of homage for bringing about progress.”45 An enormously high 
expectation has emerged, Ratzinger says, that science will solve the questions of deep human 
need and heal the woes of suffering. Many hope to evad  ethical struggles. From the 
Renaissance onward, and in a fully-fledged way since the age of the Enlightenment, Europe 
has developed a scientific rationality as a type of cultural colonialism. Ratzinger believes 
that, thanks to the technological culture which scien e has made possible, scientific 
rationality is imposing uniformity on the world:   
E sulla scia di questa forma di razionalità, l’Europa ha sviluppato una cultura che, in 
un modo sconosciuto prima d’ora all’umanità, esclude Dio dalla coscienza pubblica, 
sia che venga negato del tutto, sia che la Sua esistenza venga giudicata non 
dimostrabile, incerta, e dunque appartenente all’ambito delle scelte soggettive, un 
qualcosa comunque irrilevante per la vita pubblica. Questa razionalità puramente 
funzionale, per così dire, ha comportato uno sconvolgimento della coscienza morale 
altrettanto nuovo per le culture finora esistite, poiché sostiene che razionale è soltanto 
ciò che si può provare con degli esperimenti.46 
However, the positivist and pragmatic nature of modern scientific-minded persons is 
not the final word even though “man seems to be drugged by the narrow topicality, capable 
of perceiving only the tattered rags of reality.” Ratzinger believes that “[modern man] is 
                                                          
45 Wicks, “Six Texts,” 258. This is a quotation from lecture notes Ratzinger prepared for Cardinal Josef Frings 
for a lecture delievered in Genoa on 20 November 1961. The full text is published as “Kardinal Frings über das 
Konzil und die modernen Gedankenwelt,” in Herder Korrespondenz 16 (1961/62): 168-74. Another text which 
Ratzinger prepared in October 1965 contributed to a reformulation of no. 9 of Schema XIII De ecclesia in 
mundo huius temporis at the Second Vatican Council. Ratzinger’s text, worked on with Pierre Haubtmann, the 
lead redactor for the whole schema, became a step towards the creation of a new paragraph – no. 10 of the inal 
document, Gaudium et spes. It aims to speak from faith about the human predicament and deeper human 
questions. People know, Ratzinger claims, that theycan’t bring the forces of the world under full control and 
that the ancient human questions remain and pose themselves: “[Human beings] know obscurely that their own 
good will lacks the ability to direct rightly the forces that they themselves cause to emerge and which can later 
either oppress or help them. By these forces they appe r to be gradually coming to rule over all things. . . . Thus, 
in the midst of all the inventions and external progress, the ancient questions of the human race remain and pose 
themselves: What is the meaning of pain, evil, and death, which in spite of such great progress still ex st? What 
follows after this life? To what purpose is all this?” (Wicks, Six Texts, 292). See also Wicks, “Six Texts,” 246-
249, for the background to the formulation of this text which was furnished to Wicks from the papers of 
Haubtmann by the Archives of the Institut Catholique de Paris.   
46 Joseph Ratzinger, L’Europa di Benedetto nella crisi delle culture (Siena: Cantagalli, 2005), 35-36 (“In the 
wake of this form of rationality, Europe has developed a culture that, in a manner hitherto unknown to mankind, 
excludes God from public awareness. His existence may be denied altogether or considered unprovable and 
uncertain and, hence, as something belonging to the sp re of subjective choices. In either case, God is 
irrelevant to public life. This is a purely functional rationality that has shaken the moral consciousnes  in a way 
completely unknown to the cultures that existed previously, since it maintains that only that which can be 
demonstrated experimentally is ‘rational’” [Ratzinger, Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, 30]).  
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insecure most of all at the point where exact science abandons him, and it is the measure of 
his abandonment that first makes him aware of how narrow the slice of reality is in which 
science gives him security.”47 
Ratzinger argues that the implication of an increased confidence in, or even 
dependence upon, scientific reason is that certain long established structures that supported 
human living – namely the family, the Church, morality, and God – become the antithesis of 
freedom. Suspicion materialises in relation to the conventional structure of created existence 
that “God obliges man; [that] morality is a basic form in which the obligation to him is 
expressed”; and that “[t]he Church and family are figures in which this obligation assumes a 
concrete social form.”48 This presents a major challenge to the entire human race. Ratzinger 
fears that humanity is tempted more and more to resign itself to recognising science and 
technology as the sole barometers of progress in human freedom. Faced with such a situation, 
Benedict XVI in the Encyclical Spe salvi (SS) acknowledged the need for Christianity to 
make a more coherent attempt to balance the brilliance of the scientific age with the broad 
vision of hope that accompanies the Christian message:     
Science can contribute greatly to making the world an mankind more human. Yet it 
can also destroy mankind and the world unless it is s eered by forces that lie outside 
it. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that modern Christianity, faced with the 
successes of science in progressively structuring the world, has to a large extent 
restricted its attention to the individual and his salvation. In so doing it has limited the 
horizon of its hope and has failed to recognise sufficiently the greatness of its task – 
even if it has continued to achieve great things in the formation of man and in care for 





                                                          
47 Ratzinger, Faith and the Future, 28.  
48 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 243. 
49 SS, 25. 
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2.2.2. The Aftermath of Enlightenment Confidence in Progress and Freedom  
In the aftermath of the great confidence placed in the epistemic power of universal 
reasoning at the time of the Enlightenment, Ratzinger reflects upon the meaning of freedom 
for the average person today: 
Unter Freiheit versteht man heute im allgemeinen di Möglichkeit, alles zu tun, was 
man will und nur das zu tun, was man selber möchte. Freiheit – so verstanden – ist 
Beliebigkeit.50  
 
In its extreme form, this view of freedom can be complete only if there is no governance in 
the State and no obligation to other people or things. For Ratzinger this is symptomatic of an 
ethic of resignation whereby the human person retreats into the self and avoids the possibility 
of communal forms of society. The idea to be striven for is the unrestricted ability of every 
individual to do what he or she wants and to have everything at their disposal. Hence, “[i]n 
the scale of values with which each man is concerned, to live a life worthy of humanity, 
freedom seems to be the truly fundamental value and to be the really basic human right of 
them all.”51 In more precise terms, Ratzinger says freedom, as it is commonly understood 
today, “would mean that our own will was the only criterion for our action and that this will 
would be able to want to do anything and also be abl  to put into practice anything it 
wanted.”52 If the ethic of resignation and loss of hope in societal institutions is to be tolerated, 
                                                          
50 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 230 (“[b]y freedom one generally understands today the possibility 
of doing everything one wants and of doing only what one would like. Thus understood, freedom is 
arbitrariness” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 242]).  
51 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 231. Ratzinger gives four contemporary examples of where one may find the 
presupposition that freedom exists as the highest good  to which all other goods are subordinate: in legislation, 
political activity, religious proclamation and the natural sciences: “In legislation, artistic freedom and freedom 
of speech take precedence over every other moral value. Values that conflict with freedom, that could lead to its 
being restricted, appear as shackles, as ‘taboos,’ that is to say, as relics of archaic prohibitions ad nxieties. 
Political action has to demonstrate that it furthers freedom. Even religion can make an impression only by 
depicting itself as a force for freedom for man andfor mankind. . . . In addition there is the scepticism fostered 
by natural science regarding anything that cannot be precisely explained or demonstrated: that all seem  in the 
final analysis to be just subjective judgement, which cannot claim to be obligatory for people in general” (ibid.). 
From here, Ratzinger goes on to compare the contemporary acceptance of freedom as the primordial value with 
the sceptical attitude towards truth as it is found in Pilate’s question to Christ, “what is truth?” (John 18:38), 
drawing the conclusion that “[a]nyone who claims to be serving the truth with his life, and with his words and 
actions, must be prepared to be regarded as an enthusiast or a fanatic. For ‘Our line of sight to all bove is 
blocked’; this quotation from Goethe’s Faust sums up the way we all feel about it” (232).    
52 Ibid., 232. 
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and one is, nevertheless, to make progress in freedom, one cannot admit of any obligations 
within one’s social network: “[i]n this view liberation consists in throwing off all obligations. 
Every obligation appears as a fetter that restricts freedom; every obligation one eliminates 
means progress in freedom.”53   
It is Ratzinger’s belief, however, that in the shadow of the extremist Enlightenment 
appeal for the protection of individual freedom, a form of scepticism is emerging, because the 
rich promises made to people have not materialised in their experience. Hence a key 
implication of the modern intellectual history of freedom is not the critical appraisal of this or 
that structural mechanism within society itself. Rather, it is to question the very possibility of 
attributing meaning to the human way of life in general:    
Gerade angesichts der Grenzen der Demokratie wird der Ruf nach einer totalen 
Freiheit lauter. Nach wie vor, ja zusehends gelten “Gesetz und Ordnung” als 
Gegensatz zu Freiheit. Nach wie vor erscheinen Institution, Überlieferung, Autorität 
an sich als Gegenpole von Freiheit. Der anarchische Zug des Freiheitsverlangens 
verstärkt sich, weil die geordneten Formen gemeinschaftlicher Freiheit nicht 
befriedigen. Die großen Verheißungen der aufbrechenden Neuzeit wurden nicht 
eingelöst, aber ihre Faszination ist ungebrochen. Die demokratisch geordnete Form 
von Freiheit kann man heute nicht mehr bloß durch diese oder jene Gesetzesreform 
verteidigen. Die Frage geht an die Grundlagen selbst. Es geht darum, was der Mensch 
ist und wie er als einzelner und im ganzen richtig leben kann.54 
On the other hand, he believes that the radical current of the Enlightenment has not 
lost its appeal even if various strands of it have not been able to realise the promises of 
freedom which they made. Consequently, a common query today is that “perhaps there is no 
such thing as truth? Perhaps there is no such thingas being right or the right thing to do?”55 
                                                          
53 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 243.  
54 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz, 196-97 (“Precisely in view of the limitations of democracy, the call 
for total freedom is growing louder. Now as ever – indeed, quite noticeably – ‘law and order’ is seen as the 
opposite of freedom. Now as ever, institutions, tradi ion, authority as such appear as the opposite pole fr m 
freedom. The anarchistic trait in the demand for freedom is growing stronger, because people are not satisfied 
with the ordered forms of social freedom. The great promises of the dawn of the modern era were not redeemed, 
yet their fascination is unbroken. Nowadays the democratically ordered form of freedom can no longer b 
defended just by this or that reform of the law. The foundations are being called into question. It is a matter of 
what man is and of how he, as an individual and as a whole, can live the right life” [Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and 
Tolerance, 243]). 
55 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 242.  
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The transformation in the understanding of freedom has resulted in considerable complexity 
for intellectual thought, in general, and for theology in particular: “Scepticism is growing, 
and the reasons for it are becoming stronger, yet the desire for the absolute is not to be set 
aside.”56 The issue for humanity at the end of the twentieth c ntury, as Ratzinger sees it, is 
the challenge to not be overcome by weariness with the emptiness and meaninglessness of 
life as it has been experienced through ever-spiralling levels of human brutality in the form of 
self-inflicted wounds. Here, above all, we can see Ratzinger’s anxiety to see the proper 
pattern of freedom reinstated: 
Sich von den großen sittlichen und religiösen Kräften der eigenen Geschichte 
abzuschneiden ist Selbstmord einer Kultur und einer Nation. Die wesentlichen 
moralischen Einsichten zu pflegen, sie als ein gemeinsames Gut zu wahren und zu 
schützen, ohne sie zwanghaft aufzuerlegen, scheint mit eine Bedingung für das 
Bleiben der Freiheit gegenüber allen Nihilismen undihren totalitären Folgen zu 
sein.57                                         
In Ratzinger’s estimation, the phenomenon of growth in scepticism is a consequence of 
flagrant inequalities in liberal capitalism coming on the heels of the material failures of 
Marxism in the economic and social realm. To his mind, t actually gives notice of a new, 
albeit subtle turning towards morality and religion:  
                                                          
56 Ibid. While Ratzinger is better known for his critique of Marxist ideas, he also criticizes the practice of 
democracy in western societies. In fact, he says people’s uneasiness with their experience of democracy c n be 
seen in the intensification of the impression that democracy is still not the right form of freedom. In this regard, 
the Marxist critique of democracy is not completely misplaced and one can see how the present climate 
increases distrust towards institutions and the machinery of the State. He asks are elections free in an era where 
the outcome can be manipulated by advertising and by a small number of commentators who dominate public 
discourse to great effect. He believes it is not unrealistic to say that a new oligarchy is at work which determines 
what passes for modern and progressive. The cruelty with which public intimidation campaigns and character 
assassinations are pursued is testament to the idea that nyone who gets in the way of the prevailing agenda is a 
“foe to freedom” and an enemy to freedom of expression. He also questions the motivation behind the decision-
making process of representative bodies. The intensity with which special-interest lobbies have been 
increasingly exposed as interfering with the democrati  representative process causes suspicion about whether 
the welfare of the community as a whole truly guides the decision-making process. This raises the question 
whether the system of majority determination is conducive to freedom. The overall issue is one of a system of 
governance in which trust rather than despair marks the governed: “In this confusion of forces the problem of 
society becoming ungovernable is an ever greater thr at: the desire of opposing groups for domination bl cks 
the freedom of the whole” (243).         
57 Ratzinger, Wert in Zeiten des Umbruchs, 47 (“A culture and a nation that cuts itself off from the great ethical 
and religious forces of its own history commits suicide. The cultivation of essential moral insights, preserving 
and protecting these as a common possession but without imposing them by force, seems to be the one coditi n 
for the continued existence of freedom in the face of all the nihilisms and their totalitarian consequnces” 
[Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 52]).    
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Liberalismus und Marxismus hatten darin übereingestimm , daß sie der Religion 
sowohl das Recht wie die Fähigkeit zur Gestaltung der öffentlichen Dinge und der 
gemeinsamen Zukunft der Menschheit absprachen. Im Gärungsprozeß der zweiten 
Jahrhunderthälfte ist Religion als eine nicht auszutilgende Kraft des individuellen wie 
des sozialen Lebens neu entdeckt worden; es wurde sichtbar, daß die Zukunft der 
Menschheit nicht an ihr vorbei geplant und gestaltet werden kann.58 
This new interest in religion may give comfort to faith, but the inherent danger here, to 
Ratzinger’s mind, is a temptation which ought to be o vious to all sides – to view religion as 
an instrument to serve political ideas. However, the positive power of religion is that another 
perspective on life opens up again: “[r]eligion, which had been seen only a short time before 
as the embodiment of superstition and oppression, appeared as an agent of freedom; it 
emerged again as a public force that relativized th dominant power.”59 A technological 
civilisation, albeit a positive development, cannot adequately do justice to the grandeur of 
human nature and dignity. Therefore, a cultural dynamic operative in the evolution of the 
modern understanding of freedom is that humanity, in Ratzinger’s opinion, finds itself at a 
major crossroads: 
Der Mensch, der sich auf das exakt Wissbare beschränken will, gerät in die Krise der 
Wirklichkeit, gerät gerade so in den Entzug der Wahrheit. Es gibt den Schrei nach dem 
Glauben in ihm, den unsere Weltenstunde nicht aufhebt, sondern nur noch dramatischer 
werden lässt. Es gibt den Ruf nach Befreiung aus dem K rker des Positiven, freilich 
auch den Ruf nach Befreiung von einer Gestalt des Glaubens, die ihn selbst zur Last 
statt zur Form der Freiheit werden lässt.60  
                                                          
58 Joseph Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 7 (“Liberalism and Marxism were in agreement in refusing religion 
both the right and the capacity to shape public affairs and the common future of mankind. In the maturation 
process of the second half of the twentieth century, religion has been discovered anew as an ineradicable force 
both of individual and social living. It has become cl ar that one cannot plan and shape the future of mankind 
while prescinding from religion” (Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 8; cf. ibid., 31, 96-100, 106-7). 
59 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 98. Ratzinger says that “enlightened” Europe had been predicated on 
the insight that religion would disappear of its own accord if those societal affiliations inspired by organised 
religion were to change. Finally, however, due to the slow progress of this assumption, the possibility was 
increasingly left open that religion would never completely cease to exist altogether. Therefore “the qu stion of 
God arose precisely within the intelligentsia of the natural sciences. A science that was becoming aware of its 
limitations recognised that the real answers lay outside what it in itself could offer. At the same time as the 
question about God flared up in the midst of the strictest rationality, the thirst for the eternal –which clearly is 
imprinted in the depths of our soul – made itself hard anew out of the depths of human existence” (97-8).       
60 Joseph Ratzinger, Glaube und Zukunft (München: Kösel, 2007), 33-34 (“The man who wants to limit himself 
to what is knowable in exact terms is caught up in the crisis of reality: he beholds the withdrawal of truth. 
Within himself he hears the cry of faith, which the spirit of the hour has not been able to stifle but has only made 
all the more dramatic. There is a cry for liberation from the prison of positivism, as there is, too, for liberation 
from a form of faith that has allowed itself to become a burden instead of the vehicle of freedom” [Ratzinger, 
Faith and the Future, 28-29]) . 
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2.2.3. Unaided Reason and the Majority Principle 
Throughout the course of the twentieth-century, in the consciousness of many nations, 
the State has gradually moved from being something positive to being viewed as something 
unreasonably restrictive. Having once been seen as the custodian of the law shared by the 
community and as providing the community and the individual with protection against 
arbitrary and hostile action, “the law appears [now] as a means of maintaining obligations 
and thus unfreedom.”61 When “law and order” become negative concepts, the net result in the 
consciousness of many is that “[t]he use of force in the service of law is thus a power of 
oppression, whereas the use of force against the legal order of the state is a struggle for 
liberation and freedom and, thus, positive.”62 The moral life is viewed in the same way, 
breaking free from conventional morality being considered real morality: “[e]verything that 
serves the destruction of obligations and thus the s ruggle for freedom is good; everything 
that preserves obligations is bad.”63 Ratzinger identifies the programme that lies behind this 
modern turning-round of perspective as ultimately theological: 
Gott wird nicht mehr als eine dem Menschen gegenüberstehende Wirklichkeit 
anerkannt, aber der Mensch selbst möchte so werden, wi  er sich vorstellt, daß eine 
Gottheit wäre, wenn es sie gäbe: schrankenlos frei, von keiner Grenze eingeengt.64 
While Ratzinger acknowledges that there can indeed b  unjust laws and evil State rule 
which calls for resistance, he says there are elements of truth to be found in the basic point of 
departure and in the particulars of uninhibited liberty. This is despite the fact that “the vision 
as a whole is a distortion of truth and hence also  distortion of freedom.”65 The point of 
departure, “becoming like God” (cf. Gen 3:5) – when correctly understood – is of the very 
essence of being human. But ultimately, Ratzinger believes the hidden theological core of the 
                                                          
61 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 243. See also A.C. Grayling, Liberty in the Age of Terror: A 
Defence of Civil Liberties and Enlightenment Values (London: Bloomsbury, 2009).  
62 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 243. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 231 (“God is no longer recognised as a reality standing over against 
man; rather man himself would like to become what he imagines a deity would be if one existed: boundlessly 
free and unrestricted by any limit” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 243]). 
65 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 244. 
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radical will to freedom is based on the projection of an extreme egoism that is alien to both 
Creator and creature. Were it to prevail, Ratzinger’s big concern – the prophecy of Sartre – 
would be fulfilled: 
Ganz frei sein, ohne die Konkurrenz anderer Freiheit, ohne ein Von und ein Für – 
dahinter steht nicht ein Gottes-, sondern ein Götzenbild. Der Urirrtum solch 
radikalisierten Freiheitswillens liegt in der Idee iner Göttlichkeit, die rein egoistisch 
konzipiert ist. Der so gedachte Gott ist nicht ein Gott, sondern ein Götze, ja, das Bild 
dessen, was die christliche Überlieferung den Teufel — den Gegengott — nennen 
würde, weil darin eben der radikale Gegensatz zum wirklichen Gott liegt: Der 
wirkliche Gott ist seinem Wesen nach ganz Sein-Für (Vater), Sein-Von (Sohn) und 
Sein-Mit (Heiliger Geist). Der Mensch aber ist Gottes Ebenbild eben dadurch, daß das 
Von, Mit und Für die anthropologische Grundfigur bildet. Wo man sich von ihr zu 
befreien versucht, bewegt man sich nicht auf Göttlichkeit zu, sondern auf 
Entmenschlichung, auf Zerstörung des Seins selbst durch Zerstörung der Wahrheit. 
Die jakobinische Variante der Befreiungsidee (nennen wir die neuzeitlichen 
Radikalismen einmal so) ist Rebellion gegen das Menschsein selbst, Rebellion gegen 
die Wahrheit, und darum führt sie den Menschen — wie Sartre scharfsichtig gesehen 
hat — in eine Existenz des Selbstwiderspruchs, die wir Hölle nennen.66 
Hence, an understanding of freedom which defines itself against the State and 
communal forms of society is a major challenge today. For Ratzinger, this implies that 
freedom is an anthropological issue, insofar as it enquires into the authentic form of freedom 
which accords with the truth of human nature. His solution to one-sided, anarchic forms of 
freedom, which he defines as “the rule of caprice,”67 lies in proposing a realistic anthropology 
– one other than what masquerades as humane and life-giving in the present era: “Anarchy . . 
                                                          
66 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz, 200 (“Being completely free, without the competition f any other 
freedom, without any ‘from’ or ‘for’ – behind that s ands, not an image of God, but the image of an idol.  The 
primeval error of such a radically developed desire fo  freedom lies in the idea of a divinity that is conceived as 
being purely egotistical. The god thus conceived of is, not God, but an idol, indeed, the image of what t e 
Christian tradition would call the devil, the anti-god, because therein lies the radical opposite to the true God: 
the true God is, of his own nature, being-for [Father], being-from [Son], and being-with [Holy Spirit]. Yet man 
is in the image of God precisely because the being for, from and with constitute the basic anthropological shape. 
Whenever people try to free themselves from this, tey are moving, not towards divinity, but towards 
dehumanising, towards the destruction of being itself hrough the destruction of truth. The Jacobin variant of the 
idea of liberation [let us just use that term for modern forms of radicalism] is a rebellion against being human in 
itself, rebellion against truth, and that is why it leads people – as Sartre percipiently  observed – into a self-
contradictory existence that we call hell” [Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 248]). The Jacobin Club, along with 
its most famous member, Maximilien de Robespierre (1758-94), was a notorious political influence upon the 
development of the French Revolution. Their subsequent association with the French Government of 1793-94 
and the “Reign of Terror” means that to this day, the terms Jacobin and Jacobinism are used as pejoratives for 
radical, left-wing revolutionary politics.  
67 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 244. 
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. is not appropriate to man because he is ordered, not to isolation, but to relationship.”68 When 
society understands itself as continually oriented towards ever greater freedoms, 
accompanied with the interminable pursuit of ever-fr sh forms of democratic structures, a 
fundamental question arises in Ratzinger’s mind regarding the “majority” principle: can and 
may the majority accomplish everything? Can it declare whatsoever it desires to be law 
which then constrains everyone “or does reason trump the majority, so that something 
contrary to reason cannot really become law?”69 The question arises as to who has authority 
to say what is reasonable, since it must be asked whether a majority decision also bears 
within itself the measure of reason. Ratzinger is not trying to provoke a revolutionary attitude 
toward democracy but rather attempts to underpin its foundational presuppositions and 
limitations. He says that democracy cannot be value-neutral: 
Im letzten kann das demokratische System nur funktio ieren, wenn bestimmte 
Grundwerte – nennen wir sie die Menschenrechte – von allen als gültig anerkannt 
werden und dem Zugriff der Mehrheit entzogen bleiben. . . . Das bloß formale 
demokratische System der Machtbegrenzung und Machtverteilung funktioniert aus 
sich allein nicht.70 
In other words, the democratic rule of society presupposes an ethos with specific 
contents that is commonly accepted and commonly adhere  to in practice, even if compelling 
arguments for it cannot be as easily adduced as can the argument for the simple majority. 
Here the State comes up against a moral constraint which it must presuppose but cannot itself 
establish, and therefore, cannot itself guarantee. For Ratzinger, “the formal structure of 
[democratic] institutions is bound up with the material specificity of an ethos that belongs to 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 179. 
70 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 169 (“Ultimately the democratic system can function only when 
certain fundamental values – let us call them human rights – are recognised by everyone as valid and remain 
exempt from the reach of the majority. . . . [T]he m rely formal democratic system of limited power and the 
separation of powers does not function in and of itself” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 179]).  
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the Socratic and Christian tradition.”71 The question one is left with today is: what authority 
determines ethical legitimacy?   
In relation to the operation of formal democratic sructures, Ratzinger points out that 
what had for so long been the self-evident requirement of the institutions of State to look 
“beyond themselves” for ethical legitimacy is no longer the case. He says that even in the 
aftermath of the bloodshed of the Religious wars in Europe (c. 1524-1646), “the essential 
fundamental moral convictions that Christianity had imprinted on people’s souls were still 
certainties taken for granted and it seemed that unided reason could perceive the pure 
evidential character of these convictions.”72 However, by the time the twentieth-century had 
run its course, “unaided reason” had collaborated with ideological movements to produce 
intense violent destruction of individuals and whole societies: 
Die Entwicklungen dieses Jahrhunderts haben uns gelehrt, dass es diese Evidenz als 
in sich ruhende und verlässige Grundlage aller Freiheit nicht gibt. Der Blick auf die 
wesentlichen Werte kann der Vernunft sehr wohl verlor n gehen. . . . Freiheit kann 
sich selbst aufheben, ihrer selbst überdrüssig werden, wenn sie leer geworden ist.73 
The resolve to alert people to the vulnerability of a society predicated on, and 
governed by an unaided reason fused with majority rule, lead Ratzinger to pose a two-fold 
question – namely, what is essential and what is non-essential for growing in freedom today: 
“What must be protected in order to have freedom? What should be freed from control 
because constraint is inappropriate?”74 Ratzinger calls for a new appreciation of the idea that 
                                                          
71 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 179. 
72 Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 49-50. 
73 Ratzinger, Wert in Zeiten des Umbruchs, 45 (“The developments of the twentieth century have t ught us that 
this evidential character – as a subsistent and reliabl  basis of all freedom – no longer exists. It is perfectly 
possible for reason to lose sight of essential values. . . . Freedom can abolish itself. Freedom can weary of itself 
when it has become empty” [Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 50]). The implications of Ratzinger’s 
reflections on modern democracy, which are strongly overshadowed by memories of twentieth-century 
ideological abuses, come from his awareness of the fragility inherent in the delicate balancing of freedoms 
required to ensure that a democratic State operates au hentically. The institutions of freedom can easily be 
perceived as institutions of restriction, running the risk of contradicting their own reason for being. Elections are 
the means of empowering citizens and the elected parliament emerges as the indispensable way of distilling the 
public will. 
74 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 180. As a contemporary example, Ratzinger points to he 
phenomenon of venting all of a society’s discourse in the media. This is increasingly perceived as representing 
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“the modern State is a societas imperfecta – imperfect not only in the sense that its 
institutions always remain as imperfect as its inhabitants, but also in the sense that it needs 
forces from outside of itself in order to continue being itself.”75 Hence, Ratzinger believes 
that the existence of imperfections within the modern State and its failure to fulfil the promise 
of total freedom for its citizens rekindles in people the idea that “the existence of the state 
points beyond itself. It becomes a question of another sort of community.”76  
It can be said that for Ratzinger, a secure social sphere negates an ethic of scepticism 
because it augments the virtue of hope. As Pope he has continued this theme. Hence locating 
a sphere where the human person feels secure but not co strained is an immense challenge, 
but upon the attempt to do so rests the future of humanity itself because if there is no goal or 
certainty in which humanity can hope and trust, it will lose its hunger to live in the present – 
the time which every generation is obliged to live in: “[t]he present, even if it is arduous, can 
be lived and accepted if it leads towards a goal, if we can be sure of this goal, and if this goal 
is great enough to justify the effort of the journey.”77 This is a key point of connection for 
Ratzinger between anthropology and ecclesiology. Firstly however, we must comment on his 
analysis of how modern-day cultural dynamics feeds into what he calls the “modern 
synthesis.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the truly liberated society. However, because such a practice seems to have accelerated a correlative reduction in 
the values of the received moral tradition, he asks whether this trend is more the favouring of the rights of a 
small group over the rights and dignity of the many. He asks “[d]oes this not create a monopoly of a few, with a 
momentum that carries it further and further in onedir ction and thereby restricts freedom of opinion as well, 
because one position increasingly claims to be the only correct one and prevails?”(ibid).     
75 Ibid., 199-200. As Pope, he has set out the challenge facing politicians involved in democratic decision-
making: “For most of the matters that need to be regulated by law, the support of the majority can serve as a 
sufficient criterion. Yet it is evident that for the fundamental issues of law, in which the dignity of man and of 
humanity is at stake, the majority principle is notenough: everyone in a position of responsibility must 
personally seek out the criteria to be followed when framing laws. . . . In terms of the underlying 
anthropological issues, what is right and may be giv n the force of law is in no way simply self-evident today. 
The question of how to recognize what is truly right and thus to serve justice when framing laws has never been 
simple, and today in view of the vast extent of ourknowledge and our capacity, it has become still harder” 
(Benedict XVI, Address to the Members of the Federal German Parliament in Berlin [22 September 2011]: ASS 
103 [2011], 664-65). 
76 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 179. 
77 SS, 1.  
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2.2.4. Cultural Diagnosis: The Modern Synthesis 
Ratzinger gathers the three dynamics discussed above into a “modern synthesis.” This 
is comprised of the temptation to unite the present-day assumptions of “belief in progress, the 
absolutization of the scientific-technical civilisation and the promise of the new humanity, of 
the messianic kingdom.”78 He sees it as a temptation arising from a world-view whereby 
morality loses its evidential character, and focus turns instead towards the exclusiveness of 
technical reason and the destruction of ethos. The Bonaventurian influence on Ratzinger’s 
understanding of history, which was observed in Chapter 1, informs his presentation of the 
philosophical dynamics underpinning these attitudes. 
In the first place, Ratzinger believes the idea of pr gress is tied to the post-Hegelian 
philosophy of history, which proposes a mechanistic n erpretation of history. In socialism, 
progress was regarded as whatever served the construction of socialism, whereas for 
superficial liberalism, in a no less partisan way, everything that removes constraint appears as 
progress and consequently freedom is equated with the absence of ties: 
Wo immer Fortschritt als ein notwendiger Prozeß gesetzlicher Entwicklung der 
Geschichte angesehen wird, ist er unterhalb des eigntlich Menschlichen angesiedelt 
und im tiefsten gegen den Menschen konzipiert. Personale Freiheit und ethische 
Eigenverantwortung können dann nur als Störfaktoren solcher Gesetzlichkeiten 
angesehen werden.79  
Secondly, the canonisation of the scientific-technial civilisation logically feeds into 
progressivism. Science, in the contemporary sense of the term, refers to the realm of the 
necessary, as that which can be reduced to strict rules and admits only objectively-verifiable 
certainties. In practice, science “cannot deal with the realm of what is free, that is, with the 
genuinely human dimension of man and his social bonds.”80 The attempt to treat the human 
                                                          
78 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 129. 
79 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 64-65 (“Whenever progress is seen as a necessary process of the legitimate 
development of history, it is located below the level of what is genuinely human and in its depths it i  conceived 
against man. Personal freedom and ethical responsibility for oneself can then be seen only as factors hat
interfere with such legitimacy” [Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 95]). 
80 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 92. 
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person “scientifically,” in a narrow sense, includes a determinism which means nothing 
“human” is possible outside of the strict natural laws of necessity: 
Eine Wissenschaftsidee, die sich am Unfreien bildet, wird auf den Bereich der Freien, 
des Menschlichen übertragen, um eine “Physik des Menschen” zu ermöglichen, in der 
es notwendige Gesetze und exakte Voraussagen gibt. Die Theorie fordert hier – 
konsequent genommen – ihrem Wesen nach die Ausschaltung des Faktors Freiheit.81  
The final part of this temptation – the promise of the perfection of the kingdom within 
history – is, to Ratzinger’s mind, the logical result of progressivist-determinism: “in the face 
of growing social distress and inescapable Christian responsibility . . . it is characteristic that 
one now speaks simply of the ‘kingdom’ – without mentioning God – and that this is 
understood as the ideal human society.”82 However, if the aim of faith and the task of all 
theology is to work towards bringing about the “kingdom,” then the central word of faith 
becomes a purely political concept: “Faith itself thereby becomes political ideology. Politics 
has absorbed faith into itself.”83  
The idea that, by entering the laws of history, onemight construct an earthly paradise 
is inimical to freedom and is therefore inhuman for it presupposes that history will, at some 
point, be based on definitive structures rather than on freedom. Ratzinger, however, says,  
Die Zukunft bleibt immer offen, weil menschliches Zusammenleben immer unter dem 
Zeichen menschlicher Freiheit steht und daher immer auch in der Möglichkeit des 
Versagens. Das aber bedeutet: Das Feld des politischen Handelns ist nicht die 
Zukunft, sondern die Gegenwart.84   
Ratzinger believes that the future, even the history of the future, so to speak, is best served by 
being good today and thereby shaping a spirit of responsibility for what is good both today 
and tomorrow. To his mind, the paradox of the myth of inner-worldly eschatologies “consists 
                                                          
81 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 63 (“An idea of science that is formed on the basis of what is not free is 
transposed to the realm of what is free, namely, the human realm, in order to make possible a ‘physics of man’ 
in which there exists necessary laws and exact predictions. If this theory is taken consistently, it demands by its 
very nature the exclusion of the factor of freedom” [Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 93-94]). 
82 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 75. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 98 (“[t]he future always remains open, because human life lived in common 
always revolves around human freedom and therefore always has the possibility of failure. But this means that 
the field of political activity is not the future but the present” [Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 140-41]). 
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in the fact that one does not wish to free man for freedom but from freedom; that one wishes 
to achieve the absolute – the definitive society – precisely by excluding the absolute criterion 
– God.”85 
This synthesis is the systematic exclusion of the divine from the shaping of history 
and human life because it necessarily neglects to fact r in freedom – both human and divine. 
The “genuinely new” and remarkable thing about “this strange trinity is . . . that this structure 
now replaces the concept of God, and necessarily exc udes it, since it takes its place.”86 While 
there may be a growth in a more discerning attitude owards aspects of science, progress, and 
historical interpretation today, Ratzinger believes the temptation to combine them remains.  
Technology and science look set to continue developing with an immanent necessity 
into the future. Ratzinger says we cannot turn back to dreams of pre-technological paradises 
and expect future generations of live without the technical advancements we ourselves enjoy. 
Belief in technology’s ability to construct a new world on its own terms must leave God out 
of what happens in history and consign the question of his existence to the private, arbitrary 
realm. However, to do so – to give no rights to God in public life – means the “export [of] 
technical skills without ethos, and ultimately against ethos; . . . the spirit of having and 
making things, along with the escape into the empty promise of a ‘tomorrow’ [that] will fill 
the whole world.”87 A way forward, therefore, can only be found through a broader 
affirmation. 
                                                          
85 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 145. Ratzinger refers here to the German poet Fridrich Hölderlin’s 
(1770-1843) observation on this type of mythologizing: “Still it is man’s desire to make the state his eaven that 
has made the state hell” (quoted in Helmut Kuhn, Der Staat [Munich: Kösel, 1967], 38).   
86 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 130. 
87 Ibid., 132. If one were looking for an even more condensed summary of the consequences of Ratzinger’s 
analysis of contemporary cultural dynamics, it resid  in the idea of modern rationalism which “declares the 
irrational to be the origin of the rational. This means that it must declare the basis of freedom to be that which is 
not free, that is, freedom, like reason, is a by-product of the self-construction of the world” (115; cf., ibid., 112). 
Marcello Pera, lecturer in political philosophy at the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome, and one-time 
president of the Italian Senate (2001-2006), reflects on Pascal’s wager to live “as if God existed,” making a very 
penetrating prediction on the outcome of the exclusion of the Christian God from western culture: “To live as if 
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Ratzinger is convinced that only the idea of the unconditional, the idea of God, can 
prevent the formation of an artificial unity of humanity that extinguishes at the same time the 
forces that truly unite it – i.e. the great ethical onvictions that humanity has in common. In 
opposition to the potential “destruction of all traditional cultures through the universalization 
of the scientific objectification of the world and the goal-oriented rational organisation of 
life,” 88 Ratzinger puts forward a “Christian synthesis.” This synthesis, lived out by the 
members of the Church, proposes to society an authentic human freedom in harmony with the 
will of God. However, to develop this point further at this stage of our study would be 
premature.        
 Ratzinger has an awareness that one-sided views of freedom “are at work also in the 
ecclesiastical crisis and have left their mark on the struggle within Church today.”89 This 
means that an important preparatory task for studying h s ecclesiology is to consider how the 
modern notion of freedom has marked the Church’s life. The final part of this chapter now 
turns to this consideration.  
2.3.   Contemporary Ecclesial Dynamics of Freedom  
 
In light of all that Ratzinger has said in terms of the evolution of the understanding of 
freedom in intellectual history, there is no surprise n the fact that he believes the Church is 
compelled to answer the criticism that its own inner lif  can often be anything but a place 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
God existed means to deny man that giddy feeling of omnipotence and absolute freedom which at first elates 
him and then depresses and degrades him. It means rcognising our finite condition and becoming aware of the 
ethical limitations of our actions. This amounts to establishing our rights and acknowledging our duties. . . . 
Without the Christian vision of the human person, our political life is doomed to become the mere exercis  of 
power and our science to divorce itself from moral wisdom; our technology to become indifferent to ethics and 
our material well-being blind to our exploitation of others and our environment. Without that vision, ur
encounter with ‘the other’ – the poor, the sick, the dying, the needy or outcast of any gender, race, or age – can 
only deteriorate into violence and manipulation, and our civilisation will cut itself off from the principles that 
first baptised and nurtured it. Yes, velut si Deus daretur is the moral condition necessary in order for us to 
cultivate hope” (Marcello Pera, Why We Should Call Ourselves Christians: The Religious Roots of Free 
Societies, trans. L.B. Lappin [New York: Encounter Books, 2011], 60). 
88 Robert Spaemann, “Universalismus oder Eurozentrismus?” in Krzysztof Michalski, ed., Europa und die 
Folgen (Stuttgart: Keltt-Cotta, 1988), 320. 
89 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 182. 
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where people feel free.90 On account of the present-day conception of freedom, coming to 
terms with the tension between individuals and institutions is of fundamental importance. 
Such a discussion is especially important in contemporary ecclesiology. This subdivision is 
divided into three parts. Firstly, there is a discussion of the growing feeling of bitterness 
towards a Church that appears as a barrier to freedom rather than anything else. This is 
followed by looking at the Church from the specific perspective of freedom in the aftermath 
of the Second Vatican Council. And finally, it lays out the basic orientations of Ratzinger’s 
ecclesiology as he seeks a way forward in understanding the Church as sphere of growth in 
authentic human freedom.    
2.3.1. The Church as a Barrier to Freedom? The Experience of Bitterkeit91 
Ratzinger has an awareness of the complexity of the disdain with which the Church 
can be viewed: “Why does the Church incur the dislike of so many men, even of believers, 
even of those who yesterday could be reckoned among the most faithful and who despite 
their pain, probably still are today?”92  Broaching an answer, he suggests that while for some 
it is the case that the Church has become too worldly and for others she is not worldly 
enough, “most people have trouble with the Church because she is an institution like many 
others, which as such restricts my freedom.”93  
 Ratzinger points out that the modern critique of the Church which is often the source 
of the bitterness is especially complex and doubly burdensome because the obstacles which it 
                                                          
90 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1182-85; Called to Communion, 133-
40; “The End of Time,” 95-6; God and the World, 92-3; What It Means to Be a Christian: Three Sermons, trans. 
Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 43-49. 
91 The strong word, Bitterkeit (“bitterness”) is used by Ratzinger in a lecture originally prepared for the annual 
“Meeting for Friendship among the Peoples,” organised in Rimini by the Comunione e Liberazione ecclesial 
movement. The lecture, originally entitled “A Company in Need of Reform,” specifically reflected upon 
dissatisfaction with the Church and is a good example of Ratzinger’s intellectual honesty in openly identifying 
the discontent felt by people with the Catholic Churc . The text is reprinted in Called to Communion, 133-156, 
at 135. See also Deus caritas est (DCE), 3.     




erects reach into a person’s most personal and most intimate depths. This is principally 
because Church rules for ordering life make a claim upon the entire life of the human person 
and are thus about more than merely supporting one’s temporal welfare. Ultimately, the 
Church’s raison d'être rests in its claim to offer a more vital support t humanity than the 
services and ministrations of State regulation. He points out that the Church’s rules purport to 
“inwardly affect my course in life, telling me how I am supposed to understand and shape my 
freedom . . . demand[ing] of me decisions that cannot be made without painful 
renunciation.”94 Ratzinger tries to capture the contemporary critique of the Church through a 
series of questions: 
Will man uns nicht die schönsten Früchte im Garten d s Lebens verweigern? Wird 
uns nicht der Weg ins Weite versperrt durch die Enge so vieler Gebote und Verbote? 
Wird das Denken nicht ebenso an seiner Größe gehindrt wie das Wollen? Muss 
Befreiung nicht notwendig der Ausbruch aus solcher geistiger Bevormundung sein? 
Und wäre nicht die einzige wirkliche Reform, dies alles abzuschütteln.95  
Alongside anti-institutional sentiment, Ratzinger blieves “bitterness” with the 
Church has a second specific cause, akin to the interminable search for meaning that takes 
place in the human person. Because of the harsh nature of life and the pressures of daily 
living, “a secret hope still looks to the Church, which, it is felt, ought to be a kind of island of 
the good life, a tiny oasis of freedom into which one can withdraw now and then.”96 Because 
of the inexorable human search for meaning, the disappointment with the Church has a 
particular quality. In one way or another, people’s hopes of liberty seem to be even more 
severely crushed by the Church, given that, of all pl ces, there is an understood expectation 
that it will surely provide a zone that heralds a better world: 
                                                          
94 Ibid., 135. 
95 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 131 (“Is this not intended to deny us the sweetest fruits in the garden of 
life? Is not the way into the wide open closed by the restrictive confines of so many commandments and 
prohibitions? Is not thought kept from reaching its full stature just as much as the will is? Must notliberation 
consist in breaking out of such immature dependency? And would not the only real reform be to rid ourselves of 
the whole business?” [Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 135]). The contemporary critique of the Church is very 
often summed up in the so-called “Canon of Criticism” which includes the topics of women’s ordination, 
contraception, abortion, homosexuality, celibacy, infallibility, and the remarriage of divorced person. See 
Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 181-213. 
96 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 135. 
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[. . .] weil man sich im Stillen von ihr mehr erwartet als von allen weltlichen 
Institutionen. In ihr sollte sich der Traum von der b sseren Welt erfüllen. In ihr 
wenigstens möchte man den Geschmack der Freiheit verkost n, der Erlöstseins – das 
Heraustreten aus der Höhle, wie Gregor der Große im Anschluss an Plato formuliert.97 
When viewing the Church, therefore, modern sensibilities tend to become even more 
sensitive to the constraining nature of institutional arrangements. On the other hand, while the 
dream of a better world emanating from the Church seems extinguished because the 
empirical evidence suggests it has settled for institution and everything human, the bitterness 
cannot cause the idea of the Church to disappear. The dream of something better cannot be 
extinguished from the human heart.  
When Ratzinger analyses, from a theological perspective, the prevalence of anti-
institutional sentiment in conjunction with the human search for meaning, he describes the 
phenomenon of a thirst for freedom. It is “the form in which the yearning for redemption and 
the feeling of unredemption and alienation make their voices heard today.”98 A bitterness 
arises because on the one hand “the call for freedom demands an existence uncramped by 
prior givens that keep me from fully realising myself and throw up external obstacles to my 
chosen path” while, on the other hand in the Church, “on all sides we run into such 
roadblocks that hold us at a standstill and prevent us from continuing on our way.”99 As a 
result, when this “thirst” has cause to encounter a resignation not dissimilar from that which 
people generally have experienced in the post-liberalist and post-marxist milieu,100 it is 
composed of the temptation to disillusionment, followed by an irrational attempt at 
constructing a “space” that satisfies the yearnings of our will: 
                                                          
97 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 131-32 (“[. . .] because in their heart of hearts people expect more of 
her that of all worldly institutions. It is in the Church that the dream of a better world should be realised. There, 
at least, one would hope to know the taste of freedom, of redeemed existence – to emerge from the cave, as 
Gregory the Great expresses it in language borrowed from Plato” [Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 135]). See 
Gregory the Great, Hom. in Ezechielem. II, 1, 17: PL 76, 948 A; Plato, The Republic Bk. VII: 514a-520a.   
98 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 134. 
99 Ibid.  
100 See this dissertation § 2.2.2. 
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Weil [die Kirche] nicht so ist, wie die Träume zeign, versucht man verzweifelt, sie 
so zu machen, wie man sie wünscht: zu einem Ort aller Freiheiten einem Raum der 
Entschränkung unserer Grenzen, zum Experiment von Ut pia, das es doch irgendwo 
geben muss.101 
This call for adaptation – akin to that of a political promise to create a better world –  
subscribes to the premise that we must establish a better Church “as a first step towards a 
political goal: a Church full of humanity, pervaded by a spirit of brotherhood and large-
minded creativity, a place of reconciliation of all nd for all.”102 Rousseau’s philosophy, as 
representative of an ethic of autarchy and a revolution against institutionalism, bolsters the 
disillusionment felt by people with the ecclesiastical structure they see about them. Strong 
echoes here also of the belief in progress to achieve earthly perfection. Because fraternity is 
not a permanent or universal reality in the community, the institution is viewed as wrongly 
configured. In Ratzinger’s view this can partially be accounted for by the fact that “[i]n 
today’s world-view, the ideas of autonomy and of anti- uthoritarianism, if we can put it like 
that, have become extremely dominant.”103 Taking these ideas to their logical conclusion, 
Ratzinger says they imply that “if the autonomous sbject has the last word, then its desires 
are simply unlimited.”104  
Ratzinger believes the dissatisfaction with everything not in harmony with the 
radically autonomous subject is a major cultural and ecclesial problem today. However, to 
offset this Ratzinger says the Church of the twentieth-century has acted as a counter pole, as a 
force against repression, as that other form of society which he spoke about previously: “The 
twentieth century has made it plain in a hitherto unknown way that precisely the bond of 
communion that is the Church is a counterforce against all worldly, political, and economic 
                                                          
101 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 132 (“Because the Church is not as our dreams picture her to be, a 
desperate attempt is undertaken to bring her into conformity with our wishes: to make her a place for every 
freedom, a space where we can move freed of our limits, an experiment in utopia, which, after all, must exist 
somewhere” [Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 136]). 
102 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 136. 




mechanisms of oppression and uniformization.”105 Ratzinger acknowledges that there has 
been a growing misunderstanding of the Church’s nature due to one-sided notions of freedom 
ungrounded in truth and devoid of content, which revolt against the inevitable obligations and 
constraints that accompany an authentic, well-adjusted freedom. In response to this, he will 
argue that, in fact, the Church “gives men a place of freedom and sets a sort of ultimate limit 
to oppression.”106  
2.3.2. The Church in the Aftermath of Vatican II 
The question of the Church in the aftermath of Second Vatican Council is a multi-
faceted one, but from the perspective of freedom, Ratzinger focused on two themes in 
particular – the image of the Church as “people of G d,” and liberation theology. Of major 
concern in ecclesiology was the fact that confusion about the Church’s nature and identity 
became particularly acute during this era. As little as two years after the Council, Ratzinger 
sensed in people a feeling of disappointment with its work which amounted to an anti-climax 
or an atmosphere of unfulfilled expectations. In 1966, he began questioning the viability of 
some of that expectation in the first place:  
Die Welt, die für einen Moment erstaunt aufgehorcht und sich mit freudiger 
Zustimmung dem Konzil zugewandt hatte, geht längst wieder ihren Geschäften nach, 
und zu guter Letzt ist die Kirche doch Kirche geblien und der Glaube eher noch 
mühseliger, weil ausgesetzter , schutzloser geworden: S i es, daß in dem Beifall von 
1962 wirklich etwas aufgeklungen war von einer geheimen Sehnsucht, das Höhere 
und Ewige, das sich uns so sehr verbirgt, möchte nun faßbarer und näher werden, 
weniger verzäunt durch tausend Vorschriften und weniger verdeckt durch die Last der 
Vergangenheit, die auf dem liegt, was sich als Gottes Offenbarung uns anbietet – sei 
es, daß man sich in seiner eigenen Weltlichkeit bestätigt fühlte und von solchen 
Empfindungen her auf eine Verweltlichung der  Kirche hoffte.107 
                                                          
105 Ibid., 165. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes, 303 (“The world, which had for a moment been turned towards the Council 
to give it a joyous approval, has long since returned to its business, and in the end the Church still remained the 
Church, and faith rather more arduous than ever because of being exposed and more vulnerable: could it be that 
the applause of 1962 had touched upon a secret longing for something higher and eternal – which hides itself so 
much from us – that would now be closer and more comprehensible, less fenced off by a thousand regulations 
and less obscured by the weight of the past which covers over that which offers itself to us as God’s revelation? 
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He further contends that the Council’s immediate afrmath contributed to further 
disagreement and divided opinions amongst groups of the faithful. For some the Council had 
been “nothing but a conglomerate of cautious comproises, a victory of diplomatic caution 
over the power of the Holy Spirit who wants not complicated syntheses, but the simplicity of 
the Gospel.”108 For others it manifested a scandal that, in its fascination with popularity in the 
world and with material things, amounted to a “cheapened, reductive Christianity.”109 For 
Ratzinger himself, it was the designation of the Churc  as “people of God” in the document 
Lumen gentium, on the one hand,110 and the emergence of liberation theology,111 on the other, 
which epitomise the prevailing atmosphere. 
For those who felt the Council provided a major breakthrough in ecclesiology, the 
second chapter of Lumen gentium brought to the fore the designation of the Church as the 
“people of God,” a biblical term comprehensive enough to foster the ecumenical movement 
and retain the eschatological nature of the historical, albeit mystical Body of Christ.112 
However, Ratzinger says, the designation was quickly swamped by an “enthusiasm over the 
discovery [that] far exceeded what the biblical foundations themselves could support.”113 A 
reductionist tendency, which relegated a great dealof conciliar ecclesiology, turned “people” 
into a sociological and political term detached from its biblical roots: “[t]hus ‘People of God’ 
becomes the vehicle of an anti-hierarchical and anti-sacral idea of Church, indeed, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Or could it be that one felt the Church was about t come to terms with the world and thereby confirm people in 
their own worldliness?” [own translation]).  
108 Ibid., 303-4. 
109 Ibid., 304. 
110 Ratzinger deals with the reception of the term “peopl  of God” after the Vatican Council in a number of 
places. Some of the more key writings have recently been gathered in GS:ZV, 205-332. See also Ratzinger, 
Church, Ecumenism, Politics, 23-35, 182-85;“Communio ein Program” Internationale katholische Zeitschriften 
Communio 21 (1992): 454-63; Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 110-12; a lecture delivered in Benevento in 
June 2002, “Eucharist, Communion and Solidarity,”  
http://www.doctrinafidei.va/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20020602_ratzinger-eucharistic-congress_en.html 
(accessed 24 May 2011). See also Heim’s commentary on how Ratzinger deals with this in Joseph Ratzinger- 
Kircheliche Existenz, 310-397.   
111 Ratzinger’s key writings on the theology of liberation have recently been gathered in GS:AEL, 489-641. See 
also this dissertation §§0.2., 0.3., and 1.2.    
112 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 23-35. 
113 Ibid., 29. 
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revolutionary category suitable for developing a new concept of Church.”114 Ideas such as 
“the grass-roots Church, ‘Church from below,’ Church of the people, the congregation as the 
entity responsible for all actions, both religious and socio-political”115 were bolstered by this. 
Ratzinger notes that  
“Volk Gottes” wurde immer mehr im Sinn von Volkssouveränität aufgefaßt, als Recht 
zur gemeinsamen, demokratischen Bestimmung aller darüber, was Kirche sein und 
was sie tun solle. Gott, der durch den Genitiv “Gottes” als der eigentliche Schöpfer 
und Souverän dieses Volkes angesprochen ist, blieb in solchen Überlegungen aus dem 
Spiel; er war eingeschmolzen in das sich selbst begründende und gestaltende Volk. 116 
It became a veritable slogan for the ideas of freedom emanating from Europe – east 
and west – at the time. The western push for more democratisation, with its concomitant 
majority principle, and the call from the east for the proletariat to seize power from 
aristocratic élites, were cross pressures in the gen ral cultural environment encouraging anti-
institutional understandings of the Church. However, these political struggles led the 
“horizontal” to dominate this scriptural term, disregarding the theological foundation which 
ought to have been its ground. Ratzinger says, this “reduces the Church to the level of a party. 
Parties may, after some time, discard an old program and replace it with a new one, which 
they see for now as better, until yet another takes its place.”117 The application of “people” to 
a general political interpretation was predicated on the hope that popular sovereignty was at 
long last being applied to the Church. Ratzinger concludes that this shift in approach – so 
fundamentally anti-theological – is a key element in the growing disillusionment and 
bitterness facing the Church. It was a situation that
[. . .] gab Anlaß zu ausgiebigen Strukturdebatten, in denen je nach Lage 
“Demokratisierung” mehr westlich oder mehr im Sinn der östlichen 
“Volksdemokratien” ausgelegt wurde. Allmählich ist das “Wortfeuerwerk” (N. 
                                                          
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., 34. 
116 Joseph Ratzinger, “Communio ein Program,” Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift Communio 5 (1992): 458 
(“‘People of God’ was more and more understood in the sense of popular sovereignty, as a right to the common, 
democratic determination of all as to what the Churc  ought to be and what it should do. God, who is spoken 
about by the genitive ‘of God’ as the real creator nd sovereign of this People, remained out of play in such 
considerations; he had melted into the self-causative nd creative People” [own translation]). 
117 Ibid., 458-59 [own translation]. 
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Lohfink) um den Volk-Gottes-Begriff heruntergebrannt, zum einen und hauptsächlich 
weil diese Herrschaftsspiele sich selbst entlarvt haben und der nüchternen Arbeit im 
kirchlichen Alltag Platz machen mußten, zum anderen aber auch, weil solide 
theologische Arbeit unwidersprechlich das Umhaltbare solcher Politisierungen eines 
in sich ganz anders gelagerten Begriffs zum Vorschein g bracht hat. . . . Genau den 
Gottesbegriff hatte man bei dem “Feuerwerk” um dieses Wort weggelassen und es 
damit gänzlich seines Sinnes beraubt. Denn eine Kirche, die nur für sich selber da ist, 
ist überflüssig. Und die Menschen merken das als bald. Die Kirchenkrise, wie sie sich 
in der Krise des Volk-Gottes-Begriffs spiegelt, ist “Gottes-krise”; sie resultiert aus 
dem Weglassen des Wesentlichen. Was bleibt, ist nur noch ein Streit um Macht. Den 
gibt es anderwärts in der Welt schon genug, dazu bra chen wir die Kirche nicht.118 
In the background here is Ratzinger’s sensitivity to philosophies which lead in the 
direction of “the claim of the absolute subordination of the individual to the collective.”119 
For him, while on the one hand, “community” is a vital and relevant part of the Christian 
economy, on the other, he believes that detaching it from the universal and sacramental 
Church is not in keeping with its ecclesial essence. In such a case, the “official Church,” like 
all major political and commercial structures, would be simply perceived as a power-base that 
hampers personal freedom, whereas the local faith community would be seen as a place 
where everyone participates in everything and thus freedom is realised:    
                                                          
118 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 110-12 (“[. . .] gave rise to extensive debates over structures, in 
which – depending on the situation – “democratization” was interpreted more in the Western sense or more in 
the sense of the Eastern ‘people’s democracies.’ Gradually the ‘verbal fireworks’ (N. Lohfink) surrounding the 
concept of “People of God” burned away, in the first place (and mainly) because each of these power games 
unmasked the others and had to give way to down-to-earth work in the everyday Church, yet also, on the ot r 
hand, because solid theological work made quite manifest, in a way that was beyond contradiction, how such 
politicizing of a concept which was in itself entirely different was untenable. . . . The idea of God is the very 
thing that had been left aside in the “fireworks” surrounding this term, and it had thereby been depriv d of its 
entire meaning. For a Church that is there only for her own sake is superfluous. And people notice it 
straightaway. The crisis concerning the Church, as it is reflected in the crisis concerning the concept of ‘People 
of God,’ is a ‘crisis about God’: it is the result of leaving out what is essential. What then remains is merely a 
dispute about power. There is already enough of that elsewhere in the world – we do not need the Church for 
that” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 127-29]). In regard to the careful exegetical work carried out on 
the “people of God” concept, Ratzinger refers to Bochum University exegete, Werner Berg: “[d]espite th 
paucity of passages in which the turn of phrase ‘People of God’ is to be found – and to that extent, ‘People of 
God’ is a fairly rare biblical concept – we can nonetheless hold fast to some elements in common: the phrase 
‘People of God’ expresses the ‘being related to God,’ the ‘relationship established by God,’ the close connection 
between God and those people referred to as the ‘People of God,’ that is to say, in a ‘vertical direction.’ The turn 
of phrase is less suitable for describing the hierarchical structure of this community, above all if the ‘People of 
God’ is described ‘as opposed to’ the officeholders. . . . Nor, on the basis of the biblical understanding of it, is 
this turn of phrase appropriate as a cry of protest against those in office: ‘We are the People of God’” (“‘Volk 
Gottes’ – Ein biblischer Begriff?,” in W.Geerlings and M. Seckler, eds., Kirche sein: Nachkonziliare Theologie 
im Dienst der Kirchenreform: Festschrift für H.J. Pottmeyer [Freiberg: Herder, 1994], 20 [quoted in Pilgrim 
Fellowship of Faith, 128). 
119 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 33. 
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Der Überdruß an den anonymen Großgesellschaften trägt das Seinige dazu bei, um 
den Gedanken der sich selbst bestimmenden Gemeinde als Ausweg erscheinen zu 
lassen und von ihm her Kirche als Oase der Freiheit anzubieten. . . . Aber wo das 
Element Gemeinde isoliert und vom großen Strom der sak amentalen Gemeinschaft 
der ganzen Kirche abgegrenzt wird, verflüchtigt sich die Freiheit der Gemeinde ins 
Spielerische und wird leer. Die autonome Gemeinde sinkt zur reinen Sozialpflege und 
zur Freizeitgemeinschaft ab; das kultische Tun wird irrational oder zum bloßen Ritus 
der Gemeinschaftlichkeit, die sich selbst feiert. Wieder zeigt sich, daß die 
Eigenständigkeit als solche noch nicht Freiheit ist.120 
Consequently, Ratzinger believes it is an error to at empt to locate a comprehensive human 
freedom solely in the political arena because it compels the essence of the human person to fit 
into the realm of popular politics. This would be to curtail the ontological dignity of the 
person and destroy freedom. But because political attempts at creating complete freedom 
inevitably fail, Ratzinger believes many in the Church turn to a radical idea of freedom and 
its promise of progress. This is expressed theologically through the conduit of prophetic 
promise. This was most clearly exemplified for him in liberation theology.    
It is Ratzinger’s view that the emergence of liberation theology had the potential to 
confirm the theological importation of an anarchic form of freedom into ecclesial life.121 He 
is instinctively wary of any anthropological attitude that exalts progress within history to a 
point where “the whole of history appears as a process of progressive liberations whose 
                                                          
120 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 174-75 (“Discontent with large, impersonal associations plays its 
part in making the idea of the self-determining faith community seem to be a way out that can turn the C urch 
into an oasis of freedom. . . .  But when the element of local community is isolated and set apart from the 
mainstream of the sacramental communion of the whole Church, the community’s freedom is reduced to 
triviality and becomes empty. The autonomous community is reduced to a group for purely social concerns a d 
leisure activities; its act of worship becomes irrat onal or a mere rite of fellowship that celebrates i self. Again, it 
is evident that autonomy as such is not yet freedom” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 184-85]). 
121 We have previously treated the topic of liberation theology in this dissertation in §§0.2., 0.3. and 1.2. At this 
point, however, we arrive at Ratzinger’s primary misgiving about the direction in which its earliest pro onents 
were taking it – i.e. the potential repercussions of the politicization of ecclesial life. Speaking from a personal 
perspective, he admits that his main struggle was th t i  was painfully difficult to enter into dialogue with the 
early waves of liberationists because they clung tightly “to that illusory myth which blocks the path of the 
reforms and intensifies misery and injustices, namely, the myth of the class struggle as an instrument in creating 
a classless society” (Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report, 189). Ratzinger is convinced that some liberationists 
borrowed Marxist thought in an insufficiently critical manner that risks damaging Christian faith and Christian 
living. This is also borne out by the thrust of LN, which was issued under his leadership at the CDF. For a more 
thorough account of Ratzinger’s underlying approach, see The Ratzinger Report, 169-90; Church, Ecumenism 
and Politics, 239-47; A Turning Point for Europe, 88-101. 
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mechanism we are gradually able to explain and that we are thus able to steer ourselves.”122 
A fascinating promise seems to open up for humanity which, Ratzinger says, “over-
exaggerates the real meaning of human nature in just as detrimental a way as previous 
generations under-estimated it.123 Echoing his concern with the modern synthesis, Ratzinger 
insists that “[w]herever progress is seen as a necessary process of the legitimate development 
of history, it is located below the level of what is genuinely human and in its depths it is 
conceived against man.”124 To his mind, what is theologically unacceptable and socially 
dangerous is an inadequate anthropology that would see the sacralising of revolution – the 
mixing up of the Bible, christology, politics, socilogy and economics. This would be to 
absolutize and sacralise a theory concerning the socio-political order, which would merely 
succeed in “producing a dreamy fanaticism that can le d to even worse injustices and 
oppression, ruining in the praxis what the theory has proposed.”125 In fact, the sacralising of 
an incomplete picture of human nature is precisely what condemns to slavery the poorest who 
genuinely need to be liberated: 
Wenn man anhand von Bibel und Tradition in brüderlicher Weise versucht, die 
Abweichungen [der Mythos vom Klassenkampf als Instrument zur Schaffung einer 
klassenlosen Gesellschaft] aufzuzeigen, erhält man sch ell das Etikett von “Dienern,” 
“Lakaien,” der herrschenden Klassen, die sich dadurch die Macht sichern wollen, daß 
sie sich auch auf die Kirche stützen. . . . Von dieser Seite wird jede unserer 
Stellungnahmen, mag sie noch so überdacht und respektvoll erfolgen, a priori 
zurückgewiesen, weil man sich auf die Seite der “Herren” stellen würde. Dabei wird 
die Sache der Untersten gerade von jenen Ideologien verraten, die sich für das Volk 
stets als Quelle von Leiden erwiesen haben.126  
                                                          
122 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 240. 
123 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 241: “[M]an himself can become the engineer of his 
history. He need no longer wager on the always unsure and fragile character of his good will and of his moral 
decisions. He now sees into the inner texture of the process of freedom and can create the conditions n which 
the will is good in itself, just as we have hitherto lived in conditions in which it is bad in itself.” 
124 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 95. 
125 Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report, 190. 
126 Ratzinger, Zur Lage des Glaubens, 201 (“If one tries in a fraternal way to indicate the aberration [that a class 
struggle is an instrument that creates a classless ociety] by referencing the Bible and tradition, one quickly 
obtains the label of ‘servants,’ or ‘lackeys’ of the ruling classes, who hope to secure the power by which the 
Church itself is buttressed. . . . Our opinions, even if they be considered and respectful, are rejectd a priori, 
because it would be to side with the ‘Master classes.’ Hence, the neediest in this matter are betrayed b  the very 
ideologies that have always proved to be the source of p ople’s suffering” [own translation]). 
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Ratzinger’s point in all this is that the overthrow f a regime by means of 
revolutionary violence against societal structures p rpetuating violence is not ipso facto the 
beginning of a just regime. The paradox of forms of liberation theology which 
indiscriminately assume materialist anthropologies127 i  that they relativise the truth and 
sanction, unwittingly, a major fact in our world: “[that] millions of our own contemporaries 
legitimately yearn to recover those basic freedoms f which they were deprived by 
totalitarian and atheistic regimes which came to power by violent and revolutionary means, 
precisely in the name of the liberation of the peopl .”128  
At stake here is the matter of how theology can uphold the truth about freedom, 
without falling into aberrations of the truth about Christian freedom. In a somewhat personal 
remark, Ratzinger highlights the high stakes which the debate about the nature of authentic 
freedom raises for theology: 
Schmerzlich betrifft einen sodann auch diese – bei Pri stern und Theologen 
vorhandene – so unchristliche Illusion, daß man einen euen Menschen und eine neue 
Welt schaffen könne, nicht indem man jeden einzelnen zur Bekehrung ruft, sondern 
indem man nur auf die sozialen und ökonomischen Struktu en einwirkt. Es ist gerade 
die persönliche Sünde, die in Wirklichkeit den ungerechten sozialen Strukturen 
zugrunde liegt. An der Wurzel und nicht am Stamm oder an den Ästen des Baumes 
der Ungerechtigkeit müßte man ansetzen, wenn man wirklich eine menschlichere 
Gesellschaft will. Es handelt sich hier um grundlegende christliche Wahrheiten, und 
doch werden sie mit Geringschätzung als “entfremdend” u d “spiritualistisch” 
zurückgewiesen.129 
 In light of developments in the post-Conciliar era, R tzinger has sometimes said the 
Church finds itself in a situation of “Babylonian exil ” today.130 It languishes in an exilic 
                                                          
127 See LN, XI, 8.   
128 See ibid., XI, 10.   
129 Ratzinger, Zur Lage des Glaubens, 202-3 (“It is painful to meet so unchristian an illusion - among priests and 
theologians - that one can create a new man and a new world, not by each individual being called to conversion, 
but by acting only on the social and economic structures. For, in reality, it is precisely on personal sin that unjust 
social structures are based. If one really wants a more humane society, then one must begin at the root and not 
with the trunk or the branches of the tree of injustice. This is about basic Christian truths, and yet th y are 
dismissed with contempt as ‘alienating’ and ‘spiritualist’” [own translation]).  
130 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Ist die Eucharistie ein Opfer?” in GS:ZV, 259-70; “Warum ich noch in der Kirche 
bin” in GS:ZV, 1169-85; The Yes of Jesus Christ: Spiritual Exercises in Faith, Hope and Love, trans. Robert 
Nowell (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 1991), 50-53;‘In the Beginning . . .’: A Catholic Understanding of 
Creation and the Fall, trans. Boniface Ramsey (London: T & T Clark, 1995), 10-11, 31-32; Called to 
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situation of captivity as the result of internal divis on, mistrust and insecurity: “Amid a world 
that strives for unity, the Church is divided into ationalist resentment in the denunciation of 
the unfamiliar, in the glorification of the self.”131 But how, he wonders, has the Church found 
itself in this Babylonian captivity at the moment when a new Pentecost was being hoped for? 
How is it that, as the Council seemed to be poised to reap a rich harvest, disintegration 
emerges from so great a surge towards unity? Employing the use of metaphor, Ratzinger 
believes that the great post-conciliar effort to understand the Church was motivated by the 
same increment in exactitude to which the natural sciences submit:   
Es scheint wir sind bei unserem Bemühen um das Verständnis der Kirche, das 
schließlich auf dem Konzil zu einem aktiven Ringen um sie, zu einem konkreten 
Arbeit an der Kirche geworden ist, so nahe an eben di se Kirche herangekommen, 
dass nun eine Wahrnehmung des Ganzen nicht mehr gelingt, dass wir vor Häusern 
nicht mehr die Stadt, vor Bäumen nicht mehr den Wald zu sehen vermögen.132  
A scientific-technological rationalism conditions uto see each detail with such precision that 
we come to pass more easily over the whole of which it is part. Ratzinger says that “an 
increment in exactitude represents loss in truth.”133 Hence, he affirms, the intense effort at 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Communion, 31, 43; The Spirit of the Liturgy, trans. John Saward (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 19-23; 
Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 296-98.  Ratzinger employs this biblical comparison to capture the phenomenon 
felt within the Church of abandonment by God, on the one hand, and forgetfulness of God, on the other. In 
biblical tones, it conveys his worries about the direction in which the Church finds itself post-Vaticn II and it is 
a theme he has returned to many times. Gradually but steadily distancing itself from its homeland and its nature, 
Ratzinger says the Church has found itself in a state of exilic turmoil. Preoccupation with its own internal 
history and operations has caused the Church to interminably question its heretofore secure self-understanding. 
The excesses of time spent wrangling over partisan interests has caused the loss of the inward recogniti n of 
God’s presence in the Church. In time this has led to the breakdown of its external structure and its eventual 
“exile” – that is, the collapse of its freedom and the expansion of a situation of slavery. A unity built without 
God, or even, against him, ends in confusion and total destruction, in hatred and in chaos of all against all (cf. 
Gen 11:1-9): “[. . . ] Ratzinger displays dismay at and, indeed, disdain for those whom he perceives to be 
allowing the Church itself, and theology alike, to be led astray by secular ideas and trends. . . . Too many, he 
continues, have become obsessed with changing church structures, patterns of ministry and the like, so that the 
Church itself becomes of secondary importance. Ecclesiology becomes bogged down in a ‘battle about 
machinery.’ The ‘real problem,’ however, is the ‘crisis of faith.’ . . . His conclusion is that unbelief has taken a 
firm foothold in the Church, thanks to this blurring of distinctions” (Mannion and Boeve, The Ratzinger Reader, 
94-95). See also ibid., 82; Mannion, Ecclesiology and Postmodernity, 99; Volf, After Our Likeness, 39.  
131 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1170 [own translation].  
132 Ibid., 1171 (“It seems that in our efforts to understand the Church, which, at the time of the Council, finally 
became an active struggle for Church, and concrete work upon the Church, we have come so close to it that we 
can no longer perceive it as a whole, not the city for the houses, or the wood for the trees” [own trasl tion]).   
133 Ibid. Ratzinger’s point here is that individual parts cannot exist independently of the whole from which they 
come. Like one of the early Fathers of the Church he explains the truth in metaphor: “Indisputably precis  as is 
all that the microscope shows when we look through it at a section from a tree, it may obscure truth if it makes 
us forget that the individual is not just an indiviual, but has life within the whole, which is not visible under the 
115 
 
reform has caused everything else to be forgotten and the Church becomes “only a structure 
that can be changed, and which constantly causes us to ask what can be altered, in order to 
make the Church more efficient for the functions that someone or other thinks 
appropriate.”134 Hence, the “almost unparalleled over-emphasis on the official elements in the 
Church,”135 aimed at liberating the Church from rigidity and the inauguration of a simpler 
ministry in the spirit of the Gospel, has cultivated an alienation in people who find that the 
Church today seems to consist of little more than conversations about institutional and 
ministerial regulations. Ecclesiology, Ratzinger says, has let “questions about the Church 
exhaust themselves in a battle about machinery.”136  
Ratzinger observes that the strategic narrative surrounding the Church in the West 
does not exhibit signs that arose in faith but seems instead to display the main obstacles to 
accepting it.137 Because of the disillusionment and alienation that exists vis-à-vis the official 
Church, he believes that the acceptable catchphrase as become “trust is good, but control is 
better.”138 If we cannot trust the nature of the Church to fulfil its promise to liberate, then we 
have to retake power and control the outcome more actively. This mentality coincides 
considerably with the development of democracy as the most appropriate guarantor of 
freedom in the modern era. The temptation is to depart from the Church’s true nature because 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
microscope and yet is true – truer indeed, than the isolation of the individual” (ibid.). On another point 
consistent with the Church Fathers, a rhetorical and melodic manipulation of language – something particularly 
evident in Augustine – can regularly be observed in Ratzinger’s writing. A typical example of it is the quotation 
from the main text to which this footnote refers: “[. . .] Gewinn an Exaktheit Verlust an Wahrheit” [own 
translations].        
134 Ibid., 1171-72 [own translations used until the end of this subdivision].  
135 Ibid., 1172.  
136 Ibid. 




“[t]he sacramental principle is no longer self-evident; the only reliable thing is democratic 
control.”139  
The key “myth” which Ratzinger observed in this situation was something he was 
already worried about during the Council itself, namely, the misguided attempt in the 
twentieth-century to find an unrealistic common ground between faith and unbelief.140 In the 
first place, Ratzinger says, this is an internal dilemma for the Church because alienation and 
unbelief amongst its own members has become a key issue. There are Church members today 
who have long since given up on the Church’s Creed, but who nevertheless regard 
themselves, in good conscience, as genuinely progressive Christians. The standard by which 
these people rate the Church is the “efficiency with hich it operates.”141 In a similar fashion, 
the public at large saw the Council as a triumph for the world, believing that the Church was 
poised to give it its endorsement:   
Der Beifall für das Konzil kam zum Teil auch von denjenigen, die selbst gar nicht 
vorhatten, Gläubige im Sinn der christlichen Überlieferung zu werden, aber einen 
“Fortschritt” der Kirche in Richtung auf ihren eigne  Entscheid als Bestätigung ihres 
Weges begrüßten.142 
For Ratzinger, on the other hand, faith or belief is not an authenticator of current practice. He 
thinks that certain attempts at accommodating faith nd unbelief are not helpful to anybody. 
In fact, he says, the blurring of the lines of demarcation between faith and unbelief is a 
situation intolerable to both believer and unbeliever alike: 
Nur anfangs schien das Ergebnis dieser Verwischung Befreiung zu sein. Heute ist 
klar, dass trotz aller Zeichen der Hoffnung, die [Kirche] gibt, aus diesem Vorgang 
                                                          
139 Ibid. The viewpoint regarding the democratic systems in the Church which are compatible with the 
sacramentally determined form of Church governance are explored along with their necessary distinctions in 
Joseph Ratzinger & Hans Maier, Demokratie in der Kirche (Limburg: Lahn-Verlag, 1970).     
140 See this dissertation §1.5. 
141 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1173. 
142 Ibid. (“The applause for the Council came in part from those who had no intention themselves in being 
believers in the sense of the Christian tradition, but welcomed the ‘progress’ of the Church in the dir ction of 
their own views as a confirmation of their way of life” [own translation]). 
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nicht eine moderne, sondern eine rundum fragwürdig gewordene und tief zerrissene 
Kirche hervorgekommen ist.143 
Ratzinger is of the view that the compromise that ws promoted between the Church 
and the secular world overwhelmed ecclesial life towards the end of the twentieth-century 
and has turned out to be a conciliation that allows neither party to function according to its 
area of competence for the good of the whole in which they are part. The blurring of the lines 
leads in the direction of a questionable solution which ultimately entails “taking theological 
predicates and considering them as wholly political.”144 If the Church is no longer a reality of 
faith, it becomes an accidental organisation of the faithful which permits urgent remodelling 
in accordance with prevailing sociological theories. Hence, the Church would languish in 
exile from its own essence and reality. For him, there is a vulnerability associated with a 
secular society predicated on, and governed by, unaided reason fused with majority rule. To 
his mind secular society points to a different type of community beyond itself  – to a faith 
community that must not collapse, nor be subsumed into the operations of civil governance. 
2.3.3. Basic Orientations of an Ecclesiology of Liberation 
In light of the cultural and ecclesial dynamics at work today in the understanding of 
freedom, five basic orientations mark Ratzinger’s writings in coming to terms with the 
tension between human freedom as a “new” individuatng reality requiring unqualified 
preservation and protection, on the one hand, and a soci l good that is never a commodity 
within purely private ownership, on the other. These orientations can be summarised as: the 
human thirst for freedom, the response to modern ration lism, the reawakening of the reality 
                                                          
143 Ibid., 1174 (“Only at first did this blurring seem to be a liberation. Today it is clear that despite all the signs 
of hope that there are, the Church that has come out of this process is not a modern, but a roundly questionable, 
and deeply torn apart Church” [own translation]). Ratzinger is keen to point out here that this is not the whole 
story, for many positive things have happened including a new accessibility of the liturgy, a greater awareness 
of social problems, a better understanding between s parated Christians, the removal of much anguish that had 
arisen from a false and liberalistic faith. However, such advances were not the distinguishing features of the 
general climate of the Church which Ratzinger experienced in the late sixties and seventies. 
144 Ibid., 1175.  
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of God, the challenge of ecclesial life in a “desert” nvironment, and the recovery of a sense 
of interiority.    
In terms of a positive ecclesiological discourse, Ratzinger’s point of departure is the 
human thirst for freedom which resonates in the human person. He views this as a process 
full of inadequate, albeit necessary, stages over the course of one’s lifetime: 
[E]very stage along this road . . . brings with it the realisation that it is only a stage, 
that nothing of what [man] has attained really corresponds to his longing The desire 
for freedom is the voice of God’s image in us; it is he desire to “sit at God’s right 
hand,” to be “like God.” A liberator who would be worthy of the name has to push 
open this door, and all empirical forms of freedom will have to be judged 
accordingly.145  
Secondly, in respect of what we have seen in this chapter, it can be said that coming 
to terms with the Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom entails a specific question: 
how can Christianity respond to the modern rationalism which enslaves the truth about the 
human person through a synthesis of belief in progress, the canonisation of technological-
scientific thought and the promise of the perfection of humanity within history.146 The 
positivistic outlook which the modern synthesis establishes in the modern psyche becomes 
acutely problematic in coming to terms with the issue of human freedom. Today, this 
expresses itself, by and large, through the desire to live unhindered. From the perspective of 
human freedom, Ratzinger identifies positivism’s premise by saying that “life should give 
itself to humans without their giving [of] themselvs”: 
Nach allen Genüssen, nach allen Befreiungen und allen Hoffnungen, die man daran 
knüpfte, bleibt ein Viel-zu-Wenig. Leben als Mühsal zu bestehen und so anzunehmen, 
wird unerträglich. Es sollte sich selbst unerschöpflich gebende, grenzenlos strömende 
Lust sein. Zweierlei ist also wirksam: zum einen die Gier nach Fülle, nach 
                                                          
145 Joseph Ratzinger, “God and Freedom,” 592. 
146 See this dissertation § 2.2.4. Ratzinger deliberately calls this triad of ideas a “synthesis” because none of 
these lines of reasoning can be identified as singularly responsible for present day cultural dynamics, nor does 
any one of them necessarily outweigh the others in importance or influence. However, to Ratzinger’s mind, 
these philosophical perspectives have the potential to contribute to the modern narrative that underpins 
intellectual discourse, and shapes behavioural attitudes.  
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Unendlichkeit, die mit den Begrenzungen unseres Lebens kontrastiert; zum anderen 
der Wille, dies Ganze ohne Schmerz, ohne Anstrengung einfach zu haben.147 
In addition to the theological categorising of positivism as “a denial of love which leads to 
the flight into lies,” Ratzinger identifies it with a false image of God – as    
[. . .] die Leugnung Gottes und die Anbetung eines Idols. . . . Gott wird so in der 
Weise des Arius verstanden, für den Gott keine Außenbeziehung haben kann, weil er 
nur ganz er selber ist.148 
Thirdly, and consequently, in terms of the co-existence of God and humanity, 
Ratzinger links the human consequences of the modern synthesis with an erroneous 
manifestation of the biblical datum that the human person is made in the image of God (cf. 
Gen 1:27). In this mistaken amalgam, the true God becomes the real enemy of the human 
person, whereby humanity falsely comes to believe that accepting God would be to live a lie. 
If God is perceived as a rival, there comes about a t rning-away from love, from trinitarian 
love as unconditional self-giving. Ratzinger believes such a scenario reveals how “serious the 
sickness of our civilisation is.”149 He seeks a reawakening of the reality of God, withou  
whom, he says, all human effort remains incomplete. Today, discovering this insight anew is 
a primary pastoral concern: 
Wir vermögen heute im Allgemeinen nicht mehr einzusehen, dass die Sache mit Gott 
etwas höchst Reales, ja der eigentliche Schlüssel für unsere tiefsten Nöte ist. . . . In 
der Tat wird es keine Heilung geben, wenn Gott nicht wieder als der 
Konstruktionspunkt unserer ganzen Existenz erkannt wird. Nur im Miteinender mit 
Gott wird menschliches Leben eigentliches Leben. Ohne i n bleibt es unterhalb der 
Schwelle seiner selbst und zerstört sich selbst. Das rettende Miteinander mit Gott aber 
wird nur möglich in dem, den er gesandt hat, durch den er selbst ein Gott-mit-uns ist. 
Wir können dieses Miteinander nicht “herstellen.” Christus ist deshalb das Leben, 
                                                          
147 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für Den Herren, 45-46 (“After all the pleasures, all the emancipations, all the 
hopes they have pinned to [life], there remains a ‘much-too-little.’ To cope with life as trial and tribulation and 
to accept it as that becomes unbearable. Life should be a delight that gives of itself inexhaustibly and streams 
boundlessly. Two emotions are operative here: on the one hand, the greed for completeness, for infinity, which 
contrasts with the limitations of our life; on the other hand, the desire simply to have all this without pain, 
without effort” [Joseph Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord: Faith in Christ and Liturgy Today, trans. Martha 
M. Matesich (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 30]). 
148 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für Den Herren, 46 (“[t]he denial of God and the worship of an idol. . . . God is 
thus understood in the manner of Arius who thought tha God cannot have any relationship outside of himself 
because only he is completely himself. Humans want to be such a god, one to whom everything flows and who
gives nothing himself” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 30-1]).  
149 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 31. 
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weil er uns ins Miteinander mit Gott bringt. Allein von dorther kommt der Quell des 
lebendigen Wassers.150 
Fourthly, then, in Ratzinger’s mind, the question which becomes a task for 
ecclesiology is: “[h]as not the world with all its capabilities and powers become a desert in 
which we can no longer find the living font?”151 The context for any ecclesiology is the 
challenging environment which the Church is called upon to occupy today. His particular 
perspective rests on the fact that he has never been convinced by the post-conciliar desire to 
adjust more appropriately to worldly matters than heretofore. For him, “an orientation of the 
Church towards the world which would be its turn away from the cross, could not lead to a 
renewal of the Church, but only to its end.”152  
Finally then, he is convinced that the way to overcome the allurement of modern 
rationalism is for each person to reclaim a real sense of interiority. In 1973, his rationale for 
this was already at a mature stage, triggered by the debate over Church structures: 
There has been some renewal, but we have to delve deper still to discover just what 
the Council really intended. The council wanted to pave the way for the full flowering 
of the church’s life; instead we have confusion. . . . The difficulties are due more to 
the failure to understand the underlying reason for structures in the first place and thus 
the need for reform. Obsession with structural reform – however good and necessary 
in itself – has distracted us from the radical renewal the council called for: inner or 
interior renewal. The council called for the transformation of the world through a 
church intensely conscious of her divine mission and newly awake to the 
responsibilities arising from the saving Mysterion which she is: in other words, the 
council called for a church made up of men and women open to the transforming 
activity of God’s grace and united, not by democrati  consent, but by the one 
objective, in the one Spirit, and within the one divinely-given structure.153 
                                                          
150 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für Den Herren, 46-47 (“Today we are generally no longer capable of seeing that 
the matter of God is something real, indeed, the tru  key to our deepest human needs. . . . Indeed, thre will be 
no cure if God is not recognised as the structural core of our whole existence. Only in togetherness with God, 
being with God, does human life become real life. Without him it remains below its threshold and destroys 
itself. Redemptive togetherness or union with God, however, is possible only in the one whom he sent and 
through whom he himself is a God-with-us. We cannot ‘c nstruct’ this togetherness. Christ is the life because he 
leads us into this union with God. It is only from there that the wellspring of living water comes” [Ratzinger, A 
New Song for the Lord, 31]). 
151 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 32. 
152 Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes, 317 [own translation]. 
153 Desmond O Grady, “The Ratzinger Round,” The Month 6 (1973): 409. 
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In the same interview, Ratzinger spoke about the ben fits, even the necessity, of “interior 
liberty” as the proper way of engaging society with a “committed detachment” worthy of the 
Christian life:    
For me, the priority must be given to the urgent question of how to discover God in 
our life. . . . I’m talking about what may awkwardly be described as coming into 
contact with God, finding him as the basis of our being and all our acts – discovering 
that real sense of interiority which gives us an independence from the things of this 
world and a new relationship to them. . . . This union with God is, ultimately, the only 
real basis on which community with others can rest. Our interior liberty enables us to 
live in community, and to see and serve the needs of all, especially the poor. The type 
of committed detachment which is the byproduct of this interior liberty destroys the 
roots of all forms of exploitation including the lust for power inherent in political 
activity; and it opens the eyes to the injustices that are concealed in every system.154  
With this emphasis on the interior, which correctly orients external human activity, 
the direction of Ratzinger’s approach to the contemporary question of freedom is fully 
disclosed. Beginning from the self-evident truth that every person desires freedom, which is 
the premise for both Judeo-Christian and post-Enlightenment hypotheses, Ratzinger indicates 
that the latter involves something that one creates nd protects, while the former is something 
one accepts and ascends towards. He is troubled by the one-sidedness of the positivist 
mentality, and remains convinced that only the full expression of the truth about authentic 
freedom can remedy the deficiencies that mark current vi ws on the subject.       
2.4.   Conclusion 
This chapter makes it clear that one cannot understand Ratzinger’s treatment of the 
issue of freedom apart from his understanding of the modern history of ideas. From an 
ecclesiological perspective, he says the challenge for the Church is two-fold: the need to 
define its identity in a changing world, and the task of orienting itself authentically in the 
aftermath of the Second Vatican Council, a time when t  Church has been confronted by 
both the positive and negative cultural and intellectual influences of the age. The question of 
what constitutes authentic human freedom, both in teory and in practice, lies at the heart of 
                                                          
154 Ibid., 411.  
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Ratzinger’s ecclesiology. He tries to measure the effects of the shift towards human self-
sufficiency by weighing it against the inextinguishable human yearning for meaning. This is a 
very difficult challenge for ecclesiology because th Church is necessarily an institutional 
entity.  
What Ratzinger concludes is that, in recent times, the Church has found itself 
entangled in exilic moments of confusion and mistrust. The consequences of this, to his mind, 
are varying degrees of anti-institutional sentiment, appeals for alteration based on feelings of 
disillusionment, and, in some cases, a debilitating resignation towards the status quo. 
Ratzinger is of the view that, in light of the ideological calamities of the twentieth-century, 
the challenge from an ecclesiological perspective is to bring people to an awareness of the 
need for a renewed exploration of the human person, and the need to acknowledge another 
sort of community beyond civic society. In other words, Ratzinger will approach the subject 
of authentic freedom through a two-fold exploration of anthropology and ecclesiology. 
Hence, Section II will be a foundational treatment of the christological, anthropological and 
ecclesiological contours of Ratzinger’s arguments.













SECTION II: FOUNDATIONS 
Following on from the contextual study of Section I, this section undertakes a foundational 
treatment of the christological, anthropological and ecclesiological contours of Ratzinger’s 
arguments and demonstrates the interrelated nature of th se three fields of theology in his 
treatment of the topic. Chapter 3 looks at how the figure of Christ the liberator is evident in 
Ratzinger’s narrative, neo-chalcedonian and pauline christology, his intention being to avoid 
interpreting Christ solely in terms of a historic, futuristic or fashionable figure. Chapter 4 
continues by examining Ratzinger’s argument from the anthropological perspective. His 
anthropology is always Christ-centred because, to his mind, what it is to be human and free 
finds its greatest illumination in Christ. This chapter looks at the meaning of being human 
and free in the world, compares the modern synthesis of thought with a Christian synthesis 
and philosophy of freedom, and reviews the human response to its nature. In Ratzinger’s 
theology, the human response to its own nature takes the form of a discourse on sin as 
suppressed truth. Furthermore, he views the human person in terms of the three 
interdependent categories of dependency, relationality and limitation. He carries this triptych 
of insights into his ecclesiology – particularly in terms of an ecclesiology of liberation. 
Chapter 5 takes us into the realm of ecclesial life and demonstrates the close connection that 
exists in Ratzinger’s thought between christological anthropology and ecclesiology. Through 
a sacramental framework, Ratzinger studies the ecclesial dimensions of the three theological 
virtues in an attempt to understand how the Church is t e sphere of growth in authentic 
freedom. Ultimately, for Ratzinger, if an ecclesiology of liberation is to be sincere in its 






CHAPTER 3: The Foundations of Human Freedom – Christological Contours  
 
3.0.   Introduction  
 
When Joseph Ratzinger began publishing his Jesus of Nazareth series in 2007, he 
described it as a project born from a “long gestation”1 which is “in no way an exercise of the 
magisterium, but is solely an expression of [his] personal search ‘for the face of the Lord’ (Ps 
27:8).”2 His self-professed starting point is Jesus’ relatedness to God since his approach “sees 
Jesus in light of his communion with the Father, which is the true centre of his personality; 
without it, we cannot understand him at all, and it is from this centre that he makes himself 
present to us still today.”3 The series represented his most thorough attempt at harnessing the 
“christological hermeneutic,” developed over the course of his theological career.4 
This chapter begins by setting out the dimensions of the figure of Christ as liberator. 
Secondly, from the perspective of freedom, three focal points of his christology emerge as 
relevant – namely, a narrative christology encompassing the Exodus, the passage from Moses 
to the new Moses; a neo-chalcedonian christology of the two wills in Christ; and a pauline 
understanding of freedom. These focal points form the ground upon which Ratzinger bases 
his own understanding of authentic human freedom. From this foundation, Chapter 4 will 
look at freedom from a Christian anthropological pers ctive, while Chapter 5 considers how 
Ratzinger’s understanding of freedom informs his ecclesiology. 
         
3.1.  The Dimensions of the Figure of Christ 
Writing in the year 2000, Ratzinger described his search for the figure of Christ in 
terms of a “narrative christology,”5 the basic orientation being “to put the question of G d 
and the question of Christ in the very centre, which then leads to a ‘narrative Christology’ 
                                                          
1 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, xi. 
2 Ibid., xxiii. 
3 Ibid., xiv. 
4 See this dissertation § 1.6.  
5 Ratzinger, preface to the new edition of Introduction to Christianity, 29. 
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and demonstrates that the place for faith is in the C urch.”6 This opposes any temptation to 
diminish the divinity of the incarnate Son or weaken his incarnate existence, and it promotes 
the concept of “relatedness” as a christological category. In christology, Ratzinger is 
motivated by the desire “to warn about the necessary change of the trend of our mainline 
theological positions.”7 By this he means that, unlike the christological temptations of past 
historical periods, the threat of monophysitic bias is negligible in our day. Instead, the very 
opposite is potentially hazardous:  
[. . .] einer einseitigen Trennungschristologie (Nestorianismus), in der über dem 
Bedenken der Menschheit Christi seine Gottheit weitgehend verschwindet, die Einheit 
der Person Christi aufgelöst wird und Rekonstrucktionen des bloßen Menschen Jesus 
dominieren, die mehr die Ideen unserer Zeit als die wahre Gestalt unseres Herrn 
spiegeln.8  
 
If logos – as creative reason and love in the beginning – is decisive for the Christian 
image of God on the one hand, and simultaneously forms the core of christology, on the 
other, then Ratzinger says “the indivisibility of faith in God and faith in the incarnate Son 
Jesus Christ is only confirmed once more.”9 Relatedness of the Son as person in the Trinity 
has become Ratzinger’s principal christological category for understanding the true 
dimensions of the figure of Christ because he believ s “we will not understand Jesus any 
better or come any closer to him if we bracket off faith in his divinity.”10 If God truly 
assumed a human nature in Jesus, then he participates, as man, in the presence of God, which 
embraces all ages and prevents the man Jesus from withdrawing irrevocably into the past, 
into a faint, indistinct recollection: “If God is not in Christ, then he retreats into an 
immeasurable distance, and if God is no longer a God-with-us, then he is plainly an absent 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 11. 
8 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für den Herrn, 23 (“A one-sided separation Christology [Nestorianism] in which, 
when one reflects on the humanity of Christ, his divinity largely disappears, the unity of his person is dissolved, 
and reconstructions of merely the human Jesus dominate, which reflect more the ideas of our times than t e true 
figure of our Lord” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 10]). 




God and thus no God at all: A god who cannot work is not God.”11 
The category of relatedness allows Ratzinger to employ the help of historical 
methodology and its abundance of findings about biblical times. A christological hermeneutic 
is at work in his belief that the Scriptures can “reveal a way and a figure that is worthy of 
belief.” This “requires faith, but the aim unequivocally is not, nor should be, to give up 
serious engagement with history.”12 For him, “[t]he factum historicum is not an 
interchangeable symbolic cipher for biblical faith but the foundation on which it stands: Et 
incarnatus est – when we say these words, we acknowledge God’s actual entry into real 
history.”13 In fact, Ratzinger is so convinced that Christianity is a faith bound to history that 
he says that if we push this history aside, Christian faith as such disappears and is recast as 
some other religion. It is not surprising, then, that Ratzinger’s narrative christology 
commences from within the heart of biblical history – the liberation event of Exodus. 
However, this is not merely the rendition of a story from the Bible. Ratzinger consciously 
activates the Christian narrative on freedom from within the drama of Israel’s Exodus under 
Moses: the “liberation from the dominion of death in Egypt and release for the Exodus, for 
the journey into the freedom of the promise.”14 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, xxiii. 
13 Ibid., xv. 
14 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 21. For a series of critical evaluations of 
Ratzinger’s christology and hie method in the Jesus of Nazareth series, see Adrian Pabst and Angus Paddison, 
eds., The Pope and Jesus of Nazareth: Christ, Scripture and the Church (London: SCM Press, 2009); and the 
entire issue of Concilium 3 (2008), which is a series of appraisals of Ratzinger’s first volume of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Ratzinger’s strong desire to protect the unity of the Scriptures is one of the key motivations behind his 
narrative approach and it is set within the strong a ti-Marcionist and anti-Gnostic threads that runs throughout 
many of his writings. To his mind, this approach is designed to avoid unnecessary rupture between the Old and 
New Testaments. See, for example, “Zum Begriff des Sakraments,” in GS:TL, 219, 230; Behold The Pierced 
One, 79; Called to Communion, 68, 271; Handing on the Faith in an Age of Disbelief, 24; The God of Jesus 
Christ: Meditations on the Triune God, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 42-3, 111; A 
Turning Point for Europe, 76-7, 107, 161;  Dogma and Preaching, 92, 252; A New Song for the Lord, 88; In the 
Beginning, 8-18;  Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration 1, 121. For a 
concise account of the impact of Gnosticism in the first centuries of Christianity, and Marcion’s influence in 
Rome from 140 AD onwards when he announced a root and branch separation of Old and New Testaments, in 
an attempt to secure freedom from the law as the response to faith (cf. Gal 4:24-26), see Henry Chadwick, The 
Church in Ancient Society: From Galilee to Gregory the Great (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 42-52, 
89-92, 100-7.      
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Before coming to the particulars of Ratzinger’s narrative christology, it will be 
important to clarify more carefully his perspective – metaphysically as well as narratively and 
historically – by looking at two avenues of his thought, namely, the metaphysical logion of 
the New Testament: Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever (Heb 13:8); and 
the figure of Christ as liberator.  
3.1.1. Christ “Yesterday,” “Today,” “Forever” 
In coming to terms with Jesus Christ as a metaphysical figure, Ratzinger considers it 
important that we don’t understand “today” too narrowly. Marking out the dimensions of the 
figure of Christ, over and above the predispositions a d fashionable prejudices of a given era 
– something which a christological hermeneutic methodology requires – is a task akin to a 
metaphysical narrative, so to speak. To avoid imprisoning the figure of Christ as a carbon 
copy of the society in which he is proclaimed, Ratzinger believes a prior act of faith, in 
addition to historical consciousness, must be taken into consideration.  
In an attempt to describe Christ’s broad dimensions, Ratzinger invokes the Risen One 
as being “the same yesterday and today and forever” (H b 13:8). He says that taking 
seriously the “sameness” of Christ together with the dimensions of time, ensures that our 
listening to the Scriptures and sources “correct[s] our present age when it gets lost in its own 
fantasies.”15 In this way the lasting significance of the historical dimension is respected 
without overshadowing the present. Moreover, Christ is risen and because he is not locked 
                                                          
15 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 11. Ratzinger, as he often does, takes the historical benchmark of the 
Enlightenment as a defining moment in human thought-processes. With regard to modern theology, he says a 
very penetrating focus on the Christ of “yesterday” began in the Enlightenment. Luther accused the Church of 
subordinating the scriptures to itself with the result of dismissing the historical “once” of yesterday that cannot 
be repeated. The Church, thereby, only mirrors her own present, disregarding the true Christ by proclaiming a 
Christ of “today” without his essential and fundamental “yesterday.” The Enlightenment radically systematised 
this insight: “Only the Christ of yesterday, the historical Christ, is in fact the real Christ; everything else is later 
fantasy. Christ is only what he was. . . . But the more authentic this Jesus was supposed to be, the more fictitious 
he became through this rigid confinement to the past” (12). Ratzinger believes the search for a purely historical 
Jesus locked Christ into the past. For a fuller treatment of Ratzinger’s considerations of the search for Jesus in 
historical biblical methodology, see Ratzinger, “Biblical Interpretation in Crisis” in God’s Word: Scripture-
Tradition-Office, 91-126; Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, xi-xxiv. See also Scott W. Hahn, 
The Biblical Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos, 2009), 13-113.   
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into the past, we encounter him in the present. Indeed, our encounter with Christ always 
begins with “today.”  
There is, however, a third factor: Jesus’ whole message is focused on leading people 
to the kingdom of God. Thus Christ is always coming to us from eternity. With this 
dimension of Christ’s reality the very boundaries of time are transcended. In this way, 
Ratzinger seeks to apply the full dimensions of the understanding of Jesus in a suspenseful 
tension, so to speak: “we can see Jesus correctly today only if we understand him in union 
with the Christ of ‘yesterday’ and see in the Christ of yesterday and today the eternal 
Christ.”16 To his mind, these New Testament dimensions both integrate and surpass our 
initial awareness of the proportions of reality: 
Wer Christus bloß gestern sehen will, findet ihn nicht, und wer ihn nur heute haben 
möchte, begegnet ihm gleichfalls nicht. Zu ihm gehört von Anfang an, dass er war, ist 
und kommen wird. . . . [D]iese Beanspruchung aller Dimensionen der Zeit ruht aber 
wiederum darauf, dass er sein irdisches Leben als ein Ausgehen vom Vater und 
zugleich als ein Bleiben bei ihm wusste, also Ewigke t ins Spiel und in Verbindung 
mit Zeit brachte. Wenn wir uns selbst einer Existenz verweigern, die sich in diese 
Dimensionen ausspannen lässt, können wir ihn nicht verstehen.17 
 
 In a further elaboration, Ratzinger points out thaevery great period in the history of 
the faith has been required to form afresh the image of Christ through a journey of 
discernment. And although the first encounter with Christ occurs in the present, to ensure one 
is searching for the “whole Christ” rather than a fraction of him, one must heed the Christ of 
yesterday as he reveals himself in the sources – especially the Scriptures. 18 It is a case of a 
                                                          
16 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 11. 
17 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für den Herrn, 25 (“Whoever wants to see Christ only yesterday does not find him; 
likewise, whoever would like to have him only today does not encounter him. Right from the beginning it is of 
his essence that he was, is, and will come again. . . . In turn, this claim to all the dimensions of time is based on 
his own understanding of his earthly life: he perceived it as a going forth from the Father and simultaneously as 
a remaining with him; thus he brought eternity into play with and connected it to time. If we deny ourselves an 
existence that can span these dimensions, we cannot comprehend him” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 
12]). 
18 Ratzinger shares some concrete examples of the figure of “Christ today” from the history of Christianity. For 
early Christianity, it was the image of the shepherd carrying the lost sheep – humanity – on his shoulders. When 
caught in the pathless undergrowth with no way out,Christ is there to carry us. Following the defeat of 
Arianism, the first images of the Παντοκράτωρ (pantocrator) of Christ – the ruler on his heavenly throne – 
emerged in iconography. See Christoph Schönborn, God’s Human Face: The Christ-Icon, trans. Lothar Krauth 
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careful listening process:  
Wenn ich ihm dabei ganz zuhöre und ihm nicht aufgrund eines dogmatisierten 
Weltbildes wesentliche Teile seiner Erscheinung wegschneide, sehe ich ihn offen in 
die Zukunft hinein und sehe ihn kommen, von der Ewigkeit her, die Vergangenheit, 
Gegenwart und Zukunft zugleich umfasst. Gerade wo solches ganzheitliches 
Verstehen gesucht und gelebt wurde, ist dann Christus mmer ganz “heute” geworden, 
denn wirkliche Kraft über das Heute und im Heute hat nur, was Wurseln im Gestern 
und Kräfte des Wachstums für das Morgen besitzt und über alle Zeit hinaus in 
Berührung mit dem Ewigen steht.19  
 
3.1.2. Christ as Liberator  
 
In line with these broad dimensions, Ratzinger has reflected on some of the 
fascinating depictions of Christ which present thems lves today. One such image, “Christ the 
liberator, the new Moses on the new exodus,” begs the question “[w]hat is freedom, and 
where do we find the path that does not lead merely anywhere, but to real freedom, to the true 
‘promised land’ of human existence?”20 Ratzinger is conscious that, in light of the modern 
understanding of freedom, aspects of such an image will need to be carefully outlined on the 
basis of scriptural witness. This is achieved not by dissolving the dimensions linking time and 
eternity but, rather, by acknowledging their existence and responding to them. In order to pull 
the contemporary “image of Christ” into the indispensable tension of “yesterday – today – 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 13-14. In the a tempt to portray the “historical Jesus” as he appe red on 
earth, it was acknowledged that God dwelt in the human being Jesus – Jesus is God’s icon, letting the world see 
the invisible through the visible. By the time of the Romanesque period, the Latin Middle Ages depict the 
triumphant Christ on the cross which is his throne. The Romanesque image of the cross makes the Resurrection 
discernible in the Crucified One so that our indiviual crosses become perceptible as the promise concealed in 
Christ’s “Cross-Throne.” Gothic art rendered the humanity of Jesus evident through ever increasing depictions 
of the terrifying and unmerited horror of Christ’s suffering. He suffers as we do, and more than we do, but 
without the light of imminent triumph. It is precisely this God which acts as the great comforter and assurance 
of salvation. Finally, in the image of the Pietà, Christ appears as a dead man on the lap of a mother full of
sorrow. God seems to be dead in this world and only words from afar offer consolation: in the night is sorrow 
but with the morning joy (cf. Ps 30:5) – it is the knowledge that there is an Easter. Ratzinger concludes that “the 
lesson of these images of ‘Christ today’ remains valid because all of them are drawing on a vision that knows 
also Christ yesterday, tomorrow and forever” (Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord,13-14).          
19 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für den Herrn, 26 (“If, in the process, I listen to him carefully and do not excise 
essential parts of his appearance because of a dogmatically asserted worldview, I see him open to the future and 
I see him coming from eternity which embraces the past, the present, and the future, all at once. Where such a 
holistic understanding has been sought and lived, there Christ has always completely become ‘today’ for only 
that which has roots in yesterday and powers of growth for tomorrow and which is in touch with the eternal 
beyond all time has real power over and in the present” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 13]). 
20 Ratzinger, “God and Freedom,” 591. This was the opning quotation in this dissertation’s introduction. The 
framework of Ratzinger’s narrative christology now provides its proper context. 
130 
 
forever,” Ratzinger calls upon the axiom of the Johannine designations for Christ as the 
“way,” the “truth,” and the “life” (John 14:6). In particular, Christ the “way” correlates with 
Exodus and liberation and, in so doing, presents us with an entry point for examining “Christ 
the liberator” – the leader in the new Exodus from slavery to freedom. Ratzinger believes that 
a relevant figure of Christ as liberator who can communicate to our time will emerge from 
this endeavour. 
 Ratzinger proposes that encountering Jesus Christ today vividly recalls the biblical 
perspective of Israel’s Exodus as a “way out into the open, into the wide open space of 
freedom.”21 This is an acknowledgement by Ratzinger of the great y arning for freedom 
indicative of our age. Because of this interminable longing, Ratzinger says the feeling of not 
being where we should or could be puts us in the predicament of the disciples who ask Jesus 
where is the way and how can we traverse it (cf. John 14:4-5). Ratzinger points to the New 
Testement use of the word έξοδον which, in the Gospels, is found only in Luke’s 
transfiguration narrative (Luke 9:31). Its immediate sense there is simply that of “departure.” 
Its context is the conversation of Moses and Elijah wit  the Lord and the “Exodus” Jesus is 
about to accomplish in Jerusalem. Ratzinger says “[t]hese two men, who themselves suffered 
greatly for the sake of God, are speaking of the Passover of Jesus, the exodus of his cross.”22 
He says both are valid interpreters of the Exodus, as both precede Jesus along the way of the 
passion. Moses leads the Exodus out of Egypt; Elijah symbolically returns to Sinai when 
Israel – albeit geographically still in the Promised Land – forgets about God and leads a pre-
Exodus lifestyle. As Ratzinger interprets it, the “way,” before anything else, is linked with 
covenant: 
Man hat das Wort vom Sinai, die Weisung des Bundes, i  das innere Ziel des 
Exodus war, als Fessel abgeworfen, um zur selbstgemachten Freiheit zu kommen, die 
sich als die tiefste Tyrannei erweist. So muss Elija symbolisch zum Sinai 
                                                          
21 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 15. 
22 Ibid., 17. Εξοδον also appears in 2Pet 1:15 in the context of a departure from the present world.  
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zurückgehen, den Rückweg Israels nachwandern, um ihm vom Gottesberg her die 
Frucht des Exodus neu zurückzubringen. Bei Elija wird auf diese Weise das 
eigentliche Wesen der Exodusgeschichte sichtbar: Im Exodus handelt es sich weder 
um einen bloß geographischen noch um einen nur politischen Weg. Man kann diesen 
Weg nicht auf der geographischen und nicht auf der politischen Landkarte 
festmachen. Exodus, der nicht zum Bund führt, und dort, im Leben aus dem Bund 
heraus, sein “Land” findet, ist kein wirklicher Exodus.23 
 
In the context of Sinai, where God spoke “I am YHWH” to begin the Decalogue (cf. 
Exod 20:2; Deut 5:6), and subsequently directed that we listen to God’s Son, his Beloved (cf. 
Luke 9:35), Ratzinger believes Jesus is presented as “the living Torah, the covenant in 
person, in whom the law turns to gift.”24 Ratzinger says that the Exodus of Israel and the 
Exodus of Jesus touch each other, bringing about the Passover of Christ: “Jesus’ ‘exit’ in 
Jerusalem is the real and definitive exodus in which Christ walks the path into the open, into 
freedom.”25  
 However, to comprehensively present all the dimensions of Christ the liberator, 
Ratzinger says the aspect of the Resurrection is necessary. He invokes here the Letter to the 
Hebrews which, knowing Jesus’s Exodus does not end in Jerusalem, portrays Christ as 
opening “the new and living way . . . through the curtain,” that is through his “flesh” (cf. Heb 
10:20). The Promised Land into which he arrives is the state of being seated “at the right 
hand of God” (cf. Mark 12:36; Acts 2:33; Rom 8:34). With this New Testament axiom and 
the convergence of ideas in the image of “liberator,” Ratzinger defines freedom’s cry within 
the human person: 
                                                          
23 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für den Herrn, 30 (“The message of Sinai, the covenantal instructions that were the 
inner goal of the exodus, had been thrown off as a fetter in order to achieve a self-made freedom, which proved 
to be the most extreme kind of tyranny. For this reason Elijah symbolically has to return to Sinai, has to retrace 
Israel’s way in order to bring her anew the fruits of the exodus from God’s mountain. The authentic nature of 
the exodus story thus becomes visible in Elijah: exodus refers neither to a geographical nor a politica  way. This 
path cannot be traced on a geographical or political map. An exodus that does not lead to the covenant and does 
not find its ‘land’ in living according to the covenant is not a true exodus” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 
17]). Ratzinger has addressed these ideas more comprehensively in Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 247-52.  
24 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 18. 
25 Ibid. Ratzinger expands this through allusions to various Jewish festivals in the parallel Matthean text (cf. 
Matt 16:13-28; 17:1-9), as well as through the overall Lucan context of Jesus’ entire public ministry as a going 
up to Jerusalem – his whole existence as the Exodus that ees him portrayed as the true Moses, as well as 
fulfilling the destiny of Israel.   
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In jedem Menschen lebt der Durst nach Freiheit und nach Befreiung; bei jeder Etappe, 
die er auf diesem Weg erreicht, wird ihm aber auch bewusst, dass es nur eine Etappe 
war und dass nichts von dem Erreichten seinem Verlangen wirklich entspricht. Der 
Durst nach Freiheit ist die Stimme der Gottebenbildlichkeit in uns; es ist der Durst 
“zur Rechten Gottes zu sitzen,” “wie Gott” zu sein. Ein Befreier, der den Namen 
verdienen will, muss die Tür dorthin aufstoßen, undalle empirischen Formen der 
Freiheit müssen von dort ihr Maß nehmen.26 
 
Ratzinger enquires into the significance of Jesus’ Exodus, and its enactment, by 
looking to two sayings that relate to the promise of “sitting at the right hand”: the promise we 
hear in the parable of the last judgement made to the sheep who are “blessed by [his] Father” 
(Matt 25:34), and the saying in the dialogue with the sons of Zebedee, where Jesus tells 
James and John that sitting at his right or left is for those whom it has been prepared (Mark 
10:40). On the one hand, the promise belongs to the nes who act in regard to the “least” in 
his family (cf. Matt 25:31-40) and, on the other, it depends on the will of the Father and 
entails, as its condition, drinking from the cup that Jesus drinks and receiving the baptism 
with which he is baptised (cf. Mark 10: 35-40). Here Ratzinger combines the Matthean 
framework of Peter’s profession of faith and the transfiguration as events connected to 
Jesus’s prophecy of his death and resurrection. Peter opposes Jesus’ own words about his 
“Exodus” because he misunderstands the power of “sitting on the right.” Jesus brusquely says 
to Peter, “Get behind me Satan” (Matt. 16:23). This sheds light on the liberation Jesus brings: 
Petrus übernimmt das Geschäft des Versuchers in dem Augenblick, in dem er einen 
Exodus ohne das Kreuz propagiert – einen Exodus, der nicht in die Auferstehung 
hineinführt, sondern in die irdische Utopie. “Weg und hinter mich” – diesem Versuch, 
den Exodus auf ein empirisches Ziel zu begrenzen, st llt Jesus die Forderung der 
Nachfolge entgegen. Die existentielle Entsprechung zum Gedanken des befreienden 
Weges ist Nachfolge als Weg ins Freie, als Befreiung.27  
                                                          
26 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für den Herrn, 32 (“The thirst for freedom and liberation lives in every human 
being; but at every stage reached on this journey we become aware that it was only a stage and that nothing from 
what has been attained really corresponds to our desi e. The thirst for freedom is the voice of our being made in 
the image and likeness of God; it is the thirst ‘to sit at the right hand of God,’ to be ‘like God.’ A liberator who 
wishes to deserve the name must push open the door to this reality, and all empirical forms of freedom have to 
measure up to it” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord,19]). 
27 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für den Herrn, 33-34 (“Peter assumes the role of the devil the moment he 
disseminates the idea of an exodus without the cross – an exodus that leads not to the resurrection but to an 
earthly utopia. ‘Get behind me’ – Jesus opposes this attempt to limit the exodus to an empirical goal with the 
command to follow him. The existential equivalent of he idea of the liberating way is following or imitation as 
the way into the open, as liberation” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 20]). 
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This inter-textual convergence of ideas helps Ratzinger clarify the importance of the 
theme of “following” or “imitation” in New Testament Exodus theology. To his mind it 
needs to be understood as a broad christological category as opposed to one restricted solely 
to a form of narrow moralism. Only on its christological basis does “imitation” also become a 
moral task. If we confine imitating Christ to the adoption of certain programmatic ideas, we 
limit the Christian faith to being an inventor of a contemporaneous platform, which others go 
on to develop further. Ratzinger says that this, even if initially attractive, is as arbitrary as it is 
inadequate, compromising the dignity and true source of freedom: 
Die Zuflucht zu solchen Verkleinerungen des Nachfolgegedankens und damit der 
Botschaft vom Exodus rührt häufig von einer Logik her, die auf den ersten Blick 
einleuchtend wirkt: Jesus sei zwar Gott und Mensch gewesen, aber wir seien nun 
einmal nur Menschen; wir könnten ihm nicht in seinem Gottsein, sondern nur als 
Menschen nachfolgen. Mit einer solchen Auslegung denken wir indes viel zu klein 
vom Menschen, von unserer Freiheit, und fallen völlig aus der Logik des Neuen 
Testaments heraus, in dem sich der kühne Satz findet: “W rdet Nachahmer Gottes” 
(Eph 5:1).28 
 
The call to follow or imitate, when expressly viewed as a christological category, 
ensures that Christian faith is not confined simply to the human virtues of Jesus or a strictly 
human agenda. Rather it encompasses his entire way “through the curtain” (Heb 10:20). The 
entire, or new Exodus means that Christ opens this way for us, Ratzinger says, because only 
in this way do we come out into the open, into freedom. He asserts that “Jesus’s call can only 
be comprehended from the broad paschal context of the entire Exodus, which goes ‘through 
the curtain’.”29 This clarifies that “[i]mitation has the dimension f moving toward the divine 
communion, and this is why it is tied to the paschal mystery.”30 To be Christ’s follower, is 
                                                          
28 Ratzinger, Ein Neues Lied für den Herrn, 34 (“The recourse to such minimizations of the notion of imitation 
and hence of the message of exodus often rests on a logic that at first glance seems plausible: Jesus may have 
been both God and man, but we are, after all only humans; we cannot imitate him in his divinity, but can follow 
him only as a human. With such an interpretation, hwever, we think all too little of human beings and of our 
freedom and forsake the logic of the New Testament in which the bold sentence can be found: ‘Therefore be 
imitators of God’ (Eph 5:1)” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 21]). 
29 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 21. Recalling Jesus’ sayings about the promise of sitting at God’s right 
hand, Ratzinger says imitation can validly be defined in terms of baptism, cup, and love (22). He quotes St 




above all else, to take up one’s cross and follow (cf. Mark 8:34).  
Ratzinger rounds out his reflections on Christ the lib rator by suggesting that 
imitation entails a conversion that accepts the promise of Christ in its entirety. This 
conversion requires that one be prepared to lose one’s whole life to this promise. It further 
calls for the end of isolation and the beginning of an ecclesial existence: to go “beyond self-
reliance [. . .] entrusting ourselves to the mystery, the sacrament in the community of the 
Church, in which God enters my life as agent and frees it from its isolation.”31 Ratzinger says 
conversion of this calibre is “a cross held into the Easter mystery, although this does not 
mean it is less painful.”32 Imitation of Christ the liberator, in this fashion, means Christ 
himself becomes the “way,” and he becomes truly present “today” in my life and in the life of 
“a world that is in itself anything but a ‘promised land.’”33  
 
3.2.  Christology and Freedom 
With his concept of imitation, Ratzinger arrives at the heart of the connection between 
Christ and human freedom. At this point, three focal points from his christology present 
themselves as relevant to the discussion: a narrative christology encompassing the passage 
from Moses to the new Moses, a neo-chalcedonian christology of the two wills in Christ, and 
a pauline discussion of freedom as participation in Being itself, identification with the dignity 
of Being itself, and education towards the fullness of personhood.  
3.2.1.  Narrative Christology: The New Moses 
One needs to be reticent about claiming that a narrative christology is Ratzinger’s sole 
entry point into New Testament christology,34 which in itself is an immense terrain. 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 22. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 23. 
34 For example, looking at the theme of messianic fulfilment from the perspective of narrative christology alone, 
Ratzinger constructs a veritable narrative time-lin which consists of a number of the major scriptural ch racters 
and motifs: Jesus is the climactic fulfilment of the promises made in and through the leaders of Israel. Jesus is 
the lamb, the new Isaac who allowed himself be caught, bound and slain (cf. Gen 22:9). He didn’t merely look 
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Nevertheless it is true that he formulates his understanding of the new Moses in conjunction 
with his reflections on the covenantal gift of law wrought by way of Exodus to Sinai, and the 
character of biblical prophecy as the seeing and knowi g of God “face to face” (cf. Ex 33:11-
23; Deut 5:4, 34:10; Judg 6:22).35 By following this portion of Ratzinger’s biblical 
christology, we will observe him arriving at a figure of Christ on the Cross whose death 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
upwards (cf. Gen 22:13) but actually entered heaven nd since then the barrier between God and man is broken 
down (cf. Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 114-121). During Jesus’ conversation with Nathanael, he reveals 
himself as the new Jacob. While the Patriarch had dreamt of a ladder that rech s up to heaven (cf. Gen 28:10-
22; John 1:51), “[t]his dream has become a reality w h Jesus. He himself is the ‘gate of heaven,’; he is the true 
Jacob, the ‘Son of Man,’ the patriarch of the definitive Israel” (Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism 
in the Jordan, 171-172; cf. ibid. 240). The “royal” theology of the Ancient Near East, which was transformed by 
Israel from a theology of begetting into one of election, was further developed into a theology of hope in the 
king to come as evidenced by texts such as Psalm 2. It “defines Jesus as the true heir to the universe, a  heir to 
the promise in which Davidic theology culminates” (cf. Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 216-228, at 
220). Referring to the Johannine image of water, Ratzinger says that “John sees the risen Lord, his body, as the 
new Temple, which is awaited not just by the Old Testament, bu  by all peoples (cf. Jn 2:21). . . . It shows the 
body of Jesus to be the real Temple, built not of st ne nor by human hands; hence – because it signifies the 
living indwelling of God in the world – it is, and will remain, the source of life for all ages’ (Ratzinger Jesus of 
Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 238-248, at 247). In line with the seventh Beatitude (Matt 5:9), 
Ratzinger draws the parallel of Jesus as the true Solomon – the bringer of peace (ibid., 84-85). At another point, 
Ratzinger uses the “Son of Man”  motif as a way of bringing together many strands of Old Testament tradition, 
particularly those of Daniel with the Psalms and Isaiah, culminating in the “beloved son” (cf. Mark 12: 6) Jesus 
(ibid., 321-345; Introduction to Christianity, 216-228). Through the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Lk 
16:19-31), Ratzinger shows that Jesus is the sign which his generation demanded and, even more than that, 
Christ, “the true Lazarus, has risen from the dead – and he has come to tell us so” (Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: 
From the Baptism in the Jordan, 211-217, at 217; Behold the Pierced Ones, 112). Ratzinger’s narrative 
approach to christology is perhaps best confirmed by his own personal affirmation of his methodology in the 
preface to the new edition of Introduction to Christianity: “I believe that I was not mistaken as to the 
fundamental approach, in that I put the question of G d and the question about Christ in the very centre, which 
then leads to a ‘narrative Christology’ and demonstrates that the place for faith is in the Church. This basic 
orientation, I think, was correct” (Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 29).      
35 The new or true Moses is a theme that has grown in prominence over the years in Ratzinger’s christology. 
Significant mention of the theme can also be found in Ratzinger’s “Ist die Eucharistie ein Opfer?” in GS:TL, 
264; The God of Jesus Christ, 22-24, 61-2, 110; Principles of Catholic Theology, 189; The Spirit of the Liturgy, 
41-48; A New Song for the Lord, 5, 15, 19, 27; God and the World, 281; A Turning Point for Europe, 76-83. 
However, in his Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, it becomes a very explicit and mature part 
of his thought. It is mentioned on at least sevente separate occasions, which makes it by far one of the most 
recurring themes in the book. See ibid., 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 65, 80, 122, 144, 235-7, 241, 244, 245, 264, 30 07-318; 
346-349. In particular Ratzinger considers Matthew to have put together a portrait of Jesus as the new Moses at 
the Sermon on the Mount (cf. ibid., 65), while Luke depicts Jesus’ entire public life as a going up to Jerusalem 
so that the Son’s whole existence appears as an Exodus in which Jesus is Moses as well as Israel (cf. A New 
Song for the Lord, 18-19). Ratzinger returns to the theme of Moses in Jesus of Nazareth: Holy Week, 37, 81-82, 
90-91, 132, 147, 164, 173, 203. If the theme of the New Moses is a linchpin, so to speak, for the first volume in 
that series, the theme of the new or true worship in Christ is its equivalent in the second volume. As examples, 
see ibid., 40, 78,134-45, 148, 223, 230-34, 237-39. It will be necessary to take this theme into account in more 
detail in Chapter 4. For now it is enough to observe that the consistency with which he returns again and again 
to the great liberation event in the life of the peo l  of God is clear evidence of the priority with w ich 
Ratzinger holds biblical christology to be a narrative of freedom. Following his thought on motif of new 
worship is a beneficial way of coming to terms with the christocentricity necessary to appreciate the true nature 
of freedom. In fact it would make for a very interesting comparative study to read Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week 
as a companion book to Ratzinger’s Spirit of the Liturgy. It seems to me to be absolutely valid because liturgical 
motifs are very pronounced in Ratzinger’s second volume of Jesus of Nazareth. 
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liberates and draws all life to God. Ratzinger’s narrative christology is essentially the 
practical application of his “christological hermeneutic” as discussed in Chapter 1.  
Ratzinger’s conviction is that on the way of Exodus to Sinai, the divine-human 
encounter was concretised in Torah. However, he says, if the full dimensions of Christ are not 
respected, one of the chief consequences is an “inversion of symbols,” whereby the 
“historical” becomes the sole determinant of “today” nd “forever.”36 Within the context of 
this inadequate religious consciousness, which is based on the presupposition that traditional 
biblical faith is predisposed to a flight from reality, Ratzinger sets about clarifying the 
internal logic of God’s will for his people that is depicted in biblical narrative. He focuses on 
the Exodus narrative and examines the type of freedom to which “Sinai” points.37 He makes 
five observations regarding the goal of the Exodus, the basic direction indicating that the 
objective of the way of Exodus to Sinai is the freedom to worship and the just ordering of 
society.  
Firstly, it is clear from Moses’ conversation with P araoh that he is not after a civic 
State per se but a place to worship God and offer sacrifice as God himself wanted  (Exod 5:3; 
                                                          
36 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 239-255, at 247-8. By reading history backwards, and 
especially biblical history, both Moses and Christ are misunderstood, because Christ is subjected to political 
criteria and Moses is defined by omitting the forward dynamic to which he points. The result is an “inversion” 
of the relation between the Old and the New Testaments. To Ratzinger’s mind, the “inversion” means that t e 
Exodus is often viewed today as a “political” reality whereas baptism is considered to be in the realm of the 
mystical. In this logic, baptism points the way to the Exodus. The Christian fulfilment of symbols, which is the 
celebration of the sacraments, is logically drawn into this political dynamism. Ratzinger believes the eff ct of 
this inversion of symbols is that “Jesus is interprted backwards with reference to Moses” while “Moses . . . is 
interpreted forward with reference to Marx. And this line of interpretation now becomes decisive for the reading 
of the Bible in general, whether it be a question of the Eucharist, the kingdom of God, the Resurrection, or even 
the figure of Jesus” (248). Ratzinger’s concern is that when baptism, for example, is interpreted as the symbol of 
liberation, then the Exodus acts as a symbol of political and revolutionary action in general. This makes the 
Bible and the sacraments very topical even if their original meaning is hardly of interest anymore. Peopl  are 
attracted to this as it doesn’t display any detachment from a sense of reality. Ratzinger fears that a modern-day 
nominalism may be at play in regard to biblical faith for “in the end, one prefers an obviously false relation 
between the Bible and reality to an understanding of the Bible that appears entirely unreal” (ibid.). On the 
particular point of the reversal of the Old and New Testament in Christian consciousness, Ratzinger dir cts 
readers to LN, X, 14. See also Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 5-6, where Ratzinger makes interesting 
comments on what remains key for him in the debates round “theologies of liberation,” particularly in relation 
to the inversion of symbols argument which he resists.  
37 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 248. Ratzinger says the mere procuring of an autonom us 
State with the presence of boundaries and self- governance does not lead automatically to an internally free 
State. If it did, the liberation problems of Latin America, for example, would have been settled following the 
dissolution of Spanish and Portuguese colonial governm nts.  
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cf. 5:17; 8:21-24; 9:13; 12:3138). Secondly, and above all else, however, the goal of the 
Exodus is Sinai and the covenant with God from which the Israelite law proceeds. In other 
words, Ratzinger says, “[t]he goal is the discovery of a system of law that provides justice 
and thus builds up the right relationships of men with one another and with all creation.”39 
Thirdly, he maintains the goal of the Exodus is liberation because this covenant champions 
and protects humanity’s relationship with God and it is this which justifies and orders all 
other relationships: “the figure of freedom is the covenant and . . . the form in which freedom 
is realised is the right relation of men to one another described in the Law of the covenant, 
and this relation is derived from the right relation t  God.”40 Fourthly, the goal of the Exodus 
is to make Israel into a people from a gathering of tribes and to give to it as a people its 
freedom and its own dignity as well as its own historical mission. In this regard, Ratzinger 
says it must be remembered that, biblically, “an assemblage of men becomes a ‘people’ 
through a common system of law and that man does not live justly when he remains in an 
unjust relation vis-à-vis God.”41 Finally, while it is most certainly part of the freedom of a 
people to possess a “land” of its own, it remains subordinate to “Sinai,” in the sense that a 
people continually has the potential to destroy itself from within and return to an Exilic or 
pre-Exodus existence: 
Denn wenn Israel in seinem Land den Sinai verliert, d.h. wenn es das Recht, den 
Bund zerstört und die Ordnung der Freiheit durch die Unordnung der Willkür ablöst, 
dann ist es hinter den Exodus wieder zurückgegangen; dann lebt es im eigenen Land 
und doch in Ägypten, weil es seine Freiheit von inne  her zerstört. Das Exil bringt 
diesen schon vorangegangenen inneren Verlust der Freiheit durch den Verlust der 
Gerechtigkeit nur äußerlich-politisch zur Anschauung.42   
                                                          
38  Ratzinger says that the close connection between land and Torah also becomes clear in Joshua 1:7ff; 22:5; 
23:6.  
39 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 249. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 237 (“For if Israel loses Sinai in its land, that is, if it destroys the 
Law and the covenant and dissolves the order of freedom through the disorder of caprice, then it has returned to 
its pre-Exodus condition; it then lives in its own la d and yet is still in Egypt, because it destroys its freedom 
from within. The Exile makes visible in a merely ext rnal, political way the prior loss of freedom through the 
loss of justice” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 249]). For further development of Ratzinger’s 




On account of his reflections on the Exodus event, Ra zinger concludes that its truly 
liberating element resides in the institution of the covenant between God and humanity, 
which is concretised in the Torah – in the regulations of justice that are the shape of freedom. 
He emphasises the fact that the Exodus did not happen because of particular acts of boldness 
or particular competences on Moses’ part, but through “Sinai” – a religious event, the 
sacrifice of the pasch (cf. Exod 12: 1-28; 12:43-13:16), which anticipates an essential 
ingredient of the Torah – the ability to encounter the divine: 
Darin drückt sich ein in der Religionsgeschichte immer wieder begegnenedes 
Urwissen der Menschheit darüber aus, daß Freiheit und Gemeinschaftsbildung 
letztlich weder durch Gewalt noch durch bloße Tüchtigkeit zu erreichen sind, sondern 
durch eine Liebe, die zum Opfer wird und die Menschen erst in ihrer Tiefe 
miteinander verbindet, weil sie sie die Dimension des Göttlichen berühren läßt. So ist 
im Kern des alttestamentlichen Befreiungsgeschehens ansatzweise das vorhanden, 
was dann in der Gestalt Jesu Christi offen hervortritt und von ihm her zur Mitte einer 
neuen Freiheitsgeschichte wird.43 
 
The motif of Jesus as the New Moses has its context in this struggle for liberation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
readiness to offer three compromises (cf. Exod 8:27, 10:11, 24) as a result of the divine command: “Let my 
people go, that they may serve me in the wilderness” (Exod 7:16), Moses cannot “subject worship to anyform 
of political compromise. . . . In all this, the issue is not the Promised Land: the only goal of the Exodus is shown 
to be worship, which can only take place according to God’s measure and therefore eludes the rules of the game 
of political compromise” (16). Israel’s election was not about mere national autonomy for that would reduce 
Israel to the level of all the other nations. Land, by itself, is an indeterminate good. It becomes a true good and a 
real gift when it is the place where God reigns: “[t]hen it will not be just some independent state or other, but the 
realm of obedience, where God’s will is done and the right kind of human existence developed” (17). In the 
covenant of Sinai, the relationship between “land” and “worship” is revealed: both cult and life lived according 
to the will of God make up the true worship of God. Steadfast adherence to the law of God which orders human 
affairs correctly is the necessary condition for life in community and freedom, for people without a common 
rule cannot live. Without a common rule of law, a community “destroys itself in anarchy, which is a parody of 
freedom, its exaltation to the point of abolition. When every man lives without law, every man lives without 
freedom” (18). To Ratzinger’s mind, law and worship cannot be completely separated for worship is what 
provides the common rule of law with its proper measure: “Worship, that is, the right kind of cult, of 
relationship with God, is essential for the right kind of human existence in the world. It is so precis ly because it 
reaches beyond everyday life. Worship gives us a share in heaven’s mode of existence, in the world of G d, and 
allows light to fall from that divine world into ours. . . . It lays hold in advance of a more perfect life, and in so 
doing, gives our present life its proper measure. A life without such anticipation, a life no longer opened up to 
heaven, would be empty, a leaden life” (21). The land which accompanied the Exodus and the issue of the rig t 
to freedom of worship continues to be an important issue for Ratzinger, see his Jesus of Nazareth: From the 
Baptism in the Jordan, 82-84.              
43Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 238 (“In this is expressed a primordial knowledge of humanity, one 
encountered ever again in the history of religion, that freedom and the formation of community are ultima ely to 
be obtained, not through the use of force or through mere industry, but through a love that becomes sacrificial 
and that first binds men together in their depths because it lets them touch the dimension of the divine. Thus, at 
the core of the Old Testament liberation event, there is incipiently present that which later emerges openly in the 
figure of Jesus Christ and from him becomes the means to a new history of freedom” [Ratzinger, Church, 
Ecumenism and Politics, 250]).  
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prior to Israel’s Exodus from Egypt. It is inextricably linked to the purpose of creation in the 
first instance. It consists of the right to freedom f worship, that is, the people’s right to their 
own liturgy, to the act of encounter and adoration of their creator God. Only in the course of 
time does the reason for the gift of “land” become clear. It was given “as a space for 
obedience, a realm of openness to God, that was to be freed from the abominations of 
idolatry.”44 From the biblical viewpoint, the concept of obedienc  to God, and its consequent 
right ordering of the earth, is an essential component of the concept of freedom and the 
concept of land.  
The Exile (cf. 2Kgs 24-25; 2Chr 36:5-21) – the withdrawal of the land – can only be 
correctly understood, to Ratzinger’s mind, from this perspective of openness and obedience 
to the Creator and creation. Ratzinger says that the land itself had become a zone of idolatry 
and disobedience, and its possession, therefore, had become a contradiction. The scattering of 
Israel, however, led to the positive view that the diaspora might create “space for God and 
thus fulfil the purpose of creation suggested by the first creation account (cf. Gen 1:1-2, 4),”45 
namely, the separation of light from darkness. The promise of liberation and the goal of 
freedom are fulfilled in the sanctioning of adoration which calls all of creation to a life of 
obedience:  
Der Sabbat ist das Ziel der Schöpfung, er gibt ihr Wozu an: Sie ist da, weil Gott einen 
Raum der Antwort auf seine Liebe, einen Raum des Gehorsams und der Freiheit 
schaffen wollte.46 
 
The Mosaic liberation theme also very much occupies Ratzinger’s understanding of 
biblical prophecy. Here also, it is the context of obedience and freedom that permits 
                                                          
44 Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 83. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 113 (“The Sabbath is the goal of creation, and it 
shows what creation is for. The world exists, in other words, because God wanted to create a zone of response to 
his love, a zone of obedience and freedom” [Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 83]). 
For further reflection on the meaning of the Sabbath as actively “resting” and as the “core of social order,” see 
Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 108-112. For more extended analysis by 
Ratzinger, see A New Song for the Lord, 73-97. 
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Ratzinger to link the major covenantal and prophetic traditions of the Hebrew Bible. He 
centres his comments on Deut 18:15 – a promise which is “of decisive importance for 
understanding the figure of Jesus.”47 Moses, the speaking voice in Deuteronomy, says here 
that “[t]he Lord your God will raise up for you a pro het like me from among you, from your 
brethren – him you shall heed.”48 Ratzinger observes that “the object of this promise is not a 
king of Israel and king of the world – a new David, in other words – but a new Moses. Moses 
himself . . . is interpreted as a prophet.”49 Ratzinger intends here to demonstrate the prophetic 
quality inherent in the promise of the new Moses as liberator of God’s people.50  
Ratzinger says that, in fact, the figure of the prophet gains its true meaning in this 
Deuteronomic promise for “‘there has not arisen a prophet since in Israel like Moses,’ we 
read, ‘whom the Lord knew face to face’” (Deut 34:10). Ratzinger believes the book of 
Deuteronomy itself promotes a re-reading of Deut 18:15 that specifies the “unique and 
essential” quality of Moses: he speaks with the Lord “face to face.”51 Thus we are taken to 
                                                          
47 Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 1. 
48 This is the full translation of Deut 18:15 provided by Ratzinger in ibid., 236. He makes appeal to this passage 
frequently throughout the book, see pp. 65, 122, 126 236, 264-6.  
49 Ibid., 1. 
50 While “prophecy” can be found all over the surrounding religious world as a characteristic motivated by the 
universal human preoccupation with its own ultimate origin and unrelenting yearning to penetrate “the 
hiddenness of the future . . . so that he can avoid per ition and set out towards salvation” (Ratzinger Jesus of 
Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 1), Ratzinger says the prophetic designation of Mses is used to 
depict an element of the uniqueness of Israel’s faith. Deuteronomy contrasts the surrounding “soothsaying” – 
the attempt to “seiz[e] control of the future” – with the “way of faith” which is to be realised through 
responsiveness to the divine provision of prophets who interpret the present and the future (cf. ibid., 2-3).  
51 Ibid., 3. See Joseph Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2005), 24-27, for a concise account of Ratzinger’s interpretation of the Christian meaning of the contrast 
between Moses and Christ and their seeing “face to face” (Exod. 33:20-23; cf. 2 Cor 3:4-4:6). Contrasting 
Exodus 32-34 with Paul’s christological reinterpretation (2Cor 3:4-4:6) and Stephen’s discourse (Act 7: 1-53), 
Ratzinger says the fulfilment motif in christology emerges: “Like Moses [cf. Exod 32:31-32], Jesus had 
presented himself upon the mountain as a sin offering. The offer of Moses had not been accepted. Christ 
however, had in fact allowed himself to be made sin for us and had taken the curse upon himself for us (Gal 
3:13). He stands henceforth as an advocate for us in the presence of the Father (1John 2:1). And he isthe one 
who remains henceforth face to face with the Father: mo e than a prophet, more than a friend, he is the Son. He 
is able to see the face of God, and in his face the glory of God becomes visible to us (2Cor 4:6). From this 
moment on man’s search for the face of God has becom  more concrete: it consists in the encounter withChrist, 
in friendship with him who no longer calls us servants but friends (John 15:15)” (26). Of the early Fathers who 
interpret Exod 33, Ratzinger is particularly attraced to Gregory of Nyssa, who says that being able to see God 
only from the back means nothing other than that the encounter with God means to walk after Jesus; that the 
only way we can see God is by following Jesus, which means walking behind him and thus going along behind 
God’s back (27, n. 13; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De vita Moysis, PG 44, 408D). Ratzinger says that Christ, by the 
entire way he lived, especially in the Paschal Mystery of his suffering, death, Resurrection, and Ascen ion, 
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the heart of biblical prophecy, which is quite other than the surrounding soothsaying present 
in other societies:  
[Der Prophet] ist nicht dazu da, um Ereignisse von morgen oder übermorgen 
mitzuteilen und so der menschlichen Neugier oder dem menschlichen 
Sicherheitsbedürfnis zu dienen. Er zeigt uns das Gesicht Gottes, und damit zeigt er 
uns den Weg, den wir zu nehmen haben. Die Zukunft, m die es in seiner Weisung 
geht, reicht weiter als das, was man vonWahrsagern zu erfragen sucht. Sie ist 
Wegweisung in den eigentlichen “Exodus” hinein, der a in besteht, dass in allen 
Wegen der Geschichte der Weg zu Gott als die eigentl che Richtung gesucht und 
gefunden werden muss. Prophetie in diesem Sinn steht in strenger Entsprechung zum 
Ein-Gott-Glauben Israels, ist seine Umsetzung ins konkrete Leben einer Gemeinschaft 
vor Gott und zu Gott hin.52  
 
At this point Ratzinger appeals to Exodus 33 which not only portrays Moses’ 
speaking with God “as with a friend” but also depicts God as refusing to let Moses see his 
face. God only lets Moses see his back (cf. Exod 33:23). Both Jewish and Christian 
mysticism have relied on this text to “discern how far contact with God can extend in this life 
and where the boundaries of mystical vision lie.”53 The point is that “limits” apply to Moses’ 
relationality with God. This enables Ratzinger to say: 
So trägt die Verheißung eines “Propheten wie mich” unausgesprochen noch eine 
größere Erwartung in sich: dass dem letzten Propheten, dem neuen Mose, geschenkt 
werde, was dem ersten Mose versagt blieb – wirklich und unmittelbar Gottes 
Angesicht zu sehen und so vollends aus dem Schauen und icht bloß vom Hinsehen 
auf den Rücken Gottes her sprechen zu können. So ist damit dann auch von selbst die 
Erwartung verbunden, dass der neue Mose Mittler eines höheren Bundes sein werde 
als der, den Mose vom Sinai bringen konnte (vgl. Hebr 9:11-24).54  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
presents us with the itinerary for “seeing” God. See also Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the 
Jordan, 304. 
52 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 29 (“[The prophet’s] task is not to report on the 
events of tomorrow or the next day in order to satisfy human curiosity or the human need for security. He shows 
us the face of God, and in so doing he shows us the path that we have to take. The future of which he sp aks 
reaches far beyond what people seek from soothsayers. H  points out the path to the true ‘exodus,’ which 
consists in this: Among all the paths of history, the path to God is the true direction that we must seek and find. 
Prophecy in this sense is a strict corollary to Israel’s monotheism. It is the translation of this faith into the 
everyday life of a community before God and on the way to him” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the 
Baptism in the Jordan, 4]). 
53 Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 5. 
54 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 30-31 (“The promise of a ‘prophet like me’ thus 
implicitly contains an even greater expectation: that t e last prophet, the new Moses, will be granted what was 
refused to the first one – a real, immediate vision of the face of God, and thus the ability to speak ntirely from 
seeing, not just from looking at God’s back. This naturally entails the further expectation that the new Moses 
will be the mediator of a greater covenant than the on  that Moses was able to bring down from Sinai (cf. Heb 
9:11-24)” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 5-6]).  
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Thus the promise of Deut18:15 is of a prophet whose di tinguishing note “will be his 
immediate relation with God, which enables him to communicate God’s will and word first-
hand and unadulterated.”55 This is Ratzinger’s restatement of the classic messianic 
expectation formula and he reads it in light of the conclusion of the prologue to John’s 
Gospel: ‘No one has ever seen God; it is only the Son, who is nearest to the Father’s heart 
who has made him known’ (John 1:18). In this way Jesus is the fulfilment of the promise of 
the new prophet: 
Bei [Jesus] ist nun vollends verwirklicht, was von Mose nur gebrochen galt: Er lebt 
vor dem Angesicht Gottes, nicht nur als Freund, sonder  als Sohn; er lebt in innerster 
Einheit mit dem Vater.56 
 
Ratzinger believes this relationship with the Father is central to the New Testament 
figure of Christ: everything we are told about Jesus’ words, deeds, sufferings and glory is 
anchored here and leaving it out of the presentation of Christianity is to craft something “self-
contradictory and, in the end, unintelligible.”57 The general reaction to Jesus’ words in the 
Gospels is proof that his teaching is not the product of human learning – it is interpretation 
with authority (cf. Matt 7:29; Mark 1:22). Jesus’ filial existence is the essence of Ratzinger’s 
understanding of the figure of Christ – the inner grounding of Jesus’ very existence is “seeing 
and knowing face-to-face”:  
Die Lehre Jesu kommt nicht aus menschlichem Lernen, w lcher Art auch immer. Sie 
kommt aus der unmittelbaren Berührung mit dem Vater, us dem Dialog von “Gesicht 
zu Gesicht” – aus dem Sehen dessen heraus, der an dBrust des Vaters ruhte. Sie ist 
Sohneswort. Ohne diesen inneren Grund wäre sie Vermessenheit.58 
                                                          
55 Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 5. 
56 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 31 (“What was true of Moses only in fragmentary 
form has now been fully realised in the person of Jesus. He lives before the face of God, not just as a friend, but 
as a Son; he lives in the most intimate unity with the Father” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism 
in the Jordan, 6]).  
57 Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 6. 
58 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 31-32 (“Jesus’ teaching is not the product of human 
learning, of whatever kind. It originates from immediate contact with the Father, from ‘face to face’ dialogue – 
from the vision of the one who rests close to the Father’s heart. It is the Son’s word. Without this inner 
grounding, his teaching would be pure presumption” [Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the 
Jordan, 7]). In his discussion of the Son’s filial existenc, Ratzinger refers to Jesus’ frequent withdrawals “to 
the mountain” to spend nights in prayer with his Father. Fundamental for understanding Jesus’ identity, 
Ratzinger believes these texts lift the veil of mystery a little, allowing us to comprehend the consequence of who 
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Ratzinger’s use of Deuteronomy conceives of a forward-looking messianic promise 
for a “prophet like Moses” (Deut 34:10) that is assisted by a re-reading of Deuteronomy itself 
(and by a conceptually related passage in Exodus). It i  a fascinating narrative reading of 
Israel’s prophetic tradition but it doesn’t prevent Ratzinger for observing a “curious 
melancholy” hanging over the conclusion of the fifth book of Moses. Hence the promise 
concerning “a prophet like me” (Deut 18:15) remains u fulfilled: real liberation, which is 
more than possession of land, awaits a new prophetic figure: 
[. . .] mit jenem Wort nicht einfach die Einsetzung des Prophetenstandes gemeint war, 
den es ja gab, sondern anderes und weit mehr: die Ankündigung eines neuen Mose. Es 
war sichtbar geworden, dass die Landnahme in Palästina nicht der Einzug in Heil 
gewesen war; dass Israel immer noch seiner eigentlichen Befreiung harrte; dass ein 
Exodus radikalerer Art nötig war und dass es dafür eines neuen Mose bedurfte.59  
 
A further characteristic of biblical prophecy emerges here which is indispensable for 
understanding the figure of Christ the liberator:  “prophets fail” and “Jesus places himself in 
the line of the prophets.”60 Ratzinger says this failure, most pronounced in the figure of Jesus 
crucified, is actually the source of freedom:  
Der Prophet scheitert: Seine Botschaft widerspricht zu sehr der allgemeinen Meinung, 
den eingefahrenen Lebensgewohnheiten. Erst durch das Scheitern hindurch wird sein 
Wort wirksam. Dieses Scheiteren des Propheten bleibt als dunkle Frage über der 
ganzen Geschichte Israels stehen, und es wiederholt sich in gewisser Weise immer 
wieder in der Geschichte der Menschheit. Es ist zunächst immer neu auch das 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Jesus is: “This ‘praying’ of Jesus is the Son conversing with the Father; Jesus’ human consciousness and will, 
his human soul, is taken up into that exchange, and in this way human ‘praying’ is able to become a 
participation in this filial communion with the Father. . . . He who sees Jesus sees the Father (cf. John 14:9). The 
disciple who walks with Jesus is thus caught up with h m into communion with God. And that is what 
redemption means: this stepping beyond the limits of human nature, which had been there as a possibility and an 
expectation in man, God’s image and likeness, since the moment of creation” (7-8). Ratzinger dedicates n 
entire chapter of Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the filial identity of the Son. See also 
Ratzinger, The Way of Jesus Christ, 13-14, where he alludes to the fact that philologically, the word “person” 
has its origins in the word “face”; and Benedict XVI, General Audience, 16 January 2013, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2013/documents/hf_ben- xvi_aud_20130116_it.html 
(accessed 16 January 2013). See also Roger Scruton, The Face of God: The Gifford Lectures 2010 (New York: 
Continuum, 2012). 
59 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 28 (“[. . .] these words do not refer simply to the
institution of prophecy, which in fact already existed, but to something different and far greater: the 
announcement of a new Moses. It had become evident that aking possession of the land in Palestine did not 
constitute the chosen people’s entry into salvation; that Israel was still awaiting its real liberation; that an even 
more radical kind of exodus was necessary, one that called for a new Moses” [Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: 
From the Baptism in the Jordan, 3]). 
60 Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 189. 
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Geschick Jesu Christi: Er endet am Kreuz. Aber gerade aus dem Kreuz kommt die 
große Fruchtbarkeit.61 
 
The parables are particularly enlightening for Ratzinger at this point. He juxtaposes, 
and then proceeds to mutually interpret, the abstruse statement of Jesus in answer to the 
question as to the reason for his preaching in parables (Mark 4:11-12), and the Johannine 
logion summarising the mind of Jesus on the multiple “seed” parables (John 12:24). He says 
that, unexpectedly, the link with the original context of Jesus’ difficult remark about the 
meaning of the parable of the sower (Mark 4:1-9) shed  light on Jesus as liberator.62  
The image of the seed has a significant presence throug out the Gospels in the 
preaching of the kingdom– the seed is the presence of what is to come in the future, because 
that which is to come is here already in a hidden way. Ratzinger says, connecting it to the 
Deuteronomic expectation of prophetic climax, Jesus’ preaching is “the presence of a 
promise.”63 He points out that it is in the context of the triumphal entry into Jerusalem for the 
events that would culminate in the sacrifice at Passover that Jesus summarises the manifold 
seed parables and unveils their full meaning: “Truly, truly, I say to you, unless a grain of 
wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit” (John 
                                                          
61 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 228-29 (“Prophets fail: Their message goes too 
much against general opinion and the comfortable habits of life. It is only through failure that their word 
becomes efficacious. This failure of the Prophets is an obscure question mark over the whole history of Israel, 
and in a certain way it constantly recurs in the history of humanity. Above all, it is also again and again the 
destiny of Jesus Christ: He ends up on the Cross. But that very Cross is the source of great fruitfulness” 
[Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 189-90]). 
62 Referring to the parables of Jesus, Ratzinger says that one peculiar saying (cf. Mark 4:11-12) – Jesus’ general 
answer about the reason for preaching in parables – stands in the way of seeing in them the hidden, multi-
layered invitations to faith in Jesus as the kingdom of God in person. Ratzinger quotes from what he describes 
as Joachim Jeremias’ “painstakingly argued translation” of this text in which Jesus cites Isaiah 6:9f: “To you 
[that is, to the circle of disciples] has God given the secret of the Kingdom of God: but to those who are without, 
everything is obscure, in order that they (as is written) may ‘see and not see, may hear and yet not understand, 
unless they turn and God will forgive them’ [Isa 6:9]” (see Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in 
the Jordan,189 [quoting  Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, rev. ed., trans. S.H. Hooke (London: SCM 
Press, 1963), 17]). In order to understand whether or not God is “partisan” by using parables to lock rather than 
open doors on all but a select few, Ratzinger says we have to read Jesus’ words in light of Isaiah whom he 
quotes and, in light of his own path to Jerusalem. Isaiah’s sentiments are even more terrifying than the ones 
Jesus highlights. They say: “Make the heart of this people fat, and their ears heavy, and shut their ey s; lest they 
see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and turn to be healed” (Isa 6:10). 
This scathing account of the frustrating nature of biblical prophecy is the context for Ratzinger’s understanding 
of the failure of the prophets – their message is too radical for the comfortable habits of this world and so they 
are silenced by the necessary force. In Christ, this prophetic failure is fruitfulness. 
63 Ratzinger Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 190. 
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12:24; 1Cor 15:36-38). For Ratzinger, this means that “[Jesus] himself is the grain of wheat. 
His ‘failure’ on the Cross is exactly the way leading from the few to the many, to all: ‘And I, 
when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to myself’ (John 12:23).”64   
Through the failure of the prophets, personified in Jesus’ own failure, the source of 
freedom reaches its deepest meaning. This dying of the “seed” is the method for opening the 
eyes and ears of all. “Failure” in the eyes of many becomes precisely the “way” an 
orientation of obedience and freedom is accomplished whereby people “turn and God will 
forgive them” (Mark 4:12). Ratzinger believes that it is on the Cross that the parables are 
fully unlocked. In his farewell discourse, Jesus exclaims that “I have said this to you in 
parables [i.e. veiled discourse]; the hour is coming when I shall no longer speak to you in 
parables but tell you plainly of the Father” (John 16:25). Ratzinger believes it is because the 
parables allow the mystery of Jesus’ divinity to be se n that they are signs of contradiction. 
Indeed the parables themselves become part of the mystery of the Cross because they speak 
of it in a hidden way. To his mind, the parables are prophetic “stations on the way to the 
Cross” for in them, Jesus, the true Moses, “is not only the sower who scatters the seed of 
God’s word, but also the seed that falls into the earth in order to die and so bear fruit.”65 
Failure, precisely understood then, is God’s power in the world, but what are the mechanics 
of it as it leaves Calvary and heads out into history? This is an important aspect of 
Ratzinger’s narrative christology to which we now turn. 
3.2.1.1. Source of God’s Power in the World: Christ’s Union with the Divine Will  
 In order to illustrate the theme of God’s power in the world, revealed in Christ as the 
“seed” who dies and bears fruit (John 12:24; cf. 1Cor 15:36-38), one approach Ratzinger 
pursues is to take two Matthean texts which represent, in an antithetical way, what God’s 
power is and is not. The first text is the third temptation of Jesus (Matt 4:8-10). Upon the high 
                                                          
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 191. 
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mountain and able to survey the kingdoms of the world, the devil offers Jesus the “splendour 
of power” (Matt 4:8) which “signifies being able to d  what you want, enjoying what you 
want, having everything at your disposal and being able to choose the place of honour. . . . It 
is that deceitful ‘being like God,’ that caricature of the likeness of God with which the devil 
always fools people and parodies God’s freedom.”66 The devil offers power on his terms – at 
a price: whoever wants to dominate has to oppress, getting something out of it for oneself. In 
the devil’s logic, a redeemer needs to be more powerful than the society which is being 
redeemed. However, far from condemning civic power in society, Ratzinger purifies it by 
rejecting the identification of God’s power with civic power.  
Der Satan bietet Macht an, natürlich zu seinen Preisen: Macht, die auf Schrecken, auf 
Furcht, auf Eigensucht, auf Vergewaltigung des anderen und auf der Vergötzung des 
Ich beruht. Aber – so scheint er zu sagen – das ist eben die Macht. Anders kann man 
sie nicht haben. Wer herrschen will, muss unterdrücken, braucht die Drohung der 
Gewalt und soll dann andererseits etwas davon haben. Und wie sollte die Welt erlöst 
werden, wenn der Erlöser keine Macht hat? Also ist es wohl klar, dass der Retter, 
wenn er überhaupt etwas bewirken will, das Angebot der Macht annehmen und sich 
ihren Spielregeln fügen muss.67 
 
 This opens up a very important tenet of Ratzinger’s approach to ecclesiology, 
because, to his mind, the temptation to power has continued throughout all of history. This 
does not mean he wants to confuse or condemn civil power but rather to reject the temptation 
which Jesus had rejected: 
Immer wieder haben die Mächtigen der Welt der Kirche Macht angeboten und mit der 
Macht natürlich auch die Spielregeln ihrer Macht aufzudrängen versucht. Aber die 
Berufung der Kirche ist es nicht, ein messianisches R ich aufzurichten, in dem dann 
Menschenmacht als Gottes Macht ausgegeben und angebetet wird. Die Macht der 
politischen Herrschaft oder der technischen Verfügung kann und darf nicht die Weise 
ihrer Macht sein. Damit ist nicht staatliche Macht überhaupt verurteilt, auch nicht das 
unter dem Maß der Gerrechtigkeit stehende Schwert, ie Röm 13:1-7 zeigt. Wohl 
                                                          
66 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 48. 
67 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 61 (“Satan offers power – of course at a price: power based on 
terror, fear, selfishness, the rape of others, and the idolization of oneself. But – so he seems to be saying – that is 
exactly what power is. You cannot have it any other way. Whoever wants to dominate has to oppress, requires 
the threat of force, and should, on the other hand, get something out of it. And how should the world be 
redeemed if the redeemer does not have power? It is therefore perfectly obvious that the saviour has to accept 
the offer of power and adhere to its methods if he wants to accomplish anything at all” [Ratzinger, A New Song 
for the Lord, 48]). 
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aber ist die Identifizierung von Kirchenmacht und Staatsmacht, von Gottes Macht und 
Staatsmacht und die darin liegende Verabsolutierung menschlicher Macht überhaupt 
verurteilt, als ob diese Art von Macht auch selbst die Erlösung sein könne. Es ist eine 
bestimmte Idee von Erlösung, ein falsches Menschen- und Gottesbild abgewiesen, das 
Gott zur Karikatur macht, indem es den Menschen auf den Glanz der Macht und 
damit auf den Schein des Menschseins reduziert.68   
 
 The second Matthean text, the closing scene and commissioning of disciples (Matt 
28:16-20), is another mountain scene and Jesus is aga n standing on the mountain, in view of 
the kingdoms of the world is all their splendour. But now he can say that all power in heaven 
and on earth has been given to him, and for this rea on, it is “all power” (Matt 28:18). His 
power, in other words, comes to him from heaven as well as from earth. Ratzinger points out 
that what he refused on the Mount of Temptation is ow his but in a completely different 
way, since his power comes from a completely different source and he now sends out his 
disciples as messengers and bearers of it. He speak as the Risen One, having passed through 
death, “and only in this manner – through death, from the other side and toward the other side 
– does he have power, which, however, for that veryr ason spans not only what appears, but 
everything – heaven and earth, and time up to its limits and beyond.”69  
 Ratzinger says a third mountain appears in-between the Mountain of Temptation and 
the Mountain of Mission, which simultaneously separates and connects both moments in the 
revelation of divine power: “Jesus climbed the mountain of his crucifixion as Isaac had once 
climbed Moriah.”70 Ratzinger comes to an understanding of the nature of divine power by 
focusing on the word “all”: 
                                                          
68 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 61-62 (“Over and again the powerful of the world have offered the 
Church power, and, along with this power, they have naturally tried to impose the methods of their power as 
well. But it is not the mission of the Church to set up a messianic kingdom in which human power poses and is 
worshipped as God’s power. The power typical of political rule or technical management cannot be and must 
not be the style of the Church’s power. By this statement we are not condemning civil power in general nor the 
sword which is subject to the criterion of justice as Rom 13:1-7 shows. We are, however, condemning the 
identification of Church power with civil power and of God’s power with civil power as well as the absolutizing 
of human power in general that this entails, as if this kind of power could itself be redemption. We ar rejecting 
a particular concept of redemption, a false image of human beings and of God that makes a caricature of God by 
reducing the human being to the splendour of power and so to a pretense of humanity” [Ratzinger, A New Song 
for the Lord, 48-49]). 




[Satans] Höhen sind Höhen der Eigenmacht, des losgebundenen Selbstverfügens im 
Alleshaben und Allesdürfen, das doch zur sinnlosen Lebenslüge wird, weil das 
“Alles” des Habens und des Genießens immer nur ein winziges Etwas, eher ein Nichts 
als ein Etwas ist und der wirklich für Alles geschaffene Mensch sehr wohl die 
Nichtigkeit dieses “Alles” erfährt. Die Höhe des Kreuzigungsberges aber besteht 
darin, dass Jesus alles Haben und Dürfen weggegeben hat, auf das reine Nichts der 
völligen Nacktheit hin, die nicht einmal mehr eine Stelle auf dem Boden hat.71 
 
As such, the divine power which legitimates Jesus’ mi sion entails the putting aside of “all” 
possessions and privileges, something his own prayer life already prefigured in his “thy will 
be done” (Matt 6:10) which he spoke to the Father. In the complete unity of his will with the 
Father’s, he attains the real “all.”  
 At this moment, Ratzinger says, Jesus is at the highest peak of being for he is one 
with the true God, who is not a despot or pleasure-lov r, but eternal truth and eternal love. 
This restores the true image of God and of humanity i  contrast to the caricature of God and 
humans which lay behind the satanic offer of “being l ke God.” These three Mounts in the 
life of Christ also clarify, for all time, the nature of divine power and the basis of obedience 
which marks the relationship between the Father and the Son. It entails the Son seeking unity 
with the will of the Father. This contrasts with earthly power in that it confronts the advocates 
of pseudo-liberation with the source of its true and lasting counterpart: 
Jesus hat auch im irdischen Nichts, gegen die Macht der Gewalt und ihr Alleskönnen 
standgehalten im Einssein mit Gottes Willen. Er ist e ns mit Gott und darum eins mit 
der wirklichen Macht, die Himmel und Erde, Zeit und Ewigkeit umspannt. Er ist eins 
mit Gott, sodass Gottes Macht seine Macht geworden ist. Die Macht, die er nun vom 
Berg der Erhöhung aus verkündet, ist Macht aus den Quellen des Kreuzes und damit 
der radikale Gegensatz zur Willkürmacht des Alleshabens, Allesdürfens und 
Alleskönnens.72 
                                                          
71 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 63 (“Satan’s heights are the heights of doing things on one’s own 
authority, of uninhibitedly determining oneself in possessing all things and being permitted all things. This 
nevertheless becomes a sham existence since the ‘all’ that is possessed and enjoyed is always only a tiny bit 
more of a nothing than a something, and the human person who has really been created for all things learns the 
futility of this ‘all’ very well indeed. The height of the mountain of crucifixion consists in Jesus’ having 
relinquished all possessions and privileges all the way down to the pure nothingness of complete nakedness, 
which then does not even have a place on the ground anymore” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 50]). 
72 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 63-64 (“In his earthly nothingness but in unity with the will of God, 
Jesus also stood firm against the power of force and its being able to do all things. He is one with God and 
therefore one with real power that encompasses heaven nd earth, time and eternity. He is one with God, s  that 
God’s power has become his power. The power he now pr claims from the mountain of exaltation is power 
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 The conclusion of the prologue to John’s Gospel cou d easily be considered as a 
decisive factor in Ratzinger’s narrative christology: “No one has ever seen God; it is the only 
Son, who is nearest the Father’s heart who has made him known” (John 1:18).73 As an 
expression of the christological hermeneutic, Ratzinger’s narrative approach maintains the 
unity of Scripture by drawing upon the Mount of Calvary as the locus of the Messiah who is 
the embodiment of the Law, foretold in the Prophets. As we have seen, Ratzinger points out 
that the Mount of Calvary lies between the Mounts of Temptation and Mission. The 
invitation to “imitation” is to take up the Cross and follow him (cf. Matt 16:24; Mark 8:34, 
10:21; Luke 9:23) and, as the revelation of the authentic nature of divine obedience, it is 
expressed in the christological category of “sonship”: 
Kindsein wird mit Nachfolge Christi identisch. Das Wort vom Vatergott wird so ein 
Anruf an uns selbst: als “Kind,” als Sohn und Tochter zu leben. “Alles, was mein ist, 
ist dein,” sagt Jesus im Hohepriesterlichen Gebet zum Vater (John 17:10), und 
dasselbe hat der Vater zum älteren Bruder der verlorenen Sohnes gesagt (Lk 15:31). 
Aus diesem Bewusstsein zu leben, lädt uns das Wort “Vater” ein. So wird auch der 
Wahn der falschen Emanzipation überwunden, der am Anfang der Sündengeschichte 
der Menschheit stand. Denn Adam will auf das Wort de  Schlange hin selbst Gott sein 
und Gottes nicht mehr bedürfen. Es wird sichtbar, dss “Kindsein” nicht 
Abhängigkeit, sondern jenes Stehen in der Beziehung der Liebe ist, das die 
menschliche Existenz trägt, ihr Sinn und Größe gibt. 74 
 
 With the understanding of divine power as gift from the Father and unity in obedience 
with the will of God, Ratzinger’s narrative christology reaches its apex: Christ’s union with 
the Father’s will as the source of authentic freedom. Human freedom, from this perspective, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
coming from the roots of the cross and is thus radically opposed to the unrestrained power of possessing all 
things, being allowed all things, and being able to do all things” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 50-51]). 
73 See Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 6. For an account of the use of the 
Johannine Gospel in Ratzinger’s christology and the qu stions which it raises, see John Redford, Who is John?: 
The Fourth Gospel Debate After Pope Benedict XVI’s Jesus of Nazareth (London: St. Pauls Publishing: 2008). 
See also this dissertation §§ 3.2.1. and 7.2.    
74 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 172-73 (“Our sonship turns out to be identical with 
following Christ. To name God as Father thus becomes a summons to us: to live as a ‘child,’ as a son or 
daughter. ‘All that is mine is thine,’ Jesus says in his high priestly prayer to the Father (John 17:10), and the 
father says the same thing to the elder brother of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:31). The word father is an invitation 
to live from our awareness of this reality. Hence, too, the delusion of false emancipation, which marked the 
beginning of mankind’s history of sin, is overcome. Adam, heeding the words of the serpent, wants to bec me 
God himself and to shed his need for God. We see that to be God’s child is not a matter of dependency, but 
rather of standing in the relation of love that sustains man’s existence and gives it meaning and grandeur     
[Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 138-39]).  
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will require further contemplation of the concept of imitation, in the specific sense already 
discussed above. This would be imitation understood as a conversion that accepts in its 
entirety the promise of Christ that he is the “way” to authentic freedom, preparedness to lose 
one’s whole life to this promise, and the ending of one’s isolation and self-sufficiency for the 
beginning of an ecclesial existence. This will be taken up in the following chapters.  
 Alongside this narrative form of christology, Ratzinger places significant emphasis on 
the doctrine of the two wills in Christ. He does this through the lens of so-called neo-
chalcedonian christology. This also sheds light on he condition of human freedom in 
interaction with divine freedom.75 If Ratzinger’s narrative christology is an attempt to ake 
seriously the unity of the Scriptures in its proclamation of the way of Exodus to Sinai and the 
New Moses, the doctrine of the two wills is a very specific attempt to come to terms with 
how freedom is operative in the person of Christ, the “one and the same Christ . . . 
acknowledged in two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no 
separation.”76  
 
3.2.2. Neo-chalcedonian Christology 
 
In line with Ratzinger’s apprehension of Nestorian or separationist tendencies within 
christology, it is not surprising to observe him looking into the early history of theology for 
assistance in renewing an ethos of unity and synerg in the figure of Christ. In the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the humanity of Jesus was being newly emphasised but such debates 
go back much earlier and were worked out in the christological dogma declared at the 
Council of Chalcedon (451AD) and in its aftermath. Ratzinger’s interest in this period, 
                                                          
75 However, as will be demonstrated in § 9.1.3. of this dissertation, Ratzinger does not sufficiently deal with the 
nature of divine freedom and its relationship with human freedom – at least not to the same extent as a 
theologian such as Hans Urs von Balthasar. Ratzinger’s entry point is almost invariably that of Christ as “Son.” 
The christocentric nature of the neo-chalcedonian approach is a case in point. 
76 See Council of Chalcedon’s “Definition of Faith” in Norman Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical 
Councils: Nicaea I- Lateran V, 86.  
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colloquially known as “neo-chalcedonian,”77 lies in a leading figure among Dyothelite 
theologians, Maximus the Confessor (c. 580- c.562).78 To his mind, the value of Chalcedon 
and its subsequent deliberations was incalculable in r gard to elaborating the theme of 
authentic human freedom. Ratzinger’s study of neo-chalcedonian christology provides him 
with the basis for creaturely insertion or participat on into the divine life that renders us free. 
His contention is that the chalcedonian affirmation of humanity and divinity in Christ retains 
its meaning only if the mode of unity is clarified. And while the Council had defined Christ’s 
unity by speaking of “one person,”79 it was a formula whose implications largely remained 
unspecified at the time. Ratzinger’s attaches great importance to the subsequent clarifications 
                                                          
77 The validity of this term is not altogether undisputed. For example, neo-chalcedonian theologians are not 
readily identifiable nor are their distinguishing characteristics. Neither is it clear what has been its impact on 
western theology. It is generally accepted that the term was coined a century ago by Joseph Lebon, in his book 
Le monophysisme Sévérien: étude historique, littéraire et théologique sur la résistance monophysite au Concile 
de Chalcédoine jusqu’à la constitution de l’Église jacobite (Lovain: van Linthout, 1909), 409, n. 2, 411. See 
also ibid.., 119-23, 155-63, 507, 522. Aloys Grillmeier says the following: “J. Lebon created this expr ssion in 
imitation of the terms old-Nicenism and neo-Nicenism, which had become customary for the history of doctrine 
of the fourth century between 325 and 381” (Aloys Grillmeier and Theresia Hainthaler, From the Council of 
Chalcedon to Gregory the Great: The Church of Consta tinople in the Sixth Century [London:  Mowbray, 
1995], 429-30).The term itself broadly refers to the historical period from the Council of Chalcedon (451AD) 
until the aftermath of the christological controversi s of the 7th century. At its heart it was the debate over 
theological approaches to the issues of energeia (act) and will in Christ. From the 4th century onwards, two 
approaches emerged in christology which, in the 7th century, eventually came into conflict. They were 
Monoenergism-Monothelitism and Dyenergism-Dyothelitism. In the debates that ensued, Maximus the 
Confessor helped to move forward the position of two wills in Christ. This later emerged as the orthodox 
position of Christianity. See Grillmeier and Hainthaler, From the Council of Chalcedon to Gregory the Great, 
327-338, 429-62; Hans von Loon, The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill 2009), 30-
47. 
78 In the Germanic world, Maximus’ theology has been promoted primarily by Hans Urs von Balthasar through 
his book, Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenners, 3rd ed. (Johannes Verlag, 1988), and in 
the Anglophone world through Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (New York: Routledge, 1996). Further 
studies have been carried out by Schönborn, God’s Human Face,102-33; Aidan Nichols, Byzantine Gospel: 
Maximus the Confessor in Modern Scholarship (London: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 1994); Lars Thunberg, 
Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1995);  Demetrios Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of St 
Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Adam G. Cooper, The Body in St Maximus 
Confessor: Holy Flesh, Wholly Deified (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, 
The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
According to Cyril Hovorun, Maximus the Confessor was “an integral part of the united polemical effort against 
Monenergism-Monothelitism” and “[a]ny consideration f [him] as a self-sufficient theologian or thinker apart 
from the context of the Monenergist-Monothelite contr versy may be misleading since he composed his best 
christological writings in response to the challeng of Monenergism-Monothelitism” (Will, Action and Freedom: 
Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century [Boston: Brill Academic, 2008], 2-3). Andrew Louth 
further nuances this view by saying that “[a]lthough Maximus the Confessor is a speculative theologian of 
genius, he does not see himself, as would some later theologians, as constructing a theological system. He sees 
himself as interpreting a tradition that has come down to him, and interpreting it for the sake of others” (Louth, 
Maximus the Confessor, 21). 
79 See Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I- Latern V, 83-86. 
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at the Third Council of Constantinople (680-81), because he believes “the unity of divinity 
and humanity in Christ which brings ‘salvation’ to man is not a juxtaposition but a mutual 
indwelling. Only in this way can there be that genuine ‘becoming like God,’ without which 
there is no liberation and no freedom.”80   
3.2.2.1. Synergy of Two Wills in Christ’s Sacrifice of Obedience 
For the most part, the unity of the human and divine wills in Christ’s person and his 
consequent freedom were the clarifications to which Constantinople III addressed itself.81 On 
the one hand, it taught that the unity of God and man in Christ involves no amputation or 
reduction in any way of human nature. In fact, God brings humanity for the first time to its 
real fullness. And, on the other hand, the Council abolishes all dualism or parallelism in the 
perception of the doctrine of the hypostatic union – something which had always seemed 
necessary in order to safeguard Jesus’ human freedom. Such parallelisms promote the idea 
that freedom is somehow circumvented when a human will is taken up into the will of God.  
Constantinople III analysed the chalcedonian “two-ness” and “one-ness” in Christ by 
reference to the concrete issue of two wills in the Son’s personhood. Ratzinger skilfully 
analyses the Council’s theological reasoning: 
Es hält nachdrücklich fest, daß es einen eigenen Willen des Menschen Jesus gibt, der 
nicht vom göttlichen Willen absorbiert ist. Aber dieser menschliche  Wille folgt dem 
göttlichen Willen und wird so, nicht auf naturale Weise, sondern auf dem Weg der 
Freiheit ein einziger Wille mit ihm: Die metaphysische Zweiheit eines menschlichen 
und eines göttlichen Willens wird nicht aufgehoben, aber im personalen Raum, im 
Raum der Freiheit, vollzieht sich beider Verschmelzung, so daß sie nicht natural, aber 
personal ein Wille werden. Diese freie Einheit – die von der Liebe geschaffene Weise 
der Einheit – ist höhere und innerlichere Einheit als eine bloß naturale Einheit. Sie  
entspricht der höchsten Einheit, die es überhaupt gibt, der trinitarischen. Das Konzil 
erläutert diese Einheit mit einem im Johannesevangelium überlieferten Herrenwort: 
                                                          
80 Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 38. Ratzinger makes a very similar comment some years later which is 
worth noting. It is equally based on moving away from parallelism towards mutual indwelling: “In fact only that 
unity of divinity and humanity which in Christ is not parallelism, where one stands alongside the other, but real 
compenetration – compenetration between God and man – means salvation for mankind. Only thus in fact does 
that true ‘being with God’ take place, without whic liberation and freedom do not exist” (Joseph Ratzinger, 
Journey to Easter: Spiritual Reflections for the Lenten Season, trans. Mary Groves [New York, Crossroads, 
2006], 100).   
81 See Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I- Latern V, 124-130. 
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“Ich bin vom Himmel herabgestiegen, nicht um meinen Willen zu tun, sondern den 
des Vaters, der mich gesandt hat” (Joh. 6:38). Hierspricht der göttliche Logos, und er 
spricht vom menschlichen Willen des Menschen Jesus in der Weise, daß er ihn seinen 
Willen, den Willen des Logos nennt. Das Konzil zeigt mit dieser Exegese von Joh. 
6:38 die Subjekteinheit in Jesus auf. In ihm sind nicht zweierlei Ich, sondern nur ein 
einziges: Der Logos spricht vom menschlichen Wollen und Denken Jesu im Ich-Stil; 
es ist sein Ich geworden, in sein Ich aufgenommen, w il der menschliche Wille mit 
dem Willen des Logos völlig eins und mit ihm reines Ja zum Willen des Vaters 
geworden ist.82   
       
Prior to the deliberations of Constantinople III, Maximus the Confessor interpreted 
the complex landscape of christological dogma in this period. Ratzinger believes he made an 
influential contribution to the final outcome of the future Council’s deliberations by arguing 
for avoidance of both dualistic and hybrid varieties of christology.83 Christ is the incarnate 
Word in the identifiable freedom of his person: “there is the complete union on the personal 
level, the synthesis of freedoms from which a personal, not a natural unity results.”84 
Maximus’ way of illuminating this whole context is by referring to Jesus’ Prayer on 
                                                          
82 Ratzinger, Schauen auf den Durchbohrten, 34-35 (“It resolutely maintains that, as man, Jesus has a human 
will which is not absorbed by the divine will. But this human will follows the divine will and thus becomes one 
will with it, not in a natural manner but along the path of freedom. The metaphysical two-ness of a human and a 
divine will is not abrogated, but in the realm of the person, in the realm of freedom, the fusion of both takes 
place, with the result that they become one will, not naturally, but personally. This free unity – a form of unity 
created by love – is higher and more interior than a merely natural unity. It corresponds to the highest unity 
there is, namely, trinitarian unity. The Council illustrates this unity by citing a dominical word handed down to 
us in the Gospel of John: ‘I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will but the will of him who sent 
me’ (Jn 6:38). Here it is the divine Logos who is speaking, and he speaks of the human will of the manJesus as 
his will, the will of the Logos. With this exegesis of John 6:38 the Council indicates the unity of the subject in 
Christ. There are not two ‘I’s’ in him, but only one. The Logos speaks in the I-form of the human will and mind 
of Jesus; it has become his I, has become adopted into his I, because the human will is completely onewith the 
will of the Logos. United with the latter, it has become a pure Yes to the Father’s will” [Ratzinger, Behold the 
Pierced One, 38-39]). Ratzinger reiterated this analysis in Journey to Easter, 101. He gives further mention to 
the issue of the human and divine wills in Christ and the on-going christological relevance of the early Councils 
in A New Song for the Lord, 9-11, 23-8; The God of Jesus Christ, 30, 90; Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 81. He 
makes mention of the central distinction which had been worked out by Maximus the Confessor and was applied 
in Constantinople III: the distinction between the Θέληµα φυσικόν [Thelema physikón] [natural will] (which 
belongs to nature and thus exists separately in Christ’s godhead and manhood) from the “gnomic” Θέληµα (i.e. 
“inclination,” which is identical with the liberum arbitrium [free will] and pertains to the human person). This 
distinction is more common in eastern theology and was partly an attempt to come to terms with a postlap arian 
human existence which is in contradistinction to the harmony of the creature with God and with one another that 
is characteristic of human life in its natural state. I  is an intricate theory whereby Maximus attempted to 
bifurcate the concept of the will. Its complexities are clearly elucidated by Ian A. McFarland, “‘Naturally and by 
grace’: Maximus the Confessor on the operation of the will,” in Scottish Journal of Theology 58 (2005): 410-
433.  
83 See Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 9-10. 
84 Ibid. The Catechism of the Catholic Church quotes Maximus on the issue of the unity of Christ’s personhood: 
“The human nature of God’s Son, not by itself but by its union with the Word, knew and showed forth in itself 




the Mount of Olives, which expresses Jesus’ unique relationship with God the Father.85 It is a 
                                                          
85 For an in-depth analysis of Maximus the Confessor’ approach to the scene on the Mount of Olives (Mark 
14:32-42; cf. Matt 26:36-46; Luke 22:39-46; John 12:27-28; Heb 5:7-10), see Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 207ff, 
esp. 263-275. At various stages over the years, Ratzinger refers to the New Testament retention of the Aramaic 
(or Hebrew) prayer address, “Abbā, Father” (cf. Mark 14:36; Rom 8:15; Gal 4:6). See, for example, Joseph 
Ratzinger, The Meaning of Christian Brotherhood (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 49;  Introduction to 
Christianity, 223-28, 276; The God of Jesus Christ, 72, 68; Behold the Pierced One, 20-21, 41; Journey to 
Easter, 94; Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 344, 354; Jesus of Nazareth: Holy Week,154, 
161-2. Joachim Jeremias has been attributed with popularising “Abbā” to mean “Daddy” or “Papa” (cf. James 
Barr, “Abbā isn’t ‘Daddy’,” The Journal of Theological Studies 39 [April 1988]: 28-47). However, other 
scholars have also contributed to this simplification. See James G. D. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (London: SCM 
Press, 1975), 21-26; Christology in the Making (London: SCM Press, 1980), 22-23; Marcus J. Borg, Jesus: A 
New Vision (San Francisco: Harper, 1987) 45, as well as TWNT articles by Kittel on ’αββα, and Schrenk on 
πατήρ. Even though Barr builds a counter-critique to Jeremias’ explanation of Abbā which had become a “great 
favourite with students and with preachers,” he admits that “Jeremias seems to have stopped short of saying 
[Abbā is Daddy] explicitly” (Barr, “Abbā isn’t ‘Daddy’,”28). Barr’s intention was to conduct a philological 
argument aimed at countering the impression which had built up as a result of the “babbling sound” explanation. 
Nevertheless, the rare nature of the New Testament usage of Abbā still remains something of an enigma. Others, 
including Barr to a certain degree, do not completely r ject the possibility that the use of ’αββα is genuinely 
attributable to Jesus and that its Christian usage was prompted by an authentic tradition of Jesus’ own prayer (cf. 
Barr, “Abbā isn’t ‘Daddy’”: 39; John Ashton, “Abba,” ABD 1:7-8). However, the weight of evidence for this 
varies, and remains inconclusive. The point is alsosometimes made that the tenderness of the cry (Mark 14:36) 
of the Abbā prayer in the Garden contrasts sharply with the cry of abandonment and distance (Mark 15:34) 
which comes from the Cross (Barr, “Abbā isn’t ‘Daddy’,” 28; Joachim Jeremias, The Prayer of Jesus [London: 
SCM Press, 1967], 57). For his part, Ratzinger acknowledges the demonstration of the intimate form of address 
in Joachim Jeremias, Abba: Studien zur neutestamentlichen Theologie und Zeitgeschichte (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 15-67, and says that even though Jeremias later amended his earlier view that 
Abba was merely a childish stammer (cf. TWNT 5:984f), the fundamental perception remains: “To the Jewish 
way of thinking it would have been disrespectful and therefore unthinkable to address God with this famili r 
word. It was something new and unheard of that Jesus should have dared to take up this step. . . . The ‘Abba’ of 
Jesus’ prayers reveals the very heart of his relationship to God” (cf. Introduction to Christianity, 224, n.23). 
Writing in 2008, John M. McDermott is in agreement with this argument on the nature of Sonship: “Throughout 
the New Testament Jesus is the Father’s sole Son and heir (Mark 12:6-7), the one who addresses him as Abba 
and teaches the disciples to pray ‘our Father.’ Jesus always distinguishes ‘my Father’ from ‘your Father.’ The 
only time he says ‘our Father’ happens when he teaches others, his disciples, to pray. He is clearly the mediator 
to others of divine sonship, access to the Father” (John M. McDermott, “Didn’t Jesus Know He Was God? Mark 
10:17-22,” Irish Theological Quarterly 73 [2008]: 328). Ratzinger’s interest in the term is connected to the 
relationship which it indicates between the Father and the Son – it expresses the “unicity” of the Son(cf. Jesus 
of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 344). It appears in his work when he discusses th C ristian re-
interpretation of the terms “Son of Man,” “Son,” and “I am” (cf. Introduction to Christianity, 216-228; Jesus of 
Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 319-355). It was because the meanings of these terms went through 
so many difficult stages of discernment and fierce debate, that the Council of Nicaea (325A.D.) adopted th  
word “homoousios”: “[t]his term did not Hellenise the faith or burden it with an alien philosophy. On the
contrary, it captured in a stable formula exactly what had emerged as incomparably new and different in Jesus’ 
way of speaking with the Father” (Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 355). Rather than 
focusing on the term as an immediate disclosure of the nature of the personality of the Father, Ratzinger actually 
considers the word to contribute to the revelation of Jesus’ self-understanding as “Son” in dialogue with the 
Father. It is only in this way that this prayer address collaborates in revealing the Father. It is interesting, 
therefore, to note how Ratzinger deals with this somewhat ambiguous New Testament logion. He surveys its 
linguistic usage as it develops in the surrounding polytheistic, cultural milieu outside the immediate biblical 
narrative. He then observes it as it makes its way into the monotheistic culture of the New Testament narrative 
and the sequence of events in the early Church. Ratzinger uses the term Abbā, which is preserved by Mark and 
Paul, as a helpful interpretative key to the overall structure of divine revelation that takes a narrative form. This 
makes for an interesting comparison with an alternative approach, such as that of C. Kavin Rowe in Early 
Narrative Christology: The Lord in the Gospel of Luke (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2009), who 
focuses on a narrative interpretation that remains, with all possible consistency, within the narrative world of the 
text and the intended meaning therein.        
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prayer scene looking into the inner life of the Word-made-flesh, revealing to us, Ratzinger 
believes, a sentence which remains the measure and model of all prayer: “Not what I will but 
what you will” (Mark 14:36). From Jesus’ human will, Ratzinger describes what happens: 
Der menschliche Wille Jesu ordnet sich dem Willen ds Sohnes ein. Indem er dies tut, 
empfängt er dessen Identität, nämlich die völlige Unterordnung des Ich unter das Du, 
das Sich-Schenken und Übereignen des Ich ans Du: Dies ist ja das Wesen dessen, der 
reine Relation und reiner Akt ist. Wo Ich sich an Du verschenkt, wird Freiheit, weil 
die “Form Gottes” aufgenommen wird.86 
 
Conversely, from the viewpoint of the divine will, Ratzinger maintains that Christ’s freedom 
can be even more comprehensively understood: 
Der Logos erniedrigt sich so, daß er den Willen eines Menschen als seinen annimmt 
und mit dem Ich dieses Menschen zum Vater spricht, sein Ich diesem Menschen 
überträgt und damit das Reden eines Menschen in das ewige Wort in sein seliges “Ja, 
Vater” umwandelt. Indem er diesem Menschen sein Ich, seine eigene Identität 
zueignet, befreit er den Menschen, erlöst ihn, macht ihn zu Gott.87 
 
Understanding the synergy of the two wills in Christ from the standpoint of the 
sacrifice of obedience on the part of the Son, Ratzinger says the real meaning of “God made 
man” can now be taken “in both hands”: “the Son trasforms the anguish of a man into his 
own filial obedience, the speech of the servant into the Word which is the Son.”88 By 
revisiting part of the history of the christological debates, Ratzinger says we can understand 
how our liberation is achieved through our participation in the “Son’s” freedom. The result of 
                                                          
86 Ratzinger, Schauen auf den Durchbohrten, 36 (“Jesus’ human will assimilates itself to the will of the Son. In 
doing so, he receives the Son’s identity, i.e., the complete subordination of the I to the Thou, the self-giving and 
self-expropriation of the I to the Thou. This is the very essence of him who is pure relation and pureact. 
Wherever the I gives itself to the Thou, there is freedom because this involves the reception of the ‘form of 
God’” [Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 41]).    
87 Ratzinger, Schauen auf den Durchbohrten, 36 (“[T]he Logos so humbles himself that he adopts a man’s will 
as his own and addresses the Father with the I of this human being; he transfers his own I to this man and thus 
transforms human speech into the eternal Word, into his blessed ‘Yes, Father.’ By imparting his own I, his own 
identity, to this human being, he liberates him, redeems him, makes him God” [Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced 
One, 41]). Significantly, Pope Benedict has dedicated a number of homilies and discourses to the christology f 
Maximus by specifically returning to the scene on the Mount of Olives and discussing the nature of Christ’s 
freedom and the personal union of the divine and human wills in him. See Benedict XVI, General Audienc, 25 
June 2008, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2008/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_aud_20080625_en.html (accessed 25 April 2012); General Audience, 1 February 2012,  
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2012/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20120201_en.html 
(accessed 25 April 2012);  Homily for Mass of the Lord’s Supper, 5 April 2012,  
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2012/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_20120405_coena-
domini_en.html (accessed 15 January 2013). 
88 Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 41. 
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the personal unity of wills is that “the greatest possible change has taken place in man, the 
only change which meets his desire: he has become divine.”89  
Ratzinger takes up the drama of Gethsemane again in h sJesus of Nazareth series.90 
Not only does he say that “nowhere else in sacred Scripture do we gain so deep an insight 
into the inner mystery of Jesus,”91 but that here, in Jesus’ prayer at Gethsemane, where Jesus 
falls on his face taking up “the prayer posture of xtreme submission to the will of God, of 
radical self-offering to him, . . . the whole of our redemption is made present.”92 Once again, 
he accredits Maximus with making a decisive contribu ion to a confusing christological 
landscape. In this recent reflection on his part, Ratzinger provides further analysis of 
Maximus’ contribution, employing it to shed light upon how the existence of freedom and 
obedience in the figure of Christ contributes to the understanding of human freedom.   
Ratzinger begins by pointing out that there are two parts to Jesus’ prayer which 
correspond to the confrontation between the two wills. He describes them as the “natural 
will” of the man Jesus, which resists the looming destruction, pleading that he be spared from 
it, and the “filial will” which abandons itself totally to the Father’s will. John 12:27-28 is a 
prime example of the confrontation: “Father, save me from this hour . . . Father, glorify your 
name.” What is at work here, according to Ratzinger, is that the anguish of Jesus’ human soul 
impels him to pray for deliverance from this hour, while the awareness of his mission 
indicates that the glorification of God’s name comes through him being innocently stripped 
of all dignity in the impending horror of the Cross. Ratzinger says that this “confrontation” 
fully manifests God’s identity:  
[D]er Gott, der im Abgrund seiner Liebe, im Sich-selber-Geben allen Mächten des 
Bösen die wahre Macht des Guten antgegenstellt. Jesus hat beide Bitten 
ausgesprochen, aber die erste, die um “Rettung,” ist in die zweite, die um Gottes 
Verherrlichung im Geschehen seines Willens, eingeschmolzen – und so ist der 
                                                          
89 Ibid., 42. 
90 See Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 145-66.   
91 Ibid., 157. 
92 Ibid., 153-54. 
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Widerstreit im Innern der menschlichen Existenz Jesu zur Einheit geführt. 93 
 
When coming to terms with the meaning of human freedom, Ratzinger is convinced 
that in the figure of Christ the irreducible duality of human and divine willing requires that 
the proper modes of “nature” and “person” must be clarified. Hence, the “natural will” of 
Jesus’ human nature is present but there is only one “personal will,” drawing the “natural 
will” to itself. Crucially, Ratzinger says, “this i possible without annihilating the specifically 
human element, because the human will, as created by God, is ordered [emphasis mine] to 
the divine will. In becoming attuned to the divine will, it experiences its fulfilment, not its 
annihilation.”94 In formal theological terms, Ratzinger says, the ground for this is that  
[. . .] dass der menschliche Wille schöpfungsgemäß auf die Synergie (das 
Zusammenwirken) mit Gottes Willen hin tendiert, dass freilich durch die Sünde aus 
Synergie Opposition geworden ist: der Mensch, dessen Wille sich im Einstimmen in 
Gottes Willen vollendet, fühlt nun seine Freiheit durch den Willen Gottes gefährdet. 
Er sieht im Ja zum Willen Gottes nicht die Möglichkeit, ganz er selbst zu sein, 
sondern die Bedrohung seiner Freiheit, gegen die er sich zur Wehr setzt.95 
 
The reason why Ratzinger suggests that Gethsemane expr sses the whole of redemption is 
that the synergy of wills in Christ restores the true human greatness, while the human 
yearning to be “like God” is given an authentic interpretation: 
Das Drama des Ölbergs besteht darin, dass Jesus den Naturwillen des Menschen aus 
der Opposition in die Synergie zurückholt und damit den Menschen in seiner Größe 
wiederherstellt. In dem menschlichen Naturwillen Jesu ist sozusagen in ihm selbst der 
ganze Widerstand der menschlichen Natur gegen Gott anwesend. Unser aller 
Eigensinn, die ganze Opposition gegen Gott ist da, und ringend zieht Jesus die 
widerständige Natur in ihr eigentliches Wesen hinauf.96 
                                                          
93 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 177-78 (“[. . .] the God who, in the unfathomable 
depth of his self-giving love, sets the true power of good against all the powers of evil. Jesus uttered both 
prayers, but the first one, asking for deliverance, m rges into the second one, asking for God to be glorified by 
the fulfilment of his will – and so the conflicting elements blend into unity deep within the heart of Jesus’ 
human experience” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 157]). 
94 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 160. 
95 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 182 (“[. . .] the human will, by virtue of creation, 
tends toward synergy (working together) with the divine will, but that through sin, opposition takes the place of 
synergy: man, whose will attains fulfilment through becoming attuned to God’s will, now has the sense that his 
freedom is compromised by God’s will. He regards consenting to God’s will, not as his opportunity to become 
fully himself, but as a threat to his freedom against which he rebels” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 
160]).  
96 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 182-83 (“The drama of the Mount of Olives lies in 
the fact that Jesus draws man’s natural will away from opposition and back towards synergy, and in so doing he 
restores man’s true greatness. In Jesus’ natural human will, the sum total of human nature’s resistance to God is, 
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Quoting Christoph Schönborn, Ratzinger says that what emerges from the agony of 
Gethsemane is that the synergy of the two wills, moving from opposition to union, is 
accomplished through “the sacrifice of obedience.”97 In the prayer to the Father, “not my will 
but yours,” (Luke 22:42) the natural human will is completely subsumed into the “I” of the 
Son. The Son’s whole being – his “I” – is in total se f-abandonment to the “thou” of God the 
Father. Ratzinger concludes that “[t]his same ‘I’ has subsumed and transformed humanity’s 
resistance, so that we are all now present within the Son’s obedience; we are all drawn into 
sonship.”98 
3.2.2.2. The “Son”: Laboratory of Freedom 
Ratzinger echoes Maximus and Constantinople III by describing Jesus’ prayer 
movement in the Gethsemane scene as “freedom’s laboratory.” It consists of “that prayer 
which enters into the praying of Jesus and becomes the prayer of Jesus in the Body of 
Christ.” 99 In Ratzinger’s theology, this image clarifies the manner of our liberation via our 
participation in the Son’s freedom. Participation in Christ’s actual “praying,” as an action in 
“freedom’s laboratory,” comprises an on-going dynamism which reveals humanity’s true 
vocation and dignity as free creatures worthy of participation in God: 
Hier und nirgendwo sonst geschieht jene tiefgreifende Verwandlung des Menschen, 
deren wir bedürfen, damit die Welt besser wird. Denn nur auf diesem Weg erlangt das 
Gewissen seine tiefste Rechtheit und seine unerschütterliche Kraft. Und wiederum nur 
aus solchem Gewissen kann jene Ordnung der menschlichen Dinge entstehen, die der 
Würde des Menschen entspricht und sie schützt – eine Ordnung, die in jeder 
Generation aus dem wachen Gewissen des Menschen neu gesucht werden muß, bis 
das Reich Gottes kommt, das Gott allein aufrichten kann.100  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
as it were, present within Jesus himself. The obstinacy of us all, the whole of our opposition to God is present, 
and in his struggle, Jesus elevates our recalcitrant n ture to become its real self” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. 
Holy Week, 161]). 
97 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 161 (quoting Schönborn, God’s Human Face, 126-27). 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 42. See also Journey towards Easter, 103.  
100 Ratzinger, Schauen auf den Durchbohrten, 37 (“Here and nowhere else takes place that radical change in 
man of which we stand in need, that the world may become a better place. For it is only along this path that 
conscience attains its fundamental soundness and its unshakable power. And only from such a conscience can 
there come that ordering of human affairs which corresponds to human dignity and protects it. Every generation 
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Ratzinger believes that Maximus’ reflections bring the Johannine words, “He who 
sees me sees the Father” (John 12:45) to a climax, sketching the outline of a christology 
where the visible figure of Christ is not misunderstood as static and one-dimensional, nor as 
belonging merely to the world of the senses. The truth manifested here, in the “laboratory,” is 
that “[t]he one who looks upon the figure of Christ is aken up into his exodus . . . He is led 
upon the Easter way of Passover and learns how to see in the visible more than the 
visible.”101 The Crucified One turns out to be “the image of the invisible God” (Col 1:15). By 
placing the emphasis on Jesus’ sacrifice of obedience, Ratzinger undertakes to show what a 
biblical theology of liberation consists of: 
Im Exodus der Liebe Christi, das heißt im Übergang vom Gegensatz zur 
Gemeinschaft, der durch das Kreuz des Gehorsams führt, ist wirklich Erlösung, das 
heißt Befreiung geschehen. Dieser Exodus führt aus der Knechtschaft der philautia, 
der Selbstverfallenheit und Selbstverschlossenheit, in die Liebe Gottes hinein: “In 
Christus ist die menschliche Natur fähig geworden, der Liebe Gottes ähnlich zu sein . 
. . Die Liebe ist die Ikone Gottes.” Darum sieht, wer Christus den Gekreuzigten, sieht, 
den Vater – ja, das ganze trinitarische Geheimnis.102 
 
As is communicated from his approach to the Gethseman  scene, Ratzinger’s core 
belief is that christology is born of prayer or not at all and this is never more the case than 
when he comes to describe the full human and divine dim nsions of the figure of Christ.103 If 
Christ is, in his prayer, “freedom’s laboratory,” then our prayer, as it enters into the filial 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
has to seek anew this right ordering of the world in response to a conscience that is alert, until the kingdom of 
God comes, which God alone can establish” [Ratzinger, B hold the Pierced One, 42]).  
101 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 25. Ratzinger is heavily dependent on the research into Maximus’s 
theology in Schönborn, God’s Human Face, esp. pp. 102-33.    
102 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 40 (“In the exodus of Christ’s love – that is, in the transition from 
opposition to community which goes through the cross f obedience – redemption, that is, liberation, truly 
occurs. This exodus leads from the slavery of philautia, the slavery of self-conceit and self-containment, into the 
love of God: ‘In Christ, human nature has become capable of being the love of God. . . . Love is God’s icon.’ 
For this reason, whoever sees Christ, the Crucified One, sees the Father – indeed the entire trinitarian mystery” 
[Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord: Faith, 26 (quoting Schönborn, God’s Human Face, 129)]).  
103 See Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 46. Ratzinger has a series of seven theses which promote the active 
ground of Jesus’ existence, namely his constant communication with the Father, to the point where Jesus died 
praying and, since the centre of the person of Jesus is prayer, it is essential to participate in his prayer if we are 
to know and understand him (cf. ibid.,15-46). Currently, Peter John McGregor is undertaking doctoral studies 
on Ratzinger’s spiritual christology at the Australian Catholic University, under the title: “Heart to Heart: The 
‘Spiritual Christology’ of Joseph Ratzinger.” 
160 
 
existence of Jesus, becomes the prayer in the Body of Christ and here is the only place where 
the radical change that humanity needs can occur:  
Das Sein-wollen wie ein Gott ist das innere Leitmaß aller Befreiungsprogramme der 
Menschheit. Weil das Verlangen nach Freiheit im Wesen des Menschen begründet ist, 
ist er auch von Anfang an auf der Suche danach “wie Gott” zu werden. In der Tat – 
alles andere ist dem Menschen schlußendlich zu wenig. . . . Wo von der 
Sohnesbeziehung Jesu zum Vater die Rede ist, wird die Frage nach der Freiheit des 
Menschen und nach seiner Befreiung an ihren eigentlichen Nerv geführt, ohne den 
alles andere ins Leere zielt. Eine Befreiung des Menschen ohne Gottwerdung betrügt 
den Menschen, sein auf das Unbegrenzte zielendes Verlang n.104  
The “laboratory” where human liberation is achieved - the Body of Christ – is needed 
for the world to prosper. The “yes” in Jesus’s prayer opposes all approximations of freedom, 
since in him alone is the human person’s will able to identify with the will of the Father: 
[. . .] il Logos si abbassa fino ad assumere come sua la volontà di un uomo, e parla al 
Padre con I’“io” di questo uomo, trasferisce il suo “io” in questo uomo, e con ciò 
trasforma la parola di un uomo nell’eterna parola, nel suo beato “Sì, Padre.” Mentre 
egli dona a questo uomo il suo “Io,” la sua propria identità, egli libera I’uomo, lo 
salva, lo divinizza. Quello che in realità significa la frase “Dio è diventato uomo,” 
possiamo qui toccarlo quasi con mano: il Figlio trasforma l’angoscia di un uomo 
nell’obbedienza di Figlio, trasforma il parlare del “servo” nella parola che è del 
“Figlio.” Così diventa comprensibile anche il modo ella nostra liberazione, della 
nostra partecipazione alla libertà del Figlio.105 
In conclusion, there is no doubt that Ratzinger gives significant credit to Maximus for 
orienting christology on its proper course after the uncertainty and confusion of the 
christological controversies of early Christianity. He believes that Maximus’ thought serves 
to lead christology to the authentic meaning of Christ as liberator – the true Moses: 
                                                          
104 Ratzinger, Schauen auf den Durchbohrten, 30-32 (“Wanting to be like God is the inner motive of all 
mankind’s programs of liberation. Since the yearning for freedom is rooted in man’s being, right from the outset 
he is trying to become ‘like God.’ Indeed anything less is ultimately too little for him. . . . The question of Jesus’ 
filial relationship to the Father gets to the very root of the question of man’s freedom and liberation, and unless 
this is done everything else is futile. Any liberation of man which does not enable him to become divine betrays 
man, betrays his boundless yearning [which aims at what is infinite]” [Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 33-
35]). I have added the words in italics to capture he full sense of the original text.   
105 Joseph Ratzinger, Il Cammino Pasquale: Corso di esercizi spirituali tenuti in Vaticano alla presenza di S.S. 
Giovanni Paolo II (Milano: Ancora 2006), 90 (“The Logos stoops to assume as his own the will of man, and 
speaks to the Father with the ‘I’ is this man and thereby transforms the word of a man into the eternal Word, into 
his own blessed ‘Yes, Father.’ While giving to this man his own ‘I,’ his own identity, the Logos frees the man, 
saves him, divinizes him. We here touch almost palpably on the reality meant by the phrase “God became man.” 
The Son transforms the anguish of a man into the obedience of the Son, transforms the speech of the ‘servant’ 
into the words of the Son. Thus becomes comprehensibl  also our way of liberation, our sharing in the freedom 
on the Son” [Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 102]). 
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Nun ist Maximus Confessor alles andere als ein Monophysit; ihm ist ja wesentlich die 
Überwindung der letzten Spielart des Monophysitismu, nämlich des 
Monotheletismus zu verdanken. Für ihn ist wesentlich, dass wir gerade im Menschen 
Jesus wirklich den Vater ansehen; seine ganze Theologi  des Ölbergs und des 
Kreuzes, des Exodus der Menschheit im neuen Mose, verlöre sonst ihren Sinn. Aber 
Maximus ist so auch die entschiedenste Überwindung es Nestorianismus, der uns 
vom Geheimnis der Trinität abschneidet und die Mauer der Transzendenz wieder 
praktisch undurchdringlich macht. Bleiben wir aber diesseits der Mauer, dann sind 
wir Knechte, nicht Freunde.106 
 
As we leave Ratzinger’s reflections on the christological controversies, it can be seen that he 
endeavours to invoke them to inform the theological discussion on freedom in our day. Being 
drawn into the sphere of “Sonship,” the drama of Jesus’s prayer as the “sacrifice of 
obedience” has ecclesiological implications for humanity and its growth in freedom. Christ’s 
filial Sonship enables an adopted sonship of humanity i  the laboratory of freedom that is 
Christ’s prayer. This doesn’t preclude or compromise human freedom but rather gives it its 
fullest meaning as obedience and openness to the will of the Creator.  
In considering the implications of the unity in the divine person, Ratzinger says an 
image of Christ that embraces God and man entails a call to “imitation” – that is, to 
participate in the prayer of Jesus because such partici tion fulfils the yearning for freedom 
which builds up within the human heart. Growth in authentic freedom can be achieved where 
a person participates in this “laboratory” of unity and freedom, i.e. “where his own will is 
refashioned, where he allows himself to be expropriated and inserted into the divine will, 
where he advances toward that God-likeness through which the kingdom of God can 
come.”107 Ratzinger will find St. Paul’s treatment of freedom helpful in grounding the 
scriptural basis for this. It will be taken up in the next subdivision and in Chapter 4. 
                                                          
106 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 41-42 (“Maximus the Confessor is hardly a monophysite; he takes 
credit for essentially overcoming the last variety of monophysitism, namely monothelitism. For him it is 
essential that precisely in Jesus, the human being, we are really looking at the Father; otherwise the w ole 
theology of the Mount of Olives and the cross, of the exodus of humanity in the new Moses, would lose its 
meaning. But in the same way Maximus is also the most determined conqueror of Nestorianism, which cutsus 
off from the mystery of the Trinity and again makes the wall of transcendence essentially impassable. If we
remain on this side of the wall, however, then we are slaves, not friends” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 
27]). 
107 Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 46. 
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3.2.3. A Pauline Understanding of Freedom  
 From the perspective of a theological discussion on the theme of freedom, Ratzinger’s 
reflections on St. Paul were occasioned mainly as a consequence of his interaction with 
liberation theology during the early period of his time at the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith.108 The interaction challenged his interpretation of Christian liberation, while his 
reflections on pauline theology grounded his analysis of the implications of a Christian notion 
of freedom for the human person. As a result it forms an important plank in Ratzinger’s work 
on the topic of freedom, yielding important insights to his overall vision, particularly in terms 
of identification with Christ and the status of the fr e person.  
   
3.2.3.1. The Pauline Appropriation of the Greek Concept of ἐλευθερία  
 Ratzinger reflects on the word for freedom frequently found in St. Paul’s writings, 
ἐλευθερία (cf. Rom 6:20, 8:21; Gal 2:4, 3:28, 5:1, 13; 1Cor 7:21, 22, 9:1, 19,10:29, 12:13; 
2Cor 3:17; Eph 6:8; Col 3:11). In the political vocabulary of the Greeks, ἐλευθερία in no way 
implied, as it does today, the idea of freedom of choi e or the possibility of doing as one 
pleases. Instead, it asserted the opposite to the concept of life as a slave by expressing the 
status of full membership of the relevant social structure, family or polis, in addition to the 
full rights and responsibilities that accompany it. The free man was one who was at home, 
one belonging to his household: 
Es bedeutet den Vollbesitz der Rechte, die volle Zugehörigkeit, das Zu-Hause-Sein 
und so, aus dem vollen Mitsein und der vollen Mitverantwortung, die vollberechtigte 
Mitbestimmung in der Gestaltung der Geschicke. Freiist, wer zu Hause ist, d.h. wer 
wirklich zum Haus gehört. Freiheit hat mit Beheimatung zu tun. Freiheit ist mit 
Rechtsbesitz, mit einer Seinshöhe identisch; erst eine Folgerung daraus ist dann die 
                                                          
108 The articles dealing with freedom that gave rise to these reflections by Ratzinger first appeared in the 1980’s. 
This was also the time of some of his most active communication with liberation theologians. See “Freiheit und 
Bundung in der Kirche,” Verein der Freunde der Univeristät Regensburg 7 (1981): 5-21; and “Freiheit and 
Befreiung: Die anthropologische Vision der Instruktion ‘Libertatis conscientia’,” Internationale katholische 
Zeitschrift Communio 5 (1986): 409-24; repr. in Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics,175- 192, 239- 255 
respectively. Ratzinger’s reflections on this aspect of the pauline corpus are inspired mostly by the Letter to the 
Galatians. An important recent contribution to 20th century Germanic pauline studies on the topic of freedom is 
Wayne Coppins’ doctoral dissertation from the University of Cambridge, The Interpretation of Freedom in the 
Letters of Paul: With Special Reference to the German Tradition (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009).    
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Mitbestimmung der Geschicke, die aus der Zugehörigkeit kommt, und die andere 
Weise der Tätigkeit gegenüber dem Knecht, dem die “kn chtliche Arbeit” zugewiesen 
wird, während der Freie die Muße und die angemessenn Künste des Freien pflegt.109 
Ratzinger proceeds from here to explain that, in biblical usage, the word is given a 
new depth of meaning. In Paul’s allegory of Sarah and Hagar (Gal 4:21-31), the “free” person 
is the one born of Sarah, the freeborn wife of Abraham, and has the right of inheritance in the 
household. The slave is the one born of a slave-girl who does not live in the household but 
had been permitted temporary lodgings. Initially then, the difference between “free” and “not 
free” is not found in their activities (cf. Gal 4:1) but rather in their status – in the kind of 
membership included in inheritance rights, and rights of possession. Hence to be free is to be 
heir – to be oneself a possessor; freedom is identical with the status of son (cf. Gal 4:5). 
Ratzinger can thus say that “only from this differenc  in being does the different manner of 
acting follow at the appointed time.”110 In other words, freedom is status-related rather than 
activity-related and this status informs the approach one takes towards one’s activities. As a 
result, our actions do not gain us freedom per se, but the understanding of the nature of our 
freedom influences the way we live. Therefore, to Ratzinger’s mind, the pauline 
interpretation of the Greek concept of ἐλευθερία logically flows from the status of one’s 
membership of Christ – it is to “[f]ulfil the law of Christ” (Gal 6:2).  
                                                          
109 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 176 (“It means the possession of full rights, full membership, being 
at home, and thus, on the basis of this full associati n and full share in responsibility, full entitlement to have a 
say in the shaping of human destinies. The free man is o e who is at home, that is, one who really belongs to the 
household. [Freedom has to do with the provision of a (spiritual) home]. Freedom is identical with the 
possession of rights and with a certain ontological dignity: an initial consequence of this is the ability to have a 
say in determining fates, which results from the fact of belonging, along with a different manner of activity from 
that of the servant, to whom ‘servile work’ is assigned, whereas the free man devotes himself to leisure and the 
appropriate arts of the free man” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 186-87]). The sentence in italics 
has been added because the English translation cited her  overlooks this sentence which is found the orginal 
German text. For insight into the creation and evoluti n of the Greek polis, and the life of freedom within it, see 
Christian Meier, Kultur, um der Freiheit willen Griechische Anfänge – Anfang Europa? (München: Siedler, 
2009).   
110 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 187. Ratzinger relies here on Heinrich Schlier, Der Brief an die 
Galater (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962) for his interpretation of adopted sonship in Christ  as 
found in Gal 3:27: “[The putting on of Christ] is therefore not the expression of an ethical relationship but of a 
relationship of being with Christ. It marks the start of [jointly] sharing in Christ’s being . . .” (173).  
164 
 
Following this somewhat abstract reflection in the 1980’s, Ratzinger returned to the 
pauline treatment of freedom in volume one of Jesus of Nazareth, under the heading “The 
Torah of the Messiah.” 111 There he clarifies the idea that an authentic Christian freedom is 
intimately bound to a universalization of the Torah w ich, for Paul, amounts to the “Law of 
Christ” (Gal 6:2). Galatians 5 is Paul’s passionate defence of freedom from the Law and 
Ratzinger suggests that Paul is referring to the Messiah who was expected to bring a 
“renewed Torah,”112 when he says, “[f]or freedom, Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore, 
and do not submit again to the yoke of slavery” (Gal 5:1). But when Paul expands this to “do 
not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love be servants of one 
another” (Gal 5:13), Ratzinger believes he is explaining that freedom is “in the service of 
good, freedom that allows itself to be led by the Spirit of God. It is precisely by letting 
oneself be led by God’s Spirit, that one becomes fre om the Law.”113 Ratzinger finds in 
this the paradox of Paul’s message: “[t]he ‘law of Christ’ is freedom.” He continues: “[t]his 
freedom has content, then, it has direction, and it therefore contradicts what only apparently 
liberates man, but in truth makes him a slave.”114  
Only if Christ possesses divine authority does the universalization of the law 
accomplish its purpose. The “‘Torah of the Messiah’ s totally new and different – but it is 
precisely by being such that it fulfils the Torah of Moses.”115 Jesus brings “the gift of 
universality, which was the one great definitive promise to Israel and the world . . . [and is] 
extended now in Jesus’ new family to all nations over and above the bonds of descent 
according to the flesh.”116 In this new understanding of freedom wrought by universalization 
                                                          
111 See Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 99-127. 
112 Ibid., 99.  
113 Ibid., 100. See Gal 5:16 – 6:10. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid., 116-17. 
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of the people of God, obedience opens up in a completely new way – into filial communion 
with the will of God:    
Das Vehikel dieser Universalisierung ist die neue Familie, die als ihre einzige 
Voraussetzung die Gemeinschaft mit Jesus, die Gemeinschaft im Willen Gottes hat. 
Denn das Ich Jesu steht nun eben doch nicht als ein eige williges, in sich kreisendes 
Ego da. “Wer den Willen meines Vaters erfüllt, der ist für mich Bruder und Schwester 
und Mutter” (Mk 3:24f): Das Ich Jesu verkörpert dieWillensgemeinschaft des Sohnes 
mit dem Vater. Es ist ein hörendes und gehorchendes Ich. Die Gemeinschaft mit ihm 
ist Sohnesgemeinschaft mit dem Vater – ist auf neuer und höchster Ebene Ja zum 4. 
Gebot. Sie ist Eintreten in die Familie derer, die zu Gott Vater sagen und es sagen 
können in Wir derjenigen, die mit Jesus und – durch das Hören auf ihn – dem Willen 
des Vaters geeint sind und so im Kern jenes Gehorsams tehen, den die Tora meint.117 
In a sense, then, what is understood as “filial Sonship” in christology disseminates 
into ecclesiology as “filial communion.” To Ratzinger’s mind, being “called to freedom” (cf. 
Gal 5:13) is, so to speak, freedom for universality. It is not blind or arbitrary but, as Ratzinger 
explains, it is a “‘seeing’ freedom, anchored in communion of will with Jesus and so with 
God himself.”118 The universalization of Israel’s faith and hope, and the parallel liberation 
from the letter of the Law for a new communion, is tied to Jesus’ authority and his claim to 
                                                          
117 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 149-50 (“The vehicle of this universalization is the 
new family, whose only admission requirement is communion with Jesus, communion in God’s will. For Jesus’ 
‘I’ is by no means a self-willed ego revolving around itself alone. ‘Whoever does the will of my Father in 
heaven is my brother, and sister, and mother’ (Mark 3:34f.): Jesus’ ‘I’ incarnates the Son’s communion of will 
with the Father. It is an ‘I’ that hears and obeys. Communion with him is filial communion with the Father – it is 
a yes to the fourth commandment on a new level, the highest level. It is entry into the family of those who call 
God Father and who can do so because they belong to a ‘we’ – formed of those who are united with Jesus and, 
by listening to him, united with the will of the Father, thereby attaining to the heart of the obedience i tended by 
the Torah” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 117]).  
118 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 119. A very important tenet of Ratzinger’s 
christological hermeneutic is present in the background here. In stating that “[t]he proper interplay of Old and 
New Testaments was and is constitutive for the Church,” (121) he points out that a major issue for the nascent 
Church was the contention between Paul and the so-called Judaizers in Galatia. What is of fundamental 
importance for the Christian world here is “the connection between transcendence and fulfilment” (120). This is 
the coming to terms with universalization that is ba ed on what Ratzinger calls a “‘seeing’ freedom” (119). On 
the one hand, Paul was aware that “a literal application of Israel’s social order to the people of all n tions would 
have been tantamount to a denial of the universality of he growing community of God,” while, at the same 
time, he could see that “concrete juridical and social forms of political arrangements are no longer tr a ed as a 
sacred law that is fixed ad litteram for all times and so for all peoples” (118). As a consequence, the Torah of 
the Messiah had another focal point which was a key tenet of living the Christian life. Rather than fastening to 
literal juridical and social forms, “[t]he decisive thing is the underlying communion of will with God given by 
Jesus. It frees men and nations to discover what aspects of political and social order accord with this communion 
of will and so to work out their own juridical arrangements. . . .The concrete political and social order is 
released from the directly sacred realm, from theocratic legislation, and is transferred to the freedom of man, 
whom Jesus has established in God’s will and taught thereby to see the right and the good” (ibid.). “Seeing” 
freedom, from this perspective, is a risky affair on God’s part, but nevertheless an essential part of the faculty of 
freedom, namely the willing of (uncoerced) filial communion. It is the “anchoring” in filial communion of will 
with Jesus that permits the form of “sight” by whic one can live and “see,” so to speak, with the mind of God.      
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Sonship. On the other hand, Jesus’ universalization int  a new family would be wholly false 
if he spoke only as “a liberal reform[er] rabbi” and ot with the full authority of the Son. If 
Jesus did not possess a divine authority, he would be “enticing us to disobedience against 
God’s commandments.”119 As Son, however, his interpretation of Torah is the beginning of a 
new communion in “a new, free obedience.”120 Ratzinger continues:  
Der Sprung in die Universalität, die dafür notwendige neue Freiheit, kann nur durch 
einen größeren Gehorsam ermöglicht werden. Er kann als geschichtsbildende Kraft 
nur wirksam werden, wenn die Autorität dieser neuen Auslegung nicht geringer ist als 
die des ursprünglichen Textes selbst: Es muss eine göttliche Autorität sein. Die neue, 
universal Familie ist das Wozu der Sendung Jesu, aber seine göttliche Autorität – das 
Sohnsein Jesu in der Gemeinschaft mit dem Vater – ist die Voraussetzung, damit 
dieser Ausbruch ins Neue und Weite ohne Verrat und ohne Eigenmacht möglich 
wird.121   
All of this gives a timely context to Ratzinger’s earlier reflections on Paul. Reflecting 
on the meaning of the pauline approach, Ratzinger made four important statements regarding 
the freedom wrought by the universalization of the Torah. Firstly, the baptised ascend to full 
membership in respect of the people of God. From the s atus of being aliens they now belong 
to “the Israel of God” (Gal 6:16), with “unrestricted civil rights,”122 so to speak. Secondly, 
citizenship of Israel coincides with the moment when the tuition necessary in childhood 
ceases to have force (Gal 4:4) and is surpassed. What begins to apply to all is the law of the 
Son, the law of Christ: “[t]his is a consequence of their ontological status, that is, of the fact 
that through the Spirit of Christ they participate in the ontological status of Jesus Christ 
himself.”123 As such, these citizens are the πνευµατικοί, the spiritual (Gal 6:1). Thirdly, and 
                                                          
119 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 119-20. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von der Taufe im Jordan, 152-53 (“The leap into universality, the new 
freedom that such a leap requires, is possible only  the basis of a greater obedience. Its power to shape history 
can come into play only if the authority of the new interpretation is no less than the authority of the original: It 
must be a divine authority. The new universal family is the purpose of Jesus’ mission, but his divine authority – 
his Sonship in communion with the Father – is the prior condition that makes possible irruption of a new and 
broader reality without betrayal or high-handedness” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the 
Jordan, 120]). 




consequently, following the law of Christ in a spiritual way isn’t numinous but very concrete 
– even sacrificial. It means following in one’s very own person, the person of Christ: 
Das Gesetz Christi leben heißt also: gemäß dem Seinsstatus des Pneumatikers, in der 
Weise des Pneuma leben. Das schließt die Kreuzigung des Fleisches “mit seinen 
Leidenschaften und Begierden” ein (Gal 5:24); was es alles ausschließt, deutet Paulus 
in einem Lasterkatalog mit 15 Titeln an, von dem er sagt, daß er sich fortsetzen ließe 
(Gal 5:19-21).124 
In this way, Ratzinger indicates important aspects of the content of the pauline understanding 
of Christian freedom, namely, it is through baptism that God’s people commences free and  
fully-fledged citizenship of the holy city, the new Jerusalem (cf. Rev. 3:12; 21:2); moreover 
the status of citizenship, and the rights of freedom which it entails, do not exist without effort. 
Hence, the fourth thing Ratzinger wants to stress in relation to the pauline meaning of 
Christian freedom is that it does not facilitate self-absorption but insists upon self-sacrifice 
for others: “freedom is not without its demands; neither is it arbitrary. It constrains to such an 
extent that it can be called a ‘crucifixion’.”125 
3.2.3.2. Defining Freedom: Ontological Citizenship in Christ  
 
With his sights set on the criticisms he makes of freedom as a philosophical theme in 
the modern era, as discussed in Chapter 2 above, Ratzinger puts forward a corrective to the 
escalating one-sidedness of the human goal “to be like God.” In light of his study of Paul, he 
proposes a biblical vision of the “cry for freedom” that perennially arises in the human 
person, but which is not grounded in what he perceives as modern reductionisms. To his 
                                                          
124 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 177 (“To live the law of Christ means, therefore, to live according 
to the ontological status of the spiritual man, in the way of the Spirit. This includes crucifying the fl sh ‘with its 
passions and desires’ (Gal 5:24). Paul suggests the sorts of things it excludes in a list of fifteen vices, noting that 
it could be extended (Gal 5:19-21)” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 188]). St. Paul’s list of vices, 
as Ratzinger indicates, is by no means exhaustive but it signals the undeniably destructive nature visited upon 
those who do not live by the Spirit: “Now the works of the flesh are obvious: fornication, impurity, 
licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, anger, quarrels, dissensions, factions, e vy, 
drunkenness, carousing, and things like these. I am w rning you, as I warned you before, those who do such 
things will not inherit the kingdom of God” (Gal 5:19-21).     
125 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 188.  
168 
 
mind, these isolate particular aspects of freedom and diminish the possibility of an authentic 
theological understanding: 
Das “Sein-wie-Gott” ist zweifellos Ziel gerade auch der radikal emanzipativen 
Pädagogiken, die eine unumschränkte, gotthafte Freiheit und Allverfügung im Visier 
haben. Das Ziel ist richtig, nur das Gottesbild falsch: Sein wie Gott heißt sein wie der 
trinitarische Gott. Es heißt darum sein wie der gekreuzigte Christus.126 
From the status-related perspective, he maintains it is possible to attemp a biblical definition 
of freedom. Tentatively proceeding to do so, he supplies three elements to his definition, all 
of which converge on an idea that can be described as ontological citizenship in Christ. It 
consists of participation in “being” itself, identification with the dignity of one’s own being, 
and education towards the fullness of Personhood.    
Firstly, freedom is something other than indeterminacy. For Ratzinger, freedom is 
participation in “being”: 
[Freiheit] ist Partizipation, und zwar nicht bloß Partizipation an einem bestimmten 
Sozialgebilde, sondern Partizipation am Sein selbst. Sie bedeutet: Selbsteigentümer 
des Seins und nicht Unterworfener des Seins sein. Nur von da aus kann ja auch Gott 
als die Freiheit in Person definiert werden: weil er Totalität des Seinsbesitzes ist.127  
Secondly, Ratzinger says, this leads one to say that freedom is identical with 
Seinshöhe [ontological dignity].128 This comes about provided that ontological dignity is truly 
Höhe [elevated]. Ratzinger does not clarify his words sufficiently here, aside from making a 
relatively unsubstantiated connection between freedom and love. He appears to be saying that 
a truly elevated view of freedom is to be understood as an identification with the dignity of 
                                                          
126 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 178 (“‘To be like God’ is no doubt the goal of radically liberating 
pedagogical theories, too, which set their sights on an unfettered, godlike freedom with everything at its 
disposal. The goal is correct; it is just that the image of God is wrong: to be like God means being like the 
trinitarian God. Therefore, it means to be like Christ crucified” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 
188]). 
127 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 178 (“[Freedom] is participation, and not just participation in a 
given social structure, but participation in being tself. It means to possess being oneself and not to be subject to 
being. Only from this point of view can God also be defined as freedom in person, because he is the possession 
of being in its totality” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 188]). 
128 See Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 178. It is impossible to translate the nuanced meaning of this 
somewhat obscure expression into English. One could ren er it as “exaltation of being,” “dignity of being” or as 
“ontological dignity.” In any case, in the context in which Ratzinger uses it, it carries the sense of “high being” – 
namely that freedom is a reality consistent with the highest or truest echelons of one’s being.      
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one’s own being – this identification and dignity ultimately being a gift of love that is 
“gifted” (to us) in love. Authentic freedom furnishes us with a dignity that would otherwise 
be denied us.129  
Thirdly, making progress in the way of freedom involves being led in the ways of this 
ontological dignity, into the fullness of personhood. This is the true sense of “being like 
God.” Through education in the fullness of freedom, the person is being led into θέωσις. 
Since freedom identified with Seinshöhe only makes sense if it is truly “dignified,” Ratzinger 
believes the Christian content of freedom is about empowering humanity to grow and reach 
the fullest expression of the true characteristics of personhood: 
Darum ist Pädagogik der Freiheit Führung in diese Seinshöhe hinein, Erziehung zum 
Sein, Erzeihung zur Liebe und damit Führung in die θείωσις hinein, Führung in die 
Vergöttlichung.130  
In summary, Ratzinger takes Paul’s status-related notion of ἐλευθερία and defines the 
biblical concept of freedom as participation in the life of God that comes about through being 
educated for creaturely divinisation or ontological citizenship in Christ.131 This pedagogy of 
freedom communicates the authentic contents of identification with Seinshöhe – a legitimate 
equilibrium, so to speak, in the relationship between God and humanity such as is capable of 
authentically fulfilling the human person’s yearning to be “like God.” In Ratzinger’s view, 
                                                          
129 Despite the lack of clarity, the idea being outlined here does seem to be in keeping with a frequently 
recurring point of view found in Ratzinger’s anthropological writings – namely, the need for the human person 
to acknowledge the truth of one’s human nature and one’s creatureliness. See this dissertation §§ 4.1.3.1. and 
4.3. 
130 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 178 (“That is why the pedagogy of freedom is guidance in this 
ontological dignity, education for being, education f r love, and thus guidance in θείωσις, guidance in 
divinization” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 188]). We can note here two varations in spelling for 
the Greek word for divinization – θέωσις and θείωσις. Although Ratzinger uses the latter, it is a case of an 
itacism – both are correct but are expressions of different orthographies in the ancient and patristic world. For a 
contemporary in-depth study of the history of deificat on from its birth as a second century metaphor with 
biblical roots to its maturity as a doctrine central o the spiritual life of the Byzantine Church, see Norman 
Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); 
see also Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, eds., Theōsis: Deification in Christian Theology, (Oregon: 
Pickwick Publications, 2006); Daniel A. Keating, Deification and Grace (Ave Maria: Sapientia Press, 2007).     
131 Even though Ratzinger does not make the connection with the great christological hymns of the pauline 
corpus, it would be easy to identify the ἐν Χριστῷ and ἐν αὐτῷ, found repeatedly in Eph 1:3-10 and Col 1:12-
20, with the theme of ontological citizenship. 
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when humanity’s interpretation of God is viewed realistically from a biblical, and therefore 
trinitarian perspective, then the nature of humanity can also be understood authentically, 
especially the possibilities and perils of its insatiable yearning for liberation. Within the 
structure of the pauline understanding of freedom – an understanding which Ratzinger is keen 
to incorporate into his theology – “the pedagogy of love as a pedagogy of θείωσις is 
necessarily a pedagogy of the Cross.”132 Authentic human freedom, in Ratzinger’s theology, 
is based on one’s qualitative relationship in respect of God rather than on any quantitative 
retention of self-determination and the absence of constraint.133  
3.3.  Conclusion  
 Ratzinger’s christology is grounded on the premise that the figure of “Christ today” is 
in danger of being limited to the point where it could be prevented from achieving a broad, 
all-embracing recognition in the lives of believers. With this in mind, his narrative 
christology is largely an attempt to combine both mystery and reality in contemporary 
theology. From the point of view of considering thechristological foundations of freedom, 
Ratzinger recalls the great liberating narrative of the Exodus in Israel’s history in order to 
ensure that all the “dimensions” of the figure of Christ receive their proper context. If Israel’s 
                                                          
132 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 188. Love, as a dimension of Ratzinger’s ecclesioogy, as well 
as a pedagogy in the way of love, is something that will be addressed in detail in Chapter 5. 
133 For example one could be a liberated person while an inmate in a State prison – even more liberated than
one’s oppressors. As an instance of what he means about education in the way of the Cross, Ratzinger, in 
Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 188, n. 11, mentions the moving testimony of the experience of freedom from 
Sheila Cassidy in “Beten in Bedrängnis,” Geist und Leben 53 (1980): 81-91. She reports of her experience as a 
Christian in a Chilean jail alongside female companions, many of whom were unbelievers and Marxists: “We 
discussed the concept of freedom thoroughly and came to the conclusion that the intellectual and spiritual 
freedom that we had was something very real, even though we were surrounded by walls a meter thick, barbed 
wire, and men with machine guns. We were really quite free. The ones enslaved were the men who held us 
prisoners” (89). The experience is summed up for Ms. Cassidy in Lovelace’s poem “To Althea from Prison”:  
  If I have freedom in my love 
  And in my soul am free, 
  Angels alone, that soar above, 
  Enjoy such liberty. 
Ratzinger says a similar experience is found  chapter 17 of  Solzhenitsyn’s The First Circle (London: Merlin, 
1970): “You can tell old You-know-who – up there – that you only have power over people so long as you don’t 
take everything away from them. But when you’ve robbed a man of everything he’s no longer in your power – 
he’s free again’ (107). One could also add here Vietnamese Cardinal, François Xavier Nguyen Van Thuan and 
Benedict XVI’s reference to his thirteen-year imprisonment. See SS, 32.   
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goal is the freedom to worship on Sinai, its source is none other than the freedom of worship 
which takes place within the inner life of God itself. Then, in the fullness of time, Christ’s 
“yes” was revealed in the prayer of Jesus through the totality of his surrender, and the 
synergy of his human and divine wills. In this way, the Son is the gift who destroys isolation 
and reveals relationality as the norm of relationship for all time, and for eternity. Ultimately, 
Christ turns out to be the gift of li e itself, the pattern or t uth by which life is measured, and 
the way which must be freely assented to in order to obtain the fruits of Seinshöhe.  
 Ratzinger’s biblical definition of freedom, chiefly sponsored by St Paul, insists on 
participation in the life of “being” itself, identification with the truth of one’s own being, and 
education in the way of personhood. In his view, this “enquiry into freedom, and freedom as 
a problem of being, includes also an enquiry about God, the problem of God.”134 This 
explains his emphasis on the filial relationship within the Trinity, and the human-divine 
relationship within the figure of Christ. To Ratzinger’s mind, Christ warrants being portrayed 
in all his dimensions so that contentment with a “fashionable Jesus” does not become too 
narrow an objective for theological research. This search for the figure of Christ, if it is not to 
be a futile exercise in biblical conceptualism on Ratzinger’s part, must find its way towards a 
fruitful anthropology grounded upon his christological presuppositions. One of the ways in 
which Ratzinger achieves this is to undertake an anthropology of liberation which asks, how 
is the end of “becoming like God,” i.e. being divinized, to be achieved? To this we now turn.
                                                          
134 Ratzinger, Journey towards Easter, 98. 
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CHAPTER 4: The Shape of Human Freedom: Anthropological Contours 
 
4.0.    Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the anthropological aspects of Ratzinger’s 
writings from a human freedom perspective. The chapter is divided into three subdivisions: 
the first looks at the human search for meaning, with particular reference to the life of faith. It 
will do so, on the one hand, through an epistemological analysis of being in the world and, on 
the other hand, through a narrative analysis of Ratzinger’s writings concerning the scriptural 
categories of monotheism and creatureliness. This brings up the notion of the concept of truth 
as an inevitable dimension of the search for meaning. What emerges here is the need for the 
human person to take up a “yes” or “no” posture of dialogical orientation with regard to God. 
The second subdivision deals with Ratzinger’s comparison of the modern synthesis of 
intellectual thought with what he advances as the Cristian synthesis and philosophy of 
freedom. The third and final subdivision explores Ratzinger’s presentation of the nature of sin 
as suppressed truth, and the exaltation of mere apparance. It enables him to bring forth a 
threefold theological framework which defines the ground of authentic human freedom. 
Ultimately, in a situation where the “anarchistic trait in the demand for freedom is growing 
stronger,”1 it will be Ratzinger’s contention that the exposition of Christian anthropology can 
embody an authentic philosophy of freedom proper to the human person.        
4.1. Being Human and Free in the World 
At this point we are returning to Ratzinger’s comment that “the political, the 
philosophical and the religious problems of freedom have become an indissoluble whole” and 
“anyone looking for ways forward into the future must keep the whole of this in view and 
cannot make do with superficial pragmatic action.”2 Ratzinger opens up two foundational 
avenues of enquiry in regard to being human and free in a complex world: through an 
                                                          
1 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 243. 
2 Ibid., 243-44. See this dissertation § 2.1. 
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epistemological analysis of faith in the context of he human quest for meaning, and through 
an understanding of human personhood as being grounded i  divine personhood. 
The standard Christian interpretation of human origins rests on the insight that 
humanity finds itself torn between the original impulse of creation and its own historical and 
political ambition and momentum. No longer what was produced at the hands of the Creator, 
humanity “is burdened with another element that produces, beside the innate tendency toward 
God, the opposite impulse away from God.” 3 The temptation to distrust is present in 
humanity because of an impulse toward destruction – a wish to say “no.”4 Ratzinger has 
called this the “tragic face of human history.”5 While in God, pure freedom is expressed as an 
eternal “yes,” human freedom is endowed with the capa ity to say “yes” or “no” to the 
ground of meaning that sustains us. Otherwise, freedom could not be an authentic part of 
human existence.6 Ratzinger does not call this anthropological view nto question, but rather 
addresses himself to interpreting its significance for understanding the human faculty of 
freedom.   
4.1.1. The Human Act of Faith: Quest for Meaning and the Freedom of Making 
 
This subdivision looks at Ratzinger’s existential analysis of the human action of 
belief. Ratzinger’s objective is to analyse the fabric of the structure of belief in a world 
predicated on ever-greater autonomy. To his mind, fi ing the “meaning” that gives 
sufficient reason to uphold one’s existence is more than a matter of finding a reason to simply 
persist with life. Rather, “belief,” understood as the discovery of meaning, is a vehicle for the 
freedom to participate meaningfully with the truth of creation as a whole. For him, the act of 
believing “does not belong to the relationship ‘know-make’ . . . typical of the intellectual 
                                                          
3 Ratzinger, God and the World, 51. 
4 See ibid., 52. Ratzinger highlights Rom 7:14-20 rega ding the inner contradiction in human consciousnes .  
5 Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, 35. 
6 For an introductory overview of these issues from the anthropological perspective, see Ratzinger, The Yes of 
Jesus Christ, 88-108.  
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context of ‘makability’ thinking, but is much better xpressed in the quite different 
relationship [of] ‘stand-understand’.”7 This is central to Ratzinger’s deliberations on the topic 
of freedom because with the aid of this distinction, he maps out the meaning of the human act 
of faith. 
 Ratzinger’s existential analysis of faith commences with Isa 7:9. He translates it as 
follows: “If you do not believe [if you do not hold (ינּו  firm to Yahweh], then you will (ַתֲאִמ֔
have no foothold [8”.[ֵתָאֵמֽנּו׃ Ratzinger exploits the fact that there is a wordplay here on the 
one Hebraic root word אמן (‘mn or āmēn). This word – which, Ratzinger says, incorporates 
the meanings of truth, firmness, firm ground, as well as loyalty, entrusting oneself, taking 
one’s stand on something – points to the fact that “faith in God appears as a holding on to 
God through which man gains a firm foothold for hislife.”9 Faith, as defined here, is 
trustfully standing firm and understanding the meaning that upholds. Ratzinger concludes, 
faith is “entrusting oneself to that which has not been made by oneself and never could be 
made and which precisely in this way supports and makes possible all our making.”10 
 With this line of reasoning, Ratzinger wants to pinpoint two human attitudes to 
reality: practical knowledge and faith. The former is part of a “know-make” mentality, while 
the latter consists in a “stand-understand” orientation. For him, it is the case that both modes 
of thought are necessary and legitimate, but neither on  ought to be unwittingly absorbed into 
the other: the former is in the realm of “makability” and the latter is the realm of “meaning.” 
By the former, Ratzinger is referring to an attitude that seeks the verifiability of facts, “the 
limitation to ‘phenomena’” that “directs [man’s] attention to the future of what he himself can 
                                                          
7 See Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 68-74, here at 68. 
8 Ibid., 69. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 70.  
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create.”11 The latter – a assumed part of the ancient and medieval world – is the entrusting of 
self to the ground that upholds, to the creative original spirit, the Creator Spiritus in which 
thinking and making are one and the same thing. It is the attitude that understands “being” 
itself as apprehensible because God, pure intellect, created it and he created it by thinking it. 
Therefore, “all being is meaningful, logos, truth. . . . [and] it follows from this traditional 
view that human thinking is the rethinking of being tself, rethinking of the thought that is 
being itself.”12  
Parsing one or other of these attitudes in isolation is a temptation of every age. In 
2012, Benedict XVI said that “[w]hen the freedom to be creative becomes the freedom to 
create oneself, then necessarily the Maker himself is denied and ultimately man too is 
stripped of his dignity as a creature of God, as the image at the core of his being.”13 With the 
ascendancy of the “makability” attitude, linked as it i  to the modern understanding of 
freedom, Ratzinger believes a radical anthropocentrism has occurred. When the link with the 
metaphysical fullness of being was broken, humanity sought refuge in that which it could 
control within its own powers: 
[. . .] die Stelle der alten Gleichsetzung von Wahrheit und Sein die neue von Wahrheit 
und Tätsachlichkeit tritt, erkennbar ist nur das “Faktum,” das, was wir selbst gemacht 
haben. Nicht dem Sein nachzudenken ist die Aufgabe und Möglichkeit des 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 58, 65, respectively. See ibid., 57-69. Ratzinger deepens the “stand-understand” notion by explaining 
that the Christian attitude to belief, as expressed in āmēn, means it is on the logos that I take my “stand” – this 
truth is the only ground suitable for humanity to “stand”: āmēn “expresses the abandonment of oneself to what 
we can neither make nor need to make, to the ground f the world as meaning, which first discloses to me the 
freedom to make” (75). This subdivision is looking at what Ratzinger means by this. Ratzinger develops the 
point by saying: “the Christian act of faith intrins cally includes the conviction that the meaningful ground, the 
logos, on which we take our stand, precisely because it is meaning, is also truth” (76). With regard to the Greek 
word logos, Ratzinger says it displays in its range of meanings a certain correspondence with the Hebrew אמן. 
The ideas of word, meaning, rationality, truth are ll included in its semantic range. Continuing the word-play 
then, he says that “meaning or sense that is not truth would be nonsense” (ibid.). An interesting Jewish 
perspective on the search for meaning is opened up in Jonathan Sacks, The Great Partnership: God, Science and 
the Search for Meaning (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2011).   
12 Ibid., 59. Ratzinger further elaborates on this understanding that creation, as a whole, is meaningful: “Man 
can rethink the logos, the meaning of being, because his own logos, his own reason, is logos of the one logos, 
thought of the original thought, of the creative spirit that permeates and governs his being” (ibid.).  
13 Benedict XVI, Address to the Members of the Roman Curia and Papal Representatives for the Traditional 
Exchange of Christmas Greetings, 21 December 2012. See 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2012/december/documents/hf 
     _ben-xvi_spe_20121221_auguri-curia_en.html (accessed 3 February 2013).  
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menschlichen Geistes, sondern dem Faktum, dem Gemachten, der Eigenwelt des 
Menschen, denn nur sie vermögen wir wahrhaft zu verstehen. . . . Inmitten des Ozeans 
des Zweifels, der nach dem Zusammenbruch der alten Metaphysik am Beginn der 
Neuzeit die Menschheit bedroht, wird hier im Faktum das feste Land wieder entdeckt, 
auf dem der Mensch versuchen kann, sich eine neue Existenz zu erbauen. Die 
Herrschaft des Faktums beginnt, das heißt die radikale Zuwendung des Menschen zu 
seinem eigenen Werk als dem allein ihm Gewissen.14 
With the advance of an evolutionary, historical understanding of the world, Ratzinger 
points to the situation whereby “the world finally appeared no longer as the form of housing 
of being but as a process whose continual expansion is the movement of being itself.”15 The 
result is that today, humanity seems no longer in a position to look beyond itself except on 
the level of “facticity,” including even a view that he himself is a fact, albeit, a largely 
“random” one. Thus Ratzinger’s analysis concludes that humanity is in a curious situation 
today:  
In dem Augenblick, in dem eine radikale Anthropozentrik einsetzt, der Mensch nur 
noch sein eigenes Werk erkennen kann, muss er doch zugleich lernen, sich selbst als 
ein bloß zufällig Gewordenes, auch nur als “Faktum,” hinzunehmen. Auch hier wird 
ihm gleichsam der Himmel eingerissen, aus dem er zu kommen schien, und nur die 
Erde der Fakten bleibt in seinen Händen zurück – die Erde, in der er jetzt mit den 
Spaten die mühsame Geschichte seines Werdens zu entziffer  sucht.16 
For Ratzinger, this line of reasoning is the tangible consequence of the transformed 
contemporary consciousness towards human freedom. Nevertheless, in seeking to assuage the 
dialectic between “meaning” and “makability” in the pastoral setting, he puts forward the 
premise that the human being has to make a decision with regard to meaning because on the 
                                                          
14 Joseph Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum: Vorlesung über das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntis 
(München: Kösel, 2007), 54-55 (“[. . .] the old equation of truth and being is replaced by the new one of truth 
and factuality; all that can be known is the factum, that which we have made ourselves. It is not the task of the 
human mind – nor is it within its capacity – to think about being; rather it is to think about the factum, which has 
been made, man’s own particular world, for this is all we can truly understand. . . . In the midst of he sea of 
doubt that threatened to engulf man at the beginning of the modern period after the collapse of the old 
metaphysics, the factum was here discovered as the dry land on which man could try to build a new existence 
for himself. The dominance of the fact began, that is, man’s complete devotion to his own work as the only 
certainty” [Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 61-62]). 
15 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 62. 
16 Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum, 56 (“At the very moment when radical anthropocentrism set in and 
man could know only his work, he had to learn to accept himself as merely a chance occurrence, just another 
‘fact.’ Here, too, the heaven from which he seemed to come was torn down, so to speak, and he was left with 
just the earth and its facts in his hands – the earth in which he now sought with the spade to decipher t  
laborious history of his development” [Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 63]). 
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level of “makability” one is incessantly threatened by meaninglessness. In the end no person 
can completely avoid the realm of belief. Belief is a human way of taking a stand in the 
totality of reality in a way that cannot be reduced to practical knowledge. The human being, 
he says, cannot live for long without love, without meaning, even if worldly affluence is 
abundantly present. Ratzinger’s anthropological insight is based on the dictum that “meaning 
is not derived from knowledge”:   
Aus dem Stumpf der Ungewissheit, des Nicht-leben-Könens zieht sich niemand 
selbst empor, ziehen wir uns auch nicht, wie Descartes noch meinen konnte, durch ein 
“Cogito ergo sum,” durch eine Kette von Vernunftschlüssen, heraus. Sinn, der selbst 
gemacht ist, ist im Letzten kein Sinn. Sinn, das heißt der Boden, worauf unsere 
Existenz als ganze stehen und leben kann, kann nicht gemacht, sondern nur 
empfangen werden.17 
                                                          
17 Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum, 66 (“No one can pull himself out of the bog of uncertainty, of not 
being able to live, by his own exertions; nor can we pull ourselves up, as Descartes still thought we could, by a 
cogito ergo sum, by a series of intellectual deductions. Meaning that is self-made is in the last analysis no 
meaning. Meaning, that is, the ground on which our existence as a totality can stand and live, cannot be made 
but only received ” [Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 73]). Ratzinger points out that the believer and 
unbeliever paradoxically share a common ground which adds to the dilemma of human finitude.  He says there 
is one question that invariably persists in human co s iousness. John the Baptist anxiously asked it in his 
darkest hour: “Are you really he?” (cf. Matt 11:2) This is the question of the believer repeatedly confronted with 
unbelief. It is a question required by intellectual honesty and reason’s responsibility. Humanity’s situat on 
before the question of God marks a real dilemma for humanity, since the power of unbelief, Ratzinger says, can 
be linked to the insecurity of human existence. When a believer is threatened by doubt, it is not thisor that 
dogma that provides the stumbling block per se but the fragility of the whole structure. Ratzinger elaborates on 
the implications of this dilemma by identifying common cause between believer and non-believer: “If, on the 
one hand, the believer can perfect his faith only o the ocean of nihilism, temptation and doubt, if he has been 
assigned the ocean of uncertainty as the only possible ite for his faith, on the other, the unbeliever is not to be 
understood undialectically as a mere man without faith. Just as we have recognised that a believer does n t live 
immune to doubt but is always threatened with the plunge into the void, so now we can discern the entangled 
nature of human destinies and say that the nonbeliever does not lead a sealed-off, self-sufficient life, either” 
(Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 44-45). See also ibid., 21, 28; What it means to be a Christian, 21-31; 
The Meaning of Christian Brotherhood (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 3 ; God and the World, 27-41. 
For Ratzinger, no matter how much an unbeliever mayregard the “mystical” to have been discarded in favour of 
what is immediately certain, he or she “will never b  free of the secret uncertainty about whether positivism 
really has the last word” (Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 45). The non-believer can never be absolutely 
certain of the autonomy of what he or she has seen and interpreted as a whole. Just as a believer knows him or 
herself to be constantly threatened and tempted by un elief, so a non-believer is equally troubled by doubts 
about unbelief. Faith remains a temptation and a threa  to a positivistic worldview with its permanently self-
contained world. There is, Ratzinger says, no escaping the dilemma of being a human being: evading the 
“uncertainty of belief” leads to an experience of the “uncertainty of unbelief” which can never, with certainty, 
fully eliminate the possibility that belief may, after all, be the truth and the meaning that uphold us. Ratzinger 
says that “it is not until belief is rejected that its unrejectability becomes evident” (45). He speaks of Martin 
Buber’s (1878-1965) unavoidable “perhaps” which haunted a child of the Enlightenment so much that in the 
very act of rejection the experience of the unrejectability of the God-question was felt. See ibid., 46 where 
Ratzinger recounts the Austrian born Jewish philosopher’s account of the interaction between a Rabbi and a 
scholar of the Enlightenment. The scholar becomes haunted by the Rabbi’s words: “My son, the great scholars 
of the Torah with whom you have argued wasted their words on you; as you departed you laughed at them. They 
were unable to lay God and his Kingdom on the table before you, and neither can I. But think, my son, perhaps 
it is true” (Martin Buber, Werke 3: Schriften zum Chassidismus [Munich, Kosel-Verlag, 1963], 348). Ratzinger 
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Ratzinger then seeks to find the place of convergence between his epistemological 
analysis of the basic attitude of belief and the Christian mode of belief. He says “to believe as 
a Christian means in fact entrusting oneself to the meaning that upholds me and the world; 
taking it as the firm ground on which I can stand fearlessly.”18 However, Ratzinger is careful 
to avoid exceeding the limits of the human intellect. He sets about confirming the human 
capacity to receive meaning by pointing out that both practical knowledge and belief are 
limited. On the one hand, belief is not knowledge in the sense of calculability, but equally, 
practical knowledge is limited since its very methodology renounces the search for 
“meaningful” truth. The human approach to truth emerges here – our capacity to understand 
(truth) rests upon the ground of meaning upon which we stand: 
Die Form, wie der Mensch mit der Wahrheit des Seins zu tun erhält, ist nicht Wissen, 
sondern Verstehen: Verstehen des Sinnes, dem er sich anvertraut hat. Und freilich 
werden wir hinzufügen müssen, dass nur im Stehen sich das Verstehen eröffnet, nicht 
außerhalb davon. Eines geschieht nicht ohne das andere, denn Verstehen bedeutet, 
den Sinn, den man als Grund empfangen hat, als Sinn zu ergreifen und begreifen. Ich 
denke, dies sei die genaue Bedeutung dessen, was wir mit Verstehen meinen: dass wir 
den Grund, worauf wir uns gestellt haben, als Sinn u d als Wahrheit ergreifen lernen; 
dass wir erkennen lernen, dass der Grund Sinn darstellt.19 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
develops Buber’s idea further in I troduction to Christianity, 56-7, 70. Thus, Ratzinger says, what emerges is 
that “both the believer and non-believer share, each in their own way, doubt and belief, if they do not hide from 
themselves and from the truth of their being” (46-47). Neither person can quite get away untroubled, since for a 
believer, faith is present against doubt and, for a non-believer, faith is present through doubt and in the form of 
doubt. Doubt saves both sides from remaining imprisoned in their own world and languishing in absolute self-
sufficiency. Doubt opens an avenue of communication allowing the believer to share in the fate of the 
unbeliever, while the form which belief takes provides a constant challenge to the unbeliever. Ratzinger 
maintains that the basic pattern of human existence lies in finding the finality of one’s existence in this 
unceasing and unavoidable rivalry between doubt and belief, temptation and certainty.  
18 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 74. 
19 Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum, 70 (“The tool with which man is equipped to deal with the truth of 
being is not knowledge but understanding: understanding of the meaning to which he has entrusted himself. And 
we must certainly add that ‘understanding’ only reveals itself in ‘standing,’ not apart from it. One cannot occur 
without the other, for understanding means seizing a d grasping as meaning the meaning that man had received 
as ground. I think this is the precise significance of what wem an by understanding: that we learn to grasp the 
ground on which we have taken our stand as meaning and truth; that we learn to perceive that ground represents 
meaning” [Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 77]). In the argument that meaning elicits understanding, it is 
a short step for Ratzinger to imply that understanding is an intrinsic property of faith. Knowledge of the 
functional aspects of the world cannot bring about a satisfactory understanding of the world, or of being. 
Ratzinger says understanding grows out of belief. Hnce he says, in the theological discussion of God: 
“believing and understanding belong together no less than believing and ‘standing,’ simply because standing 
and understanding are inseparable” (Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 78). Our “understanding” only 
makes sense when it is conceived of as more than the mere ability to apprehend; it is the apprehension of the 
fact that we are comprehended. Only then, precisely b cause it comprehends us, does understanding furnish us 
with meaning.   
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Ratzinger is careful, however, to avoid the impression that the mode of Christian 
belief is a mere “possession” of meaning, because that would paradoxically bear the 
hallmarks of practical knowledge as understood in the present context. The point he asserts is 
that the trust required of a recipient of “meaning” is not a blind surrender to the irrational: 
“On the contrary, it is a movement toward the logos, the ratio, towards meaning and so 
towards truth itself, for in the final analysis the ground on which man takes his stand cannot 
possibly be anything else but the truth revealing itself.”20  
Ratzinger says that Christians understand their exist nce as a response to the reason, 
the logos, that upholds and maintains all things. He advocates th  attitude that “receiving 
precedes making”21 and the primacy of the invisible as the truly real. This doesn’t reduce the 
value of “making,” but, on the contrary, defines the “die Freiheit des Machens” or “the 
freedom of making” as a gift to be respected.22 Thus, the proper context of the “freedom of 
making” is that of a creative and participative faculty bestowed upon us by God to contribute 
to the world in which we live: 
Christlicher Glaube . . . bedeutet die Option dafür, dass das Nichtzusehende 
wirklicher ist als das zu Sehende. Er ist das Bekenntnis zum Primat des Unsichtbaren 
als des eigentlich Wirklichen, das uns trägt und daher ermächtigt, mit gelöster 
Gelassenheit uns dem Sichtbaren zu stellen – in der Verantwortung vor dem 
Unsichtbaren als dem wahren Grund aller Dinge. Insofern ist freilich – man kann es 
nicht leugnen – christlicher Glaube in doppelter Hinsicht ein Affront gegen die 
Einstellung, zu der uns die heutige Weltsituation zu drängen scheint.23 
 
4.1.2. Human Freedom and Relativity in the Manner of Christ 
 
The second line of enquiry which Ratzinger pursues regarding being human and free 
in the world is an understanding of human personhood derived from divine personhood. 
                                                          
20 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 75. 
21 Ibid., 73. 
22 Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum, 67. 
23 Ibid., 66-67 (“Christian belief . . . means opting for the view that what cannot be seen is more real than what 
can be seen. It is an avowal of the primacy of the invisible as the truly real, which upholds us and hence enables 
us to face the visible with calm composure – knowing that we are responsible before the invisible as the true 
ground of all things. To that extent it is undeniable that Christian belief is a double affront to theattitude that the 
present world situation seems to force us to adopt” [Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 74]).  
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Modern intellectual history has demonstrated the vast ground of possibility that comes with 
being a person endowed with freedom. In the Christian world-view, the human person finds 
themselves in the midst of Christ’s “yes” to the will of the Father, and their own freedom to 
decide whether or not to participate in this. In any event, Ratzinger says, intellectual honesty 
demands that we address the unavoidability of human finitude. He once described finitude as 
marking the “real burden of our existence”24 to the point where “an immense feeling of 
futility pervades everything.”25 The possibility of saying “no” to God is present i the nature 
of finite creatures, but has developed in history. We are built for love but we can also 
withdraw and isolate ourselves, desiring self-sufficiency. For the finite creature, “faith is 
always given only in the context of a fragile freedom.” This is what Ratzinger describes as 
“God’s great gamble.”26 This essential tension is correlative to humanity’s undeniable 
greatness. What looks like a gamble in human vocabulary is a challenge to the human race to 
share in God’s fundamental attitude of trusting in human greatness. The heart of the human 
dilemma is the great peril that accompanies great potential: 
[Der Mensch] ist zum Größten berufen, aber seine Freiheit kann den anderen Versuch, 
Größe gegen Gott haben zu wollen und zu einem Gegengott zu werden, zu einer 
wirklichen Bedrohung werden lassen. Sie kann sein Absturz sein, so daß er zu einem 
zerstörerischen Dämon wird. Manchmal möchten wir zu Gott am liebsten sagen, 
hättest du den Menschen doch weniger groß gemacht, dann wäre er auch weniger 
gefährlich. Hättest du ihm die Freiheit nicht gegeben, dann könnte er nicht so weit 
abstürzen. Und doch wagen wir es dann letztlich nict zu sagen, weil wir auch 
dankbar sein müssen, daß Gott die Größe geschaffen hat. Und wenn er das Risiko der 
Freiheit des Menschen und damit aller ihrer Abstürze auf sich nimmt, dann können 
wir zwar schaudern vor dem, was dabei geschehen kann, und müssen versuchen, alle 
positiven Kräfte zu mobilisieren, aber wir müssen auch das Grundvertrauen, das Gott 
in den Menschen hat, mitteilen.27   
                                                          
24 Ratzinger, Spirit of the Liturgy, 31. 
25 Ibid., 35. 
26 Ratzinger, God and the World, 55. See also ibid., 278-81. 
27 Ratzinger, Gott und die Welt, 102 (“[Man] is called to greatness, but his freedom can allow the contrary 
temptation, that of wanting to be great over against God and thus to become a kind of anti-God, to develop into 
a serious threat. This is always liable to be his fall from greatness, so that he turns into a demon of destruction. 
Sometimes we even feel like saying to God, if you had only made man a little less great, then he would be less 
dangerous. If you hadn’t given him his freedom, then  would not be able to fall so far. And yet, we don’t quite 
dare to say it in the end, because at the same time we are grateful that God did put greatness into man. And if he 
takes upon himself the risk inherent in man’s freedom and all the falls from greatness it involves, then we feel 
horrified by the thought of what that might mean, ad we have to try to summon up all the positive forces at our 
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Nevertheless, in this “gamble,” the temptation for human self-emancipation from God 
remains, since “God, in a completely understandable logic of existence, appears in his 
infinitude to be a threat to our finitude, and that for this reason men and women want to be 
free of God in order to be free themselves.”28 If God – and by extension, all other persons –  
are rivals to individual freedom, is there any way in which one can live harmoniously with 
them, or must the primacy of self-sufficiency cause the human person to be mistrustful of all, 
including God? If there is any possibility of building harmony in the relationship between 
God and personal freedom, the description of the relationship that pertains between God and 
the human person endowed with freedom must be carefully delineated. Ratzinger does this by 
considering the theme of personhood in God.  
In line with patristic trinitarian theology, Ratzinger points out that the three persons in 
the Trinity exist as natural relations as opposed to persons as substances. While the substance 
is one, on the level of dialogical reality, God is pure relativity towards the other: “[i]n God, 
person means relation.”29 Ratzinger suggests that Johannine theology provides the clearest 
testimony to the “phenomenon of pure relativity as the nature of person.”30 For example it is 
the same Christ who uses the formulas, “The Son canot do anything of himself” (John 5:19) 
and “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30). This is central to Ratzinger’s argument in 
characterising a divine from a purely human relationality: 
Gerade deswegen, weil [der Sohn] nichts von sich allein hat, weil er sich nicht als 
eine abgegrenzte Substanz neben den Vater stellt, sondern in der totalen Relativität 
auf ihn hin ist, nichts anderes darstellt als die Relativität auf ihn hin, die keinen 
Vorbehalt des bloß Eigenen sich ausgrenzt, darum sind sie eins.31  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
command, but we also have to share in God’s fundamental attitude of putting trust in man” [Ratzinger, God and 
the World, 119]). 
28 Joseph Ratzinger, The End of Time? The Provocation of Talking about God, eds. Tiemo Rainer Peters & 
Claus Urban, trans. Matthew Ashley (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), 82.   
29 Ratzinger, Dogma und Preaching, 186.  
30 Ratzinger, Dogma und Verkündigung, 208. 
31 Ibid. (“Precisely because [the Son] has nothing of his own alone, because he is not defined as a substance in 
addition to the Father, but in total relativity towards him, in a relatedness which does not marginalise what is 
properly his own – precisely thus are they one” [own translation]). 
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Ratzinger finds a moment of profound illumination here regarding the biblical 
meaning of person: “not a self-enclosed substance, but rather the phenomenon of total 
relatedness, which of course can ultimately enter ito its fullness only with the one who is 
God, yet which is a signpost pointing the way for all personal being. Thus . . . we have 
reached the point at which the doctrine about God passes into Christology and 
anthropology.”32 To be a person, then, is to be relational. Instead of there being a 
contradiction of ownership at the point of pure relat dness, Ratzinger surmises that the 
impact of this phenomenon clarifies the meaning of both God and the human person:  
Dein Ich ist einerseits dein Allereigenstes und zugleich das, was du am wenigsten von 
dir selber hast, was am meinsten dein Nichts-Eigenes ist, das erst vom Du her 
überhaupt als Ich sein kann. . . . Dies ist nun zwar zunächst nur eine Aussage über die 
Dreieinigkeit, aber zugleich doch die Grundaussage darüber, worauf es im Begriff 
Person überhaupt ankommt, die Eröffnung des Personbegriffs in den menschlichen 
Geist hinein und sein tragender Ursprung.33  
Ratzinger believes the opening up of a Christ-centred anthropology occurs when 
Christ says to his followers, “[w]ithout me you can do nothing” (John 15:5), and when he 
prays “that they may be one as we are one” (John 17:11): 
Damit gehört nun zum Wesen auch der Jüngerexistenz, daß der Mensch nicht den 
Vorbehalt des bloß Eigenen setzt, nicht die Substanz des abgeschlossenen Ich zu 
bilden sich müht, sondern in die reine Relativität auf den anderen hin und auf Gott hin 
eintritt, und so gerade wahrhaft zu sich selber kommt und in die Fülle seines Eigenen, 
weil er in die Einheit mit dem hinein tritt, auf das hin er relativ ist.34 
When relativity towards the other is understood as constituting personhood without 
prejudicing one’s own identity, Ratzinger says the significance of Christ’s personhood and 
human freedom are mutually illuminated. What truly distinguishes human consciousness is 
                                                          
32 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 188.  
33 Ratzinger, Dogma und Verkündigung, 210 (“Your self is, on the one hand, what is most peculiarly yours, and, 
at the same time, that which you own the least in and of yourself, that which is most truly not your own, which 
can be ‘I’ at all only in terms of a ‘Thou.’ . . . Now initially this is only a statement about the Trinity, yet, at the 
same time, it is the fundamental statement about wha matters in the concept of person in general, the 
inauguration of the concept of person in the life of the human mind and the origin that supports it” [Ratzinger, 
Dogma and Preaching,189]). 
34 Ratzinger, Dogma und Verkündigung,208-9 (“Thus it is part of the nature of discipleship also that man does 
not reserve what is merely his own, does not strive o develop the substance of his self-enclosed ego, but rather 
enters into pure relativity directed toward the other and toward God and precisely in this way truly comes to 
himself and comes into the fullness of what is his own, because he enters into union with that to which e is 
related” [Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching,187]). 
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its ability to reflect not only on itself and being in general, but on the wholly other, the 
transcendent God. Central to this understanding of relativity is that “such being-totally-with-
the-other as we find in [Christ] does not abolish his being-with-himself, but rather brings it to 
fulfilment.”35 As the “second Adam” (cf. Rom 5:12-14; 1Cor 15:42-49), Scripture means to 
characterise Christ as the true fulfilment of the id a of the human person, by adding the idea 
of “we” to the ideas of “I” and “you”: 
In Christus, dem Menschen, der ganz bei Gott ist, wird das Menschsein nicht 
aufgehoben, sondern kommt zu seiner höchsten Möglichke t, die im Sich-
überschreiten ins Absolute hinein und im Eingeholtwerden der eigenen Relativität in 
die Absolutheit der göttlichen Liebe besteht. . . . Denn Christus, den die Schrift als 
den letzten Adam, also als den endgültigen Menschen benennt, erscheint in den 
Zeugnissen des Glaubens als der umfassende Raum, in dem sich das Wir der 
Menschen zum Vater hin sammelt. Er ist nicht nur ein Vorbild, hinter dem 
hergegangen wird, sondern er ist der einbegreifende Raum, in dem sich das Wir der 
Menschen sammelt auf das Du Gottes hin.36   
The dynamic characterisation of the human person flowing from Christ, the new Adam, is 
that of a “signpost indicating where humanity is tending, since as long as history is under 
way, humanity never completely catches up with itself.” 37 Such a definition factors in the 
historicity of the human person: a human being constituted in terms of relativity towards the 
eternal, implies a being on the “way” in the manner of human history.  
This leads Ratzinger to a related point which, in fact, is an opening argument towards 
the existence of an ecclesial reality for the human person endowed with freedom. Ratzinger 
believes a viewpoint which modern and Christian philosophy does not fully appreciate is that 
                                                          
35 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 194. 
36 Ratzinger, Dogma und Verkündigung,217-18 (“In Christ, the man who is entirely with God, humanity is not 
abolished but, rather, arrives at its highest potential, which consists of self-surpassing that leads into the absolute 
and of having one’s own relatedness caught up into the absolute character of divine love. . . . For Chist, whom 
Scripture call the last Adam and, thus, the ultimate man, appears in the testimonies of the faith as te 
comprehensive space in which the We of men is gathered in to the Father. He is not only a model to be 
followed, but he is also the inclusive space in which the We of mankind is gathered into the Thou of Gd” 
[Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 194-95]). 
37 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 194. One is reminded of the Fourth Lateran Council’s teaching on the 
similarity and distinction between divine and human personhood: “For between creator and creature ther can be 
noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between them” (See Norman Taner, ed., 
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I- Latern V, 232). Freedom is such an innate part of both human 
and divine identity, that the paradoxical tension of likeness and irreducible gap between creator and creature, as 
expressed by the Council, can be legitimately applied here. 
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the Christian economy doesn’t consist merely of a dialogical principle of a pure “I-Thou” 
relationship. Neither on the side of human beings nor o  the side of God does a merely pure 
“I” or a pure “thou” exist. In fact on both sides the “I” is integrated into a greater “we.” 
Ratzinger thus claims that a fundamental aspect of the theological concept of person is that 
not even God can be seen as a pure and simple “I” towards which the human person tends. 
What a Christian concept of God does is it “expressly denies the divine monarchy in the 
sense of ancient philosophy” and, as a matter of princi le, “has given to multiplicity the same 
dignity as unity.”38 This communitarian “we” which, when fully understood, means that God 
exists only as a “we,” also prepares the space of the human “we.” In this sense Ratzinger says 
the relationality of personhood teaches us that “[t]he one Christ is . . . the We into which 
Love, namely, the Spirit, gathers us, who thus signifies the bond uniting us at the same time 
with one another and to the common Thou of the one Father.”39  
At this point, we have come to see that Ratzinger understands personhood in 
relational terms – a relationality of the “I” and “Thou” that permits of a “we.”40 This 
                                                          
38 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 195.  
39 Ibid., 196. In the past, Ratzinger has been critical of what he describes as the anthropological turn in 
Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity. The “we” reality of God that comes to light in the three-fold liturgical 
formula per Christum in Spiritu Sancto ad Patrem was one of the most fundamental developments of the 
Western Church and impacted upon the concept of the Church and the understanding of the human person. But 
gradually the full varacity of the “we” reality of God was bracketed off and “squeezed into the 
individualistically narrowed I-Thou relationship, which in this narrowness ultimately loses the Thou as well. As 
a consequence of Augustine’s doctrine on the Trinity, in fact, the Divine Persons were entirely enclosed within 
God’s interior and to the outside God became a pureI; thus the entire We-dimension lost its place in theology 
and the individualised I-Thou relationship became increasingly narrow, until finally, in transcendental 
philosophy (for example, Kant’s), the Thou can no longer be found, either” (ibid.). It was from an unlike y 
source, he says – the work of Feuerbach – that a breakthrough occurred into personal reality between th  “I” and 
the “Thou.” It stimulated theology to reflect more d eply on the origin of our being. Interestingly, and in a 
subsequent note to the original text, Ratzinger said his judgement of Augustine on this issue was harsh because 
“for Augustine the ‘psychological doctrine of the Trinity’ remains an attempt at understanding that is kept in 
balance by factors in tradition” (ibid. n. 12). Far more radical, to Ratzinger’s mind was Aquinas’ separation of 
the philosophical doctrine of the one God and the theological doctrine of the Trinity. It even led Aquinas to 
justify the formula “God is una persona” – something which had been anathema in the early Church. See ST III, 
q.3, a.3 ad I.  For more on the effects of Augustine’s trinitarian insights in the history of theology, see Thomas J. 
Norris, A Fractured Relationship: Faith and the Crisis of Cultures (Dublin: Veritas, 2007), 209-242.  
40 Ratzinger’s epistemological analysis presupposes that the Christian mode of belief is that of personal 
encounter because its central formula is expressed not by “I believe in something,” but “I believe in you.” 
Through the relationship of Jesus with the Father, Ch ist is not a neutral observer but, as the logos, is the witness 
to the presence of the eternal in the world. Through him the meaning of the world is present before us and “it 
vouchsafes itself to us as love that loves even me and makes life worth living by this incomprehensible gift of a 
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constitutes the fullness of personal freedom-in- relation without prejudicing one’s own 
identity, and legitimises the human aptitude for creativity. It is also understood, at this stage, 
that Ratzinger believes the situation of being freeand human in the world is predicated on 
holding to a meaning that can uphold the whole of one’s existence, including the burden of 
finitude. To Ratzinger’s mind, the idea at the root f a person’s inner security is the harmony 
they enjoy within themselves. Living out of this affirmation, only the one who can accept 
oneself can also accept the “Thou,” and the world:  
Der Grund dafür, daß ein Mensch das Du nicht akzeptieren, mit ihm nicht ins reine 
kommen kann, liegt darin, daß er sein Ich nicht mag und dann erst recht nicht ein Du 
annehmen kann. . . . Sein Ich wird ihm nur akzeptabel dadurch, daß es zuerst von 
einem anderen Ich akzeptiert ist. Er kann sich selbst nur lieben, wenn er zuvor von 
einem anderen geliebt ist. . . . Erst indem das Leben angenommen wird und sich als 
angenommenes vorfindet, wird es annehmbar. Der Mensch ist das merkwürdige 
Wesen, das nicht nur der physischen Geburt, sondern der Gutheissung bedarf, um 
bestehen zu können.41  
Furthermore, Ratzinger says the affirmation that leds to self-acceptance requires the 
“I”  to hear from beyond the self: “It is good that you exist” in an act that is more than a 
linguistic formula. Ratzinger says it must come from an “act of the entire being that we call 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
love free from any threat of fading away or any tinge of egoism” (Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 79). 
The meaning of the world therefore resides in a trustworthy “you” – one that is not itself an open question but 
the ground of all that is. Faith is the finding of a “you” that upholds me in this world with not only the promise, 
but the guarantee of indestructible love: “Christian f ith lives on the discovery that not only is there such a thing 
as objective meaning but that this meaning knows me and loves me, that I can entrust myself to it liketh  child 
who knows that everything he may be wondering about is safe in the ‘you’ of his mother. Thus in the last 
analysis believing, trusting, and loving are one, and ll the theses around which belief revolves are only concrete 
expressions of the all-embracing about-turn, of the assertion ‘I believe in you’ – of the discovery of God in the 
countenance of the man Jesus of Nazareth” (80). See also ibid., 21-22; Principles of Catholic Theology, 78-84; 
God and the World, 41-45, 54, 85-86, 96-100, 110-12; Truth and Tolerance, 158. See also Markus Rutsche, Die 
Relationalität Gottes bei Martin Buber und Joseph Ratzinger (Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag, 2007). 
41 Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, 83 (“The reason is that a person cannot accept ‘thou,’ cannot come 
to terms with him, lies in the fact that ‘I’ does not like the self, and therefore cannot accept a ‘thou’. . . . His ‘I’ 
is only acceptable to him if it is first accepted by another ‘I.’ He can only love himself, if he has fir tly been 
loved by someone else. . . . Only when life is accepted and is perceived so, does it becomes acceptabl. Man is 
the strange creature that requires not only physical b rth, but affirmation, in order to survive” [own translation]). 
Ratzinger provides three examples which verify his view: A mother gives not only physical life but total life to a 
child when she turns its tears into smiles. The phenomenon known as hospitalism comes from the same insight. 
It was a paediatric diagnosis used in the 1930’s to describe infants who deteriorated in hospital because of lack 
of social contact between infants and a caregiver. It was believed that poorly funded hospitals experience less of 
this because they could not afford incubators and consequently the hospital staff  regularly held the infants in 
their arms; finally, Ratzinger believes the violent disturbances of this present generation also have their root 
here: “the magic of the revolution is no longer merely protest against repairable injustices, but an objection to 
being itself, which has not experienced its acceptance and therefore assumes its unacceptability” (ibid.).  
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love [for] it is the way of love to will the other’s existence and, at the same time, to bring that 
existence forth again.” As such “[t]he key to the I lies with the thou; the way to the thou is via 
the I.” 42 This brings into focus a fundamental question for Ratzinger: “Is it true, then, when 
someone says to me: ‘It is good that you exist?’ Is it really good?” Or, as Ratzinger probes, 
Kann seine Liebe, die mich will, nicht letztlich ein tragischer Irrtum sein? Wenn die 
Liebe, die mich zum Sein ermutigt, nicht auf Wahrheit b ruht, dann muß man am 
Ende auch der Liebe fluchen, die mich betrügt, die etwas festhält, was eigentlich 
besser zerstört würde.43 
Formulated as an indirect critique and response to the contemporary experience of life 
espoused by Sartre and others, Ratzinger says this apparently so simple act of liking myself, 
of being at one with myself, actually raises the qustion of  the whole universe because it 
“raises the question of truth: Is it good that I exist? Is it good that anything at all exists? Is the 
world good?”44 Ratzinger believes the reticence today to enthusiastically affirm that existence 
is good has become the source of an incessant anxiety and despair in humanity: “Love alone 
cannot do. If the truth is against it, it is in vain. Only when truth and love coincide, man can 
be happy: only the truth liberates.”45 In this way, the meaning that upholds consists of a 
dependable and steadfast justice.  
As we have seen in this subdivision, Ratzinger’s verbalises the human disquiet about 
the dilemma of finitude by asking: can we trust ourcreation? His answer is “yes” – in faith 
we can accept the truth of being a creation that is loved and upheld by God. Ratzinger 
believes that, ultimately, trusting in our origin must be a prerequisite for believing in our 
destination.46 When the inescapability of the “perhaps” of both belief and unbelief is linked to 
                                                          
42 Ibid., 84. See also Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 99-104. 
43 Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, 84 (“Can this love that wills me ultimately be a tr gic mistake? If 
the love that encouraged me to be, is not based on truth, then I must also end up cursing the love that betrays 
me, that holds something that would actually be better were it destroyed” [own translation]). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. For more in-depth reflection on this, see Ratzinger, “Vorfragen zu einer Theologie der Erlösung,” in Leo 
Scheffczyk, ed., Erlösung und Emanzipation (Freiburg: Herder, 1973), 141-55.  
46 Ratzinger’s epistemological analysis is an endorsement that “not our love for God but God’s love for us” 
(1John 4:10) is the rational basis for human existence. See Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 88-97. 
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the unavoidability of one’s finitude, Ratzinger believes the inner tension of human existence 
is truly felt. He defines authentic human freedom as being in relation to, and in distinction 
from, the absolute relativity of divine freedom. The differentiation implies that the human 
person takes up a particular orientation in relation o the trustworthy meaning that grounds all 
reality. In other words, in freedom, the human person i  afforded the dignity of addressing 
one’s “yes” or “no” with regard to God’s constant “yes.” Unlike the pure relativity existent in 
the divine freedom of the Triune God, human freedom is qualitatively different. For the 
human person there is the distinct possibility of saying “no” to the meaning upholding one’s 
origin and destiny. This is partly occasioned by the reality of doubt which penetrates the 
search for a meaning on which to build one’s life; otherwise the human “yes” is not erected 
freely as an act of trust in the truth and meaning that upholds. This provokes the question of 
what the basic pattern of the human person’s “yes” looks like. In this task, Ratzinger 
proceeds by contemplating the monotheism wrought by the biblical pilgrimage from Exodus 
to Sinai. Truth is a necessary component of the search for meaning and the presence of the 
“freed” person on Sinai calls for the acceptance of a truth, namely the truth of creatureliness, 
on the part of humanity. This is the basic pattern o which Ratzinger makes reference, and it 
links the particularity of the human person’s “yes” to the universal truth contained in the 
inner meaning of creation. 
4.1.3. Categories of Authentic Human Freedom: Monotheism and Creatureliness 
 
Following on from our concentration on Ratzinger’s existential analysis of faith and 
personhood, we now turn to two specifically scriptural categories of authentic freedom. For 
Ratzinger these consist of monotheism and creatureliness. The former implies a form of 
Christian universalism based on the claim to truth which accompanies the insight that the 
only real human salvation is found in Christ Jesus (cf. Acts 4:12; 1Tim 2:5; Eph 4:4; John 
8:12; 10:9; 11:25; 14:6; 1John 4:14; 5:11). The latter, at least from the perspective of this 
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study of Ratzinger’s writings, refers to the particularity of human freedom to say “yes” or 
“no” to the truth of creatureliness. This subdivision will look at these positions and examine 
how Ratzinger envisages both of them converging at the covenantal site at “Sinai,” where the 
truth about the one God can be encountered in a sphere t at empowers the human person into 
recognising the truth about oneself, and into taking up a posture of dialogical orientation with 
regard to God. 
4.1.3.1. The Monotheistic Revolution: Approaching the Truth that Frees 
Firstly, the position that Christianity assigns itself in the history of religions is one 
that was basically expressed long ago: it sees in Christ the only real human salvation, and 
thus, its final freedom. Of this Ratzinger says  
Nicht Machttrieb war der Ausgangspunkt des christlichen Universalismus, sondern 
die Gewißheit, die rettende Erkenntnis und die erlös nde Liebe empfangen zu haben, 
auf die alle Menschen Anspruch haben und auf die sie im Innersten ihres Wesens 
warten. Die Mission wurde nicht als Zugewinn von Menschen für den eigenen 
Machtbereich betrachtet, sondern als pflichtgemäßes W itergeben dessen, was für alle 
bestimmt war und wessen alle bedurften.47 
 
However, he says, strong doubts have arisen today that cannot be ignored about the certitude 
of saving knowledge: “[t]he history of the worldwide mission is seen by many, not as the 
history of the spreading of liberating truth and love, but to a great extent as the history of a 
process of alienation and of domination by force.” He believes this requires of Christians “a 
                                                          
47 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz, 46 (“[i]t was not the drive to power that launched Christian 
universalism but the certitude of having received the saving knowledge and the redeeming love to which all 
people have a claim and for which, in the inmost depths of their being, they are waiting. The mission was 
regarded, not as the acquisition of people for their own sphere of domination, but as the passing on, as a matter 
of obligation, of something meant for everyone and of which everyone stood in need” [Ratzinger, Truth and 
Tolerance, 55-56]). Ratzinger has always been concerned with the theological meaning of universalism in the 
context of salvation history. See The Meaning of Christian Brotherhood, 75-84; Faith and the Future, 20-33; 




radical process of reflection about what they are and what they are not, what they believe and 
what they do not believe, what they have to offer and what they cannot offer.” 48  
Ratzinger begins by describing belief in a single God as a “monotheistic 
revolution.”49 As religious experience moved beyond the primeval xperience of the divine 
and the subsequent mythical religions, the monotheistic revolution advanced in Israel’s 
history until, subsequently and in full measure, th face of God was revealed to humanity in 
the person of Christ.50 But, Ratzinger asks, are Christian faith and the modern age 
compatible? This is a key question because the incrasingly widespread thrust of the modern 
age is the claim that to “have” recognisable and essential “truth” is an obsolete piece of 
presumption. Renouncing the claim to truth in the Cristian faith is increasingly put forward 
as the only approach to peaceful co-existence of human persons compatible with the virtue of 
tolerance, a virtue indicative of the modern age. 
Ratzinger’s writings contain three basic attitudes towards reality that mark human 
intellectual history. They are the magical, the metaphysical and the scientific.51 To his mind, 
the first two mark out the vast bulk of human history, while the third, the scientific, is a more 
recent phenomenon. The significance for the argument on freedom which Ratzinger wants to 
highlight here is the fact that Israel’s Exodus instituted the monotheistic revolution in relation 
                                                          
48 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 56-57. As an example, Ratzinger quotes a text penned by Leonardo Boff 
entitled “I cinquecento anni della conquista dell’Amercia Latina: Un ‘venerdì santo’ che dura ancora oggi”: 
“1492-1992 are dates that in the perspective of native nd black South Americans mark out a way of the cross, 
with countless stations of suffering and a Good Friay that has now lasted for five hundred years. The European 
Christians . . . conquered bodies with the sword and dominated souls with the cross . . . For the natives and for 
the enslaved Africans, Christianity appeared as a religion of the enemy who subjugated and killed peopl . For 
them, the gospel could not be a message of joy; rathe  it was bad news, which brought misfortune. . . 1992 could 
be the year that represents the resumption of their religions, which were just and worthy, the coming of God to 
his peoples through these religions, and the peoples started on their way to God through them.”    
49 Ratzinger’s use of the term “monotheistic revolution” can be seen very succinctly described in Truth and 
Tolerance, 28-32. He provides a detailed account of the unity and diversity of religions and the emergence of 
the Judeo-Christian faith within the history of religions in ibid., 15-44. 
50 See particularly Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 116-136; The God of Jesus Christ, 20-25; Credo for 
Today: What Christians Believe, trans. Michael J. Miller et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), 21ff. We 
have already seen Ratzinger’s enthusiasm for narrative christology and the unity of the Scripture. See this 
dissertation §§ 1.6. and 3.2.1. 
51 See Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 57. See also 39-69; 137-61; Truth and Tolerance, 15-79. 
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to the polytheistic religion of Egypt. Egypt is the place of (magical) poly-theism, poly-truth, 
relativism, whereas Sinai was the (metaphysical) worship mountain of the One God, living 
and true. The events relating to “Sinai” introduce a metaphysical attitude to life – and bring a 
consciousness of true and false into the world. The metaphysical attitude to life holds that the 
good, the truth and God are but the one question and ought not to be separated.   
Jan Assmann, an Egyptologist from the University of Heidelberg whose views 
Ratzinger critiques, has claimed that professing the oneness of God and of truth has brought 
nothing but conflict into the world. 52 Assmann names this phenomenon as the “Mosaic 
distinction”53 – something which he says was a watershed in the history of religion as a 
whole. It amounted to the introduction of a distinction between true and false in the realm of 
religion. Hitherto, the gods of polytheistic religions often presided in functional equivalence 
one to another and as such were interchangeable with each other. The concept of true and 
false religion was somewhat alien to the ancient polytheistic religions. However, the new and 
revolutionary scenario – belief in a single god – meant the new religion was, of its nature, an 
“anti-religion.” It excluded everything that went before it as paganism, and was a medium, 
not of intercultural translation but the alienation f one culture from another. Assmann 
contends that it was at this moment that the concept of idolatry began to develop as the 
greatest of all sins. Ratzinger quotes the follow words of Assmann: 
In der Vorstellung vom goldenen Kalb, der biblischen “Ursünde” des 
monotheistischen Ikonoklasmus . . . ist das Haß- und Gewaltpotential festgeschrieben, 
                                                          
52 The full extent of the Ratzinger-Assmann discussion can be found in Truth and Tolerance, 210-31. See Jan 
Assmann, Moses der Ägypter: Entzifferung einer Gedächtnisspur (München: Hanser, 1998).  
53 See Erich Zenger, “Was ist der Preis des Monotheismus? Die heilsame Provokation von J. Assmann,” in 
Herder-Korrespondenz 55 (2001):187, where Assmann is quoted as explaining this concept in the following 
manner: “By the ‘Mosaic distinction,’ I mean the introduction of a distinction between true and false in the 
realm of religion. Hitherto, religion had been based on the distinction between pure and impure, or betwe n 
sacred and profane, and had no place at all for the idea of ‘false gods’ . . . , whom one should not wrship.” See 
Jan Assmann, Moses der Ägypter, 17-23. 
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das sich in der Geschichte der monotheistischen Religionen immer wieder aktualisiert 
hat.54  
Ratzinger says the conclusion to be drawn from Assmann’s depiction of monotheism is self-
evident:  
Der Exodus ist rückgängig zu machen; wir müssen zurück nack “Ägypten” – das 
heißt: Die Unterscheidung von wahr und unwahr im Bereich der Religion muß 
aufgehoben werden, wir müssen wieder zurück in die Welt der Götter, die den 
Kosmos in seinem Reichtum und seiner Vielfalt ausdrücken und daher keinen 
gegenseitigen Ausschluß kennen, sondern gegenseitiges Verstehen ermöglichen.55 
Ratzinger believes that what is happening – subconsci u ly at least – is the search for 
a way back into the world of “Egypt.” Ratzinger believes such an aspiration separates the 
question of the good and the true – something that often happens in the scientific age – with 
the result that the question of God falls from memory. When the metaphysical criterion of 
God beyond human manipulation collapses, the good is decided by the majority or by 
sectarian factions. Then truth is relegated to an endless groping for meaning in obscurity. For 
Ratzinger, the true and the good cannot be separated for to do so means that the distinction 
between good and evil loses its basis.56 One cannot – no matter how hard one tries – be set 
totally free from the distinction between what is good and what is not. Ratzinger believes 
science is a good and necessary discipline on so many levels, but as sole criterion, a scientific 
attitude to life means that truth is provisional until the next experiment requires a revision. A 
                                                          
54 Assmann, Moses der Ägypter, 20 (“In the portrayal of the golden calf, the biblical ‘original sin’ of 
monotheistic iconoclasm . . . the potential for hate nd for violence was set down in writing, and in the history of 
monotheistic religions this has ever and again taken concrete form” [quoted in Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 
212]).  
55 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz,  172 (“[T]he Exodus must be reversed; we must go back to ‘Egypt’ 
– that is to say, the distinction between true and u true in the realm of religion must be done away with; we 
must return to the realm of the gods, which are an xpression of all the wealth and the variety of the cosmos and 
thus do not ever exclude one another but rather facilitate mutual understanding” [Ratzinger, Truth and 
Tolerance, 213]). 
56 See Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 223-231. Ratzinger extends the argument to “the Mosaic-Socratic 
distinction,” whereby Greek thought equally implies the convergence of the true and the good:  “Plato was right 
when he identified the highest divinity with the idea of good . . . if we cannot know the truth about God, then the 
truth about what is good and what is bad remains equally inaccessible. Then there is no good and evil;only the 
reckoning up of consequences remains: ethics is replac d by calculation” (230).What Ratzinger implies here is 
that the three questions, concerning truth and good and God are but one single question and if there is no 
answer, then the essential things in life evade us. Then human existence is genuinely burdened and tragic – and 
paradoxically, through its very absence, it becomes possible to understand what redemption really means.  
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metaphysical world-view, on the other hand, which biblically is depicted by humanity 
bowing down before Sinai, acknowledges that truth has a deeper root. And to relativize truth 
is to relativize the very meaning of good and evil, the very possibility of human society.57 
Without a communal and relational structure to human society, Ratzinger says the human 
family could not survive long and would end up on a downward spiral towards definitive 
slavery. 
Ratzinger makes a very close connection here between truth and the possibility of 
authentic freedom. While it may look like the Mosaic d stinction sanctioned the 
“canonisation of intolerance,”58 Ratzinger says it is in fact the case that the one God is a 
jealous God (Exod 34:14; Deut 6:15), who unmasks the “gods,” confirming that they are not 
God. Therefore “the plural of ‘God’ is as such a lie” and “a lie always means a lack of 
freedom, and it is no mere chance, above all no untruth, that in Israel’s memory Egypt 
appears as the house of slavery, as the place of lack of freedom.”59 Quoting John 8:32, 
Ratzinger says that if humanity does not live by truth, it languishes in Egypt, in slavery: 
Nur die Wahrheit macht frei. Wo Nützlichkeit über Wahrheit gestellt wird, wie es im 
Fall der gespaltenen Wahrheit geschieht . . . wird der Mensch Sklave der Nützlichkeit 
und derer, die darüber entscheiden können, was das Nützliche ist. In diesem Sinn ist 
zunächst die “Entmythisierung” notwendig, die die Götter ihres falschen Glanzes und 
damit ihrer falschen Macht entkleidet, um dann ihre“Wahrheit” herauszustellen, das 
heißt zu erklären, welche realen Mächte und Wirklich eiten hinter ihnen stehen.60 
                                                          
57 Ratzinger sometimes uses the term techne to denote a quasi-exclusive technological society. For example, see 
Introduction to Christianity, 58-66. This idea, which strongly echoes Ratzinger’s interpretation of modern 
rationalism, keeps recurring in his writings. See this dissertation §§ 2.2. to 2.2.4. To his mind, this is a society 
that often makes attempts to live without the metaphysical criterion of God, and so finds itself enslaved in a 
cycle of perpetual belief in progress and a promise of a future that is empty and can never fulfil thehuman 
yearning for happiness. In fact, when God is removed as the personal partner of humanity and exists merely as a 
type of formal principle, or “higher being,” the world convinces itself that it would be better off with a moral 
optimism, and to live as if God approved of our actions. 
58 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 227. 
59 Ibid., 227-28. 
60 Ratzinger, Glaube – Wahrheit – Toleranz, 184 (“Only the truth will set you free. Wherever usefulness is set 
above truth, as happens in the case of the division of truth . . . then man becomes a slave to practicl purposes 
and to those who make the decisions about what is useful and practical. In this sense the ‘demythologisin ’ is 
necessary to strip the gods of their false glamour and thereby of their false power, so that the ‘truth’ of them 
may stand out, that is, to explain which worldly powers and real entities stand behind them” [Ratzinger, Truth 
and Tolerance, 228]). In the interface between Christianity and the history of religions in general, Ratzinger 
discerns two phases of engagement, namely, transformation and continuity: the gods are no longer gods since 
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The Ratzinger-Assmann exchange is a discussion on the various basic attitudes 
towards reality which the human spirit has entertained in history. To Ratzinger’s mind, the 
interaction between “Egypt” and the Mosaic distinction clarifies that the Judeo-Christian 
economy cannot abandon or disregard the question of truth. In contrast, he takes the view that 
the technical-scientific attitude of the modern era desires to severely limit the application of 
truth. As the predominant human attitude today, it has meant that a new concept of reality has 
gradually developed in modern consciousness which is based on a constriction of truth: 
Wir haben es aufgegeben, das verborgene Ansich der Dinge zu suchen, in das Wesen 
des Seins selbst hinabzuloten; solches zu tun erscheint uns als fruchtloser Versuch, 
die Tiefe der Seins gilt uns als letztlich unerreichbar.61 
Ratzinger concludes that more and more we have limited ourselves to our own perspective –
that which is visible and within our measuring grasp suffices for us. He says we resign 
ourselves to thinking “[w]e can deal with [the restiction to phenomena] and thus create for 
ourselves a world in which we can live as men.”62 In order to offset what he sees as the 
universalization of the human spirit to the exclusion of all else, Ratzinger looks to the 
particularity present within the doctrine of creation.  
4.1.3.2. Acknowledging the Truth of Creatureliness 
The search for salvific truth, then, may possess universal quality, but Ratzinger is 
equally conscious of the particularity inherent in he truth of creatureliness – that each person 
is created free and out of love. The Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation, Ratzinger says, is a 
statement that the universe comes from freedom, love and reason. The Babylonian Exile, 
along with the encounter it brought with the forces of Babylonian religion and its creation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the question of truth has itself deprived them of their heretofore divinity, bringing about their downfall. But at 
the same time, the truth about the gods emerges: thy are reflections of divinity whose hidden significance is 
purified and fulfilled through the question of truth. As such, a “transposition” of the gods is something that does 
occur when they are viewed as steps in the search fo  t e true God and for his reflection in creation. 
61 Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum, 52 (“We have given up seeking the hidden ‘in-itselfness’ of things 
and sounding the nature of being itself; such activities seem to us to be a fruitless enterprise; we have come to 
regard the depth of being as, in the last analysis, unfathomable” [Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 58]). 
62 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 58. 
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account of Enuma Elish, was the moment when the doctrine of creation became a dominant 
theme for Israel. Gen 1:1-2:4a, albeit based on very ancient traditions, emerges from this 
time.63 In fact, to Ratzinger’s mind, it is only when John t e Evangelist consciously 
redeployed the first words of the Bible, reading them in light of Christ, that we meet the 
“conclusive and normative scriptural creation account” of John 1:1-3.64 It then becomes 
possible, in a definite way, to encounter what the reason, or “Word” is, that appears 
throughout the Bible and which God desires us to absorb.65 Because God’s reason and, 
therefore, the cause and meaning of existence, resides in the doctrine of creation, Ratzinger 
believes our freedom rests upon properly living in harmony with its content: 
[. . .] brauchen wir den Schöpfungsglauben auch heute nicht zu verstecken. Wir 
dürfen ihn nicht verstecken, denn nur wenn die Welt aus Freiheit, aus Liebe und 
Vernunft kommt, nur wenn dies die eigentlich tragend  Mächte sind, können wir 
einander trauen, können wir in die Zukunft hineingehen, können wir als Menschen 
leben. Nur weil Gott der Schöpfer aller Dinge ist, i  er ihr Herr und nur darum 
können wir beten zu ihn. Denn dies bedeutet, daß Freiheit und Liebe nicht 
ohnmächtige Ideen, sondern daß sie die Grundmächte der Wirklichkeit sind.66   
                                                          
63 See James B. Pritchard, ed., The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures (Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), 28-35. This Babylonian creation myth viewed the world as a dragon’s body and human 
beings as created from the dragon’s blood. This foreb ding picture of creation described how “the world was 
produced out of a struggle between opposing powers and that it assumed its form when Marduk, the god of 
light, appeared and split in two the body of the primordial dragon. Subsequently, heaven and earth came to be 
from this sundered body. Thus the firmament and the earth were produced from the sundered body of the dead 
dragon, but from its blood Marduk fashioned human beings” (Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 12). See also W. C. 
Lambert and Simon Parker, Enûma Eliš. The Babylonian Epic of Creation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1966). 
64 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 15. Of course, the Gen 1:1-2:4a creation account is ot the only recounting of the 
activity of the Creator in creation. Immediately after it comes another with differing imagery (Gen 2:4- 5), 
while the psalms and wisdom literature, each, in their own way, attempt to clarify faith in creation. Accordingly, 
one decisive fact emerges for Ratzinger: the Old Testament is not the end of the road. The wisdom literature 
provides the final bridge towards the message of Christ in the New Testament. Therefore, almost all the literary 
genres of the Hebrew Scriptures assert the notion of belief in the creation of the world by God, developing it in 
different ways and with different emphases. These include the decidedly anthropomorphic account of Gen2: 4b-
25, as well as the Sethite genealogy of Gen 5:1-7. The prophets of the Exile also highlight the salvific aspects of 
the mystery of creation (cf. Isa 40ff; Jer 32:17-18; 33:25-6). The psalms often proclaim creation’s mysterious 
nature in praise of the Creator (cf. Ps. 8, 104, 136; see also 19, 33, 148). The wisdom literature emphasises the 
rational and intellectual aspects of creation, in which beauty and order are to the fore (cf. Prov 3:19-20; 8:22-31; 
Sir 1:1-9; Job 38-39; Wis 1:14; 6:7; 9:1-2; 11:17, 21-26; 14:3; 19: 6-9, 22). The New Testament, as Ratzinger 
points out, also continues the biblical reflection upon the theme of creation.    
65 Echoing here his christological hermeneutic, he reit rates that Christians read the Old Testament with and 
through Christ. This “frees us from the slavery of the letter, and precisely thus does [it] give back to us, 
renewed, the truth of the images” (Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 15). See this dissertation § 1.6.  
66 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 27 (“[W]e must not in our own day conceal our faith in creation. We may 
not conceal it, for only if it is true that the universe comes from freedom, love, reason, and that these are the real 
underlying powers, can we trust one another, go forward into the future, and live as human beings. Godis the 
Lord of all things because he is their creator, and o ly therefore can we pray to him. For this means that freedom 
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 What, then, in specific terms, does Ratzinger mean by saying the ground of human 
possibility corresponds to a universe that comes from freedom, love and reason? For him the 
reasonableness of the universe provides us with access to meaning – that is, to God’s reason: 
“[e]ven if [human] reason itself cannot perhaps give an account of it, it searches in faith and 
finds there an answer that it had been looking for.”67 Ratzinger makes the case that faith in 
creation is reasonable. There is what he calls the “that” of creation – the fact  of a beginning –  
which points to the power present at the beginning that could say “[l]et there be. . .” The core 
insight of the biblical creation account is that God created the world. The world is not a chaos 
of mutually opposed forces, nor is it a dwelling place for demonic powers from which human 
beings must protect themselves. Instead, creation comes from the one power – “God’s eternal 
reason, which became – in the Word – the power of ceation.”68 This, so to speak, liberates us 
from the need for Assmann’s “Egypt” because in the Word which is present at the very 
beginning of creation, Ratzinger says “we come intocontact with the real primordial force of 
the world and with the power that is above all powers.”69  
Knowing there is a free, rational and loving Creator liberates us from the need to 
revolt against the “that” of created existence. Creation is ultimately good because the 
universe is not the product of darkness and unreason. It comes, Ratzinger believes, “from 
intelligence, freedom, and from beauty that is identical with love. Seeing this gives us the 
courage to keep on living, and it empowers us, comforted thereby, to take upon ourselves the 
adventure of life.”70 The key consequence of such a universe is dependency: if God is the 
Lord of all things, then the truth of creatureliness follows. The biblical account of creation, 
Ratzinger says, “means to give some orientation in the mysterious region of human-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and love are not ineffectual ideas but rather that t ey are sustaining forces of reality” [Ratzinger, In the 
Beginning, 18]).  
67 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 21. 
68 Ibid., 5. 
69 Ibid., 6. 
70 Ibid., 25. 
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beingness.”71 Both humility and consolation accompany the statement that God formed man 
from the dust of the ground (Gen 2:7): 
Demütigung – denn damit wird uns gesagt: Du bist kein Gott, du hast dich nicht selbst 
gemacht, und du verfügst nicht über das All; du bist egrenzt. Du bist ein Wesen zum 
Tod wie alle Lebendige, du bist nur Erde. Aber es ist auch Tröstung; denn es wird uns 
so auch gesagt: Der Mensch ist kein Dämon, wie es bisweilen scheinen könnte, kein 
böser Geist. Der Mensch ist nicht geformt aus negativen Mächten, sondern er ist 
gebildet aus Gottes gutter Erde.72 
 This leads to Ratzinger’s observation of two basic models which exist today with 
regard to the connection between faith in creation and the freedom of the human person. 
Ratzinger expresses here the particularity of human freedom to say “yes” or “no” to the 
dependency at the heart of creatureliness. Ratzinger calls them the Gnostic and the Christian 
models. At its core, the Gnostic model is the repudiation of creation because of 
disenchantment with its refusal to be regulated. Its overall effect is the rejection of the 
mystery of suffering, of love and of vicarious atonement in favour of control over the world, 
and the regulation of life through knowledge. Love, fr edom and reason are principles that 
are too insecure as a foundation for life because, from a human perspective, they depend on 
something too unpredictable and unenforceable to manage. What is awaited may fail to 
appear, making one permanently dependable and powerless in the face of uncertainty. It 
would be like “a permanent risk factor, a source of insecurity over which I have no control.”73 
Thus a beautiful promise becomes an unbearable feeling of dependence, of subjection. This 
risk factor must be eliminated: 
Im gnostischen Weltbild, antik oder modern, erscheint Schöpfung als Abhängigkeit, 
Gott als Grund von Abhängigkeit. . . . Die gnostische Option zielt daher auf Wissen 
und auf Machen durch Wissen als die einzig zuverlässige Erlösung des Menschen, die 
                                                          
71 Ibid., 42. 
72 Joseph Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 48 (“Something humbling because we are told: You are not God, 
you did not make yourself, and you do not rule the universe; you are limited. You are a being destined for death, 
as are all things living; you are only earth. But something consoling too, because we are also told: The human 
being is not a demon or an evil spirit, as it might occasionally appear. The human being has not been formed 
from negative forces, but has been fashioned from Gd’s earth” [Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 43]) 
73 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 96.   
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sich deshalb auch nicht der geschaffenen Welt vertraut, sondern der zu erschaffenden, 
die kein Vertrauen mehr braucht, sondern nur Können.74 
On the other hand, Ratzinger says, the Christian model pposes this because it 
considers the human being to be dependent – creatureliness can be disputed only by den ing 
human nature itself. Dependency means the human person can live only from others and by 
trust. In fact, dependency in the form of love bolster  the meaning of one’s existence: 
Abhängigkeit aber hat dann nichts Degradierendes mehr, wenn sie die Form der Liebe 
hat, denn dann ist sie nicht mehr Abhängigkeit, nicht mehr Verminderung des 
Eigenen durch die Konkurrenz des anderen, sondern dan konstituiert sie gerade das 
Eigene als Eigenes und befreit es, denn Liebe hat ja wesentlich die Form “ich will, 
daß Du bist,” sie ist das Creativum, die einzig schöpferische Macht, die anderes als 
anderes hervorbringen kann ohne Neid, das Eigene zu v rlieren. Der Mensch ist 
abhängig – das ist seine primäre Wahrheit. Weil es so i t, kann nur die Liebe ihn 
erlösen, weil nur sie Abhängigkeit in Freiheit umwandelt.75 
  
Ratzinger compares the two alternative models and co cludes that human beings will 
only succeed in destroying their redemption – destroying themselves – if they eliminate love 
so as “to be on the safe side” and say “no” to “creation as love and to mak[ing] that love the 
foundation of one’s life.”76 Ratzinger underscores the christological basis of this by invoking 
the crucified God as the visible certainty that creation is the trustworthy expression of 
dependency in the form of love.77  
The fundamental Christian attitude to creatureliness is one of humility – not in a mere 
ethical sense, but humility of being: “being as receiving, accepting oneself as created nd 
                                                          
74 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 92 (“In the Gnostic view of the world, whether ancient or modern, creation 
appears as dependence, and God as the reason for dependence. . . . The Gnostic option aims at knowledge and at 
power through knowledge, the only reliable redemption of humankind. Gnosticism will not entrust itself to a 
world already created but only to the world still to be created. There is no need for trust, only skill” [Ratzinger, 
In the Beginning, 97]). 
75 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 93 (“[. . .] there is nothing degrading about dependence when it takes the 
form of love, for then it is no longer dependence, th  diminishing of self though competition with others. 
Dependence in the form of love precisely constitutes the self as self and sets it free, because love ess ntially 
takes the form of saying, ‘I want you to be.’ It is creativity, the only creative power, which can bring forth the 
other without envy or loss of self. Humans are dependent – that is the primary truth about them. And because it 
is, only love can redeem them, for only love transforms dependence into freedom” [Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 
98-99]). 
76 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 99. 
77 See Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 91-105. See also this dissertation § 3.2.1. 
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dependent on ‘love’.”78 If we try to undermine our nature, we rob it of its worth.  We end up 
with what Ratzinger calls a “monism of grace.”79 Ratzinger cites the text of 1Cor 15:46, 
saying we must not skip the sequence of physical first, then the spiritual, for if we do, 
creation is denied and grace is deprived of its foundation. Human dependency is not the 
removal of our particularity or uniqueness, but rather the freedom to share in the fullness of 
our identity:   
Eine Selbstlosigkeit, die das eigene Ich aufheben will, verfällt der Ichlosigkeit und 
wird so gerade auch Du-Losigkeit. Als Verlästerung der Schöpfung kann sie nie 
Vehikel der Gnade werden, sondern nur des “odium generis humani,” der gnostischen 
Zerfallenheit mit der Schöpfung, die zuletzt auch keine Gnade mehr will und wollen 
kann. . . . Die christlichen Liebe muß aber als Glaube an den Schöpfer zugleich die 
Annahme meiner selbst als Schöpfung und das Lieben der Schöpfung des Schöpfers 
in mir selbst enthalten und zu der Freiheit, mich anzunehmen wie irgendein Glied am 
Leib Christi hinführen.80  
In order not to undermine human nature, but maintain the truth of its dependency, 
Ratzinger says the doctrine of creation is inseparably included within the doctrine of 
redemption. Redemption is based on an irrevocable “yes” to creation, to the truth of human 
nature, whereas “[t]he fundamental opposition set up by modernity between loving and 
making turns out to be identical with the opposition between trusting being and doubting 
being (the forgetting of being, the refusal of being).”81 This is significant in Ratzinger’s 
search to uncover the inadequacies in the modern synthesis of thought, with its over-
optimistic belief in progress and in creativity whic  binds humanity to the production of the 
world, as opposed to the meaning of dependency inhere t in the doctrine of creation. It is a 
burden of existence which the creatum – the created – cannot bear and was never designed to 
                                                          
78 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 99. 
79 Ibid., 94. 
80 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 90 (“A selflessness that tries to abolish one’s own ‘I’ degenerates into ‘I-
lessness’ and then ‘Thou-lessness’ follows directly. This undermining of creation can never become a vhicle of 
grace, but only of an odium generis humani [hatred for human race], a Gnostic disenchantment with creation, 
which ultimately does not and cannot desire grace any longer. . . . No, Christian love presupposes faith in the 
Creator. It must include acceptance of myself as his creature and love of the Creator’s creation in me; it must 
lead to the freedom to accept myself as well as any other member of the Body of Christ” (Ratzinger, In the 
Beginning, 94-95]). See Tacitus, The Annals 15.44. 
81 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 100. 
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bear. The truth of creatureliness resides in the “hopelessness of taking a stand against creation 
[for] [e]ven ‘creativity’ can only work with the creatum of the given creation.”82 For 
Ratzinger, we proceed authentically with the future only if we do not lose creation.83 
4.1.4. Dialogically Related in Christ to God  
 
A genuine correspondence between Creator and creature which, to Ratzinger’s mind, 
supplants the “monologue of the self-sufficient mind” with “the fateful dialogue of God with 
man,” leads him to speak about the idea of dialogischen Hinordnung auf Gott or a posture of 
dialogical orientation with regard to God.84 At this point in Ratzinger’s discussion of human 
freedom, there is a convergence of creation and covenant. In this subdivision we will see the 
significance which Ratzinger places in the movement of creation towards Sinai, the place of 
covenant, of worship, of sacrificial submission, and of liberation. It is God’s will that the 
entire life of God’s people be directed towards a posture of dialogical orientation through the 
cultic, eschatological and social elements of what R tzinger calls the “Sabbath structure of 
creation.” In effect, the movement towards Sinai becomes a pathway to a lifestyle 
conforming to a posture of liberating dialogical orientation.  
Ratzinger’s christology informs the direction of his reflections here. While to God 
alone can be ascribed the fullness of freedom, becaus  only God is the possession of being in 
totality, he says that does not mean that humanity must retreat into its creaturely shell without 
                                                          
82 Ibid. 
83 The importance of this has never left Ratzinger. As recently as 2011, he made the same assertion: “[T]he 
unredeemed state of the world consists precisely in the failure to understand the meaning of creation, in the 
failure to recognise truth; as a result, the rule of pragmatism is imposed, by which the strong arm of the 
powerful becomes the god of this world” (Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 193). It is interesting to 
note too, that in Benedict XVI’s speech to the Pontifical Council Cor unum of 19 January 2013, he expressed in 
positive terms the anthropology which the Church is committed to promoting. He described it as “the promotion 
of man according to God's plan, man in his integral dignity, with respect for his twofold vertical and horizontal 
dimension. . . . The Christian vision of man is, in fact, a great ‘yes’ to the dignity of the person called to intimate 
communion with God, a filial communion, humble and confident. The human being is neither an individual 
subsisting in himself nor an anonymous element of the collective. He is rather a singular and unrepeatable 
person intrinsically ordered to relationship and sociality.” See 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2013/january/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20130119_pc-corunum_it.html (accessed 20 January 2013). 
84 See Ratzinger, Dogma und Verkündigung, 309-10. For translation, see Dogma and Preaching, 270. 
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hope of greatness and remain somehow incomplete in the dilemma of finitude. Ratzinger is 
convinced that, as a goal, “being like God” remains the correct one. Achieving the way to it 
depends on coming to terms with the truth – the possibilities and parameters – of 
creatureliness and the will of the Creator. To be lik  God is to be like the trinitarian God 
which is to be like Christ crucified. From a pauline perspective, Ratzinger has understood 
freedom not as indeterminacy but as participation – “ ot just participation in a given social 
structure, but participation in being itself.”85 This is the comprehensive meaning of 
divinisation and the destiny of the covenant between God and creation – “yes” to the “yes” of 
God: 
Der Mensch ist nicht unübersteiglich in seine Endlichkeit eingeschlossen. Gewiß, er 
muß zunächst seine Endlichkeit anzunehmen lernen. Er muß anerkennen, daß er nicht 
autark und nicht autonom ist. Er muß die Lüge der Beziehungslosigkeit und der 
Beliebigkeit aufgeben. Er muß ja sagen zu seiner Bedürftigkeit, ja zum anderen, ja zur 
Schöpfung, ja zur Grenze und zur Weisung seines eigen n Wesens. Frei ist noch 
nicht, wer bloß zwischen Beliebigem wählen kann.86 
For Ratzinger, the biblical account of creation presents an alternative way of speaking 
about reality to that of the modern synthesis. It is marked by numbers that do not merely 
reproduce the universe’s mathematical structure, but the inner design of its fabric – in other 
words, the idea according to which it was constructed. Ratzinger places an emphasis on the 
presence of the number seven. For him, the scheme of seven days governs the whole. It 
heralds the rhythm of life, including human life. He concludes that “we human beings are not 
bounded by the limits of our own little ‘I’ but that we are part of the rhythm of the universe . . 
. and thus, thanks to this interlinking, are fitted into the logic of the universe.”87 But this 
                                                          
85 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 188. 
86 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 243 (“Man is not inescapably enclosed in his finitude. Certainly, he 
must first learn to accept his finitude. He must recognise that he is not self-sufficient and autonomous. He must 
give up the lie of unrelatedness and of arbitrariness. He must say Yes to his neediness, Yes to the other, Yes to 
creation, Yes to the limits and precepts of his own essence. He who can merely choose between arbitrary 
options is not yet free” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 255]). 
87 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 26-27. For his exegesis of Genesis 1:1-2:4, Ratzinger relies on Claus 
Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion (London: SPCK, 1984), 74-177; Gerhard 
von Rad, Genesis, trans. John H. Marks (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1963), 4 -65; Josef Scharbert, Genesis 1-11 
(Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1983). Along with the number seven, he highlights the number ten. The words “God 
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numerical-typology is not only connected to the cosmic significance and rhythm of “seven.” 
The deeper meaning of the rhythm itself is that “[c]reation is oriented to the sabbath, which is 
the sign of the covenant between God and humankind.”88 This leads him to say that creation 
is designed in such a way that it is oriented to worship. Created reality is assigned its proper 
significance when it lives with a view to worship – worship being the freedom to take up a 
dialogical orientation with regard to truth and love which converge as one with God’s will for 
his people: 
Anbetung in einem richtigen Sinn verstanden heißt, daß ich mein Wesen erst als 
Beziehungssein, richtig lebe, daß ich damit die innere Idee meines Seins richig lebe. 
Und dann ist es ein Leben, das auf den Willen Gottes, nämlich auf das Einverständnis 
mit der Wahrheit und mit der Liebe zugeht. Es geht nicht darum, irgend etwas zu 
machen, damit Gott auch seine Freude hat. Anbetung heißt, den Pfeilflug unseres 
Daseins anzunehmen. Zu akzeptieren, daß nichts Endliches mein Zweck ist und mich 
daher verpflichten kann, sondern daß ich hinausreiche über alle anderen Zwecke. 
Nämlich in das innere Einssein mit dem, der mich als Beziehungspartner gewollt hat 
und mir gerade darin die Freiheit gegeben hat.89     
In the realm of worship, it is Christ’s perfect obedience to the Father – above all on 
the Cross – which opens the definitive sphere of human liberation. Christ takes on a human 
body and through it a new obedience becomes possible which surpasses all human efforts at 
abiding in the covenant: “[o]ur own morality is insufficient for the proper worship of God” in 
the sense that Christ’s “perfect obedience”, which fulfilled love on the cross, “draws us all 
with him and at the same time wipes away all our disobedience through his love.”90 In this 
understanding, the person of Christ becomes the true worship and the total answer to God in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
said” appear ten times underlining that the Ten Commandments are, as it were, “an echo of the creation; they are 
not arbitrary inventions for the purpose of erecting barriers to human freedom but signs pointing to the spirit, the 
language and meaning of creation; they are a translation of the language of the universe, a translation of God’s 
logic, which constructed the universe” (Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 26).       
88 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 27. 
89 Ratzinger, Gott und die Welt, 96 (“Worship, understood in the correct sense, means that I am truly myself 
only when I form relationships, that only then am I true to the inner ideal of my being. And my life is then 
tending toward the will of God, that is to say, toward a life more closely in agreement with truth andwith love. 
It is not a matter of doing something to please God. Worship means accepting that our life is like an arrow in 
flight. Accepting that nothing finite can be my goal r determine the direction of my life, but that I myself must 
pass beyond all possible goals. That is pass beyond them into being inwardly at one with him who wished me to 
exist as a partner in a relationship with him and who has given me freedom precisely in this” [Ratzinger, God 
and the World, 111-12]). 
90 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 235. 
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which we can participate. Matthew and Mark tell us that on the Mount of Olives, Jesus fell on 
his face (cf. Matt 26:39; Mark 32:35). Ratzinger says this is Jesus in “the prayer posture of 
extreme submission to the will of God, of radical self-offering to him.”91 In Christ the posture 
of dialogical orientation with regard to God is total. Ratzinger points out that our 
“metamorphosis” or “our being reshaped in a way that akes us beyond this world’s scheme 
of things. . . and into the will of God”  takes place in our being drawn into sacramental, 
bodily fellowship with Christ.92  
Ratzinger says that sacrifice is at the heart of all religious worship, but it is almost 
always viewed as having something to do with destruction – handing over to God a reality 
precious to humankind: something precious to the human being is taken from them for the 
appeasement of the heavens. This is a key moment in u derstanding human freedom because 
Ratzinger says the shape of true surrender to God looks very different – it is the union of 
humanity and creation with God: 
Gottzugehörigkeit hat nichts mit Zerstörung oder Nichtsein zu tun, wohl aber mit 
einer Weise des Seins: Sie bedeutet das Heraustreten aus dem Status der Trennung, 
der scheinbaren Autonomie, des Seins nur für sich selber und in sich selber.93 
Ratzinger says the true heart of sacrifice and the purpose of the world is “love-transformed 
mankind, the divinization of creation and the surrend r of all things to God: God all in all 
(1Cor 15:28).”94 This means, to his mind, that the goal of worship and the goal of creation, as 
a whole, are the same: “divinisation, a world of freedom and love.”95 This convergence 
implies that the pathway of history dynamically intertwines with the cosmic such that the 
doctrine of creation means “the cosmos is not a kind of closed building, a stationary container 
                                                          
91 Ibid., 153. This line of argumentation is in keeping with the New Testament tradition of humanity’s total self-
giving as a sacrifice of praise (cf. Heb 13:15-16; Pet 2:5). 
92 See Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 117-18. There are also strong echoes here of Ratzinger’s 
sacramental theology. See this dissertation § 5.1. 
93 Ratzinger, Der Geist Der Liturgie in GS:TL, 43 (“Belonging to God has nothing to do with destruction or 
non-being; it is rather a way of being. It means emerging from the state of separation, of apparent autonomy, of 
existing only for oneself and in oneself” [Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 28]). 




in which history may by chance take place. It is itself movement, from its one beginning to its 
one end.”96 Ratzinger calls this dynamic of worship “spiritual creation”: the inauguration of 
God’s dealings with humanity, the phenomenon whereby the covenant completes creation:  
[. . .] und so die geistige Schöpfung, die Schöpfung des Bundes, ohne den der 
geschaffene Kosmos ein leeres Gehäuse bliebe. So stehen Schöpfung und Geschichte, 
Schöpfung, Geschichte und Kult in einem Wechselverhältnis: Schöpfung wartet auf 
den Bund, aber der Bund vollendet die Schöpfung und bewegt sich nicht neben ihr. 
Wenn aber der Kult – recht verstanden – die Seele des Bundes ist, dann heißt dies, 
dass er nicht nur den Menschen rettet, sondern die ganze Wirklichkeit in die 
Gemeinschaft mit Gott hineinziehen soll.97 
 
However, respect for the right of the free creature o utter “no” to the will of God the 
Creator puts into context, for Ratzinger, the belief that the truest goal of the Exodus from 
Egypt was “Sinai”98: a place to worship God rightly in obedience to the Law and the 
Covenant, so that an order of freedom can prevail oer the pre-Exodus disorder of caprice. 
This context demonstrates the precise chronology of Ratzinger’s theology: Creation because 
Covenant. Only this allows the human person to utter “yes” to the will of the Creator because 
this sequence of events demonstrates the purpose of cr ation. He says that “if creation is 
meant to be a space for the covenant, the place where God and man meet one another, then it 
must be thought of as a space for worship.”99 
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 Ratzinger, Der Geist Der Liturgie in GS:TL, 43 (“Thus begins the spiritual creation, the creation of the 
covenant, without which the created cosmos would be an mpty shell. Creation and history, creation history, and 
worship are in a relationship of reciprocity. Creation looks toward the covenant, but the covenant completes 
creation and does not simply exist alone with it. Now if worship, rightly understood, is the soul of the covenant, 
then it not only saves mankind but is also meant to draw the whole of reality into communion with God” 
[Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 27]). See also Credo for Today, 46. 
98 On the theological significance of “Sinai” from the Christian perspective, see Ratzinger, The Spirit of the 
Liturgy, 13-23. 
99 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 26. In Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 103-27, 
Ratzinger engages with the work of Rabbi Jacob Neusner (b. 1932), and subscribes to his assessment of the real 
and valid content of the Sabbath: “[o]n that day we do celebrate creation. For six days we make things; on the 
seventh, we appreciate them. . . . [However] not working on the Sabbath stands for more than nit-picking r tual. 
It is a way of imitating God” (Jacob Neusner, A Rabbi Talks with Jesus [McGill-Queen’s University Press: 
Montreal, 2000], 74-75). This prompts Ratzinger to add that “the Sabbath is therefore not just a negative matter 
of not engaging in outward activities, but a positive matter of ‘resting,’ which must also be expressed in a spatial 
dimension. . . . The Sabbath is not just a matter of personal piety; it is the core of the social order” (Ratzinger, 
Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 108). Ratzinger goes on to cite Neusner again on the theme 
of “rest” which is an integral element of the Sabbath: “[t]his day makes eternal Israel what it is, the people that, 
like God in creating the world, rest from creation on the seventh day” (Neusner, A Rabbi Talks with Jesus, 74). 
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In order to further the link between creation and covenant, Ratzinger depicts the 
Sabbath as “the day when the human being, in the freedom of worship, participates in God’s 
freedom, in God’s rest, and thus in God’s peace.”100 The Sabbath, Ratzinger believes, 
provides “a vision of freedom,” whereby “creation moves toward the Sabbath, to that day on 
which man and the whole created order participates in God’s rest, in his freedom.”101 
Ratzinger says the inner biblical view is that creation and worship belong together. The 
Sabbath is the sign of the covenant between God and humanity – by summing up the inward 
essence of the covenant, it reveals the intention behind the account of creation: 
Schöpfung ist, damit ein Ort sei für den Bund, den Gott mit den Menschen schließen 
will. Das Ziel der Schöpfung ist der Bund, die Liebesgeschichte zwischen Gott und 
Mensch. Die Freiheit und die Gleichheit der Menschen, die der Sabbat wirken soll, ist 
keine rein anthropologische oder soziologische Vision; sie ist nur theologisch 
denkbar: Nur wenn der Mensch im Bund mit Gott steht, wird er frei, erscheint die 
Gleichheit und die Würde aller Menschen.102 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ratzinger had previously expressed a similar view, whereby creation and covenant are not merely ordered 
towards one another but that “right from the start creation came to be so that there would be a place for the 
covenant. . . .[T]he covenant can only exist if it conforms to the yardstick of creation” (Ratzinger, A New Song 
for the Lord, 84). In an even more focused comment, with regard to the Jewish feast of Atonement, he confirms 
that the purpose of creation is nothing other than t e bringing of God and humanity into harmonious relationship 
– into a singular relational “yes”: “According to rabbinic theology, the idea of the covenant – the idea of 
establishing a holy people to be an interlocutor for G d in union with him – is prior to the idea of the creation of 
the world, and supplies its inner motive. The cosmo was created, not that there might be manifold things n 
heaven and earth, but that there might be a space for the covenant, for the loving ‘yes’ between God an his 
human respondent. Each year the Feast of Atonement restores this harmony, this inner meaning of the world that 
is constantly disrupted by sin, and it therefore marks the high point of the liturgical year” (Ratzinger, Jesus of 
Nazareth. Holy Week, 78). Celebrated on the 10th day of the seventh month, the Day of Atonement was the day 
when Israel’s sins were repented and atoned for. Only in this ceremony was the sacrificial blood of the sin-
offering applied to the inner sanctuary, the Holy of H lies (cf. Lev 16:1ff; 23:26ff; Num 29:7ff). The national 
guilt of Israel was laid symbolically upon a “scapegoat” who was then expelled into the desert (cf. Lev 16:8, 10, 
20, 26). For more on the connections between covenant and creation, see works by Bernhard W. Anderson, ed., 
Creation in the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984); Bernhard W. Anderson, Creation versus 
Chaos: The Reinterpretation of the Mythical Symbolism n the Bible (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); From 
Creation to New Creation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994). 
100 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 30-31. On Ratzinger’s theology of the Sabbath and the day of God’s freedom, 
see also The God of Jesus Christ, 20; A New Song for the Lord, 80-89; The Spirit of the Liturgy, 24-34; Jesus of 
Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 106-22; Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 257-59; “Eucharist, 
Communion and Solidarity” (Benevento: June 2002), 
http://www.doctrinafidei.va/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20020602_ratzinger- eucharistic-congress_en.html 
(accessed 24 May 2011).   
101 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 25. 
102 Ratzinger, Der Geist der Liturgie, in GS:TL, 42 (“Creation exists to be the place of the covenant that God 
wants to make with man. The goal of creation is the covenant, the love story of God and man. The freedom and 
equality of men, which the Sabbath is meant to bring about, is not a merely anthropological or sociological 
vision; it can only be understood theo-logically. Only when man is in covenant with God does he become free. 
Only then are the equality and dignity of all men made manifest” [Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 26]). 
Ratzinger views the significance of this Sabbath ordinance within creation through the lens of an observation 
from 2Chro 36:21: “All the days that it lay desolate it kept Sabbath to fulfil seventy years.” Ratzinger says that 
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Describing the link between creation and covenant as “ he Sabbath structure of 
Creation,” Ratzinger says it speaks of the rhythm of freedom, leisure and worship in life.103 
Celebrating the Sabbath, which means celebrating the covenant, implies returning to the 
source and wiping away the defilement which human activity accumulates over time. 
Celebrating Sabbath is an act of “going forth into a new world in which there will be no 
longer slaves and master but only free children of G d – into a world in which humans and 
animals and the earth itself will share together as kin in God’s peace and freedom.”104 
Ratzinger believes this is the context for Christ’s de ire to clarify the meaning of the Sabbath. 
In the Old Testament, the Sabbath is the day when fraternal fellowship of all creatures is re-
established in the midst of a world where equality nd freedom are absent: 
An ihm kehrt die Schöpfung für eine Atemlänge lang wieder an ihren Ausgangspunkt 
zurück: An ihm sind alle frei von der Freiheit Gottes her. Das Wirken Jesu am Sabbat 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Israel’s self-examination during the Exile, led to the Chronicler’s observation that while Palestine lay empty 
during the exilic period, Israel remained free to enjoy the Sabbaths it had missed because of infidelity to the 
Torah and Covenant. In this way, harmony with creation was being restored so that the exiles may return. For 
the Exiles “looking back, all other sins seem secondary in the face of this fundamental unfaithfulness, in the face 
of this locking oneself into the self-made world of work which negates God’s sovereignty” (Ratzinger, A New 
Song for the Lord, 86). The Exile was the consequence of Israel’s “no” to the will of God the Creator. The 
reason for the seemingly inordinate punishment of God upon his people and upon himself through the loss of the 
land, the Temple and even worship lies in the people’s rejection of God’s rest with its attendant leisure, worship, 
peace and freedom: “They brought the earth into the slavery of their activity and thereby enslaved thems lves. 
Therefore God had to give them the Sabbath that they denied themselves. In their ‘no’ to the God-given rhythm 
of freedom and leisure they departed from their likeness to God and so did damage to the earth. Therefor  they 
had to be snatched from their obstinate attachment to their own work. God had to begin afresh to make them his 
very own, and he had to free them from the dominatio  of activity, Operi Dei nihil praeponatur: The worship of 
God, his freedom and his rest come first. Thus and only thus can the human being truly live. . . . The Cr ator 
alone is humanity’s true saviour, and only if we trus  the Creator shall we find ourselves on the way to saving 
the world of human beings and of things” (Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 32-39). Ratzinger quotes from the rule 
of St Benedict: Operi Dei nihil praeponatur – “Nothing must be put before the service of God.” Ratzinger 
believes this is not an expression of otherworldly piety but a clear and sober translation of the creation account 
and its meaning. He says “[n]othing ought to be prefer d to the work of God . . . This phrase represents the 
correct attitude with respect to the preservation of creation as opposed to the false worship of progress, the 
worship of changes that crush humankind, and the calumny against the human species that destroys the earth
and creation and keeps it from its goal’ (ibid. 38-39). 
103 See Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 30. His application of this phrase is inspired especially by the work of Karl 
Heinz Schwarte, Die Vorgeschichte der augustinischen Weltalterlehre (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt-Verlag, 1966), 
220-56. Also of interest in this area is Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. Alexander Dru (New 
York: Pantheon Books. 1952). 
104 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 31. Ratzinger wants to underline the fact that the Mosaic law developed from 
the idea that the Sabbath brings about universal equality. The Sabbath ordinance was extended from the weekly 
Sabbath to include every seventh year as a Sabbath during which earth and human beings can rest in a public 
way. Furthermore, every seventh year times seven was called a great Sabbath year in which all debt was to be 
remitted and all purchases and sales annulled. In this way the earth was to be received back from the creating 
hands of God, and everyone begins anew. See 2Chr 36:21. In historical terms, it appears that this latter 
ordinance was never carried out in full.  
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richtet sich nicht gegen den Sabbat, sondern ist ein Kampf um seinen ursprünglichen 
Sinn: ihn als Tag der Gottesfreiheit zu wahren und ih  nicht unter den Händen der 
Kasuisten zu seinem eigenen Gegenteil, zu einem Tag verquälter Kleinlichkeit 
werden zu lassen.105 
 
If it can be maintained that the Sabbath is more than a pious ritual, as Ratzinger says, 
then he argues that only the honouring of the full breadth of the Sabbath rest - its cultic, 
social and eschatological elements – can guarantee the space for dialogical orientation with 
regard to the covenantal relationship between God and his creation. The Sabbath is cultic in 
as much as it signals the rhythm and relationality between God and creature – “the Sabbath is 
the day of God’s freedom and the day of human participation in God’s freedom”106; the 
Sabbath is social in that it is more than remembrance of Israel’s liberation from slavery – it is 
“an active exercise of freedom” anticipating “creation’s release from anxiety”107; it is 
eschatological in that through the opening up of the messianic age “we become practiced in 
the way of life of the world to come.”108 To Ratzinger’s mind, only these dimensions 
permeating one another provide the correct understanding of the unifying nature of the 
biblical creation account and worship: “[h]ere cult means the liberation of humans through 
their participation in the freedom of God and thus the liberation of creation itself, its release 
into the freedom of the children of God.”109    
                                                          
105 Joseph Ratzinger, Der Gott Jeus Christi: Betrachtungen über den Dreieinigen Gott (München: Kösel, 2006), 
23-24 (“On the Sabbath, the creation returns for a moment to its point of origin. On the Sabbath, all are free, 
thanks to God’s own freedom. Jesus’ working on the Sabbath is not directed against the Sabbath. Rather he is 
fighting to establish its original meaning, preserving it as the day of God’s freedom, so that the hands of the 
casuists may not pervert it into the opposite, that is, a day of tormented petty-mindedness” [Ratzinger, The God 
of Jesus Christ, 20-21]). Some may question Ratzinger’s use of the Sabbath in defence of the Christian doctrine 
of freedom, but see his A New Song for the Lord, 87-89, where he defends his approach by saying that 
theologies that oscillate between a form of Marcionism and politico-socio interpretation of the inter-
testamentary period fail to grasp the true essence of the Scriptures. For example, Ratzinger says that at the time 
of Jesus’ defence of the Sabbath, the real significance of it was not at issue; rather, the point was “to defend the 
essential meaning of the Sabbath as a feast of freedom over against a practice that has turned it into a day of 
nonfreedom” (87). 
106 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 85. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid., 86. 
109 Ibid., 87. 
207 
 
The sphere in which one will come to utter one’s “yes” will be during the course of 
one’s lifetime and in the context of “spiritual creation” in history. This cosmic alignment is of 
great consequence and is represented in Ratzinger’s understanding of the spiritual creation of 
God’s will whose end lies in covenantal relationship, in dialogical orientation, in the 
realisation of humanity’s presence in the midst of G d – in divinization. There is a tension 
and a potentiality inherent in the human response of “yes” or “no” to God’s “yes.” Ratzinger 
expresses this tension through the dialectic of the modern synthesis and a Christian 
philosophy of freedom. To this we now turn.   
4.2.   Comparing the Modern and Christian Syntheses   
 
A key moment in coming to terms with the shape of human freedom in Ratzinger’s 
anthropology is his depiction of a dialectic between the modern synthesis and his cultural 
diagnosis on the one hand, and the Christian synthesis and its philosophy of freedom, on the 
other.110 Up to now, this chapter has been coming to terms with how Ratzinger builds his 
argument for human and divine relations in a sphere governed by reason, love and freedom. It 
now examines the merits of his argument when set against his understanding of the flow of 
contemporary cultural developments. 
Firstly, let us briefly recall Ratzinger’s characterisation of “functional truth,” which 
encapsulates the rationalism which is at play when he looks at the modern synthesis and the 
expanding one-sided understandings of freedom:   
An dieser Stelle ist man als moderner Mensch versucht zu sagen: Uns ist dank der 
Wissenschaft die Schöpfung lesbar geworden. . . . Ja wirklich, in der großartigen 
Mathematik der Schöpfung, die wir im genetischen Code des Menschen heute lesen 
können, vernehmen wir die Sprache Gottes. Aber leider nicht die ganze Sprache. Die 
funktionelle Wahrheit über den Menschen ist sichtbar geworden. Aber die Wahrheit 
über ihn selbst – wer er ist, woher er kommt, was er soll und was das Gute ist oder das 
Böse – die kann man leider auf solche Weise nicht lesen. Mit der wachsenden 
Erkenntnis der funktionellen Wahrheit scheint vielmhr eine zunehmende Erblindung 
                                                          
110 See this dissertation § 2.2.4. See also Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 128-37. On the understanding 
of the Christian synthesis, see ibid., 112-17, 162-63, 177-80; Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 255. 
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für “die Wahrheit” selbst Hand in Hand zu gehen – für die Frage nach dem, was wir 
wirklich sind und was wir wirklich sollen.111  
With his modern synthesis, Ratzinger captures a particular philosophical viewpoint 
predicated on conveying “the feeling of breaking through barriers and of liberation . . . that 
do not hold man in the tiresome balance of faith but offer him practical forms of self-
redemption.”112 It promotes the withdrawal of the idea of God to the private realm and the 
extinguishing of the objective “Good” which informs our knowledge of the good. As a result, 
the one God is not so much seen as life’s originating principle, but as remote and 
unconcerned about what happens and what causes strif  in the earthly realm. The 
phenomenon arises where “worship is directed, not to the only good one . . . but to the many 
ambiguous powers who concretely beset our life and with whom one must come to terms.”113 
In keeping with his understanding of the desire to get behind the monotheistic revolution, 
Ratzinger describes this as a “chronic defection frm the one God.”114 For Ratzinger, this 
defection from the principle that upholds life generat s a one-sidedness that leads in the 
direction of modern rationalism and the gradual exclusion of the elements of the Christian 
synthesis: 
Der Mensch, der den einen guten Grund aller Dinge als zu fern, zu unsicher und zu 
unwichtig ausklammert, um sich statt dessen den näheren Mächten zuzuswenden, 
erniedrigt sich selbst. Die Dekomposition der christlichen Synthese, vor der wir 
stehen, muß im letzten auch zu einer Desintegration des Menschen selbst führen.115 
                                                          
111 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 217 (“At this point, modern man is tempted to say: 
Creation has become intelligible to us through science. . . . Indeed, in the magnificent mathematics of creation, 
which today we can read in the human genetic code, we recognise the language of God. But unfortunately not 
the whole language. The functional truth about man h s been discovered. But the truth about man himself – who 
he is, where he comes from, what he should do, whatis right, what is wrong – this unfortunately cannot be read 
in the same way. Hand in hand with growing knowledge of functional truth there seems to be an increasing 
blindness toward ‘truth’ itself – toward the question of real identity and purpose” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. 
Holy Week, 193]). See also Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 110-17. 
112 Ibid., 162. 
113 Ibid., 163. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 115 (“The man who excludes the one good foundation of all things as too 
distant, too uncertain and too unimportant, so that he may turn instead to the powers that lie closer at hand, 
abases himself. The decomposition of the Christian synthesis facing us must ultimately also lead to a 
disintegration of man himself” [Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 163-64]). 
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When this view is contrasted with Ratzinger’s Christian synthesis, it takes us into the inner 
workings of his philosophy of freedom. We will now consider these two philosophical 
viewpoints in Ratzinger’s writings.  
4.2.1. A Christian Philosophy of Freedom: Synthesis of Thinking, Willing and Feeling 
The actual content of Ratzinger’s “Christian synthesis” is something he outlines as a 
philosophical principle. He presents a synthesis of thinking, willing and feeling as a 
summation, or more accurately, as a culmination of his overall approach to authentic 
freedom.116 To begin with, he says authentic freedom takes shape when “essence, willing and 
acting [“Wessen, Wollen und Tun”] have at last coincided in [man]. . . . In this way, man can 
touch the infinite in the finite, and unite himself to it, and thus become infinite precisely in 
the recognition of limits.”117 This resonates closely with Ratzinger’s three-fold pattern of 
divinisation which he describes in terms of participat on, identification and education in the 
way, the truth and the life of being. Furthermore, f om an anthropological perspective, 
Ratzinger’s presentation consists of a triadic formulation echoing the imperatives to accept 
the truth of creaturely essence, to enter the prayer of the Son, and to submit to a dialogical 
orientation of trust with the meaning that upholds one’s life.118  
In a noteworthy, indeed informative change in terminology that helps us understand 
Ratzinger’s rationale, he recognises the challenging nature of this philosophy: “This synthesis 
of understanding, will and feeling [“Verstand, Wille und Gefühl”] is not easy.”119 If we 
                                                          
116 See Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 112-17, 162-63, 177-80. 
117 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 255. The original German text can be found in Kirche, Ökumene 
und Politik, 243.  
118 See this dissertation §§ 3.2.3.2. and 4.1.3.2. 
119 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 162. The original German text can be found in Wendezeit für Europa, 
114. There are two other formulations of the Christian syntheis in Ratzinger’s writings which are similar, 
namely “understanding, will and heart” in Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 296 and “reason, will and emotion” in A 
Turning Point for Europe, 179. It is impossible to ignore the echoes of St. Augustine’s philosophy of memory 
(see esp. De Trinitate, and chapters 10 and 11 of the Confessions) in Ratzinger’s account of the Christian 
synthesis. Although Ratzinger himself doesn’t allude to it, there can be little doubt that he is persuaded by 
Augustinian thought here. In De Trinitate, Augustine seeks the image of God in the human soul.This is because 
he was already convinced that Gen 1:26 implies that the image of God in human beings is to be found in the 
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consider both formulations of his philosophy of freedom, we find, in the first instance, that 
“essence” and “understanding” are two sides of the one search for truth. From the perspective 
of Ratzinger’s reflections on human freedom, the trajectory of this search is towards the 
acceptance of creatureliness, the mode and object of which is an authentic participation in the 
life of being itself. This object is enhanced by considering the category of “will” or “willing.” 
This calls to mind the figure of Christ and relationality within God – the filial, dialogical 
worship conducted in God. Christ becomes the sphere of access for humanity into the 
legitimate identification with the truth of being. Christ discloses this sphere for us in two 
respects. On the one hand, the essence of the Incarnate Son’s assent to the Father’s will is 
revealed. On the other hand, the possibility of coming to terms with the truth of the creaturely 
essence frees up the human person for realistic and fruitful relationality in a posture 
consistent with a dialogical orientation with regard to God. In other words, the universal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
incorporeal soul (cf. Conf. 3.7.12; 5.10. 19-20). This led him to single out three aspects of the mind – memory, 
understanding and will – which are not three separate minds but one mind. Like the persons of the Trinity they 
are three related as one by mutual relations (cf. Trin. 10.11.18). There is on-going debate about the significance 
of memory within Augustine’s writings, particularly in the move from Platonic reminiscence to his later belief 
in the illumination of the mind by the light of eternal reason. However, there seems to be agreement that the 
philosophy of memory is conducted through a “typical Augustinian move from the exterior to the interior and 
from the inferior to the superior.” See Roland Teske, “Augustine’s Philosophy of Memory” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Augustine, ds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 148-58, at 151. In the search for the “int rior” and “superior,” Augustine’s discussion f memory, 
understanding and will is engaged in coming to terms with the search for happiness which is to rejoice v r 
God, for God and because of God (cf. Conf. 10.22.32). And if God is the truth, then joy in the truth is the happy 
life (ibid., 10.22.33). The dynamic behind Augustine’s philosophy is that each human recollection involves a 
trinity: “that which is hidden in memory even before it is thought of, that which results in thought when it is 
seen, and the will which forms a link between the two of these” (Trin. 11.7.12). There can be false memories to 
which the will ignores the true object of its remembering (ibid. 11.8.15), but there is also, according to 
Augustine, a case for saying that memory does not merely commit events and sounds to itself. Rather it 
understands and falls in love with them: “But when we believe to be true what we hold in thought and love what 
we ought to love, we then live in accord with the trini y of the inner man” (ibid., 13.20.26). There is even a 
sacramental tone to Augustine’s reflections. The words we speak aloud are signs of the inner words that we have 
come to understand and love (cf. ibid., 15.11.20). Ratzinger doesn’t use the word “memory” when he speaks 
about the philosophy of freedom but uses the words “es ence,” “understanding” and “thinking.” Indeed, in 
Called to Communion, 114, Ratzinger gives a clear indication of what he se ks to imply here, by using the 
terminology of “knowledge” alongside that of understanding and will. He maintains that without the apostles’ 
communion with Jesus, their knowledge, understanding and will remains obsolete in respect of the apostolic 
mission.This is quite significant as regards where Ratzinger is coming from when he invokes his triadic 
philosophy of freedom. At the heart of it, both Ratzinger and Augustine refer to a similar dynamic – that there is 
a primacy of memory or knowledge just as there is a primacy of the Father who is first in the Trinity, “for 
without memory, the gaze of our thought has no object to return to” (Trin. 15.21.41). Hence we see Ratzinger’s 
rationale for spending a lot of time coming to terms with the meaning that upholds us – the object of our 




promise of salvation and the particular response of humanity are validly reconciled in the 
person of the Son. This is further illuminated by looking at the third component of 
Ratzinger’s formula: “acting” and “feeling.” Here, once more, one is confronted with 
mutually inclusive ideas. Within the sphere of divine-human relationality, the meaning that 
upholds comes into focus as the prospective ground upon which to build one’s life. This 
meaning, if it can be found to be trustworthy, allows one to act, to feel and therefore to love. 
It is the gift of love received and the act of love undertaken which ultimately educate the 
human person in the way of being and towards an authentic “being like God” existence.   
In the Christian synthesis, all three elements coincide in the expression of authentic 
freedom. Consequently, feeling meets reason and for Ratzinger, this aspect is a particular 
flashpoint for much of the one-sided theological and ecclesiological misunderstandings of the 
age. In the 19th century, he says, “an intellectual truce” was introduced between feeling and 
reason, particularly through the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) who had been 
striving to save religion from the excesses of reason by defining it as feeling and taste for the 
infinite.120 However, this undermined both elements. The concept of “reason” was injured 
because it became detached from meaning, causing it to resign itself to the realm of what is 
functional and to accepting itself as no longer capable of recognising the truth of existence 
about humanity, creation and God. It also damaged “f eling,” introducing an apersonal piety 
which corresponds to an apersonal philosophy lacking the courage to believe in the personal 
God who hears us via a bond of relationality. As a result, “[w]e no longer dare for the most 
part to presume that we could recognise truth in the essence of our questioning. This false 
humility abases man, making our action blind and our feeling empty.”121  
                                                          
120 See Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 113-15. For a concise introduction to Schleiermacher and the 
origins of modern theology, see Martin Henry, On Not Understanding God (Dublin: The Columba Press, 1997), 
140-160.   
121 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 113-14. 
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In this scenario, all religions exist merely on theplane of higher emotion and, 
therefore, are interchangeable. They become vehicles to serve “the noblest goals of mankind 
with the thrust of the best feelings and to be instruments for the construction of a society of 
universal peace.”122 However, Ratzinger is clear that while universal peace is a noble goal, “a 
religion that is nothing more than a means to attain p rticular goals is debased just as much as 
a religion that is allowed to govern only as feeling.”123 While it is certainly the case that 
“reason” and “feeling” are components of religious activity in general and Christianity in 
particular, Ratzinger says they can “retain their power only when they do not lose their own 
inherent interconnection. This interconnection consists in the fact that faith takes up feeling 
and redeems it from its indeterminacy by giving it its true ground: the feeling for the infinite 
is based on the truth that there exists an infinite God and that he addresses us, the finite 
ones.”124  
At this stage, yet another citation from Ratzinger’s philosophy of freedom adds an 
additional and important perspective. When he refers to the “[c]ooperation of thinking, 
willing and feeling in faith [denken, wollen und fühlen],” 125 he explains that his vision 
consists of a Christian philosophy of freedom as a reality born out of faith. He goes on to say, 
its supreme manifestation consists of the relational e counter of two freedoms, divine and 
human, in dialogical orientation:  
Christliches Beten . . . ist Antwort von Freiheit auf Freiheit, Begegnung der Liebe. 
Wiederum trägt die Tendenz zur apersonalen Frömmigkeit ein Stück Wahrheit in 
sich: Sie sucht nach der Überwindung der Differenz, die uns von dem anderen und 
von den anderen trennt. Aber die Rücknahme des Seins, die Resignation, die darin 
liegt, rettet nicht. Wenn die Begegnung zweier Freiheiten Liebe wird, dann gerade 
geschieht Überwindung der Differenz. Nicht die Leugn ng der Person, sondern ihr 
                                                          
122 Ibid., 114. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., Joseph Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 114-15. 
125 Ibid., 112. The original German text can be found in Wendezeit für Europa, 77. See also The Yes of Jesus 
Christ, 112; God and the World, 33. 
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höchster Akt, die Liebe, schafft jene Einheit, nach der wir uns als Geschöpfe des 
dreieinigen Gottes vom Grund unserer Existenz her sehnen.126  
Ratzinger opens up this insight of Christian freedom as a reality born of faith by saying it 
makes the highest demands on believers, because it greatly esteems the human person. The 
Christian synthesis sets a very elevated ideal when it asserts the convergence of one’s reason 
and feeling with one’s will as that which is in keeping with the truth of one’s being. This 
sharply contrasts, in Ratzinger’s view, with the philosophy underpinning modern rationalism, 
which on account of its “methodological self-limitat on, declares the irrational to be the 
origin of the rational.”127 Hence, the contours of modern rationalism’s relationship with 
reason and freedom are disclosed:   
Das schließt ein, daß [moderne Rationalismus] das Unfreie als Grund des Freien 
erklären muß, daß also Freiheit wie Vernunft ein Abfallprodukt aus der 
Selbstmontage  der Welt ist. Demgegenüber geht der Glaube, der den Logos als 
Anfang weiß, vom Primat der Freiheit aus. Nur die Bindung an den Logos 
gewährleistet die Freiheit als Strukturprinzip des Wirklichen.128 
 
4.2.2. Christian Freedom: Other than Indeterminacy  
 
It is the openness and uncontrollability of freedom that makes it so unsettling from the 
human perspective. The resistance to total regulation is also what permits authentic freedom 
to defy assimilation to the modern cultural dynamics of rationalism. Ultimately, in order to be 
genuine, love as an encounter between two freedoms evades total conceptual cohesion: 
[Die Philosophien des Notwendigen] bieten Gebrauchsanweisungen, um mit 
Notwendigkeit die bessere Welt herbeizuführen. Die Philosophie der Freiheit, die aus 
dem Glauben kommt, kann das nicht. Sie hat keine Weltformel. Oder besser gesagt: 
                                                          
126 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 80 (“Christian praying . . . is the response one fre dom makes to another 
freedom, an encounter of love. Once again, the tendency to apersonal piety bears a portion of truth in itself: it 
seeks to overcome the difference that separates us from the Other and from others. But the withdrawal of 
existence, the resignation that this contains, does n t ave. The difference is overcome precisely when t  
encounter of two freedoms becomes love. It is not the denial of the person but rather the person’s highest act, 
namely, love, that creates that unity for which we yearn from the depths of our existence, as creatures of the 
triune God” [Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 116-17]). 
127 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 115. 
128 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 79-80 (“This means that [modern rationalism] must declare the basis of 
freedom to be that which is not free, that is, thatfreedom, like reason, is a byproduct of the self-construction of 
the world. Against this, faith, which knows the Logos as the beginning, has the primacy of freedom as its 
starting point. Only the link to the Logos guarantees freedom as the structural principle of what really exists” 
[Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 115-16]). 
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Ihre Weltformel ist die Freiheit der Liebe Gottes, die uns in Jesus Christus ruft und 
immer neu der Freiheit des Menschen den Weg zeigt.129 
In the challenge of reconciling creatureliness with an authentic “being like God” 
existence, Ratzinger addresses whether the Christian philosophy of freedom means that being 
a creature represents a withdrawal and retreat into fini ude and arbitrariness. Juxtaposing the 
two forms of syntheses, he says the Christian experience of God is that of “self-obligation in 
triune love and, thus, pure freedom. To be an image of this God, ‘to become like him,’ is 
man’s vocation.”130 The modern synthesis, on the other hand, which promotes an “unlimited 
arbitrariness of the ability to do all has an idol as its model and not God.”131 The truth about 
authentic human freedom, Ratzinger says, is that one “who can merely chose between 
arbitrary options is not yet free.”132 Hence to be free, in the truest sense of the human 
yearning for liberty, is the vision of a person, who can embark in faith upon the explicit path 
to divinisation, correctly understood. Authentic freedom, in this context, is not the perusal of 
arbitrary options but a movement whereby the human person becomes one with their essence 
and therefore, with truth itself. Therefore, to Ratzinger’s mind, freedom has to be other than 
indeterminacy, while “constraints are an essential, formal part of freedom” that cannot be 
ignored, be it on the moral or ontological level. He continues: 
[. . .] Indeterminiertheit nicht das Wesen menschlicher Freiheit bildet, auch wenn 
zunächst das Verlangen nach Freiheit wie von selbst in diese Richtung vorstößt. 
Freiheit muß positiv definiert werden, wenn sie positiv ein soll. . . . Sie wäre . . . in 
der Richtung des Selbstbesitzes zu suchen, als Möglichkeit der Selbstverwirklichung, 
der Verwirklichung des eigenen Wesens und seiner Möglichkeiten.133  
                                                          
129 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 80 (“[Philosophies of what is necessary] offer user’s instructions on how to 
bring about the better world by necessity. The philosophy of freedom that comes from faith cannot do this. It has 
no simple formula for the world. Or, to put it more exactly, its formula for the world is the freedom f God’s 
love, which calls us in Jesus Christ and ever anew shows the path for man’s freedom” [Ratzinger, A Turning 
Point for Europe, 116]).  
130 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 255. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Raztinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 172 (“[. . .] indeterminacy does not constitute th essence of human 
freedom, even though the longing for freedom at firs pushes ahead almost automatically in this direction. 
Freedom must be defined positively if it is to be something positive. . . . [W]e should look for it along the lines 
of self-possession, as the possibility for self-realisation, the realisation of one’s own essence and authentic 
nature and of one’s possibilities” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 182]).  
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Furthermore, growing in freedom is growing in the capacity to take the measure of one’s 
actions from within, without the need to obey external constraint. Therefore, authentic 
freedom is consistent with the concepts of self-posses ion or self-realisation. Ratzinger thus 
concludes that “he who is free has become one with his essence, one with the truth itself. For 
he who is one with the truth no longer acts according to external necessities and 
constraints.”134  
Where Ratzinger’s understanding of human freedom coes under most scrutiny is 
when he deals with the issue of sin. In fact, this furnishes him even further with a theological 
vocabulary to speak about authentic freedom as against its one-sided derivatives. The final 
subdivision of this chapter looks at Ratzinger’s reflections on this. 
4.3.   Acknowledging the Truth of Human Nature: Sin as Suppressed Truth 
 From the perspective of a Christian synthesis, an authentic philosophy of freedom 
whereby one’s acting coincides with one’s willing and essence necessitates participation in 
the prayer of Christ, identification with the person of Christ and education in the mission of 
Christ.135 However, as an approach to the goal of creation, the freedom and love envisaged in 
the notion of divinisation is often hampered by the disharmony of human activity. When 
Ratzinger categorises sin as the suppression of truth, it leads him to an explicit presentation of 
a three-fold convergence of insights which are implcitly present throughout his 
anthropological literature, characterising the human person as dependent, relational, and 
limited. 
 To Ratzinger’s mind, society today has erected a psychological barrier, so to speak, 
that inhibits discussion of sin. For example, he says that “sin has become almost everywhere 
                                                          
134 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 255. 
135 See this dissertation § 3.2.3. 
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today one of those subjects that are not spoken about.”136 In an atmosphere of quantification, 
where technical and scientific reason holds sway, objective codes of behaviour – something 
not manufactured by us but coming from the inner goodness of creation – are increasingly 
non-existent. Ratzinger says that such objective standards are viewed more and more as an 
affront to personal freedom: “People today know of n  standard; to be sure they do not want 
to know of any because they see standards as threats to their freedom.”137 As such, an 
absurdity has entered reality in that “sin has become a suppressed subject, but everywhere we 
can see that, although it is suppressed, it has nonetheless remained real.”138 Despite this 
irrational suppression, he says the effects of sin and guilt remain, and they require 
assuagement from another source: 
Weil [die verdrängte Wahrheit der Schuld] dennoch da ist, muß er sie angreifen und 
zertreten. Weil es so steht, d.h. weil der Mensch Wahrheit verdrängen, aber nicht 
beseitigen kann und weil er an der verdrängten Wahrheit erkrankt, darum ist es eine 
der Aufgaben des heiligen Geistes, “die Welt der Sünde zu überführen” (Joh 16:8f).139 
In contrast to the view that objective standards threaten freedom, Ratzinger says 
human beings can be healthy only when they stop supressing and destroying truth. He 
invokes the third chapter of Genesis as a guide to suppressed truth. In the first instance, the 
attraction to cast off the covenant is at work in this text. Ratzinger says the portrayal of 
Adam’s temptation epitomizes Israel’s temptation and, i  general terms, the nature of 
temptation and sin in every age. Temptation doesn’t begin with outright denial of God, but 
rather through the planting of doubt which lures one from trust to mistrust. This is a 
dangerous provocation  for “[t]here is indeed a great deal of enlightenment when one doubts 
the covenant, experiences mistrust, demands freedom, and renounces obedience to the 
                                                          
136 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 62. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid., 63. Ratzinger comments upon the aggressiveness with which society today indulges in a blame-culture, 
demeaning the other person and demanding a scapegoat wherever misfortune strikes. He says the desire to 
change the world by violent means amounts to a suppressed reality of guilt, which people do not want to admit. 
139 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 66 (“[S]ince [the suppressed reality of guilt] is still there, they have to 
attack it and destroy it. As long as the situation remains thus – that is, as long as people suppress th  truth but do 
not succeed in doing away with it, as long as they ar  suffering from this suppressed truth – it will be one of the 
tasks of the Holy Spirit to ‘convince the world of sin’ [John 16:8]” [Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 63]).   
217 
 
covenant as a straitjacket that prevents one from enjoying the real promises of life.”140 The 
inner nature of temptation is that it has a very attrac ive irrationality, whose main purpose is 
to convince people that the covenant is not a gift but enslavement and an obstacle to 
influential power and autonomy: 
Es ist so leicht, dem Menschen einzureden, daß dieser Bund nicht Gabe und Geschenk 
sei, sondern Ausdruck eines Neides gegenüber dem Mensch n, daß er ihn seiner 
Freiheit und der köstlichsten Dinge des Lebens beraube. Mit dieser Verdächtigung des 
Bundes kommt der Mensch dann auf den Weg, auf dem er sich selbst seine Welt 
erbaut. Anders gesagt: Darin ist der Vorschlag an den Menschen eingeschlossen, daß 
er die Grenze seines Wesens nicht annehmen solle; daß er die Grenze von Gut und 
Böse, die Grenze des Sittlichen überhaupt, nicht als eine Grenze betrachten, sondern 
sich einfach freimachen solle und könne, indem er sie wegläßt.141 
Ratzinger, then, believes the nature of human guiltis found in the story of Adam. 
When covenantal order is cast into doubt, it leads to a denial of the order which comprises the 
nearness of the God of the covenant. Ratzinger maintains this denial of the covenantal order 
leads to the very heart of sin – to the denial of creatureliness on the part of humanity – 
because it refuses to accept the standard and the limitations that are implicit in it. In this 
scenario, human beings “do not want to be creatures, do not want to be subject to a standard, 
do not want to be dependent. . . . [This] is what sl very is and from slavery one must free 
oneself.”142 Dependence on God’s creative love is an external imposition when the creature 
itself wants to be God. In this new scenario, the other becomes a rival: “Human beings who 
consider dependence on the highest love as slavery nd who try to deny the truth about 
themselves, which is their creatureliness, do not free themselves; they destroy truth and 
love.”143 For Ratzinger then, it is clear that sin is, in its essence, a renunciation of the truth 
                                                          
140 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 67. On the theme of the serpent in Genesis 3 Ratzinger relies on Westermann, 
Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, 237-241; von Rad, Genesis, 83-99.    
141 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 68-69 (“It is so easy to convince people that this covenant is not a gift but 
rather an expression of envy of humankind and that i  is robbing human beings of their freedom and of the most 
precious things of life. With this doubt people arew ll on their way to building their own worlds. Inother 
words, it is then that they make the decision not to accept the limitations of their existence; it is hen that they 
decide not to be bound by the limitations imposed by good and evil or by morality in general, but quite simply 
to free themselves by ignoring them” [Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 67]). 
142 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 70. 
143 Ibid., 70-71. 
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and a defacement of the integrity of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, i.e. a denial of 
human limitation and creatureliness (cf. Gen 2:16-17; 3:6-7). Denial of the limitations 
imposed by good and evil, which are the inner standard of creation, is to deny the truth and 
live in mere appearance – in suppressed truth. 
Ratzinger points out a further characteristic of sin which emerges in Genesis 3, 
namely that it is not merely framed in terms of an abstract possibility but rather as a personal 
deed. There is the sin of a particular person who stands at the origin of humankind and with 
whom the history of sin begins. In other words, sin begets sin, and therefore all the sins of 
history are interlinked. Ratzinger says theology’s use of the “misleading and imprecise”144 
term for this – “original sin” – can seem absurd from our viewpoint since guilt is something 
purely personal. Ratzinger believes that coming to an answer on what theology means by the 
term “original sin” demands nothing less than a better understanding of the human person. 
Within the context of this doctrine, Ratzinger makes three statements of clarification. They 
form the core of his model of authentic freedom: dependency, relationality and limitation, 
correctly understood.145 
4.3.1. Authentic Freedom: Acceptance of Dependency, Relationality, Limitation    
Firstly, authentic human freedom requires the acceptance of dependency: no human 
being is closed in upon oneself or can live from oneself alone. Life is received every day 
from without, not merely at the moment of birth. The “self” exists not merely within itself but 
also outside of itself. Human beings “live in those whom they love and in those who love 
                                                          
144 Ibid., 72. Although Ratzinger has never produced a text specifically dedicated to the doctrine of original sin, 
references to it appear intermittently throughout his writings. He believes it is the key to unravelling many of the 
contentious issues within theological anthropology today. As we saw in this dissertation § 1.5., he has expressed 
an interest in writing specifically on making the doctrine of original sin comprehensible to the modern world. 
See also Principles of Catholic Theology, 49, 93; The Yes of Jesus Christ, 74; Daughter Zion, 62-71; 
Introduction to Christianity, 249, 266-69; Faith and the Future, 17; Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 241; In 
the Beginning,71-77; The End of Time, 20; The Spirit of the Liturgy, 31; God and the World, 86-88; Jesus of 
Nazareth. Holy Week, 101, 252-3.  
145 See Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 72-4. 
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them and to whom they are ‘present’.”146 Sin is the forgetting or rebuffing of this 
foundational element of human nature. 
Secondly, authentic freedom requires the acceptance of relationality. The human 
person possesses life only by way of relationship. Only in and with “you” can “I” be myself, 
whereas being “alone” is inadequate: “to be truly human means to be related in love, to be of 
and for.”147 Sin’s point of entry is precisely “the rejection of relationality.”148 As a 
disturbance of relationship, sin is not restricted to the individual for it touches the other 
person involved in the relationship. Ratzinger says this is the root meaning of “original sin” – 
sin is an offence that always touches others, that alters the world and damages it:  
Weil es so ist, gilt: Wenn das Beziehungsgefüge des M nschseins vom Anfang her 
gestört wird, tritt jeder Mensch fortan in eine von der Beziehungsstörung geprägte 
Welt ein. Mit dem Menschsein selbst, das gut ist, fällt ihn zugleich eine von der 
Sünde gestörte Welt an. Jeder von uns tritt in eineVerflechtung ein, in der die 
Beziehungen verfälscht sind. Jeder ist deshalb schon von seinem Anfang her in seinen 
Beziehungen gestört, empfängt sie nicht, wie sie sein sollten. Die Sünde greift nach 
ihm und er vollzieht sie mit.149   
The third clarification follows from this: authentic freedom requires the acceptance of 
limitation. Ratzinger says it is clear that human beings alone cannot save themselves and 
humanity’s innate error is precisely the desire to do it for themselves. This desire is the crux 
of false freedom: 
Erlöst, d.h. frei und wahr werden, können wir nur, wenn wir aufhören, ein Gott sein 
zu wollen; wenn wir auf den Wahn der Autonomie und der Autarkie verzichten. Wir 
können immer nur erlöst werden, d.h. wir werden wir selbst, wenn wir die rechten 
Beziehungen empfangen und annehmen. Unsere zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen 
aber hängen daran, daß das Maß der Geschöpflichkeit allen halben im Lot ist, und 
gerade da sitzt die Störung. Weil die Schöpfungsbeziehung gestört ist, darum kann 
nur der Schöpfer selbst unser Erlöser sein. Erlöst werden können wir nur, wenn der, 
                                                          
146 Ibid., 72. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., 73. 
149 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 73 (“To the extent that this is true, when the network of human 
relationships is damaged from the very beginning, then every human being enters into a world that is marked by 
relational damage. At the very moment that a person begins human existence, which is a good, he or she is 
confronted by a sin-damaged world. Each of us enters into a situation in which relationality has been hurt. 
Consequently each person is, from the very start, dmaged in relationships and does not engage in them as he or 
she ought. Sin pursues the human being, and he or she capitulates to it” [Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 73]). 
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von dem wir uns abgeschnitten haben, neu auf uns zugeht und uns die Hand reicht. 
Nur das Geliebtwerden ist Erlöst-werden, und nur die Liebe Gottes kann die gestörte 
menschliche Liebe reinigen, das von seinem Grund her verfremdete 
Beziehungsgefüge wiederherstellen. 150 
When Ratzinger considers the New Testament response t  this human situation, his 
anthropological and christological considerations converge quite significantly. He says the 
Old Testament account of human beginnings points beyond itself, to the One in whom God 
endured the human refusal to accept its limitations – the one, as it were, who entered into 
“suppressed truth” in order to restore humanity to itself. Ratzinger points to Phil 2:5-11 as the 
briefest and most telling response to the narrative of Genesis 3. He says that although the pre-
pauline hymn may have its sights on a different version of the story of the Fall (cf. Job 15:7-
8), it reverberates with a sense of Jesus as the one who is really “like God.” Being “Son” 
means total relationality, and relationality views dependency as positive. 151 From the human 
perspective, the desire to be omnipotent as the rout  t  unimpeded autonomy melts at the 
moment when dependency is perceived in the relationsh p between the Son and the Father: 
Und darum klammert der wirklich Gottgleiche sich nicht an seine Autonomie, an die 
Grenzenlosigkeit seines Könnens und Wollens. [Der Sohn] geht den umgekehrten 
Weg: er wird der ganz Abhängige, er wird der Knecht.152 
Taking the route of love rather than power, Jesus can descend into Adam’s lie – that 
of suppressed truth – and raise up again the truth wri ten into creation. Christ, as the New 
Adam, is the open invitation to relationship. The Cross as the “place of his obedience,” where 
                                                          
150 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 73 (“We can only be saved – that is, be free and true – when we stop 
wanting to be God and when we renounce the madness of autonomy and self-sufficiency. We can only be saved 
– that is, become ourselves – when we engage in the proper relationship. But our interpersonal relationships 
occur in the context of our utter creatureliness, and it is there that the damage lies. Since the relationship with 
creation has been damaged, only the Creator himself can be our saviour. We can be saved only when he from 
whom we have cut ourselves off takes the initiative with us and stretches out his hand to us. Only being loved is 
being saved, and only God’s love can purify damaged human love and radically re-establish the network of 
relationships that have suffered from alienation” [Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 73-74]). 
151 The Johannine relationality texts highlighting therelationship of the Son and the Father find their context 
here. See, as examples, John 1:1-3, 14, 18; 5: 19-30, 43-47; 6: 44-46; 7:16-18; 8:28; 11:41-42; 14:1-17:26.  
152 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 75 (“[T]he one who is truly like God does not hold graspingly to his 
autonomy, to the limitlessness of his ability and his willing. He does the contrary: he becomes completely 
dependent, he becomes a slave” [Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 75]). 
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Christ is completely open, now becomes “the true tre of life.”153 With the discovery of the 
true tree of life, the moment of true “enlightenment” is reached. On the one hand, humanity is 
indeed a “divine project”154 – the fruit of love which creative “Reason” was aud cious 
enough to conceive. While on the other hand, God is obedient because self-sacrifice means 
being motivated to the point where dependence is freedom grounded in truth and love. 
Ratzinger says that Christ, by his life, death and resurrection, has erected the true pole of the 
earth, which is the liberation of humanity from “our rejection of our limitations and from the 
lie of our autonomy.”155 In Christ, freedom is authentic because love and truth are one:   
Von diesem Baum her kommt nicht das Wort der Verführung, sondern das Wort der 
rettenden Liebe, das Wort des Gehorsams, in dem Gott selbst gehorsam geworden ist, 
und uns so seinen Gehorsam als Raum der Freiheit anbietet. Das Kreuz ist der wieder 
zugänglich gewordene Lebensbaum.156 
As a way of approaching the communal or ecclesial apect of Christ’s “yes,” 
Ratzinger looks to Augustine’s philosophy of history, viewing it as a commentary on the 
tension inherent in free creatures within a world ceated in freedom and out of love.157 For 
Augustine, history was the struggle between two kinds of love – “self-love reaching the point 
of contempt for God . . . [and] love of God carried as far as contempt for self.”158 This is 
precisely the history into which the Church enters and Ratzinger, through his christological 
anthropology, has presented the contemporaneous manifest tion of this dynamic. It is the 
dynamic between the meaning that sustains human life on the one hand, and the limitation to 
functional truth or feasibility on the other: 
Die Liebesfähigkeit, das heißt die Fähigkeit, auf das Unverfügbare in Geduld zu 
warten und sich von ihm beschenken zu lassen, wird erstickt durch die schnellen 
Erfüllungen, in denen ich auf niemanden angewiesen bin, aber auch nie aus mir 
heraustreten muß und darum auch nie in mich hineinfi de. Diese Zerstörung der 
                                                          
153 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 76. 
154 Ibid., 57. 
155 Ibid., 77. 
156 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 75 (“From this tree comes not the word of seduction, but the word of the 
saving love, the word of obedience, in which God himself has become obedient, and his obedience is offered us 
as sphere of freedom. The cross is the tree of life become accessible again” [own translation]). 
157 See Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 178-79. 
158 Civ., Bk. XIV, 28. 
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Liebesfähigkeit gebiert die tödliche Langeweile. Sie ist die Vergiftung des 
Menschen.159   
Finally, Ratzinger moves to a eucharistic theology to redress the human “mentality of 
power and activity”160 that threatens creation. Carrying forward the image of the Cross as the 
true tree of life, Ratzinger considers the Eucharist to be the abiding presence of the fruit of 
true life in our midst. Unlike the serpent’s promptings of doubt in the inner goodness of 
creation, the open invitation to receive and eat of the Eucharist is to accept the “yes” of 
Christ’s obedience. It is the “yes” from the crucified Lord that sets the standard of our 
creatureliness and freedom: 
Darum ist Eucharistie als Gegenwart des Kreuzes der bleibende Lebensbaum, der 
allezeit in unserer Mitte steht und uns einlädt, Frucht des wahren Lebens zu 
empfangen. Dies schließt ein, daß Eucharistie niemals bloß eine Art von 
Gemeinschaftspflege sein kann. Sie zu empfangen, vom Baum des Lebens zu essen, 
das bedeutet darum, den gekreuzigten Herrn zu empfangen, also seine Lebengestalt, 
seinen Gehorsam, sein Ja, das Maß unseres Geschöpfseins anzunehmen. Es bedeutet, 
die Liebe Gottes anzunehmen, die unsere Wahrheit ist – jene Abhangigkeit von Gott, 
die uns nicht Fremdbestimmung bedeutet, so wenig dem Sohn die Sohnschaft 
Fremdbestimmung ist: Gerade diese “Abhängigkeit” ist Freiheit, weil sie Wahrheit ist 
und Liebe.161 
In his anthropology, Ratzinger aims to oppose “the lie of human autonomy”162 by 
concentrating upon Christ’s presence in the world as the presence of meaning for the human 
person. Sustaining this presence from day to day is the ubject of his ecclesiology and will be 
the subject of the next chapter. For him the Church “must fulfil the task in which her identity 
                                                          
159 Raztinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 127 (“The capacity to love, that is, the capacity to wait in patience for what 
is not under one’s control and to let oneself receive this as a gift, is suffocated by the speedy fulfilments in 
which I am dependent on no one but in which I am never obliged to emerge from my own self and thus never 
find the path into my own self. This destruction of the capacity to love gives birth to lethal boredom. It is the 
poisoning of man” [Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 179-80]).  
160 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 35. 
161 Ratzinger, Im Anfang Schuf Gott, 75-76 (“Therefore the Eucharist, as the presence of the cross, is the abiding 
tree of life, which is ever in our midst and ever invites us to take the fruit of true life. This means that the 
Eucharist can never be merely a kind of community builder. To receive it, to eat of the tree of life, thus means to 
receive the crucified Lord and consequently to accept the parameters of his life, his obedience, his ‘ye ,’ the 
standard of our creatureliness. It means to accept th  love of God, which is our truth – that dependence on God 
which is no more an imposition from without than is the Son’s sonship. It is precisely this dependence that is 
freedom, because it it truth and love” [Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 76-77]). 
162 Ratzinger, In the Beginning, 77. 
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is based: to make God known and to proclaim his Kingdom. . . . She must prepare space for 
the divine.”163  
4.4.    Conclusion 
 
Chapter 4 builds on the findings of Chapter 3 which investigated the christological 
foundations of Ratzinger’s understanding of authentic freedom. His treatment of human 
freedom reveals an existential framework that can be summarised in three points. In the first 
instance, there is a qualitative difference between divine and human freedom which takes us 
to the core of christology. As the creaturely prerogative to reply “yes” or “no” to God’s 
eternal “yes” to creation, human freedom is a determining factor that imbues all of history. 
christology becomes the bedrock of Ratzinger’s approach to this because Christ’s “yes” 
clarifies that monotheism and creatureliness are the categories upon which an authentic 
Christian freedom is to be properly expressed. From the anthropological perspective, the 
former is the category of being in which the human person comes to know ontological 
citizenship in Christ; the latter is the category of truth in which the human person comes to 
accept one’s dependency, relationality and limitation. These become the existential 
parameters for how Ratzinger will circumscribe anthropology and ecclesiology. In the 
yearning for liberty, for a “being like God” existence, relationality views dependency and 
limitation as positives. 
 Second, and subsequently, Ratzinger’s attempt to analyse the modern synthesis of 
thought, setting it in dialectical tension with the triadic formula of the Christian synthesis, is a 
significant theological examination of the content of an authentic freedom. It affords him not 
only the opportunity to reflect on the dynamics of Christian freedom, but it also acts as an 
antidote for the tendency of extreme self-sufficieny in contemporary societies. For 
Ratzinger, the modern synthesis buffers itself against the idea of the unconditional – of God – 
                                                          
163 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 178. 
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and seeks the universalization of a scientific objectification of reality. Against this, he 
contends that an authentic human freedom consists in the truthful human orientation with 
regard to God. This, in turn, furnishes the “tools” of science, tchnology and historical 
consciousness with their proper locus within society.  
Thirdly, human beings do not exist relationally only in the direction of the Creator, 
but also towards one other. There is a communal aspect to the “yes” of humanity which is 
motivated by a sacrificial love modelled on the Son’s “yes” to the Father. It emerges 
particularly clearly when Ratzinger deals with the ract on sin. The fundamental insight of the 
whole discussion on the shape of human freedom is Ratzinger’s belief that the necessary and 
inevitable questions of humanity are ultimately ontological questions – questions of liberty 
and truth. Unless the human person wrestles with them and with the doubt which 
accompanies them in the present day, there can be no harmony in one’s life. In this regard, 
Ratzinger says the Church must be prepared to suffer and to witness, and to do so freely, 
convinced of the truth about God and the human person:  
[Die Kirche] muß überzeugen, denn nur, indem sie Übrzeugung schafft, öffnet sie 
den Raum für das, was ihr übergeben ist, und immer nur auf dem Weg der Freiheit, 
das heißt über Verstand, Wille und Gefühl zugänglich werden kann.164  
 Opening up this aspect of Ratzinger’s work will be th  task of Chapter 5.
                                                          
164 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 126 (“[The Church] must convince, for it is only b convincing that she 
opens up space for what has been entrusted to her; and this can be made accessible only along the path of 
freedom, which means via reason, will and emotion” [Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 179]).  
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CHAPTER 5: Growth in Human Freedom: Ecclesiological Contours 
 
5.0.   Introduction 
On 4 June 1970, Ratzinger delivered a lecture at the Katholischen Akademie n
Munich in response to a predominantly existential enquiry which carried a great urgency in 
its formulation, “Why I am still in the Church.”1 In the course of the lecture, he provided four 
basic points which were seminal and would continue to inform his ecclesiology throughout 
his professional life. In the first instance, he points out that, at its deepest level, the Church 
belongs to God and is “gift” for us. Secondly, one cannot believe in God on one’s own 
because faith requires a community. Thirdly, to love means to serve the other to the point of 
sacrifice rather than to satiate the self in personal aggrandisement. And fourthly, hope can be 
authentic only when based on truth and an authentic recognition of the contours of human 
freedom. To this end, the Church is portrayed as a custodian of the liberating truth that God 
reveals in Jesus Christ.2     
Hence this chapter is divided into four subdivision. It proposes that one approach to 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology is to study it in terms of an overarching sacramental framework that 
embraces the ecclesial dimensions of the theological virtues of faith, love and hope.3 
                                                          
1 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin” in GS:ZV, 1169-85. An English translation can be 
found in Ratzinger, Credo for Today, 181-200. 
2 David L. Schindler has recognised that Ratzinger “ra ely writes on any churchly matter that does not manifest 
its implications for man and culture; and vice versa. Indeed this indissoluble linking is one of the main 
distinguishing features of his theology” (David L. Schindler, introduction to Joseph Ratzinger in Communio: 
The Unity of the Church [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010], ix). 
From such a perspective, it is possible to frame Ratzinger’s ecclesiology in terms of the Church’s impact upon 
human civilisation and vice versa. 
3 It is important to note that while it is necessary to make specific choices in dealing with various eccl siological 
themes for illustrative purposes, none of the dimensions explored can exist in isolation. The advantage of the 
proposed approach is that, from a largely existential s arting point, the four perspectives indicate th  raison 
d'être of the Church today by uncovering the main themes which lay the ground for Ratzinger’s understanding 
of Church as sphere of growth in authentic human freedom. His decidedly existentialist approach on Ratzinger’s 
part has afforded him, at various junctures over th years, the opportunity to reflect upon the reasons behind the 
ecclesial needs of humanity and the human requisite for God’s intervention in history. It will be important to 
keep in mind that three core relationships mark the discussion of the Church as “sphere”: firstly, theindividual 
person’s growth in freedom through personal interaction with the Church; secondly, communal fellowship 
within the Church community; and finally, missionary outreach and the value of an ecclesial presence within the 
setting of wider, civil society. These interconnected “layers” will remain largely implicit in the pres nt chapter 
as we set out Ratzinger’s ecclesiology but will be explicitly expressed in Section III when we reflect on some of 
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Following an examination of the important aspects of Ratzinger’s sacramental framework – 
something which acts like an overarching postulate – the dimensions of faith, love and hope 
will be introduced, and their concomitant ecclesiological themes will be developed. This final 
chapter of Section II studies Ratzinger’s ecclesiology in light of his christocentric 
anthropology with the intention of yielding insight in o the Church as sphere of growth in 
authentic human freedom.  
5.1.   A Sacramental Framework: God’s Church, not “our” Church 
    
 The primordial canvas from which Ratzinger launches is existential enquiry into the 
Church can be explained in terms of “ownership.” His guiding principle here is: “‘his 
Church’ lives behind ‘our Church’ . . . [and] we cannot change this situation. . . . I can stand 
by [Christ] only if I stand by and in his Church because . . . at the deepest level it is not our 
Church but precisely ‘his’.”4 One can discern a sacramental underpinning to his approach 
here. With regard to us, the heart of his approach to t e meaning of sacrament is based on 
receptivity of gift on the part of the human subject: “I give what I myself cannot give; I do 
something that is not my work; I am on a mission and have to become the bearer of that 
which another has committed to my charge.”5 One can distinguish in these remarks, the 
reception, possession and communication of that which one has not created for oneself – the 
authority to communicate what is received is found in another. This is a liberating vision for 
it shifts the burden of possession and accomplishment away from the receiver.6 The starting 
point – a “self-expropriation for the other, this leave-taking from oneself, this self-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the inferences of his thought. Ratzinger’s ecclesioogy is constantly engaged in coming to terms with the 
necessary balance to be struck between the personal and communal aspects of ecclesial life and the avoid nce of 
an individualist mentality in the Church. In the context of freedom, this balance is particularly relevant in the 
modern age which puts a very high value on personal integrity.  
4 Ratzinger, “Why I am still in the Church,” in Credo for Today, 193. See also The Ratzinger Report, 48-49. 
5 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 115.  
6 However, the receiver should not be understood as pas ive in this process. Paul O’ Callaghan delivered a very 
interesting paper on this at an International Theology Symposium held at the Pontifical University, Maynooth in 
June 2012. See Paul O Callaghan, “The Anthropological Roots of Communion,” in Proceedings of the 
International Symposium of Theology: The Ecclesiology f Communion Fifty Years after the Opening of Vatican 
II, vol. 2 of 50th International Eucharistic Congress (Dublin: Veritas, 2013), 287-301. 
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dispossession and selflessness” – is the “movement away from self” that conforms us to the 
mystery of the Trinity. Thereby, the imago Dei is consummated in us and the fundamental 
pattern according to which we were created is brought to new life. Created in the image of the 
Trinity, the truth about each person is that only the one who loses oneself finds the true self.7  
  Concretely, Ratzinger says, it is the Church, in spite of all its frailty, that presents the 
God of Jesus Christ to us. He asks where would one look for Christ were it not for the 
continuity of his Church? Christ would evaporate, over time, without the Church to hold 
Christ up for us. Ratzinger says this elementary fact must stand right at the beginning. 
Therefore, as true as it is to say that the Church must ever and again check itself against the 
measure of Christ, “there is ultimately no oppositin between Christ and Church.”8 Because 
the Church gives birth to Christ ever anew in the faith and prayer of people in all ages, 
Ratzinger says, it gives “a light, a support, and a standard without which humanity would be 
unimaginable.”9 Hence, it can be said of Ratzinger that preceding any existential analysis of 
“ownership,” his ecclesiological writings are founded on a theo-logical foundation, in the 
strict sense, which opens up the importance of christology and ecclesiology. This entails a 
eucharistic ecclesiology advocating an ecclesial encou ter with Trinitarian communio at the 
heart of God’s plan of salvation. In Ratzinger’s eccl siology, along this path of sacramental 
and ecclesial receptivity is growth in authentic freedom. 
5.1.1. Eucharistic Ecclesiology: Freedom in Communio  
If, as Ratzinger maintains, it is in the Church that we encounter Christ and the 
Christian faith, then the Church is our “contemporaneity with Christ: there is no other.”10 In 
his writings, the Church is seen as a divine-human re lity constituting a covenantal communio 
– that is, God and humanity in a process of unification. The source of that unity is the 
                                                          
7 See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 115-16. See also ibid., 118, 143, 146. 
8 Ratzinger, “Why I am still in the Church,” in Credo for Today, 193. 
9 Ibid., 194. 
10 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 60.  
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Eucharist, the sacrament of the paschal mystery by which God, in Christ, reunites sinful 
humanity with himself. Communion in, and with the one body and blood of Christ transforms 
the faithful interiorly into the one body of Christ that is the Church (cf. Rom 12:4; 1Cor 6:6; 
10:17; 12:12,13,20; Eph 2:16; 4:4; Col 3:15) – “Body of Christ” being, in Ratzinger’s 
understanding,  the most distinctive New Testament and patristic description of the new 
people of God.11   
                                                          
11 Ratzinger says that participation in the eucharistic sacrifice is the opening up of the Church as the body of 
Christ. To Ratzinger’s mind, the Body of Christ in the Eucharist as constitutive of the ecclesial body coincides 
with his overall approach to the meaning of sacrament: “In the Eucharist we receive the Body of the Lord, and, 
thus, become one body with him; we all receive the same Body and, thus, ourselves become ‘all one in Christ 
Jesus’ (Gal 3:28). The Eucharist takes us out of ourselves and into him, so that we can say, with Paul, ‘It is no 
longer I who live but Christ who lives in me’ (Gal 2:20). I, yet no longer I – a new and greater self i  growing, 
which is called the one body of the Lord, the Churc” (Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 102-3). In 
essence this is Ratzinger’s very pauline viewpoint n ecclesiology and is succinctly presented in ibid., 90-111. 
To participate in sacramental communion means becoming the Church, because it means becoming one “Body” 
with Christ. Ratzinger says that this “being one Body” needs to be understood as Paul intends it: as, “two 
becoming one” (cf. 1Cor 6:16) along the lines of husband and wife – one flesh and yet two; two and yet on . 
Ratzinger maintains that personal liberty is not be hampered but rather cultivated and fulfilled: “the difference is 
not abolished but is swallowed up in a greater unity” (103). Ratzinger says 1Cor10:1-22 deepens these ideas: as 
one can come under the power of idols and be ruled and shaped by them, so it is, analogously, albeit differently, 
that partaking of the one bread is participation in Christ’s one body: “the religious attitude towards Communion 
and that towards the Church blend into one another:  one bread makes us into one body; the Church is simply 
that unity created by eucharistic Communion, the unity of the many in and through the one Christ” (103-4). 
For an in-depth account of Ratzinger’s treatment of the conciliar understanding of the term people of G d and 
the modern misleading variations which became fashionable following the Council, see his Church, Ecumenism 
and Politics, 13-35; his lecture in Aversa in September 2011, “The Ecclesiology of Vatican II,”  
http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/cdfeccv2.htm (accessed 15 August 2010); his lecture in Rome in November 
2000, “The Ecclesiology of the Constitution on the Church, Lumen gentium,”  
http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/cdfeccl.htm  (accessed 26 September 2008). The people of God motif, as it 
was popularised in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council has always concerned Ratzinger. He fears it has 
been construed in a reductionist way that gives it a sociological and political interpretation which “becomes the 
vehicle of an anti-hierarchical and anti-sacral idea of Church, indeed, a revolutionary category suitable for 
developing a new concept of Church” (Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 26-27). He is apprehensive 
of a Marxist understanding of “the proletariat” being transferred into a self-understanding of the Churc ’s 
membership. He says that sometimes even the placement of the chapter on the people of God before the chapter 
on the hierarchy in Lumen gentium is taken to be positive proof that the Church’s understanding of hierarchy 
and laity has changed. However, to his mind, this cronology simply demonstrates that “ll belong to the People 
of God; here the topic being treated is the Church as a whole and her nature” (28). For him, christology and 
sacrament are essential, co-determining factors in accepting the biblical people of God motif as a designation for 
the Church: “The word Ecclesia-Church is the New Testament variation on and transformation of the Old 
Testament ‘People of God’ concept. It is used because it contains the notion that only new birth in Christ causes 
the non-people to become a people. . . . [W]e cannot simply say that Christians are the People of God. From the 
empirical perspective, they are a non-people, as any sociological analysis can quickly demonstrate. And God is 
nobody’s property; no one can claim him for himself. The non-people of the Christians can be God’s People 
only through incorporation into Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Abraham. Even if we speak about the 
People of God, christology must remain the centre of the teaching about the Church, and, consequently, the 
Church must be thought of essentially in terms of the sacraments of baptism, Eucharist, and holy orders. We are 
People of God by virtue of the crucified and risen Body of Christ and in no other way. We become it only i  
living association with him, and only in this context does the expression have any meaning. The Council made 
this connection beautifully clear by highlighting another fundamental word for the Church along with the 
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For Ratzinger, eucharistic ecclesiology implies that e Church is a visible as well as 
spiritual reality, at once local and universal, a communion of communities, whose visible 
unity is manifested and guaranteed by the apostolic suc ession in union with the petrine 
ministry of the bishop of Rome. Part of the context for this visibility or concreteness in 
Ratzinger’s theology is that “[m]ankind needs a framework of meaning that imparts the 
strength to serve, which creates an interior freedom fr m the world and thereby gives 
individuals the ability to live and work unselfishly, because a man’s hope is more deeply 
rooted than his external career aspirations.”12 Therefore, “[a] church that only ‘functions,’ 
that is merely ‘functional,’ no longer accomplishes its special purpose: to be the space in 
which we step out of the world of agendas and into the freedom of God.”13  
In terms of developments in twentieth-century ecclesiology, Ratzinger believes that 
although “the term ‘communion’ does not occupy a central place in the Council,”14 the word 
has, in the gradual process of understanding the Council, become the “synthesis for the 
essential elements of the conciliar ecclesiology.”15 Highlighting the semantic and secular 
roots of κοινωνία in its Hebraic and Greek context,16 Ratzinger says the Church is not solely 
the synthesis of these semantic meanings, because “in J sus, a new event takes place in that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
expression “People of God”: the Church as sacrament. One remains faithful to the Council only if one alw ys 
reads these two central terms for its ecclesiology – sacrament and People of God – together and always thinks of 
them together. Here it becomes apparent how far ahead of us the Council still is: the idea of the Church as 
sacrament has scarcely entered into our consciousness” (26-27).   
12 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 227.  See this dissertation § 4.1.1.  
13 Ibid., 242. Vincent Twomey describes Ratzinger’s approach by saying that “the goal of the Church, her basic 
mission, is the incorporation of humanity into the lif -rhythm of the Trinitarian God” (Twomey, Pope Benedict 
XVI, 59). 
14 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 129. 
15 Ibid., 130.  
16 See Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 84. See also his Ministers of Your Joy. Meditations on Priestly 
Spirituality, trans. Robert Nowell (London: St. Paul’s Publishing, 1989), 108ff. In Greek, the word has secular 
roots meaning community, fellowship (common property, common work or common values). In Hebrew, the 
corresponding term is habhûrâ, which likewise can be translated as fellowship or cooperative. Three aspects 
present themselves: “As early as the first century B.C., the group of the Pharisees call themselves habhûrâ; 
since the second century A.D. the term is also usedfor the rabbis; and ultimately the word applied to th se (at 
least ten in number) assembled for the Passover meal. This latter usage shows quite clearly how easily it could 
be applied to the mystery of the Church: the Church is t e habhûrâ of Jesus in a very deep sense – the 
fellowship of his Passover, the family in which hiseternal desire of eating the Passover with us (cf. Luke 24:15) 
is fulfilled” (Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 84). 
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the only God actually and really enters into communion by taking flesh in human nature.”17 
The Church is the product of a heretofore non-existnt reality in the life of humanity: 
Der eine, transzendente Gott des Alten Testaments dckt sein innerstes Leben auf, 
zeigt, daß er in sich selbst Dialog ewiger Liebe ist. Weil er in sich selbst Beziehung ist 
– Wort und Liebe –, darum kann er sprechen, fühlen, antworten, lieben. Weil er 
Beziehung ist, kann er sich auftun und Beziehung seine  Geschöpfes zu sich selber 
schaffen. In der Fleischwerdung des ewigen Wortes vollzieht sich jene Kommunion 
zwischen Gott und dem Sein des Menschen, seiner Kreatur, die vorher mit der 
Transzendenz des einzigen Gottes unvereinbar schien.18      
At the service of this κοινωνία between God and his people is the sacramental 
meaning of the Church. Consequently Ratzinger states he equation: “Church is communion . 
. . not only between human beings, but as a result of the death and resurrection of Jesus, 
communion with Christ, the incarnate Son, and hence communion with the eternal triune 
Love of God.”19 In other words “the brotherhood of Christians in the Lord is raised – through 
the Christ-event – above the realm of ideas to the dignity of true actuality.”20  
Again, and again in his ecclesiology, in light of the necessary connection between 
Trinitarian communio and the Body of Christ’s destiny in God, Ratzinger makes use of an 
existential approach to faith, to the “we” of the Church’s social structure. However, it is 
important to note that without seeking to give the impression that he advocates “a distortion 
of trinitarian doctrine and an intolerably oversimplified fusion of Creed and Church polity,”21 
                                                          
17 Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 87. 
18 Ratzinger, Schauen auf den Durchbohrten, 73 (“The one, transcendent God of the Old Testament unveils his 
innermost life and shows that, in himself, he is a dialogue of eternal love. Since he himself is relationship – 
Word and Love – he can speak, feel, answer, and love. Since he is relationship, he can open himself and provide 
his creature with a relationship with him. In the Incarnation of the eternal Word there comes about that 
communion between God and the being of man, his creatur , which up to now had seemed irreconcilable with
the transcendence of the only God” [Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 86-87]).   
19 Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 86. 
20 Ratzinger, The Meaning of Christian Brotherhood, 50. Trinitarian communio is a defining feature for the 
Church’s constitution. The Church’s point of departure, as well as its centre, is the event of encounter with 
Christ that leads to fellowship with God: “Fellowship with God is mediated by the fellowship of God with man, 
which is Christ in person; the encounter with Christ brings about fellowship with him and, thus, with the Father 
in the Holy Spirit; on this basis it unites men with one another” (Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 130). 
While the sacramental perspective on communio is given here as an overall framework to Ratzinger’s 
ecclesiology, his remarks on ecclesial communio will be taken up again in this dissertation § 5.2.2. See also 
Tracey Rowland, “Ratzinger the Romantic,” The Tablet (10 July 2010): 9-11.   
21 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 39. Ratzinger says that to superficially take the fundamental 
“we” form of divinity as the structural prescription for worldly structures is naively inadequate because of the 
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it remains the case that the God professed in the Cre d is a “we” which, by analogy, 
epitomizes the basic thrust for the action of the Curch as a “we.” While respecting the limits 
of the analogy by not simply equating the “we” of God and the Church, Ratzinger says the 
fundamental form of divinity –  unity in the trinitarian relations of I-you-we as opposed to a 
lonely self-reflection of thought within an absolute and indivisibly self-contained “I” –  
precedes all other instances of “we.” Nevertheless, for Ratzinger, relationality among human 
persons is modelled on their image and likeness of God since the very beginning. If the goal 
of the Church is the incorporation of humanity into the life-rhythm of the Trinitarian God via 
its gift of contemporaneity with Christ, then, in lght of Ratzinger’s understanding of 
authentic freedom, exposing the lie of self-sufficiency and awakening a realisation of 
humanity’s nature as dependent, relational, meaningful, and as other than indeterminacy, is 
the task of the Church in every age.22 
5.1.2. Successio Apostolica: The Spiritual Office of Receptivity in the Church 
The Church as gift of contemporaneity with Christ has come to be expressed in the 
concept of apostolic succession (successio). This is the sacramental office which Ratzinger 
describes as “the God-given authority originating precisely in self-dispossession, in not 
speaking in one’s own name.”23 From the perspective of freedom, the sacramental context of 
receptivity of gift highlights an important facet of ecclesiology, namely, whether we can be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
inherent weaknesses and limitations associated with fin e reality. The basic thrust of such thinking within 
ecclesiology is that “God’s ‘we’ must be a model for the action of the Church as a ‘we’” (38). Arianism was a 
political theology favoured by the emperors precisely b cause it supplied a divine analogy for a political 
monarch whereas the trinitarian view terminated the theological justification for political monarchy. However, 
even the trinitarian model goes too far if it claims that the exercise of the primacy by a single man in Rome is 
the result of an erroneous Arian model. To keep with the three persons in God, the argument goes, the Church 
should be led by a college of three – this triumvirate, acting together, would be “pope.” Ratzinger says some see 
in this the panacea for ecumenism because it appears to derive immediately from theo-logy and the concept of 
God. It might then be possible to see the papacy – a chief barrier to unity for non-Catholic Christians – as the 
definitive vehicle for bringing about the unity of all Christians if a Roman Catholic, an Orthodox and 
Protestant got together to form a “papal troika.” Ratzinger’s theology of personal response is designed to 
counteract such a theology which discounts the dissim larity between the reality of the eternal God and the 
limitations of temporal existence.       
22 See this dissertation §§ 4.1.1., 4.1.4., 4.2.2 and 4.3.1. 
23 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 118. See ibid., 119; Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 184; Jesus of Nazareth. 
Holy Week, 98-99. 
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satisfied that such contemporaneity is authentic. Even from the earliest days of the Church, 
there has been a temptation to fallaciously contrast christology and pneumatology to the point 
where the christological-incarnational focus on sacrament effects a curtailment of the 
freedom of the children of God (Rom 8:21) in conjunction with a side-lining of what flows 
from the pneumatological-charismatic tradition. However, Ratzinger says, because the Trinity 
invalidates any understanding of God as a communion of three gods, in favour of one single 
God in the relativity of persons, “Christ and the Spirit are properly distinguished only if, by 
considering their difference, we can learn better to understand their unity.” He continues: 
“Christ as the Lord can be there among us and for us only because the Incarnation was not his 
last word.” When the pneumatological christology of Paul and the farewell discourses in John 
are taken seriously, Ratzinger says, we realise “[t]he new presence of Christ in the Spirit is . . 
. the necessary presupposition for there being sacraments or any presence of the Lord in the 
sacraments.”24  
Successio is a difficult concept in an age suspicious of external authority structures 
with the potential to encroach upon individual liberty. Nevertheless, it is central to the 
sacramental constitution of the Church. Ratzinger explains that apostolic succession is not an 
attempt to lead us independently of God’s Spirit but is precisely the reception of 
contemporaneity with Christ that is prerequisite for ecclesial life in the first instance:  
Die Bindung an die Linie der successio bedeutet . . . daß uns das sakramentale Amt 
nie selbst zur Verfügung ist, sondern immer wieder durch den Geist gegeben werden 
muß, eben das Geist-Sakrament ist, das wir nicht selber schaffen, nicht selber 
einsetzen können. Die funktionale Kompetenz als solche reicht dafür nicht aus, 
sondern die Gabe des Herrn ist nötig.25 
                                                          
24 See Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 183-84. 
25 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 158 (“[t]he link with the line of successio means . . . that the 
sacramental office is never at our disposal but has to be given by the Spirit again and again, that it is the 
sacrament of the Spirit, which we can never provide and never institute for ourselves. Functional competence as 
such is not sufficient; the gift of the Lord is requisite” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 184]). See also 




The successio principle, therefore, is oriented so as to prevent “p eumatic anarchy” (i.e. 
autonomous pneumatology) in the Church. 26 Ratzinger recalls that the notion of successio 
was comprehensively assimilated during the anti-gnostic polemics of the second century. Its 
purpose was to oppose unwritten, secret traditions with the true apostolic tradition of the 
apostolic Church. For the early anti-gnostic theologians, the uninterrupted apostolic 
succession was the proof of the illegitimacy of the sporadic, unwritten traditions of Gnostic 
preaching. Ratzinger notes that at the outset, successio and traditio were synonymous in 
meaning and always consist in a personal freedom predicated on self-dispossession: 
“Überlieferung” ist eben gar nie einfaches, anonymes Weitergeben von Lehre, 
sondern ist persongebunden, ist lebendiges Wort, das im Glauben seine konkrete 
Wirklichkeit hat. Und umgekehrt: Nachfolge ist nicht ein Übernehmen von 
Amtsgewalten, die ihrem Träger dann zur Verfügung stehen, sondern sie ist 
Indienstnahme für das Wort, Zeugenamt am anvertrauten Gut, das über seinem Träger 
steht, so daß er ganz hinter dem zurücktritt, was er üb rkommen hat, gleichsam – mit 
dem wunderbaren Bilde Jesajas und Johannes’ des Täufers z  sprechen – nur Stimme 
ist, die dem Wort die Lautwerdung schafft in der Welt.27 
When God’s word is tied to the witness of that word in a personal sense, it is guaranteed the 
freedom of unambiguous meaning as opposed to “a mere wo d floating in isolation.” 
Simultaneously the witness stands as one self-dispossessed, free of “self” and bound to 
another: “linked to the Pneuma, the Paraclete who authenticates the truth and opens up the 
                                                          
26 See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 119. Ratzinger is not implying by this term that charism in the Church 
is something negative but rather that an interpretation of  God the Holy Spirit that is detached from God the 
Father and from Christ cannot yield an authentic account of the action of God’s will in the world.     
27 Ratzinger and Rahner, Episkopat und Primat, 45-46 (“‘Tradition’ is never a simple, anonymous passing on of 
doctrine, but is personal, is the living word, concretely realised in the faith. And ‘succession’ is not a taking over 
of official powers, which then are at the disposal of their possessor, but is rather a dedication to the word, an 
office of bearing witness to the treasure with which one has been entrusted. The office is superior to its holder, 
so that he is entirely overshadowed by that which he as received; he is, as it were – to adopt the image of Isaiah 
and John the Baptist – only a voice which renders the word articulate in the world” [Joseph Ratzinger and Karl 
Rahner, The Episcopacy and the Primacy, trans. Kenneth Barker et al. [New York, Herder and Herder, 1962], 
46-47). It is significant to note that historically, the principle of successio-traditio was formulated prior to texts 
of the New Testament being understood as scriptural. For example, the New Testament texts themselves do not 
carry any consciousness of being “Scripture.” Ratzinger points out that in the consciousness of the individual 
New Testament writings, “the Old Testament is Scriptu e while the gospel of Christ is precisely ‘Spirit,’ which 
teaches understanding of the Scripture” (Ratzinger and Rahner, The Episcopacy and the Primacy, 49). However, 
Ratzinger says, this does not mean that “succession” and “word” have to be opposites: “[. . .] if true apostolic 
succession is bound up with the word, it cannot be bound up merely with a book, but must, as the succession of 
the word, be a succession of preachers, which in turn cannot exist without a ‘mission,’ i.e., a personal continuity 
reaching back to the apostles. Precisely for the sak of the word, which in the New Covenant is not to consist in 
dead letters but in a living voice, a living succession is necessary” (53).   
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memory and, in his turn binds the witness to Christ.”28 In other words, there is a personal 
witness structure of the Church which demands that the witness be personally responsible for 
the gift received: 
Diese Bindung an das Pneuma und an seine Wesensweise – “nicht aus sich selbst, 
sondern was er hört” – nennen wir in der Sprache der Kirche “Sakrament.” Das 
Sakrament bezeichnet den dreifachen Knoten Wort – Zeuge – Heilger Geist und 
Christus, der die eigentliche Struktur neutestamentlicher Nachfolge beschreibt.29   
In light of Ratzinger’s remarks, apostolic succession is a constitutive part of the 
Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom for it ensures that clandestine, speculative 
assertions cannot infiltrate or subjugate the covenantal relationship of God the Father and his 
children, a relationship grounded in God’s Son as eternal Word and realised through God’s 
Spirit as divine witness (cf. Rom 8:14-17). Understanding successio in this way requires a 
particular understanding of freedom – one in which the believer acknowledges one’s 
dependency, and one’s need for education as a partici tive “hearer” of the word rather than 
merely a passive “reader”:   
[Es] wird gerade und erst in solchem Verständnis der der Kirche verliehenen Gabe 
des Wortes der Mensch immer wieder in vollem Ernst in die Situation eines “Hörers 
des Wortes” verwiesen, eines Hörers, der selbst keine Gewalt über das Wort hat, 
                                                          
28 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 67-68. 
29 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 64 (“This binding of the witness to the Pneuma and to his mode of 
being – ‘not of himself, but what he hears’ – is called ‘sacrament’ in the language of the Church. Sacrament 
designates a three-fold knot – word, witness, Holy Spirit and Christ – which describes the essential structure of 
the New Testament” [Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 68]). Ratzinger says the available testimony of the 
Pastoral Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles suggests that the “the apostolic generation already gave to this 
interconnection of person and word in the believed presence of the Spirit and of Christ the form of the laying on 
of hands” (Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 68). In Ratzinger’s presentation of sacrament, the impression can 
sometimes be given that he prefers a Christo-monism to the exclusion of the pneumatological. I think this 
impression is unwarranted .There is no dichotomy betwe n Christ and the Spirit in fact, even if there can appear 
to be tension in our understanding between christomonistic institutionalism (or juridicism) and pneumatological 
charism. In Ratzinger’s own work, for example, he makes use of the pneumatological logion 2Cor 3:17 (cf. 
Called to Communion, 33). Furthermore, as the “three-fold knot” indicates, Ratzinger is anxious to define 
sacrament in terms of witness and Spirit. For him the word is always “tied to” the (apostolic) witness who is 
guided by the Spirit (cf. ibid.). That is a definition of sacrament whic  incorporates the message, the messenger 
and the Spirit of the message. In a paper delivered at the IEC Theology Symposium held at the Pontifical 
University, Maynooth in June 2012, Oliver Treanor stre sed the need for inclusion of the Spirit in the work of 
successio. See Oliver Treanor, “The Eucharist: Apostolicity of Communion,” in Proceedings of the 
International Symposium of Theology: The Ecclesiology f Communion Fifty Years after the Opening of Vatican 
II, vol. 2 of 50th International Eucharistic Congress (Dublin: Veritas, 2013), 446-463. It is also of note here that 
there is both a broad and more specific sense of apostolicity. Here Ratzinger is speaking about the narrow sense 
of the apostolic office or ministry. However, the whole Church is apostolic by nature and the apostolic ministry 
is at the service of that. Again, Treanor is helpful in this regard.      
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sondern der in jenem reinen Empfangen steht, das “Glauben” heißt. Und solches 
“Glauben” ist jeder individualistischen Verengung entrissen, es ist durch das “Hören” 
immerfort dem Du zugekehrt, jener großen Gemeinschaft der Glaubenden, die in 
Christus “ein einziger” zu werden berufen ist (Gal 3:28).30 
 
5.1.3. The Episcopal Office: Safeguarding from Pneumatic Anarchy 
Within the ecclesial structure of successio, Ratzinger says the “once-always” of the 
mystery of Christ cannot be ignored. Because of it we can never escape into a “free-floating 
Pneumatology, never leave behind the solid earth of e Incarnation, of God’s action in 
history,” and conversely “this once-for-all element is only mediated in the gift of the Holy 
Spirit, which is the Spirit of the risen Christ.”31 Ratzinger says, Christ has passed through the 
veil of the flesh and has set free, within what is once for all, that which endures forever. The 
Incarnation does not stop with the historical Jesus but, transformed in the Resurrection, is 
present at all times and in all places.   
Ratzinger sets out a two-fold definition of the episcopal office with reference to the 
successio principle. Firstly, the office guarantees the continuity and unity of the faith. He 
describes continuity as sacramental – i.e. as something we receive and cannot create 
ourselves. It ensures, as it were, that “‘one’s own spirit’ is not parading as the Holy Spirit” – 
a “suspicion [which] is always appropriate whenever someone speaks on his own account and 
‘of himself’; that contradicts the characteristic action of the Holy Spirit, which is typified by 
‘not speaking on his own authority’ (John 16:13) – in this area truth and originality can easily 
enter into opposition.”32 Ratzinger thereby brings the meaning of two inseparable 
                                                          
30 Ratzinger and Rahner, Episkopat und Primat, 51 (“[. . .] it is precisely and only in such an u derstanding of 
the gift of the Word to the Church, that man is forced, continually and in all earnestness, into the position of a 
‘Hearer of the Word,’ a hearer who himself has not power over the Word, but remains in that purely receptive 
frame of mind which is called ‘believing.’ Such ‘believing’ is stripped of all individualistic limitation. Because 
it is based on ‘hearing,’ it is continually directed to a ‘thou,’ to that great community of the faithful who are 
called to become ‘one person’ in Christ (Gal 3:8)” [Ratzinger and Rahner, The Episcopacy and the Primacy, 
54]). 
31 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 184. 
32 Ibid., 39. 
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components of sacrament into unity in the successio apostolica – namely, the “once-only” of 
the incarnational-christological, and “ever-new” of the charismatic-pneumatological: 
[. . .] bleibt als Kern dieses Begriffs die sakramentale Struktur der Kirche 
festzuhalten, in der sie das Erbe der Apostel, das Erbe Christi immer neu empfängt. 
Durch das Sakrament, in dem Christus durch den Heiligen Geist handelt, 
unterscheidet sie sich von allen anderen Institutionen. Das Sakrament bedeutet, daß 
sie vom Herrn her als “Geschöpf des Heiligen Geistes” lebt und immerfort neu 
geschaffen wird.33 
Secondly, successio encapsulates a practical task which reaches beyond the 
management of local Churches: the apostles’ successors have to see to it that Jesus’ 
commission to carry the Gospel to the ends of the earth is carried out. This leads to 
Ratzinger’s observation, as found in St Irenaeus (d. 202), that bishops are responsible “for 
seeing that the Church does not become a sort of federation of local Churches, just existing as 
such side by side, but retains her universality and unity. They have to carry forward the 
universal impetus of what is apostolic.”34 To Ratzinger’s mind there exists a danger in 
understanding the Church’s nature in purely institutional and bureaucratic terms and 
forgetting its charismatic dimension due to a one-sid d administrative understanding of 
apostolic succession: “the offices of the apostolic su cession might atrophy into a mere 
service undertaken in the local Church, the universality of Christ’s commission might be lost 
from view and from within our hearts.”35 
On the basis of the sacramental dimension, Ratzinger says “[. . .] the Church is not 
like a circle, with a single centre, but like an ellipse with two foci, primacy and 
                                                          
33 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 172 (“[. . .] we keep hold of the sacramental structure of the 
Church, within which she receives ever anew the heritage of the apostles, the heritage of Christ. Through the 
sacrament of orders, in which Christ is acting through the Holy Spirit, she is distinguished from other 
institutions. The sacrament means that she lives as ‘a vessel of the Holy Spirit,’ founded on the Lord, and is 
constantly being re-created” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 201]). 
34 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 190.  See also Ratzinger and Rahner, Episkopat und Primat, 52-59; 
Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 83-103.As examples of Irenaeus’ perspective, see Haer. 1, 10, 2; 3, 3, 1-2.   
35 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 191. 
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episcopacy.”36 The dialectic between the primacy and the episcopacy is a necessary tension 
for ensuring the Church’s freedom to maintain fidelity to Christ, in the Spirit, in every new 
generation. As a result of the apostolic succession, the “once-for-all” element of faith is 
guaranteed for the temporal pilgrimage of the Churc, while an interdict against ignoring the 
“ever new,” as well as safeguarding against pneumatic anarchy, is firmly established through 
the personal witness structure of the Church. The dual universal-local ecclesial dynamic 
safeguards the vita evangelica from the human will to power and the desire for self-
sufficiency.37 
5.1.4. A Free Response: The New Structure of Personal Responsibility 
 
Thus far, we have seen that Ratzinger’s understanding of sacrament specifies the 
responsibility of gift on the part of the witness. To his mind, the coming of Christ leads to “a 
new structure of personal responsibility” within Christianity. In salvation history, the 
                                                          
36 Ratzinger and Rahner, The Episcopacy and the Primacy, 43. He takes this image from Heribert Schauf, De 
Corpore Christi Mystico (Freiburg: Herder, 1959), 307. He says the reference to the bishop of Rome is the 
primary relationship to be ascertained for the catholicity and the apostolicity of other sees. However, Rome also 
requires the testimony of “real Catholicity” in order to remain true. Thus, he describes the picture that emerges 
from the dual universal-local ecclesial dynamic: “The Church is the living presence of the divine Word. This 
presence is made concrete in those persons (the bisops) whose basic function is to hold fast to the word, who 
are, then, the personal embodiment of ‘tradition’ (παράδοσις) and to this extent are in the apostolic line of 
‘succession’ (διαδοχή). . . . Just as the other sees need the apostolic test mony of Rome in order to be Catholic, 
so Rome needs their Catholic testimony, the testimony of real fullness, in order to remain true. Without the 
testimony of reality, Rome would negate its own meaning. . . . The majority of the bishops has, from ti e 
immemorial in the Church, been determined not simply by the externally greater number, but by the weight of 
the sees. And there can be no number large enough t counterbalance the decisive weight of the See of St. Peter. 
Anything else would mean substituting some sort of pr ane arithmetic for the holy bond of tradition” 
(Ratzinger and Rahner, The Episcopacy and the Primacy, 59-61). See also Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes: 
Entwürfe zur Ekklesiologie, 257-61; Called to Communion, 47-74; Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 259-63. In 
Called to Communion, 69, n. 20, Ratzinger highlights Vincent Twomey’s doctoral study which compellingly 
points to the preeminent and normative place of Rome – the site of Peter’s martyrdom – within the three p trine 
sees of Rome, Antioch and Alexandria. See Vincent Twomey, Apostolikos Thronos (Aschendorff: Münster, 
1982). 
37 See Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 191-208, where he undertakes a commentary on the emergence 
and buoyancy of apostolic movements in the Church. He demonstrates the facilitative role, so to speak, played 
by the apostolic succession in safeguarding the requisite freedom for the Church’s mission to witness and 
discern the things which contribute to the unity of the Church. Even through all the difficulties of ecclesiastical 
history, he says, “it has always been possible to make a place in the Church for the great new upsurge of life” 
(203). The point he says is “that the apostolic movements appear in history in forms that are ever new – 
necessarily so, because they are the Holy Spirit’s answer to the changing circumstances in which the Curch is 
living. . . . [M]ovements certainly cannot be organisationally introduced according to plans by the authorities. 
They have to be given us, and they are given. We simply have to pay attention to them: by the gift of 
discernment, pick up what is right in them and learn to overcome what is not useful” (ibid.). 
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communal dealing of God with his people is clear but so too is personal responsibility. This is 
Ratzinger’s basic insight into the structure of the Bible: “[t]he ‘we’ does not dissolve the ‘I’ 
and ‘you’, but rather it confirms and intensifies them so as to make them almost definitive.”38 
In his view, this means that the practice of “naming” i  the Bible is very important, to the 
point where a biblical name has the equivalence of the philosophical concept “person”39: God 
and human beings have names and therefore they can be ddressed and can address. In the 
history of revelation, the human person is called by name and is held personally responsible. 
In the New Testament, this concept reaches its fullest measure when the people of God are 
henceforth generated, not by birth, but by means of a call and a response. This is what 
Ratzinger calls the new structure of personal respon ibility whereby the idea of a collective 
consignee of a whole people functioning as a sort of corporate individual vis-à-vis world 
history, in collective punishment, liability, penance and pardon, no longer applies as it used 
to.40 The “new people” is now also characterised by a structure of personal responsibility 
which is manifest in the personalising of the cultic event: each one is named in baptism and 
each one is thereafter called to do personal penanc.  
As regards the episcopal office, it essentially exists n a collegial “we” – in a “we” 
which gives robust significance to the individual “I” which, in this case, is the community of 
a local Church represented by a bishop. For a localChurch, fitting itself into a “we,” which as 
a whole carries on the apostolic heritage, means that “collegiality fulfils its meaning only if 
the individual bishop really and faithfully represents his individual Church” within the “we” 
of all the bishops. In this way, and “through him a piece of ecclesiastical plenitude is truly 
                                                          
38 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 39. 
39 See Ratzinger, The God of Jesus Christ, 15-25. See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Umkehr im Neuen 
Testament,” Internationale katholische Zeitschrift 3 (1974): 481-91. An English translation of this key article 
can be found in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Spirit and Institution (vol. 4 of Explorations in Theology, trans. 
Edward T. Oakes [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995]), 245-260. A selection of Ratzinger’s major articles in 
the area of anthropology have been very helpfully gathered in David L. Schindler and Nicholas J. Healy, eds., 
Anthropology and Culture (vol. 2 of Joseph Ratzinger in Communio [Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2013]).   
40 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 39-42. 
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inserted into the whole of the Church's unity.”41 A bishop is related, on the one hand, to his 
brothers (“thou”) in the same office, but also to his brothers and sisters (“we”) who are, by 
the same grace as himself, baptised in the name of Christ. This impacts upon the entire nature 
of the Church’s freedom since “there can be no egotism of dioceses and congregations caring 
only for themselves, while simply abandoning all others to God and the Holy See.”42 As a 
consequence, to Ratzinger’s mind, collegiality as an ecclesial principle “is not only a 
statement about the nature of the episcopal office, but about the structure of the Church as a 
whole.”43 As a key principle best captured by the term “brotherliness,” Ratzinger says 
collegiality raises the question about how precisely the particularity of the structure of 
personal responsibility can be reconciled with the communality or fraternitas structure 
informing ecclesial life. 
 In the modern understanding of freedom, unity is decoupled from human dependency. 
Ratzinger believes this is opposed to the meaning of collegial fraternity. To his mind, the 
giving of one’s “I” in dependence upon God and one a other is precisely the way unity 
comes about. This follows onto the ecclesial level, whereby the implication of Ratzinger’s 
sacramental dimension is that the local Church cannot go on living if isolated from the 
“whole.” He says the Church is not solely in a particular locality nor is it the property of a 
                                                          
41 Joseph Ratzinger, “Die pastoralen Implikationen der Lehre von der Kollegialität der Bischöfe” in Das neue 
Volk Gottes, 215 (own translation). 
42 Ibid. (own translation). 
43 Ibid., 220 (own translation). Ratzinger says that e broader ecclesial principle implied by the word 
collegiality means “that the one Church is built from the communion of the many local churches together, and 
therefore also the unity of the Church necessarily includes the element of multiplicity and plenitude. . .  The 
collegiality of the bishops is the expression of the fact that the Church should be (under, and in the security 
guaranteed by the primacy) an ordered multiplicity” (220-22) (own translation). Ratzinger has lauded the 
Second Vatican Council’s revitalization of the concept of collegiality as the “we” structure of the faith, and as 
something more than a functional feature of Church governance. It is a fundamental law that reaches into every 
individual level and relationship in the Church to the point where it is “possible to demonstrate thate ‘we’ 
structure was part of Christianity in the first place” (Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 37). From such 
a context, Ratzinger has always considered Christian ty to have a social structure. That is why the modern 
notion of freedom as radical self-sufficiency and iependence clashes so intensely with the Christian 
worldview. A believer, Ratzinger says, can never stand on their own: “[T]o become a believer means to emerge 
from isolation into the ‘we’ of the children of God; the act of turning to the God revealed in Christ is always a 
turning also to those who have already been called. The theo-logical act as such is always an ecclesial act, which 
also has a characteristically social structure” (ibid.).   
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particular individual: “[t]he Church is not just here, but throughout the earth; the Church is 
not just today, but also yesterday and tomorrow. Only when both are accepted – unity with 
others, with the whole, and unity with those who went before us in faith, unity with the 
Church of all times – is the Church truly present.”44 Therefore, the believer’s response to 
God’s gift, while personal, remains insufficient, if approached in a solely individualistic way. 
The personal response of the believer is authentic to he extent that its motivation is for the 
“whole”, as it were, and never for the “self” only. Thus an essential feature of the Church is 
its will to self-dispossession, its “non-autonomy”:  
Denn den fleischgewordenen Christus, der das eigentliche Leben der Kirche ist, und 
der in jeder kirchlichen Versammlung ganz unter uns weilt, diesen Christus, der damit 
jede in seinem Namen geschehende Versammlung ganz zu Kirche machen will, kann 
man nicht für sich allein haben. Er ist im Einzelnen ganz und er ist im Ganzen nur 
Einer. Daher kann man ihn nicht ohne das Ganze und erst recht nicht gegen das Ganze 
haben. Und daher ist das grundlegende Kriterium dafür, ob eine Gemeinde in seinem 
Namen versammelt und mithin Kirche ist, ihr Stehen im Ganzen. Ihr grundlegendes 
Kriterium ist ihre Unabgeschlossenheit, ihre Nichtautonomie, ihre Offenheit ins 
Ganze der Kirche hinein. Ihr Kriterium ist, daß sie n cht etwas besonderes sein will, 
sondern an diesem Ort die eine Kirche verkörpert, die überall dieselbe und nur so sie 
selber ist.45  
The sacramental framework – the attitude of openness and receptivity to the gift of 
God – places freedom at the heart of the Church’s con titution. At least, that is, freedom 
understood in terms of relationality, dependency and limitation. In the midst of the human 
yearning for transcendence, a sacramental perspective unburdens humanity of false 
perceptions of its nature and destiny. While a sacramental framework sustains Ratzinger’s 
assertion of personal responsibility before the will of God, he does not claim this by 
                                                          
44 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 230. There are strong echoes here of Ratzinger’s reflections on diachronic 
and synchronic dimensions of the Church’s life. Seethis dissertation § 7.5.  
45 Ratzinger, Dogma und Verkündigung, 240 (“For no-one can have for himself alone the Incarnate Christ, who 
is the authentic life of the Church and dwells wholly among us in every church gathering, this Christ who 
desires to make every gathering that occurs in his ame wholly his Church. He is wholly in the individual and in 
the whole he is only One. Hence no one can have him without the whole and certainly not in opposition t  the 
whole. And, hence, being part of the whole is the foundational criterion for whether a congregation gathers in 
his name and, consequently, is Church. Its foundational criterion is its not being self-contained, its non-
autonomy, its openness to the whole of the Church. Its criterion is that it does not want to be something special 
but, rather, embodies at this place the one Church, which is the same everywhere and only in that way is herself” 
[Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 214]). 
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compromising the “we” structure of the faith. There is a faith dimension to Ratzinger’s 
ecclesiology which ensures that the communal aspect of ecclesial life is not negligible, even 
in the face of a society that makes a virtue out of independence. By coming to terms with the 
truth that the “I” is complete within the “whole,” Ratzinger contemplates Christ’s “Body” in 
terms of the “whole” and consequently, as sphere of gr wth in authentic human freedom. 
Ultimately, a personal-communal ecclesial dynamic is not reserved to the episcopal office, 
but permeates the entire nature of the Church: 
Wie niemand für sich allein Christ sein kann, sonder  nur zusammen mit den anderen, 
mit der lebendigen Gemeinschaft der Glaubenden, so kann auch keine Gemeinde, 
keine Region für sich allein Kirche sein. Sie kann es nur durch die Öffnung ins Ganze 
hinein und durch die Einordnung in die apostolische Üb rlieferung, deren Garanten 




                                                          
46 Ratzinger, Dogma und Verkündigung, 261 (“[. . .] just as no man can be a Christian by himself but only 
together with others, with the living community of believers, so too no congregation, no region, can be Church 
by itself. It can do so only by opening itself up to the whole and by being aligned with the apostolic tradition, of 
which the apostles and their successors are the guarantors” [Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 230]). It is 
arguably the case that the universal-particular dynamic in ecclesiology received its most dramatic highlighting 
in the well-known debate between Walter Kasper and Ratzinger over the validity of the ontological priority of 
the universal Church. Sparked off by a 1992 letter from the CDF, “Letter to Bishops of the Catholic Church on 
Some Aspects of the Church Understood as Communion,” it led to a very public debate between the two 
German theologians on the relationship of the universal Church with local (or diocesan) Churches. It is
thoroughly summarized by Kilian McDonnell in “The Ratzinger/Kasper Debate: The Universal Church and 
local Churches,” Theological Studies 63 (June 2002): 227-250, and in “Walter Kasper on the Theology and 
Praxis of the Bishop’s Office,” Theological Studies 63 (Dec 2002): 690-711; Richard P. McBrien, The Church: 
The Evolution of Catholicism (New York: Harper Collins: 2008), 426, n. 8; Heim, Joseph Ratzinger: Life in the 
Church and Living Theology, 357-382; Anne Hunt, Trinity: Nexus of the Mysteries of Christian Faith (New 
York: Orbis, 2005), 130-137.  Avery Dulles made a significant interjection into the debate in 2001 which 
appears to have resolved it, at least for the present time. See “Ratzinger and Kasper on the Universal Church,” 
Inside the Vatican (June 2001), 12-14. The article’s key statement is significant because of who enunciated it as 
much as it is for its contents: “The ontological priority of the Church universal appears to me to be almost self-
evident, since the very concept of a particular chur  presupposes a universal Church to which it belongs, 
whereas the concept of the universal Church does not imply that it is made up of distinct particular churches . . . 
. The Church as we find it today is made up of many particular churches and does not exist without them any 
more than they exist without it. It is impossible to belong to either the universal or the particular church without 
belonging to both” (13). Dulles points out that both Ratzinger and Kasper acknowledge the teaching that the one 
Church of Christ comes into being both in and from the particular churches (cf. LG, 23) – for the former there is 
a “mutual precedence,” for the latter, “a simultaneous mutual priority.” Indeed, in somewhat pragmatic fashion 
perhaps, Dulles concludes that “[i]in this age of gl balisation and multiple inculturation, it is more imperative 
than ever to have a vigorous office that safeguards the unity of all the particular churches in the essentials of 
faith, morality, and worship” (14). A very helpful addition to the debates on the universal-local dynamic can be 
found in Christopher Ruddy, The Local Church: Tillard and the Future of Catholic Ecclesiology (New York: 
Crossroad, 2006).  
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5.2.  The Faith Dimension: Belief Requires Community 
 
If an essential feature of ecclesial life is “self-dispossession,” then consideration of 
the thesis that the Church is a sphere of growth in authentic freedom is no longer merely a 
question about institutional integrity but about personal faith within the whole: 
Wenn ich sage “Ich glaube,” dann heißt dies eben, daß ich die Grenze meiner privaten 
Subjektivität überschreite, um in das gemeinsame Subjekt der Kirche wie in ihr die 
Zeiten und die Grenzen der Zeit überschreitendes Wissen einzutreten. Der 
Glaubensakt ist immer ein Akt des Beteiligtwerdens a  einem Ganzen; er ist ein Akt 
der Communio, ein Sich-einfügen-lassen in die Communio der Zeugen, so daß wir 
mit ihnen und in ihnen das Unberührbare anrühren, das Unhörbare hören, das 
Unsichtbare sehen.47  
A faith dimension, which in many respects is correlative to the sacramental 
framework, informs Ratzinger’s ecclesiology here, and its basic premise is that a person 
cannot go on believing on their own, but only as one among fellow believers. For Ratzinger, 
faith is the power of union whose archetype is Pentecost, where people who were otherwise 
unknown to one another could participate in the miracle of communal understanding. Faith, 
Ratzinger says, occurs in the Church or not at all. Just as a person cannot go on believing on 
their own, neither can one believe through one’s own resources alone – a self-acquired faith 
is a self-contradiction that guarantees precisely what one is without faith. In like fashion, a 
self-made Church that exists by its own “graces” is a contradiction: “[a]lthough faith 
demands communion, it is the sort of communion that has authority and takes the lead, not 
the sort that is my own creation, the instrument of my own wishes.”48 This opens out into a 
key ecclesiological principle for Ratzinger: “Either this Jesus was more than a man, so that he 
had an inherent authority that was more than the product of his own arbitrary will, or he was 
                                                          
47 Joseph Ratzinger with Godfried Cardinal Danneels, Franciszek Cardinal Macharski and Archbishop Dermot J. 
Ryan, Die Krise der Katechese und ihre Überwindung (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1983), 27 (“When I say ‘I 
believe,’ then this means precisely that I am going beyond the limits of my private subjectivity so as to enter 
into the collective subject of the Church and, in her, to enter into the knowledge that transcends the ages and the 
limits of time. The act of faith is always an act of becoming a participant in a totality; it is an act of communio, a 
willingness to be incorporated into the communion of witnesses, so that we with them and in them may touch 
the untouchable, hear the inaudible, and see the invisible” [Ratzinger, Handing on the Faith in an Age of 
Disbelief, 27-28]).  
48 Ratzinger, “Why I am still in the Church,” in Credo for Today, 194. 
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not. . . . [E]ither an authority proceeded from him that extends and lasts through the ages, or 
else he left no such authority behind.”49 If Christ is more than the leader of a religious or 
civic movement, then he is not dependent on human reconstruction and the power which he 
left behind him remains operative. The Church and faith in Christ meet at this point. 
Above and beyond packages of dogmas and complex philosophies, “Christian faith is 
being touched by God and witnessing to him.”50 It is because “[t]he Church is the most 
intimate place of the encounter between Jesus and mkind, in his act of giving himself to 
us,”51 that Ratzinger maintains “[t]he Church is not there for her own sake but should be the 
instrument of God for gathering men to him, so as to prepare for the moment when God shall 
be ‘everything to everyone’ (1Cor 15:28).”52 From a faith perspective, the Church jettisons 
self-centred autonomy: 
Was der Kirche Bedeutung gibt, ist in der Sicht des Glaubens die Tatsache, daß sie 
mehr ist als Produkt zweckmäßigen menschlichen Handelns und geschichtlicher 
Entwicklungen. Sie stellt vielmehr den Raum einer realen Begegnung zwischen Gott 
und Menschen in dieser Welt dar, einer Begegnung, die nicht nur einzelne zu Gott 
führt, sondern sie zugleich zueinander bringt, sie zu iner neuen Familie werden 
läßt.53 
 
5.2.1. Ecclesio-Knowledge: The Primacy of God 
 In an attempt to understand the contribution of faith to the freedom of the human 
person, Ratzinger advances the scenario of a God-free world.54 To his mind, forgetfulness of 
God places humankind on a trajectory of self-destruction. A community which has no place 
                                                          
49 Ibid., 194-95. 
50 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 286. 
51 See Ratzinger, “Eucharist, Communion and Solidarity,” § 2.  
52 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 129. See Called to Communion, 29-33, where Ratzinger comments on 
the Church’s self-description as ekklesia as the dynamic movement of gathering into the one Church of Jesus 
Christ. 
53 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 221 (“What gives the Church significance is, in the view of faith, 
the fact that she is more than the result of purposeful human activity plus historical development. She represents, 
rather, the sphere of a concrete encounter between God and man in the world; an encounter that not only brings 
individuals to God, but at the same time leads them to one another, makes them into a new family” [Ratzinger, 
Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 254-55]). 
54 See Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 284-98. 
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for God would, in his view, become a kind of hell.55 On the basis of this scenario, he believes 
the mission of the Church is threefold: firstly, it is witnessing to God. Secondly, this witness 
opens up barred and darkened windows so that God’s light can shine among us. Thirdly, this 
means that there is room for God’s presence once mor because, as hell is God’s absence, 
heaven is his presence. Hence he provides a forthrigh  characterisation of the Church as 
necessary for humanity: 
Kirche ist dazu da, daß Gott, der lebendige Gott, bekanntgemacht werde – dazu, daß 
der Mensch lernen kann, mit Gott, unter seinen Augen und in der Gemeinschaft mit 
ihm  zu leben. Kirche ist dazu da, das Vordringen dr Hölle auf die Erde zu bannen 
and sie durch das Licht Gottes bewohnbar zu machen.56 
Ratzinger’s exhortation that the Church ought to expr ss the primacy of God in its life 
simultaneously conjures up a concrete application of the Christian philosophy of freedom, as 
well as the synergy of wills which he advocates strongly in the course of his reflection.57 In 
line with the third petition of the Lord’s Prayer, “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven” 
(Matt 6:10), Ratzinger says, “[w]herever God’s will is carried out is heaven, and there earth 
                                                          
55 Ratzinger is particularly sensitive to this possibility because of his own youth in Germany, and its close 
proximity to the Iron Curtain. See this dissertation §§ 1.1. and 1.2. In his understanding, twentieth-century 
atrocities turned out to be hell despite being partially constructed on the premise of bringing about a future with 
humanity as its own master. Ratzinger paints a disconcerting scenario: “[w]herever God is not, hell comes into 
existence; it consists simply in his absence. . . That does not imply that there cannot be – as in fact there are – 
atheists with high ethics. Yet I venture to maintai that these ethics are based on the lingering glimmer of the 
light that once came from Sinai – the light of God. Far-distant stars, now already dead, may still be shining upon 
us. Even when God seems to be dead his light may be round. Yet Nietzsche rightly pointed out that the 
moment when the news that God is dead has reached everywhere, the moment in which his light would finally 
be extinguished can only be frightful” (Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 285). For analysis of the 
Nietzschean death of God theory – commonly associated with Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, § 
108,125, see Bernd Magnus & Kathleen M. Higgins, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche (N w York: 
Cambridge University Press), 35-38, 90-118, 223-251, 307-319, 326-7. 
56 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 250 (“The Church is there so that God, the living God, may be 
made known – so that man may learn to live with God, live in his sight and in fellowship with him. The Church 
is there to prevent the advance of hell upon the earth and to make the earth fit to live in through the light of 
God” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 286]). Ratzinger’s understanding of the Church as the domain of 
God’s presence is consistent with a call by him for the Church to be filled more and more with the divine. He 
says that only on the basis of God’s presence can the Church be humanised for without his presence within , 
the Church would fast become a fabricated super-structu e insufficient for human well-being: “[w]hat makes the 
Church the Church . . . are those elements that do not derive from merely human activity. They alone distinguish 
the Church from all other communal groupings and accord her the quality of being unique, being irreplace ble” 
(Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 255).  
57 See this dissertation §§ 2.2.4., 3.2.2.1. and 4.2. 
245 
 
can become heaven.”58 Ecclesial life is about making it possible to discern the knowledge of 
God’s will and bringing the human person’s will into harmony with it (cf. Col 1:9-10). The 
Church as the receptacle of God’s will implies that it is a sphere of, what may be called, 
ecclesio-knowledge – a form of collective knowledge whereby a living proclamation of the 
primacy of God’s will for his people is learnt and enjoyed.59 As a whole, Ratzinger says, the 
Church exhibits knowledge not born of private expertis  or technical mastery, but of God’s 
intimacy towards humanity that is made known through the full revelation of Christ in the 
world.60     
However, the primacy of God and his loving will cannot be fully known by taking an 
academic note of his existence. On the contrary, knowledge of God’s will occurs in, and 
through the faith community. Ratzinger therefore says that ecclesial membership requires an 
“all-embracing assent” to God’s will which concerns the whole person, including their will, 
for otherwise it comes to nothing.61 The Church exhorts the taking of an informed decision by 
the human person with respect of assent towards, or repudiation of God’s will. It is when the 
“whole” person commences taking a positive decision in this regard that ecclesio-knowledge 
becomes fruitful in the life of the believer. In this way, the Christian synthesis takes concrete 
shape in the discernment of God’s will for the human person within the community of faith. 
For Ratzinger then, growth in authentic freedom is found along the route of the giving 
of the whole self to this ecclesio-knowledge of the primacy of God’s will. However, in light 
                                                          
58 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 286. See also Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan, 
147-50.  
59 It is important to say that “ecclesio-knowledge” is not a term Ratzinger has ever used. Rather it is my attempt, 
from the perspective of the human subject, to capture the on-going, collective reception in the Church of the 
primacy of God and his will for creation. It presupposes a sacramental understanding that such knowledge is 
gifted to each new generation down through history. In this way, humanity is empowered to participate in the 
uninterrupted ecclesial discernment of the divine will.
60 See Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 286-87. 
61 In this regard, I wish to draw attention to Ratzinger’s comment that knowing God requires the whole person:  
knowledge, will and heart. In other words, coming to know God’s will, which is coming to knowledge of the 
truth about the meaning of oneself, entails the use of our reason, the decision to trust and the capacity  to love.  
See especially Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 255. When one or more elements of this all-
embracing assent are deficient, the believer’s ecclesial membership increasingly suffers from fragility. 
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of the all-embracing assent required of a believer confronted with the intimacy of revelation 
in Christ, the Church can never be a matter of simply aintaining membership for to do so 
would be the beginnings of a human power-bloc intent on supremacy over other sections of 
the human race. Consequently, religious freedom is of the essence of a legitimate 
ecclesiology. This is the principle behind the Ratzinger’s view that “[t]he Church is not there 
for her own sake.”62 The Church has a task to perform in the world and for humanity. It is to 
prevent the self-destruction of humanity by avoiding an eclipse of God in the world:  
Nur deswegen muß [die Kirche] überleben, weil ihr Verschwinden die Menschheit in 
den Strudel der Gottesfinsternis und so der Verfinsterung, ja, der Zerstörung des 
Menschlichen hineinziehen würde. Wir kämpfen nicht um Selbsterhaltung, wir wissen 
uns mit einer Sendung betraut, die uns Verantwortung für alle auferlegt.63 
Ratzinger believes the Church is in decline the moment it becomes a self-absorbed 
organisation pursuing its own ends. That is why the C urch has to measure herself, and be 
measured by others for the extent to which the presence of God is alive in its members. That's 
why Ratzinger’s benchmark for the Church is the primacy of God. To his mind, a primacy of 
the knowledge of God’s will means the Church is there for humanity “so that the world may 
become a sphere for God’s presence, the sphere of th  covenant between God and men.”64  
5.2.2. Communio Ecclesiology: Safeguarding Personal Integrity 
Ratzinger, then, envisages that God’s creative will for the human person and the 
Church encounter one another very concretely in the realm of freedom. As we saw in Chapter 
4, the way the creation story (Gen 1:1-2:4) moves towards the Sabbath is the biblical way of 
expressing creation’s inner basis and purpose: “It is there in order that the covenant may 
come to be in which God freely gives his love and receives the response of love.”65 The 
                                                          
62 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 287. 
63 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 250-51 (“The only reason she has to survive is because her 
disappearance would drag humanity into a whirlpool of the eclipse of God and, thus, into the eclipse, indeed the 
destruction, of all that is human. We are not fighting for our own survival; we know that we have been ntrusted 
with a mission that lays upon us a responsibility for everyone” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 287]). 
64 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 287. 
65 Ibid., 288. 
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dialogical orientation of humanity – a human posture freely undertaken with regard to God – 
consists of this encounter with God and one’s respon e, affirmative or negative, in return.66 
This sphere of divine-human encounter in Ratzinger’s cclesiology is expressed in the 
category of communio. 
It is a concern – and particularly in the modern era – that personal integrity be 
maintained while not, at the same time, forgetting humanity’s social nature. Ratzinger 
believes that a communio ecclesiology safeguards this dynamic.67 Through the Incarnation of 
the Word, God determined to encounter humanity as a social and historical being: “God 
wants to come to men through men. God has approached men in such a way that through 
him, and on account of him, they can find their way to one another. Thus the Incarnation 
includes the communal and historical aspects of faith.”68 With this view, Ratzinger 
                                                          
66 See this dissertation §§ 4.1.4 and 4.3.  
67 Ratzinger is a long-term advocate of c mmunio ecclesiology. A number of his writings in this are have been 
helpfully gathered together in GS:ZV,  519-604. Acknowledging that communio did not occupy a central place 
in the Second Vatican Council, he believes that “if properly understood it can serve as a synthesis of the 
essential elements of the Council’s ecclesiology” (Joseph Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of Vatican II,” § III, 
http://www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/CDFECCV2.HTM [accessed 25 May 2011]). He pinpoints the 
extraordinary Synod of Bishops in 1985 as the place wh re the Council’s ecclesiology was reflected upon and 
fruitfully synthesised for the first time into an “ecclesiology of communion.” To his mind, however, a 
misunderstanding may arise from the temptation to abandon altogether the hierarchical ecclesiology of the First 
Vatican Council in favour of a solely communitarian or horizontal sense of the Church. If taken in that w y, he 
feels communio would support a “pluralist” ecclesiology that was a type of federal union opposing a centralist 
conception of Church. It would also stress the exchange of giving and receiving among local Churches with
regard to worship, discipline and doctrine. While no doubt, such co-operation is vital in the life of discipleship, 
were it to become the overarching ecclesial model, shaped as it is by the inevitable horizontalism that stems 
from a network of multiple communities, Ratzinger blieves it would be akin to a conciliarist ecclesiology 
which, since the fifteenth century, has left its own ound in the Church’s memory. In Ratzinger’s view, the 
horizontal dimension of communio, if promoted to the exclusion of the vertical, would ratify the idea of self-
determination. See Ratzinger, “Eucharist, Communion and Solidarity.” See also Church, Ecumenism and 
Politics, 93-96; Benedict XVI, Light of the World: The Pope, the Church and the Signs of the Times, trans. 
Michael J. Miller and Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011), 155-162, where we get a limpse 
of the Pope’s personal views on reform in the Churc. For an overview of Conciliarism in the life of the Church, 
see The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, s.v. “Conciliar Theory.”  
68 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 165. Taking the incarnational approach to reality means that time, and 
the social nature of humanity are valid features of our relationship with God. Because the Word of God took 
bodily human form, christology and ecclesiology areforever inseparable. Ratzinger describes the connectio  
between Christ and the Church as the “ecclesial depth of Christology” (166). Ratzinger’s core insight is that it is 
through Christ that the Church fulfils its purpose. H  highlights this through the following biblical insight which 
is the basis of an incarnational ecclesiology encompassing the tension between the “one” and the “many”: 
“God’s action brings into being ‘the People of God,’ and ‘the People of God,’ on the basis of Christ become ‘the 
body of Christ,’ in accordance with the profound interpretation of the promise to Abraham offered by Paul in the 
Letter to the Galatians. This [promise] is made – thus it is that Paul reads the Old Testament – to ‘the seed’ of 
248 
 
concludes, Christian faith is never simply spiritual and inward, nor a subjective, private 
relationship with Christ; rather it is entirely concrete and ecclesial, involving a mutual self-
giving of persons, resting on the just ordering of obligations assented to in freedom: 
Eine rechte Vision des Menschen aber muß von einer Beziehung ausgehen, in der 
jeder Person und frei bleibt und gerade so dem andere  verbunden ist. Sie muß 
Beziehungslehre sein und einen Typ von Beziehungen suchen, der kein Zweck-
Mittel-Verhältnis ist, sondern Sich-Geben von Personen.69 
 
In Ratzinger’s writings, the self-giving of persons – an idea wholly consistent with his  
understanding of human freedom as the acceptance of d pendency, relationality and 
limitation – manifests the theological, social and personalist character of  a communio 
ecclesiology. Ratzinger highlights three New Testament texts which, at various levels, are 
grounded upon free and mutual self-giving relationality: 1John 1:3-4, 1Cor 10:16ff and 2Cor 
13:13. Amongst these, the Johannine text is given pr -eminence.70  
For him, 1John1: 3-4 contains the essential elements for correctly understanding the 
theological character of κοινωνία. Communio, he says, is primarily a theological notion 
extending into the realm of ontology. In the first instance, as we saw from its correlation with 
trinitarian and eucharistic ommunio, the object of ecclesial communio is union with the Son 
of God who comes to humanity in and through the Church.71 From this, its social aspects find 
their inner depth. Fellowship (κοινωνία) among human beings is born in this union and it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Abraham: that is, not to many, but to one. God’s action is aimed accordingly at getting us, the many, to be, not 
merely ‘at one,’ but ‘one’ – sharing in his bodily life with Jesus Christ (Gal 3:16f., 28)” (165-6).   
69 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 233 (“A correct vision of man must proceed from a relationship in 
which each one remains a free person and is joined to the other precisely as such. It must be a doctrine of 
relationship and seek a type of relationship that is not a means-end relationship but the self-giving of persons” 
[Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 245]).  
70  For the sake of reader accessibility, I quote the thr e texts here: “[W]e declare to you what we have seen and 
heard so that you also may have fellowship (κοινωνίαν) with us; and truly our fellowship (κοινωνία) is with the 
Father and with his Son Jesus Christ. We are writing these things so that our joy may be complete” (1John 1: 3-
4); “The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a sh ring (κοινωνία) in the blood of Christ? The bread that we 
bless is it not a sharing (κοινωνία) in the Body of Christ? Because there is one bread, we who are many are one 
body, for we all partake of the one bread” (1Cor 10:16-17); “The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of 
God, and the communion (κοινωνία) of the Holy Spirit be with you all” (2Cor 13:13). 
71 See this dissertation § 5.1.1. 
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merges into fellowship with the Triune God because encountering Christ creates communion, 
through him, in the Holy Spirit, with the Father.72  
In the second text (cf.1Cor 10:16-17), the characte of communio is deepened by St 
Paul, who explores its social character. From this,Ratzinger finds evidence for his conviction 
that “[t]he ecclesiology of communion at its very foundation is a Eucharistic ecclesiology.”73 
Through the Eucharist, “ecclesiology becomes more cncrete while remaining totally 
spiritual, transcendent and eschatological.” He continues, 
[i]n the Eucharist, Christ, present in the bread anwine and giving Himself anew, 
builds the Church as His Body and through His Risen Body He unites us to the one 
and triune God and to each other. The Eucharist, celebrated in different places is 
universal at the same time, because there is only one Christ and only a single body of 
Christ.74 
 
The communio model, rooted in the corporate personality of the “single Christ,” offers 
a basis for both safeguarding and resolving the tension between the freely assenting 
individual believer and the social nature of Church membership.75 It accounts for the identity 
of each free subject within the corporate whole. Communicating with Christ in the Eucharist 
is the affirmation of the “commingling of Christ’s life with our own” and, by being inserted 
into the movement of Christ’s life, “[o]ur existence is ‘dynamised’ in such a way that each of 
                                                          
72 While there is no mention of the Holy Spirit in 1John 1:3-4, Ratzinger finds resolution in Jesus’ Johannine 
farewell discourses (John 13-17). The discourses indicate a further point: the goal of communio is the fullness of 
joy. Ratzinger says the Church carries within her an eschatological dynamic. The present time of sorrow, 
according to John 16:20, 22, 24, will turn to joy with Christ’s definitive return. When this verse is compared 
with the invitation to invoke the Spirit in Luke 11:13, Ratzinger believes “joy” and the “Holy Spirit” are 
equivalent. In summary, he maintains that, biblically, an ecclesiology of communion is invaluable because of its 
theological, ecclesiological and soteriological character. See Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of Vatican II,” § III. 
73 Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of Vatican II,” § III. 
74 Ibid. 
75 On the semitic conception of corporate personality nd how this stands in the background to Ratzinger’s 
ecclesiological understanding of the Body of Christ, see Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 33-40; Introduction 
to Christianity, 234-43. Ratzinger develops this concept, which is te notion that “we are all Adam, a single 
person writ large,” into the idea of nuptiality – the union of “Bride” and “Body”: “Christ and the Church are one 
body in the sense in which man and woman are one flesh, that is, in such a way that in their indissoluble 
spiritual-bodily union, they nonetheless remain unconfused and unmingled. The Church does not simply become 
Christ, she is ever the handmaid whom he lovingly raises to be his Bride and who seeks his face throug these 
latter days” (Called to Communion, 39).   
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us can become a being for others.”76 Consequently, all who commune with his one body are 
configured to Christ and, though many, are members of one body (cf. Rom 12:4-5; 1Cor 
12:12-31). This necessarily involves a social dimensio  as it unites one person organically 
with every other person receiving Christ: if my being united to Christ means I am together 
with my neighbour, then “the individual realities of my communicating and being part of the 
life of the Church are inseparably linked to one another.”77 To Ratzinger’s mind, the Church 
is not born as a federation of communities but rather can only begin from the one Lord and 
from the one body which is formed by communion in the one bread: 
[The Church] becomes one not through a centralised government but through a 
common centre open to all, because it constantly draws its origin from a single Lord, 
who forms her by means of the one bread into one body. Because of this, her unity 
has a greater depth than that which any other human unio  could ever achieve. 
Precisely when the Eucharist is understood in the intimacy of the union of each person 
with the Lord, it becomes also a social sacrament to the highest degree.78  
 
Hence the fundamental structure of ecclesial communio expresses a reciprocal communion on 
the theological and social levels: “communion with Jesus becomes communion with God 
himself, communion with the light and with love; it becomes in this way an upright life, and 
all of this unites us with one another in the truth. Only when we regard communion in this 
depth and breadth do we have something to say to the world.”79 For Ratzinger, fellowship 
and unity in the truth preserve all that is best in the human person, both individually and 
collectively. 
Alongside the theological and social levels, Ratzinger acknowledges a third element, 
namely, the personalist character of c mmunio. This copper-fastens his argument for the 
preservation of personhood within the self-giving of persons that is integral to ecclesial life. 
The realisation that communion among the faithful can only follow from communion 
                                                          
76 Joseph Ratzinger, “Eucharist, Communion and Solidarity,” § 2, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20020602_ratzinger-
eucharistic-congress_en.html (accessed 24 May 2011).   





between God and the human person is described by Ratzinger as an “all-encompassing third” 
element because communion is not merely something between two individual human 
beings.80 While it may be our common human nature that creates the possibility that we can 
communicate with one another, nature alone, Ratzinger states, is not sufficient to 
communicate the inner sensibility of persons. Conscious of the modern anxiety regarding a 
potential loss of personal autonomy through submission to an authority figure, Ratzinger 
states an anthropological principle: “individuality separates, personhood opens” because 
personhood, by nature, is relational. The deepest id ntity of personhood is “point[ing] beyond 
the self to a greater something, even a greater someone.” This all-embracing third element 
binds precisely because it is greater than the individual. Ratzinger believes one further step is 
required here: for a person, this “third” is not exernal but is itself within each individual: 
“This third, which in truth is the first, we call God. In him we touch ourselves. Through him – 
not in any other way – the depths of communion are reached.”  
The third scriptural text (2 Cor 13:13) is operative at this point. The Christian 
tradition, as expressed in this pauline liturgical greeting, interprets κοινωνία as an outright 
description of the Holy Spirit. Concretely, this means that our communion with one another is 
through Christ in the Holy Spirit “so that [communio  among people] becomes a community 
– “Church” in the genuine sense of the word.”81 God’s communication of himself in the 
historical fact of the Incarnation means that Christ’s humanity is opened up through the Holy 
Spirit in such a way that it embraces all of us, so that all can be united in a single body, in a 
single common flesh. Hence, the pneumatic anarchy which he seeks to avoid in the Church is 
overcome through pneumatological communion with Christ and with one another.82 
                                                          
80 Ratzinger, “Communio – ein Program,” 460 (own transl tion). 
81 Ibid. (own translation). 
82 When Ratzinger speaks about the need for more “divinity” in the Church, he is referring to the 
pneumatological activity which gives the Church its correct orientation and is the corrective to ecclesiologies 
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With regard to whether submission to the Church’s sacramental authority under the 
guise of an ecclesiology of communion might be merely the surrender of personal integrity 
by another name, Ratzinger finds illumination in the convergence of the sacramental 
framework and faith dimension of his ecclesiology. Jesus, the one who is bearer of divine 
power (cf. Matt 7:29, 21:23; Mark 1:27, 11:28; Luke 20:2, 24:19) announces a message he 
did not engineer but is himself “sent” on the mission assigned him by the Father.83 In the 
context of his Resurrection, Jesus’ mission passes ov r into the office of the apostles – those 
who have been sent: “Jesus confers his power upon the apostles and thereby makes their 
office strictly parallel to his own mission.”84 Ratzinger points out that the structure of Jesus’ 
mission involves his entire being – it is relationship, the significance of which is expressed in 
a Johannine parallelism: “The Son can do nothing of himself” (John 5:19, 30) and “Without 
me you can do nothing” (John 15:5). From this, Ratzinger proposes that the “nothing” of 
ecclesial authority is centred on the mission Christ receives from the Father. Ratzinger states 
that Jesus links the apostles to himself and they sare with Jesus this “nothing” which 
“expresses at once the power and impotence of the apostolic office.”85 The “nothing” of 
ecclesial authority unburdens the Church from having to engineer the content of its mission, 
just as the Father unburdens the Son in the fulfilment of his mission. While the transparency 
of both is comparable, it is not identical. This is a key moment in Ratzinger’s ecclesiology as 
regards the nature of authority found in the Church. The authority which the Church 
possesses is not an act of the arbitrary will of the apostles and their successors. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“from below” which presuppose that one may regard the Church as a merely sociological entity and that Christ, 
as an acting subject, has no real significance. In Ratzinger’s opinion, ecclesiologies undertaken solely “from 
below” imply that one can no longer speak of a Churc  at all but only of a society which sets religious goals for 
itself. Ratzinger contends, on the other hand, that the Lord is one wherever he is found and consequently, there 
is but one Church and the prospective union of humanity is an indispensable definition of the Church.  
83 See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 112-125.  
84 Ibid., 113. Ratzinger points to Jesus’ words to the Twelve that “[h]e who receives you receives me” (Matt 
10:40; cf. Luke 10:16; John 13:20). A series of texts of this nature from the four Gospels show Jesus’ 
transmission of his own power to the Twelve and the parallelism indicative in their one mission: Matt 9:8, 10:1, 
21, 23, 40; Mark 6:7, 13:34; Luke 4:6, 9:1, 10:16,19; John 13:20,17:18, 20:21. 
85 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 114. 
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submission to it is not the surrender of personal itegrity. It is a paradigmatic expression of 
the Christian philosophy of freedom – apostleship is bound to participation in the mission of 
Christ and never to human resources alone: 
Von sich aus, aus den eigenen Kräften ihres Verstandes, ihrer Erkenntnis, ihres 
Wollens können sie nichts tun, was sie als Apostel tun sollen. . . .  Nichts von dem, 
was apostolisches Tun konstituiert, ist Produkt eigenen Vermögens. Aber gerade in 
diesem “Nichts” des Eigenen liegt ihre Gemeinschaft mit Jesus, der ja auch ganz vom 
Vater ist, nur durch ihn und in ihm, und überhaupt nicht bestünde, wenn er nicht 
ständiges Herkommen vom Vater und Sichzurückgeben an der Vater wäre.86    
Hence, it is this having of “nothing” by themselves alone that draws the apostles into 
communion with the mission of Christ. This is what gives the authority of the Church 
legitimacy and assures the community of faith that ey can trust the sacramental authority of 
the Church because it participates in the “nothing” of Christ. With this insight, Ratzinger 
returns to the sacramental structure of the Church’s mission and the fulfilment of the 
fundamental pattern of human life: “[t]his bond to the Lord, which enables man to do what he 
cannot do but what the Lord does, is synonymous with the sacramental structure.”87 This 
“giving” in mission of what does not come from oneself yields a sacramental principle which 
is the fundamental ecclesiological statute and orientation for the Church’s authority structure: 
“One can receive what is God’s only from the sacrament, by entering into the mission that 
makes me the messenger and instrument of another.”88  
In the community of faith then, Ratzinger says the sacramental quality of the new 
mode of mission respects personal integrity, for the communio of the Church requires 
receptivity in freedom for its fruitfulness: 
                                                          
86 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 111 (“On their own, by the force of their own understanding, 
knowledge and will, the apostles cannot do anything they are meant to do as apostles. . . . Nothing that makes up 
the activity of the apostles is the product of their own capabilities. But it is precisely in having ‘nothing’ to call 
their own that their communion with Jesus consists, since Jesus is also entirely from the Father, has being only 
through him and in him and would not exist at all if he were not a continual coming forth from and self-r turn to 
the Father” [Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 114-15]). There are strong echoes here of the Christian 
philosophy of freedom. See this dissertation §§ 4.2. to 4.2.2.    
87 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 116. 
88 Ibid., 115.  
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Zur Kirche gehört wesentlich das Element des Empfangens, so wie Glaube vom 
Hören kommt und nicht Produkt eigener Entschlüsse oder Reflexionen ist. Denn 
Glaube ist Begegnung mit dem, was ich nicht erdenken oder durch Leistungen 
herbeiführen kann, sondern was mir eben begegnen muß. Wir nennen diese Struktur 
des Empfangens, des Begegnens “Sakrament.” . . . Kirche kann man nicht machen, 
nur empfangen, und zwar empfangen von dort her, wo sie schon ist und wo sie 
wirklich ist: aus der sakramentalen Gemeinschaft seine  durch die Geschichte 
hindurchgehenden Leibes.89   
One can legitimately conclude of Ratzinger’s thought that the person who is growing in 
authentic freedom is one who trusts and receives thir being from another. Only such an 
understanding of the source of receptivity in respect of the human person can provide the 
platform for validly holding the principle of self-expropriation as a life-giving conduit 
leading to genuine human liberation. As the sphere in which the human person grows in 
authentic freedom, Ratzinger maintains that the Church is the locus for bringing us out of 
ourselves and towards the “Other,” and therefore all “others”: 
Glaube und Sakrament bleiben konstitutiv für die Kirche. Anders verliert sie sich 
selbst. Sie hat dann auch der Menschheit nichts mehr zu geben. Sie lebt davon, daß 
der Logos Fleisch geworden ist, daß die Wahrheit Weg wurde. Die von der Bibel und 
den Vätern entwickelte Sicht der Kirche und der christlichen Existenz ist mehr als ein 
“Paradigma,” mehr als eine epochale Anschauungsform. In ihr werden wir aus den 
Paradigmen herausgeführt zur Berührung mit der Wirklich eit selbst (vgl. Mk 4:18; 
Joh 16:25). Darin eben besteht “Offenbarung”; dies ist der Kern unserer Befreiung – 
das Herausgeführtwerden aus dem Spiegelkabinett der Bil r und der historischen 




                                                          
89 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 18-19 (“One essential element of Church is receiving, just as faith 
comes from hearing and is not the product of one’s own decisions and reflections. For faith in an encounter with 
something I cannot devise or bring about by my own efforts; instead, it is something that has to come to meet 
me. We call this structure of receiving, of encounteri g, ‘sacrament.’ . . . Church cannot be made but only 
received, that is to say, received from a source whre she already exists and really exists: from the sacramental 
communio of [Christ’s] Body as it makes its way through history” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 
19-20]). 
90 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 230 (“Belief and sacrament remain constitutive for the Church. 
Otherwise she just gets lost. And then she no longer has anything to offer to mankind. She draws her lif  from 
the Logos having become flesh, from the truth having become a way. The view of the Church developed from 
the Bible and the Fathers is more than a ‘paradigm,’ more than one era’s view of life and the world. Here we are 
led out of all the paradigms into contact with the ruth itself (see Mark 4:18; John 16:25). That in fact is what 
‘revelation’ consists of; this is the core of our liberation – being led out from the cabinet of mirrors f images 
and historical points of view and into the encounter with the reality that is vouchsafed to us in Christ” 
[Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 264-65]). 
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5.3.   The Love Dimension: Faith that Works through Freedom and Love 
Thus far, this chapter has presented the ground upon which Ratzinger understands 
ecclesial identity to be built, i.e. through the spiritual office of receptivity and ecclesio-
knowledge. “Knowledge of God,” he says, “may be compared to the knowledge of someone 
in love: it concerns me as a whole; it also demands my will; and it comes to nothing if it does 
not attain this all-embracing assent.”91 Talk of knowledge, will and love brings us 
immediately into the realm of Ratzinger’s Christian synthesis. The sacramental framework 
and faith dimension set a criterion for participation n ecclesial life by advocating trust in the 
primacy of God’s will and the acceptance of sacramental authority from outside the self. Now 
the question arises about the practicability of such a demanding vision. For example, can the 
human person enjoy freedom against this backdrop of such ostensibly idealistic criteria? Can 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology deal convincingly with thechallenge of transgression within the 
Church itself? This leads us towards a third aspect of his ecclesiology – the love dimension. 
Its basis is that “a person sees only to the extent that he loves.”92 In other words, there is an 
axiomatic correspondence between human freedom and the will to self-expropriation for the 
“beloved” who is not merely an “other” anymore. 
Love is a virtue of many elements but for our purposes, this subdivision concentrates 
on how Ratzinger deals with the ecclesial response to God who loved us first (cf. 1John 4:10, 
19) and how this shapes growth in authentic freedom. This response takes the form of 
occupying an authentic worship posture whose heart is the Eucharist. It is within this 
perspective that relationality becomes truly concrete in the theme of “call and response.”93 It 
takes the form of the Church’s martyrological profile. To love wholeheartedly – in this 
instance, God, through Christ in his Church – means to freely sacrifice everything for the 
                                                          
91 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 287. 
92 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1182 (own translation).  
93 See this dissertation § 5.1.4. 
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beloved. This is also where Ratzinger deals with the life of grace. God’s goodness opens up 
the space which, over time, becomes the signpost of faith whereby humanity may come to 
know what is right, and make the wholehearted sacrifice necessary for its realisation. To his 
mind, the Church occupies this space which is the sp re of nonpartisan worship in the upper 
room. The Church is also the advocate for witnesses who are expert in a human vigilance 
capable of counteracting the cheapening of grace in history. Through its witnesses – the 
communio sanctorum – the Church itself becomes a sphere of vigilance for the world, helping 
its peoples to come to terms with the truth of human n ture as dependent, relational and 
limited.   
5.3.1. The Upper Room: Moulding the Posture of Self-Giving 
In the context of ecclesial life, Ratzinger turns to the liturgy when he reflects on how 
one’s love for the other grows. He believes that when genuine love propels one to give 
oneself to, and for the beloved, there is a missionary dynamic at the heart of the self-giving 
posture of the “lover.” For a Christian believer, Ratzinger says this requires a specifically 
eucharistic posture. In this way, the Church has a heart – the Eucharist – which is the 
fulfilment of Jesus’ promise at the beginning of Holy Week: “And I, when I am lifted up 
from the earth, will draw all people to myself” (John 12:32). Understood correctly, he says, 
the Eucharist is “the mystical heart of Christianity, n which God mysteriously comes forth, 
time and again, from within himself and draws us into his embrace.”94 Without its burning 
heart, apostles could not preach nor could martyrs shed their blood. Through the Eucharist, 
“[t]he heart must remain the heart, that through the heart, the other organs may serve 
aright.”95 To his mind then, love is anchored in truth, and this ontology of love, so to speak, 
                                                          
94 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 121. He quotes Ignatius of Antioch on this point: “Christianity is not 
the result of persuading people; rather it is something truly great,” (Epis. Rom. 3:3). 
95 Ibid., 122. See 1 Cor 12:12-31; Col 1:18; 2:18-20; Eph. 1:22-23; 3:19; 4:13. Ratzinger refers to the insights of 
Thérèse of Lisieux in this regard. See Thérèse of Lisieux, “Manuscrit B (Lettre à soeur Marie du Sacré-Coeur),” 
in Oeuvres Complètes (De Brouwer: Cerf and Desclée, 1992), 225f. Thérèse knew that the heart of the Church 
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brings him to the setting of the “upper room” as the place of eucharistic celebration. In this 
sphere, the believer’s self-giving or missionary faith comes from God and leads to God:   
Gerade dann, wenn die Eucharistie “im Obergemach,” im Innenraum ehrfürchtigen 
Glaubens ohne andere Absichten als die, Gott zu gefallen, recht gefeiert wird, 
entspringt aus ihr Glaube: jener Glaube, der dynamischer Ursprungsort von Mission 
ist, in der die Welt zur lebendigen Opfergabe wird – zur heiligen Stadt, in der es dann 
keinen Tempel mehr gibt, weil Gott, der Allherrscher s lbst ihr Tempel ist und das 
Lamm.96 
To Ratzinger’s mind, a key element identifying the eucharistic celebration since its 
institution is the attractiveness of truth for its own sake. The celebration demonstrates an 
inner connection between worship and mission: “[w]hat was impressive about it was 
particularly its sheer lack of a practical purpose, th  fact that it was being done for God and 
not for spectators. . . . The very selflessness of this standing before God and turning the gaze 
toward God was what allowed God’s light to stream down into what was happening and for it 
to be detected even by outsiders.”97 In this respect, Ratzinger finds it a great “anthropocentric 
error” to construct the liturgy solely for the community where God does not actually play any 
role. The focus would then be purely on winning peopl  over and keeping them satisfied. 
Such undue attempts at “arm-twisting” so to speak, would deny the possibility of the human 
heart falling in love with God as God, because “[n]o faith can be aroused that way . . . since 
faith has to do with God, and it is only where his closeness is felt, where human intentions 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was love and she herself, though never leaving the environs of the Carmel, was a missionary (and laterpatroness 
of mission) – a loving person, present to Christ at the heart of the Church. In this regard, Ratzinger suggests that 
missionary exhaustion is the result of our thinking upon external activities and forgetfulness of the de per centre 
from which missionary activity flows. This centre, simply called “love” and “heart” by Thérèse, is the Eucharist. 
96 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 106 (“It is at that point, when the Eucharist is being celebrated 
aright ‘in the upper room,’ in the inner sphere of reverent faith, and without any aim or purpose beyond that of 
pleasing God, that faith springs forth from it: that faith which is the dynamic origin of mission, in which the 
world becomes a living sacrificial gift, a holy city in which there is no longer any temple, because God the ruler 
of all is himself her temple, as is the Lamb” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 122]). In order to make his 
argument, Ratzinger undertakes a typology of the “Upper Room” (cf. Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 90-122) as 
the sphere of eucharistic celebration. He begins with a Russian legend which displays something of the inn r 
connection between worship and mission. The legend, which recalls the origins of Christianity in Russia, tells 
how Prince Vladimir of Kiev had been dissatisfied with Islamic, Jewish and Roman Catholic rituals of wrship. 
It was only when two of his ambassadors returned to court, utterly inspired by a Greek Orthodox liturgy they 
experienced in the Church of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople – not knowing whether they had been in heaven or 
on earth – that the decision in favour of Orthodox Christianity was made. See Petro Bilaniuk, The Apostolic 
Origin of the Ukrainian Church (Parma, Ohio: Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary Ukrainian Catholic 
Parish, 1988). 
97 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 92. 
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take second place to reverence before him, that the credibility comes about that creates 
belief.”98 
For Ratzinger the meaning of the “upper room” is that t e theological significance of 
faith and the arousal of love in the human person are p rt of the one action of worship. For 
him, without falling in love, without yearning to worship God in the “upper room,” there can 
be no justifiable case for Christian mission. The Eucharist, though not in itself directly 
orientated to awakening people’s faith in a missionary sense, is at the heart of faith, 
nourishing and perpetually calling missionary activity into proper perspective: 
[Die Eucharistie] schaut primär auf Gott und zieht die Menschen in diesen Blick 
hinein, zieht sie hinein in den Abstieg Gottes, der ihr Aufstieg in die 
Gottesgemeinschaft wird. Sie will Gott gefallen und Menschen dazu führen, daß sie 
dies auch als den Maßstab ihres Lebens ansehen. Und insofern ist sie freilich in einem 
tieferen Sinn Ursprung von Mission.99 
Ratzinger is building up here a notion of Christian freedom concentrated on a new 
obedience born out of love. As we have already seen, Ratzinger’s christocentric approach to 
the life of faith is predicated upon the primary biblical relationship between the Father and 
the Son, the content of which is based on obedience.100 The notion that this crucified form of 
existence becomes the ecclesial form of love is a theme that Ratzinger takes up in the second 
part of Jesus of Nazareth:  
                                                          
98 Ibid., 93. One could speculate on whether or not Ratzinger has John Henry Newman’s Grammar of Assent in 
mind here. Written against the background of British empiricism, Newman’s work is divided into two parts and 
deals with two aspects of how assent is not contrary o human nature. The topics under discussion are beli f 
without full understanding and belief without absolute proof. Ratzinger does not explicitly mention Newman in 
this discussion of eucharistic celebration but the issue raised here is no less than the “credibility” of the faith 
today – of a kind to prompt a full and free assent. In he Grammar, Newman raises the idea of the illative sense 
which is that faculty of the mind which closes the logic-gap in concrete situations. Newman maintains that in 
concrete life, incontrovertible proof in favour of a decision is not possible. Hence, while the illative sense is not 
without its risk, it is comparable to Aristotle’s phronesis or practical wisdom. It assists in closing the gap
between converging probabilities and full assent.   
99 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 94 (“[The Eucharist’s] gaze is primarily directed toward God, 
and it draws men into this point of view, draws them into the descent of God to us, which becomes their ascent 
into fellowship with God. It aims at being pleasing to God and at leading men to this as being likewis the 
measure of their lives. And to that extent it is, of c urse, in a more profound sense, the origin of mission” 
[Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 94]). 
100 See this dissertation § 3.2.2.1.  
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Denn der leibhafte Gehorsam Christi ist ja als offener Raum dargestellt, in den wir 
mit hineingenommen werden und durch den unser eigens Leben einen neuen 
Zusammenhang findet. Das Mysterium des Kreuzes steht nic t einfach uns 
gegenüber, sondern bezieht uns mit ein und gibt unserem eigenen Leben einen neuen 
Rang.101 
 
When Christ takes on a human body, a new obedience be omes possible which 
surpasses all possible human discharge of the command ents of the law: “[o]ur own morality 
is insufficient for the proper worship of God” in the sense that Christ’s “perfect obedience” to 
the Father, which fulfilled love on the cross, “draws us all with him and at the same time 
wipes away all our disobedience through his love.”102 In this new understanding, true worship 
is the doorway to the living human being. The whole human person becomes a total answer 
to God, and is shaped by God’s healing and transforming word. It is Christ’s self-giving in 
obedience that takes us and brings us to God. That is true worship in Ratzinger’s 
ecclesiology.103  
From a human perspective, Ratzinger says the worshipping posture means “[k]eeping 
one’s gaze freely fixed upon God in order to receive from him the criterion of right action 
and the capacity for it – that is what matters.”104 This posture is also the basis for his view 
that the liturgical community, and the larger communion of the Church it represents, is a 
                                                          
101 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 260 (“The incarnate obedience of Christ is 
presented as an open space into which we are admitte  and through which our own lives find a new context. The 
mystery of the Cross does not simply confront us; rather, it draws us in and gives a new value to our life” 
[Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 236]). 
102 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 235. 
103 More than anywhere else, the scene on the Mount of Olives is where Ratzinger expresses this obedient prayer 
posture: the Son’s “prayer posture of extreme submission to the will of God, of radical self-offering to him” 
(Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 153).This line of argumentation is in keeping with the New 
Testament tradition of humanity’s total self-giving as a sacrifice of praise (cf. Heb 13:15-16; 1Pet 2:5). See this 
dissertation §§ 3.2.2.2. and  4.1.4. 
104 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 288. The theme of worship as the true human sacrifice, based 
particularly on Rom 12.1, occurs at various junctures in Ratzinger’s writings. See Truth and Tolerance, 129-30; 
Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 114-118; Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 80, 236-37. It seems to me that the theme 
of the new or true worship in the person of Christ is the most recurring theme of this latter book. It is present in 
every chapter culminating in Chapter 8 on the crucifixion and burial of Jesus (Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. 
Holy Week, 202-40). A human person becomes “a living sacrifice” when they offer their body as total worship – 
in a manner similar to Christ. 
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sphere of freedom.105 Paul’s phrase in Rom 12:1 (λογικὴν λατρείαν, a phrase that has been 
translated in a variety of ways into English) opens up Ratzinger’s understanding of worship 
as humanity’s entrance into its freedom. Ratzinger himself –  translating it at one juncture as 
rationabilis oblatio, “the rationally directed worship conformed to the logos, or ‘spiritual 
worship’”106 – says the true sacrifice to God is that of the human person’s inmost being, itself 
transformed into worship. Consequently, Ratzinger says, in our worship 
Wir bitten darum, daß der Logos, Christus, der das w hre Opfer ist, uns selber in sein 
Opfern hineinnehme, uns “logisiere,” uns wortgemäßer, wahrhaft vernünftiger mache, 
so daß sein Opfer unseres wird und von Gott als unseres angenommen, uns 
zugerechnet werden kann. . . . Wir bitten . . . daß wir selbst mit Christus Eucharistie 
und so für Gott wohlgefällig werden.107   
This “metamorphosis,” as Ratzinger describes it, is“our being reshaped in a way that 
takes us beyond this world’s scheme of things, beyond sharing in  what ‘people’ think, say 
and do, and into the will of God.”108 Hence Ratzinger envisages it as a recasting of the human 
person in terms of the Christian synthesis and its philosophy of freedom. The worship posture 
of the whole person leads to metamorphosis or “logificat on” which, from the perspective of 
ecclesial life, consists of ever-increasing union with the will of God. As Ratzinger says of 
Rom 12, St. Paul goes on precisely to explain the shape of the transformation away from 
being conformed to this world and into the new lifeo  Christ (Rom 12:2). Therefore, to 
Ratzinger’s mind, the transformation of the gifts at the Eucharist has to be extended as far as 
us, as persons, in the process of moulding our posture of self-giving. Through our willing 
participation in Christ’s sacrificial banquet, the one body of Christ forms itself in and through 
individual persons who, becoming members one of the o r (cf. Rom 12:4-5), are 
simultaneously growing in authentic freedom: 
                                                          
105 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 242-245. 
106 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 130. 
107 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 101 (“[w]e ask that the Logos, Christ, who is the true sacrifice, 
may himself draw us into his act of sacrifice, may ‘logify’ us, make us ‘more consistent with the word,’ ‘more 
truly rational,’ so that his sacrifice may become ours and may be accepted by God as ours, may be able to e 
accounted as ours. . . . We are asking . . . that we ourselves might become a Eucharist with Christ and, thus 
become acceptable and pleasing to God” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 116]).  
108 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 117-18. 
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[Die Verwandlung der Gaben bringt uns] aus dem verengten Eigenwillen heraus in 
die Einheit mit dem Gotteswillen hinein. Der Eigenwille . . . ist in Wirklichkeit 
Unterwerfung unter die Schemata einer Zeit und dem Anschein entgegen Sklaverei; 
der Gotteswille ist Wahrheit und das Hineingehen in ihn daher Ausbruch in die 
Freiheit hinein.109 
 
5.3.2. Call and Personal Response: The Martyrological Profile of the Church 
To Ratzinger’s mind, then, a person who undertakes  worshipping posture in the 
Church becomes a witness. While the direct object of one’s love is God, this reveals itself as 
God’s will for unity with all of creation. Ratzinger’s particular use of the word witness, as in 
the Greek term µάρτυς, is far removed from the stereotypical conception of martyrdom 
ranging from super-human stories of fearless heroism to bloodshed by political actors who 
kill others and themselves in the hope of being showered with blessings in the afterlife.110 
Nor is Ratzinger particularly concerned with distinguishing “red” and “white” martyrdom.111 
For him, the value of witness is more nuanced than solely dying for one’s faith. Ratzinger 
follows closely the understanding of Ignatius of Antioch (died c. 115) and the nascent 
                                                          
109 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 102 (“[The transformation of gifts brings us] out of our 
restricted self-will out into union with the will of God. Self-will, however, is in reality a subordination to the 
schemes and systems of a given time, and, despite appearances, it is slavery; the will of God is truth, and 
entering into it is thus breaking out into freedom” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 118]). It is 
interesting to find Ratzinger quoting a saying of Alfred Delp, the German Jesuit who was executed by the Nazis: 
“Bread is important, freedom is more important, butmore important is unfailing worship [die unverlorene 
Anbetung].” In another place Ratzinger seems to continue with this worship motif: “Where this order of goods is 
not respected but turned upside down, justice is no lo ger done and the suffering individual is no longer cared 
for; instead the very realm of material goods is runed and destroyed as well. Where God is viewed as something 
secondary, which can be set aside temporarily or alt gether for the sake of more important things, then precisely 
these supposedly more important things fail” (Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, 89-90).   
110 See Michael L. Budde and Karen Scott, eds., Witness of the Body: The Past, Present and Future of Christian 
Martyrdom (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), vii. Other informative 
material, which attempts to critique a fatalistic understanding of martyrdom and reorient it towards its more 
intrinsic value of witness and total self-sacrifice, includes Craig Hovey, To Share in the Body: A Theology of 
Martyrdom for Today’s Church (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos Press, 2008); Rona M. Fields et al., Martyrdom: 
The Psychology, Theology and Politics of Self-Sacrifice (London: Praeger, 2004); Michele T. Gallagher, Reason 
is Beguiling: On the Mystery of Martyrdom and of Total Self-Gift (New York: Alba House, 2000).  
111 In the earliest days of Christianity, the term µάρτυς was originally used of the Apostles as the witnesses of 
Christ’s life and Resurrection (cf. Acts 1:8. 22). It was the spread of imperial persecution against Christians that 
caused the word to be extented to those undergoing hardships for the faith until finally it became restricted to 




Church.112 It is an exhortation to witness and imitation – the prospect of one’s actual physical 
death being fortuitous, so to speak, to the action and motive of the witness. Ratzinger’s 
interest here is the endeavour to present the freedom of a witness who has fallen in love – the 
freedom of the martyr – as a constitutive element of the Church. For him, something 
constitutive of the Church is expressed through the witness-posture of its members.113  
At the heart of this aspect of the love dimension, whereby witness to God’s will for 
unity is freely undertaken, human freedom experiences the tension between the “individual” 
and the “collective.” A collective can either support individuals in a productive way or 
subsume them in a destructive way so that neither party grows nor prospers. For Ratzinger, 
the theologies of personality and communality are mutually inclusive and the re-
establishment of the connection between them is an essential feature of an ecclesiology that 
wishes to promote growth in authentic human freedom. He maintains the link resides in the 
witness of the believer who has been called by name nd responds to this personal expression 
of love. 
It is in the sacramental framework, where the believ r’s authentic response entails the 
characteristics of “non-autonomy” and motivation for the “whole,” that the basis for the 
believer-witness is found.114 In reflecting upon personal response as something motivated by 
the call of God in one’s life, Ratzinger looks to the martyrological profile of the Church to 
reconcile the biblical structure of personal responsibility and the human requisite for 
                                                          
112 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Magisterium of the Church, Faith, Morality,” in Problems of the Church Today 
(Washington: United States Catholic Bishops Conference, 1976), 74-83, for an account of Ratzinger’s 
agreement with the understanding of martyrdom found in Ignatius.  
113 Candida Moss’s superb study of early Christian texts presents a very credible portrait of this reality: The 
Other Christs: Imitating Jesus in Ancient Christian Ideologies of Martyrdom (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). Even though Ratzinger doesn’t detail the historical context of martyrdom in the emerging Church 
in any great depth, I believe Moss’s interpretation of early Christianity closely adheres to the framework of his 
approach: “If Christians are exhorted to imitate th actions of Christ, if discipleship entails suffering like Christ, 
and if Christ the true martyr blazes the way for his followers, then dying for Christ was not just a possibility; it 
was an obligation. . . . The gospel-worthy martyr does not offer him- or herself for martyrdom but eagrly 
embraces it once the sentence is passed” (ibid. 22-48).  
114 See this dissertation § 5.3.3.  
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dependence, and consequent relationality.115 Ratzinger claims the Church has always held 
that, as imperfect as its members are, there has never b en anonymous leadership of the 
Christian community.116 The naming of the leadership – the names of the saints nd the 
names of those who bear responsibility for unity – is profoundly in keeping with the central 
structure of New Testament faith. For Ratzinger, this emphasis upon particularity is the origin 
of Christian witness, reaching to the core of the meaning of personal responsibility in the 
Church:  
Dem Zeugen Jesus Christus entsprechen di  Zeugen, die, eben weil sie Zeugen sind, 
mit Namen für ihn einstehen. Das Martyrium als Antwort auf das Kreuz Jesus Christi 
ist nichts anderes als die letzte Bekräftigung dieses Prinzips der unabtretbaren 
Namentlichkeit, der namentlich haftenden Person. Zeugenschaft impliziert 
Namentlichkeit, Zeugenschaft aber ist – als Antwort auf Kreuz und Auferstehung – 
Ur- und Grundform christlicher Nachfolge überhaupt.117 
Chief amongst Ratzinger’s reflections in this regard is what he calls the 
“martyrological structure of the primacy.”118 Ratzinger finds the martyrological principle 
                                                          
115 See this dissertation §§ 4.3.1. and 5.1.4. 
116 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 39-42. As examples, Ratzinger refers to St. Paul’s naming 
of himself as responsible for the communities he founded, while also addressing by name those who hold 
authority with him and under him. Ratzinger also points to the fact that the New Testament texts were, for the 
most part, attributed to a name of apostolic origin, while the liturgical prayers of the eucharistic celebration 
contained the names of martyrs and saints, as well as prayers for the named leadership of the Church. From the 
earliest times, lists of Popes and bishops have been an important part of the personal liability which leaders have 
had for the communities in their care.  
117 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 39 (“[T]o the one witness, Jesus Christ, correspond the many 
witnesses who, precisely because they are witnesses, tand up for him by name. Martyrdom as a response to the 
Cross of Jesus Christ is nothing other than the ultimate confirmation of this principle of uncompromising 
particularity, of the named individual who is personally responsible. Witness implies particularity, but witness – 
as a response to the Cross and Resurrection – is the primordial and fundamental form of Christian discipleship 
in general” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 40-41]). On a number of occasions, Ratzinger has 
outlined and developed his thoughts on how the new covenant in Christ emerges as the culmination of the legal 
(cultic) and prophetic traditions that echo in deutero-Isaiah’s suffering servant (Isa 42:1-9; 49:1-13: 50:4-9; 
52:13 – 53: 12). The new and perfect form of sacrifice is to be man’s self-surrender. The true sacrifice was the 
worship that testified to God by one’s whole and entir  existence. See Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes, 249-57; 
“Ist die Eucharistie ein Opfer,” in GS:TL, 259-70; Called to Communion, 26- 27; Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 
110; Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 115-144. The Suffering Servant reflects a theology developed during the 
Babylonian Exile when Israel had neither temple nor cultic worship. In God’s seeming abandonment, Ratzinger 
says it became possible for Israel to make a new discovery: “Israel itself, in its rejection, bruised and exiled, is 
humanity’s sacrifice before the face of God; the sufferings of the people themselves are worship and scrifice to 
God and not some other ritual. Israel gets to know a new and more central form of sacrifice than even th  
Temple could offer: Martyrdom, in which the ritual sacrifice is superseded by the gift of human self-surrender” 
(Ratzinger, “Ist die Eucharistie ein Opfer,” in GS:TL, 267 [own translation]). 
118 See Joseph Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 42. He makes his argument here largely through the 
historical retelling of a controversial ecclesiastical debate about the primacy which Cardinal Reginald Pole 
conducted with King Henry VIII, Archbishop Cranmer and Bishop Sampson (cf. ibid.,43-49). The result of the 
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anchored not only in the triune God who, by the Son’s Incarnation, became a radical witness 
to himself, but also in the petrine theology of theN w Testament, whereby Peter makes a 
profession of faith and by so doing is able to become a witness for the Church. A call and a 
response unite in the witness who is open to receiving the responsibility of witnessing: 
Das Wir der Kirche beginnt mit dem Namen desjenigen, d r namentlich und als 
Person zuerst das Christusbekenntnis vortrug: “Du bist der Sohn des lebendigen 
Gottes (Matt 16:16). . . . Das Credo zu sprechen ist ie eigenes Werk des Menschen, 
und so kann der, der im Gehorsam des Bekenntnisses sagt, was er aus sich selbst nicht 
sagen kann, auch tun und werden, was er aus Eigenem nicht tun und werden 
könnte.119 
Ratzinger says the “we” of the future Church was something included is Jesus’ prayer 
when “[h]e pleads for unity for his future disciples.”120 The response to God’s call is to create 
unity with God and among ourselves. Regarding the precise nature of the unity Jesus prays 
for, Ratzinger begins by expressing what unity cannot be, namely, a solely inner-worldly 
phenomenon: “Unity does not come from the world: on the basis of the world’s own efforts, 
it is impossible. The world’s own efforts lead to disunion, as we can all see. Inasmuch as the 
world is operative in the Church, in Christianity, it leads to schisms.”121 On the contrary, 
Ratzinger says, unity can only come from the Father t rough the Son. It entails the “glory” 
which the Son gives and is granted in the Spirit. Christ’s “glory” is his presence as the fruit of 
the Cross – the fruit of his transformation through death and Resurrection. Yet this fruit is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
debate, as Ratzinger recalls it, is that “personal responsibility serves unity” (49). In the clash betw en the 
political aims of the State and the universal nature of the Church of Jesus Christ, the bondage of the witness by 
which the chair of Peter is bound ensures that personal witness cannot be suppressed, despite the ulterior 
motives of the State. Therefore, the primacy, “as a testimony to the profession of faith in Christ is o be 
understood first in terms of the witness for which personal responsibility is taken in martyrdom, as the 
verification of one’s witness to the Crucified who is victorious upon the Cross” (44). And furthermore, the 
primacy “figures essentially as a guarantee of the contrast between the Church in her catholic unity and the 
secular power, which is always particular” (ibid.). 
119 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 39-40 (“The ‘we’ of the Church begins with the name of the one 
who in particular and as a person first uttered the profession of faith in Christ: ‘You are . . . the Son of the living 
God’ (Matt 16:16). . . . To recite the Creed is never man’s own work, and thus the one who says in the 
obedience of the profession of faith what he cannot say on his own can also do and become what he could n t 
do and become by his own resources” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 41]). 
120 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 93. Four times Jesus makes his plea that the world “recognise” that 
he is sent by the Father (cf. John 17:11, 21, 22, 23). Ratzinger says no discourse on ecumenism can afford to 
overlook this. 
121 Ibid., 95. 
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invisible. God’s power – which Ratzinger describes as “immanence . . . become ontological” 
in Jesus122 – reaches into the midst of the world in which God’s witnesses live and as such, 
unity must be of a kind that the world can “recognise” and thereby come to believe: 
Das nicht von der Welt Kommende kann und muss durcha s etwas in der Welt und 
für die Welt Wirksames und auch für sie Wahrnehmbares sein. Die Zielsetzung der 
Einheitsbitte Jesu ist gerade, dass durch die Einheit der Jünger für die Menschen die 
Wahrheit seiner Sendung sichtbar wird. Die Einheit muss erscheinen, und zwar als 
etwas, das es in der Welt sonst nicht gibt; als etwas, das aus den eigenen Kräften der 
Menschheit nicht erklärbar ist und daher das Wirken einer anderen Kraft sichtbar 
macht.123 
It is the visible presence of the humanly inexplicable unity of Jesus’ disciples down 
through the centuries that vindicates Jesus as the “Son” in the eyes of faith: “[h]ence God can 
be recognised as the creator of a unity that overcomes the world’s inherent tendency toward 
fragmentation.”124 In the face of the anthropological intractability of fragmentation, Ratzinger 
believes that visible unity remains an urgent task for Christians of every age because invisible 
unity alone is not sufficient to witness to God’s power. Visible unity, freely undertaken by 
God’s witnesses, is the concrete sign that humanity can (and has) fallen in love with the one 
God. Ratzinger says that from the beginning the unity of the future Church was dependent on 
the faith Peter proclaimed at Capernaum in the name of the Twelve, when others were turning 
                                                          
122 See Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 90-93, at 92. Ratzinger coins this phrase to helpd scribe the 
significance of the “name” in God’s plan of love. Through the revelation of God’s name in the words, “I have 
manifested your name to the men that you gave me out of the world . . .” (John 17:26), Jesus is once more 
depicted as the new Moses bringing to completion the revelation of God’s name at the burning bush. The name 
meant that God could be invoked by Israel as they enter d covenant relationship with him. Ratzinger says, 
God’s name means his “immanence” in the midst of peple, so that he is entirely there for them. However, at the 
same time, he infinitely surpasses everything human and everything worldly. This is what stands behind Jesus’ 
words to manifest God’s name. It is not some new word but in Jesus, a new mode of God’s presence is enact d: 
“[i]n Jesus, God gives himself entirely into the world of mankind: whoever sees Jesus sees the Father (cf. John 
14:9)” (91-92). God’s immanence, effective in the Old Testament in the form of the word and liturgical 
celebration, has now become, in Ratzinger’s view, ontol gical, for, in Jesus, God has truly become man– God 
has entered our very being. The divine mode of ontol gical immanence, revealed in Christ’s continual approach 
to humanity, “is aimed at the transformation of the whole of creation, so that it may become in a completely new 
way God’s true dwelling place in union with Christ” (92).   
123 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 113-14 (“While it does not come from the world, it 
can and must be thoroughly effective in and for the world, and it must be discernible by the world. The stated 
objective of Jesus’ prayer for unity is precisely that through the unity of the disciples, the truth of is mission is 
made visible for men. Unity must be visible; it must be recognisable as something that does not exist lsewhere 
in the world; as something that is inexplicable on the basis of mankind’s own efforts and that therefore makes 
visible the workings of a higher power” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 96]).  
124 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 96. 
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away: “We have believed, and have come to know, that you are the Holy One of God” (John 
6:69). Through the unity of the disciples then, the world may recognise Jesus as the one sent 
by the Father.  
For Ratzinger, this “recognising” and “believing” is not something merely intellectual 
however. Rather it involves being touched by God’s love and being changed. Ratzinger says 
that through the visible unity inherent in the disciples and in their mission “the world as a 
whole is to be torn free from its alienation, it is o rediscover unity with God.”125 But how, 
Ratzinger enquires, does such a universalism sit with the harshness of Jesus’ prayer (cf. John 
17:9): “I am praying for them; I am not praying for the world”? The inner unity of these 
seemingly contradictory sentiments can only be grasped by understanding there are two 
senses in which John uses the word “cosmos” or “world”: 
Zum einen verweist es auf die ganze gute Schöpfung Gottes, besonders auf die 
Menschen als seine Geschöpfe, die er liebt bis zur Weggabe seiner selbst im Sohn. 
Zum anderen spricht das Wort von der Menschenwelt, ie sie geschichtlich geworden 
ist: In ihr ist Korruption, Lüge, Gewalt sozusagen “das Natürliche” geworden.126 
With these words, that which has been implicit in Ratzinger’s deliberations on unity 
comes to the fore, as does the dialectic between God’s creation and the historical march of 
humanity in time and space. All of this impinges upon the martyr touched by God’s love. 
Ratzinger says the historical state of humanity, which philosophers have described in their 
respective ways, is known as “original sin” in the eyes of faith.127 Overcoming this dialectical 
situation in human nature calls for the believer-martyr to exert the whole of one’s being in 
respect of their beloved. This, we know, means for Ratzinger, the martyr’s assent of intellect, 
                                                          
125 Ibid., 100.  
126 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 118 (“On the one hand, it refers to the whole of 
God’s good creation, especially to men: his creatures, whom he loves to the point of the gift of himself in the 
Son. On the other hand, the word refers to the human world as it has evolved in history. Corruption, lies, and 
violence, have, as it were, become ‘natural’ to it” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 100]). 
127 Ratzinger says various thinkers in modern intellectual history have grappled with the historical human 
condition. For example, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) spoke of a second nature that in the course of history has 
supplanted the first; (the early) Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) talks of human nature being reduced to the 
impersonal – to existing in a state of “inauthenticity”; Karl Marx (1818-1883) expounded the state of human 
alienation (cf. Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 100-1).  See this dissertation § 4.3.  
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will and heart to God’s will. Hence, human freedom is intimately bound up with the 
martyrological profile of the Church which begins with Peter but includes every believer’s 
confession of faith in its scope. The price of this is the “sacrifice” of self for the world in 
analogous fashion to Christ so that the world may come to recognise that the unity which God 
desires above all else expresses a love which is eternal:        
Diese Art von “Welt” muss verschwinden; sie muss umgewandelt werden in die Welt 
Gottes. Gerade dies ist die Sendung Jesu, in die die Jünger hineingenommen werden: 
die “Welt” aus der Entfremdung des Menschen von Gott und von sich selbst 
herauszuführen, damit sie wieder Welt Gottes werde und damit der Mensch wieder 
ganz er selbst werde im Einswerden mit Gott. Diese Umwandlung kostet freilich das 
Kreuz, und sie kostet auch die Martyriumsbereitschaft der Zeugen Christi.128 
The historical human condition and the theology of martyrdom merge in Ratzinger’s 
thought when he speaks of an ecclesiology of liberation. He says that the founding of the 
Church can be seen in Jesus’ prayer for unity (cf. John 17) even if the word “Church” is 
absent. The Church is nothing other than the sphere t at orients humanity and God to each 
other in a precise relationship where neither party suffers diminution: 
Denn was ist Kirche anderes als die Gemeinschaft der Jünger, die durch den Glauben 
an Jesus Christus als den Gesandten des Vaters ihre Einh it empfängt und 
hineingehalten ist in die Sendung Jesu, die Welt zur Erkenntnis Gottes zu führen und 
sie so zu retten?129  
 
                                                          
128 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 118-19 (“The present ‘world’ has to disappear; it 
must be changed into God’s world. That is precisely what Jesus’ mission is, into which the disciples are t ken 
up: leading ‘the world’ away from the condition of man’s alienation from God and from himself, so that it can 
become God’s world once more and so that man can becom  fully himself again by becoming one with God. 
Yet this transformation comes at the price of the Cross; it comes at the price of readiness for martyrdom on the 
part of Christ’s witnesses” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 101]). An essay by James Schall, entitled 
“Chesterton, The Real Heretic: The Outstanding Eccentricity of the Peculiar Sect Called Roman Catholics” in 
James V. Schall, The Mind that is Catholic: Philosophical & Political Essays (Washington: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2008), 33-44, expresses th  difficult route which must be travelled by a disciple of 
Jesus. Through the lens of Chesterton, Schall considers the freedom of the will as something other than 
voluntarism – a form of medieval thinking, often attributed to Duns Scotus that gives pre-eminence to the will 
over the intellect. Voluntarism insists that the will itself is the total cause of its own volitions. In its extreme 
form it asserts that the human person “wills” or creates one’s own redemption. Christianity, on the other hand, 
proclaims the “will” as “the power by which we decide whether or not we choose to live in the universe that is, 
in the redemption that is given us, not the one we make for ourselves” (43).  
129 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 119 (“For what else is the Church, if not the 
community of disciples who receive their unity through faith in Jesus Christ as the one sent by the Father nd 
are drawn into Jesus’ mission to lead the world toward the recognition of God – and in this way to redeem it?” 
[Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 101]). 
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5.3.3. Loving the Church: The Convergence of Divine Gentleness and Human 
Vigilance 
  
Witness in the Church is not without risk for both the Church and the witnesses 
themselves. The love that motivates witness carries th  temptation of blinding one into either 
ignorance about, or hostility towards, shortcomings that can arise within the human family in 
general and the Church community in particular. Ratzinger’s principle, as expressed above  – 
that a person sees only to the extent that he or she loves130 – not only brings the witness to the 
point of being able to love from within the Church, but, even further, to the point of a living 
relationship with the Church itself. From the ecclesial perspective, growing to love Christ in 
the Church – because Christ is never absent from it – means that one does not need to dilute 
the positives nor airbrush the negatives out of any given epoch of the Church’s life. In this 
sense, love that cooperates with truth is in a process of reaching its highest expression and 
rightful liberation. There is a noble freedom is reaching such a degree of love but if it is 
detached from the truth of the object that is loved then it risks causing harm to the subject or 
the object, or both.  
Today, Ratzinger observes, a great deal of the Church’s membership are distinctly 
uneasy with talk of loving the Church itself. In general terms, this manifests itself in two 
ways. On the one hand, there are those who are so blinded by love that they become 
impulsive defenders of the Church, incapable of perceiving the defects amongst its members 
and its administration. He says it is precisely this attitude that “preserves love in a blindness 
which overlooks [the Church’s] own limitations and dangers.”131 On the other hand, there are 
those whose enmity is so overpowering towards the Curch that it stifles them from 
positively participating in the on-going renewal that ecclesial life requires. In fact, he says 
there are people with such a “clear-sightedness of denial and hatred . . . [that] they can see 
                                                          
130 See this dissertation § 5.3.  
131 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1183 (own translation).  
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only what is suited to them: the negative.”132 He says a “negativity” that contains the human 
posture of denial and hate cannot be constructive. Love is a risk; in fact, to love is to risk 
encounter with destructivity but not necessarily to be dominated by it: 
Ohne ein gewisses Maß an Liebe findet man nichts. Wer sich nicht ein Stück weit 
wenigstens in das Experiment des Glaubens, in das Experiment mit der Kirche 
einlässt, bejahend einlässt, es nicht riskiert, mit den Augen der Liebe zu schauen, 
ärgert sich nur. Das Wagnis der Liebe ist die Vorbedingung des Glaubens. Wird es 
gewagt, so braucht man nichts von den Dunkelheiten der Kirche zu verbergen.133 
Ratzinger says discomfort with talk about loving the Church is built on the premise that love 
is the antithesis of criticism – that somehow to criticise is to dishonour one’s love for a 
beloved – whereas, in fact, “true love is neither static nor uncritical.” He continues: 
Wenn es überhaupt eine Möglichkeit gibt, einen anderen Menschen positiv zu 
verändern, dann doch nur, indem man ihn liebt und so ihn langsam wandeln hilft, von 
dem, was er ist, zu dem hin, was er sein kann. Sollte es bei der Kirche anders sein?134 
To love the Church is to participate in its construc ive contribution to society. 
Ratzinger believes genuine reform which achieves positive change has always been the result 
of “watchful individuals who, with the gift of discernment, loved the Church ‘critically’ and 
were willing to suffer for her.”135 Therefore, to Ratzinger’s mind, it is an “illusion” to want to 
become a sort of “transcendental subject, in which only the absolute has validity.”136 Echoing 
the modern synthesis which prides itself on self-reliance, Ratzinger says it is a “contradiction 
in terms” to want “to remain in a Church that we must first make so that it will be worth 
remaining in.”137 The love dimension of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology has a different departure 
                                                          
132 Ratzinger, “Why I am still in the Church,” in Credo for Today, 197. These contrasting attitudes to the 
Church, both of which are trends originating from within the Church’s membership today, share an inability to 
contribute constructively to ecclesial life and mission. See also this dissertation § 2.3.1.   
133 Ibid. (“Without some measure of love one finds nothing. One who does not get involved, at least for a little 
while, in the experiment of faith, in the experiment of becoming affirmatively involved with the Church, who 
risks not looking with the eyes of love, only vexes themselves. The wager of love is the condition of faith. Once 
wagered, one need not conceal the darkness of the Church [own translation]). 
134 Ibid., 1184 (“If there is ever a way to change another person positively, it can be only by loving him, thus 
helping him slowly change from what he is, into what e can be. Should it be any different with the Churc ?” 
[own translation]).  
135 Ratzinger, “Why I am still in the Church,” in Credo for Today, 200. 
136 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1184 (own translation).  
137 Ibid., 1184-85 (own translation).  
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point: authentic human growth requires the continued “suffering [of] the tension between the 
ideal and the actual in human nature”138: 
In der Kirche zu bleiben, weil sie es wert ist, dass sie bleibt; weil sie es wert ist, dass 
sie geliebt und durch Liebe allzeit neu über sich hinaus zu sich selbst verwandelt wird 
– das ist der Weg, auf den die Verantwortung des Glaubens auch heute weist.139  
Ratzinger says this “wager of love” asserts that, alongside the history of scandals in 
the Church one finds a history of liberating graces that has been kept alive by people “who 
are living witnesses to the liberating power of Christian faith.”140 Together with the scandals 
which the Church experiences, a sense of beauty throug   “incomparable works of art . . . 
great cathedrals . . . music. . . the dignity of the Church’s liturgy and . . .the reality of festival” 
is not accidental but engenders the impulse of the gospel, because “something that could 
express itself in that way cannot be mere darkness.”141  
Ratzinger believes the lives of the saints give eloquent testimony to that determined 
love towards the Church which yearns for excellence within it. The truth about humanity’s 
nature and destiny does not lie in the illusion of a sorrow-free existence in this world or in the 
deception that “one can become a human being without conquering oneself, without the 
patience of renunciation and the toil of overcoming o eself.”142 It is through the realisation of 
the necessity to continue “suffering in the self and by becoming free from the tyranny of 
egotism through suffering that one finds one’s truth, one’s joy, and one’s happiness.”143 
                                                          
138 Ibid., 1182 (own translation).  
139 Ibid., 1185 (“To remain in the Church, because it is n itself worthy to remain, because it is worth loving and 
through love is transformed ever anew into its truer self – that is the way in which the responsibility of faith 
expresses itself today, as always” [own translation]). 
140 Ibid., 1184 (own translation). 
141 Ratzinger, “Why I am still in the Church,” in Credo for Today, 198. The proceedings of the second and third 
Fota International Liturgical Conferences have paid particular attention to Ratzinger’s approach to beauty in the 
life of the Church. See D. Vincent Twomey and Janet E. Rutherford, eds., Benedict XVI and Beauty in Sacred 
Art and Architecture (Dublin: Four Courts, 2011); Janet E. Rutherford, ed. Benedict XVI and Beauty in Sacred 
Music (Dublin: Four Courts, 2012). 
142Ratzinger, “Why I am still in the Church,” in Credo for Today, 197.  
143 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1182 (own translation). This approach to human 
happiness echoes Ratzinger’s theologies of the Cross and of sacrament.  Through the sacrifice of self-
dispossession, one finds the true self and, therefore, reedom: “A human being in fact is saved in no other way 
but through the Cross, through acceptance of his own passion and that of the world, which in God’s Passion 
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Ratzinger says the saints express the way “the Church has carried through history a vestige of 
light that cannot be ignored.”144 Their fidelity in the face of adversity demonstrates hat 
freedom is not dependent upon the ability to engineer a comfortable existence for oneself. 
Instead, the fidelity of the saints offers considerable testimony to the world of the love God 
bears for humanity and vice versa. Ratzinger maintains that from the outset of the Church’s 
self-reflection, the communio sanctorum has expressed a most satisfactory definition of the 
Church across history, supplying it with the necessary openness to its cosmic nature:  
Kirche wird . . . nicht von ihren Ämtern und von ihrer Organisation her definiert, 
sondern von ihrem Gottesdienst her: als Tischgemeinschaft um den Auferstandenen, 
der sie allerorten versammelt und eint. . . . Man fing an, Kirche nicht mehr bloß als 
Einheit des eucharistischen Tisches zu verstehen, sondern als Gemeinschaft derer, die 
von diesem Tisch aus auch untereinander eins sind. Von da aus tritt dann sehr bald 
eine kosmische Weite in den Kirchenbegriff ein: DieG meinschaft der Heiligen, von 
der hier die Rede ist, überschreitet die Todesgrenze; sie verbindet alle jene 
miteinander, die den einen Geist, seine einige, lebenspendende Macht empfangen 
haben.145 
There is a sense, then, particularly evident in the lives of the saints, of the need to bear the 
tension of what is to come in juxtaposition to the m re falling into line with the ways of the 
world as it has evolved in history. The power to witness here offers the world something else 
– a testimony to the life of grace.  
Ratzinger uses the vocabulary of divine gentleness and human vigilance to capture the 
prospective power of the believer motivated to witness by their love for the Church. Indeed, it 
is the convergence of grace and human freedom in the martyr that demonstrates divine justice 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
became the site of liberating meaning. Only in thisway, in this acceptance, does a human being become free. 
All offers that promise it at less expense will fail and prove to be deceptive” (Ratzinger, “Why I am still in the 
Church,” in Credo for Today, 197).  
144 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1183 (own translation).  
145 Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum, 316-17 (“[. . .] the Church is not defined as a mtter of offices and 
organisations but on the basis of her worship of God: as a community at one table around the risen Christ who 
gathers and unites them everywhere. . . .The Church began to be seen, not just as the unity of the eucharistic 
table, but also as the community of those who through this table are united among themselves. Then from this 
point a cosmic breath very soon entered into the concept of Church: the communion of saints spoken of here 
extends beyond the frontier of death; it binds togeher all those who have received the one Spirit and his one, 
life-giving power” [Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 334-35]). As Pope, his first full set of Wednesday 
general audience catecheses was built around the theme of the nacent apostolic community, the Church Fat ers, 
the teachers and the saints who contributed to the Church’s welfare and progression through history. See
Benedict XVI, La Santità non passa mai di moda (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009). 
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for all. God’s justice, in essence, is a relationality bound to a freedom with the force of truth. 
God, in the “obstinacy of divine grace” and acting out of freedom, respects the terms of the 
covenantal relationship.146 In this regard, “gentleness” emanates from God as the fruit of the 
submission of the Son to the will of the Father.147 Human freedom demands God’s gentleness 
if there is to be true justice administered justly. Otherwise, divine freedom would be a 
tyranny wrecking the possibility of human growth in authentic freedom. The mystery of God, 
Ratzinger says, is precisely “that he acts so gently, that he only gradually builds up his history 
within the great history of mankind . . . that he continues to knock gently at the doors of our 
hearts and slowly opens our eyes if we open our doos t  him. . . . Not to overwhelm with 
external power, but to give freedom, to offer and elicit love.”148      
Ratzinger says the counterpart to divine “gentleness” is human “vigilance.”149 His 
admonition to vigilance is the basic attitude demanded of humanity in the “interim time” of 
our present existence. It entails doing what is right n the sight of God: 
Wachheit bedeutet zuallererst Offenheit für das Gute, für die Wahrheit, für Gott, 
mitten in einer oft unerklärlichen Welt und mitten in der Macht des Bösen. Sie 
bedeutet, dass der Mensch mit aller Kraft und mit großer Nüchternheit das Rechte zu 
                                                          
146 See Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes, 249-57, at 254. This phrase that is translated in the main text – “. . . 
Dennoch der göttlichen Gnade . . .” needs a note of explanation. The German word “dennoch,” normally used in 
the sense of an adverb in German, is repeated twiceover by Ratzinger in the upper case – “. . . einem Dennoch, 
dem Dennoch der göttlichen Gnade . . .” It seems to captures the sense of “nevertheless”, “besides,” or 
“notwithstanding” which Ratzinger’s theology of grace is trying to convey. It could be translated as “obstinacy.”  
As such, the Church is holy because it is founded on the irrevocable obstinacy of divine grace. He is speaking 
about the final and unsurpassable character of the Church rooted, as it is, in the incarnation of the divine Word. 
To his mind, the Church exists as the perpetual witness and actual place of God’s salvation of sinners. One can 
say therefore, that it is even proper to the Church that the people who form it be sinners because in itself, it is 
born from grace. The Church is not founded on the morality of man, but rather on the grace issued against the 
amorality of man, on the incarnation of God.   
147 See Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 275-77. Ratzinger says it is difficult for us to c me to terms 
with a divine justice that is “gentle,” as opposed to the impression – often taken for granted – of an impregnable 
authority befitting of divinity. He says we are often tempted to ask the question of St Jude Thaddeus at the Last 
Super: “Lord, how is it that you will manifest yourself to us and not to the world?” (John 14:22). Why, for 
example, Ratzinger continues, does God not resist hi  enemies? Why are there only ever a few to witness ( .g. 
Abraham, Israel, the disciples of Jesus) to the greatness of someone possessing the powers inherent in the
obstinacy of grace? 
148 Ibid., 276. 
149 See ibid., 48, 152-3, 287-8. 
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tun versucht, dass er nicht nach seinen eigenen Wünsche  lebt, sondern nach der 
Wegweisung des Glaubens.150  
In other words, this attitude of sobriety is the route to unity with God’s will for creation 
whereby growth in authentic freedom is nurtured. To Ratzinger’s mind, the sobriety in this 
dialectic between God’s “gentleness” and human “vigilance” means that confining 
Christianity to just a jubilant message in which there can be no judgement distorts its very 
nature and curtails God’s freedom. Models of Christiani y that do not allow for divine 
judgement refashion the truth about God and humanity by discounting the fact that God 
values human freedom enough to let us learn to use it authentically or otherwise: 
Der Glaube bestätigt nicht den Hochmut des schlafenden Gewissens, die  
Selbstherrlichkeit derer, die ihre eigenen Wünsche zur Norm ihres Lebens erklären 
und Gnade damit zu einer Entwertung Gottes und des Menschen umschmelzen, weil 
Gott ohnedies nur zu allem ja sagen kann und darf. Wohl aber wird dem leidenden 
und ringenden Menschen gewiß, daß “Gott größer ist als unser Herz” (1John 3:20) 
und daß ich in allem Versagen voller Zuversicht sein darf, weil Christus auch für 
mich gelitten und im voraus für mich bezahlt hat.151 
Hence, an important implication of the love dimensio  in Ratzinger’s ecclesiology is 
the concept of Church as magistra – as educator in human “vigilance” so as to avoid the 
cheapening of grace. Ratzinger says evil must be dealt with, while it is the concept of 
                                                          
150 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 313 (“Vigilance means first of all openness to the
good, to the truth, to God, in the midst of an often meaningless world and in the midst of the power of evil. It 
means that man tries with all his strength and withgreat sobriety to do what is right; it means that he lives, not 
according to his own wishes, but according to the signpost of faith” [emphasis added] [Ratzinger, Jesus of 
Nazareth. Holy Week, 288]). Ratzinger is guided here by the eschatological parables in the Gospels, particularly 
those of the watchful doorkeeper (Mark 13:33-36), the vigilant servant (Luke 12:42-48) and the wise and foolish 
virgins (Matt 25:1-13). By retuning to one of his favourite scenes from the life of Jesus, Ratzinger gives the 
example of Gethsemane as the place where the admonition to vigilance is at its most sombre. Jesus, greatly 
troubled and distressed, asks the group of three disciples to remain and keep watch (Mark 14:33-34). Ratzinger 
says that despite the immediacy of the scene, Gethsemane also points ahead to the later history of Christianity: 
“Across the centuries, it is the drowsiness of the disciples that opens up possibilities for the power of the Evil 
One. Such drowsiness deadens the soul . . . [I]n its state of numbness, the soul prefers not to see all this; it is 
easily persuaded that things cannot be so bad, so as to continue in the self-satisfaction of its own comfortable 
existence. Yet this deadening of souls, this lack of vigilance regarding both God’s closeness and the looming 
forces of darkness, is what gives the Evil one power in the world” (Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 
153). 
151 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 97 (“Faith does not reinforce the pride of a sleeping conscience, 
the vainglory of people who make their own wishes the norm of their life, and who thus refashion grace so as to 
devalue both God and man, because God can then in any case only approve, and is only allowed to approve, 
everything. Yet any one of us who is suffering and struggling can be certain that ‘God is greater than our hearts’ 
[1John 3:20] and that whatever my failures, I may be full of confident trust, because Christ suffered for me, too, 
and has already paid the price for me” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 111]). 
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freedom rooted in truth and love which safeguards divine justice. The fact that “God now 
confronts evil himself, because men are incapable of doing so” expresses the “‘unconditional’ 
goodness of God which can never be opposed to truth o  the justice that goes with it.”152 With 
human freedom being respected within the sphere of the divine, the human person is given 
the space and support needed for one’s liberation to come to fruition. To Ratzinger’s mind, 
this requires the Church to educate society in the ability to accept human dependency, 
relationality and limitation.153 The ecclesial “space” enabling the divine longing for humanity 
to come to this fulfilment also forms the basis for the hope dimension of Ratzinger’s 
ecclesiology. Indeed, the virtue of hope has the capa ity to locate ecclesiology in its proper 
perspective – beyond inner-worldly institutional struc ures towards a divine-human dialogue 
on the prospect of salvation (Rom 8:24):  
Die große Erwartung an die christliche Existenz bleibt, dass sie das ganz Andere, das 
nirgends Aufzufindende, die heile Gemeinschaft und damit die Heilung, auch des 
eigenen Inneren, schenke. Aber diese Erwartung wird transponiert auf das Irdisch-
Institutionelle der Kirche, die die heile Gesellschaft sein müsse, und kann dann nur in 
heillosem Zorn enden. . . . Die Verleugnung der Hoffnung zugunsten der Sicherheit, 
vor der wir hier stehen, beruht auf der Unfähigkeit, die Spannung auf das Kommende 







                                                          
152 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 133. The blood of animals, albeit a sign of hope for a greater 
obedience that may be redemptive, cannot by itself be the atonement for sin that brings God and humanity 
together. Christ’s “blood”, on the other hand, is “the total gift of himself, in which he suffers to the end all 
human sinfulness and repairs every breach of fidelity by his unconditional fidelity” (134). Ratzinger, as we have 
seen, calls this the “new worship” established by Jesus, “drawing all mankind into his vicarious obedience” 
(ibid.). For Ratzinger, Christ’s obedience establishes the dynamic of love into which the Church is drawn.  
153 See this dissertation § 4.3.1. 
154 Ratzinger, Auf Christus schauen, 91-94 (“The great expectation of Christian life remains that it should 
bestow the totally other, that which is nowhere to be found, the ideal community and with it the healing even of 
one’s own inner self. But this expectation is transposed to the earthly and institutional aspect of the C urch that 
is expected to be the ideal community, and as a result it can only end in unholy rage. . . . The denial of hope in 
favour of security that we are faced with here rests on the inability to bear the tension of waiting for what is to 
come and to abandon oneself to God’s goodness” [Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 79-82]). 
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5.4.   The Hope Dimension: Only Truth Frees155  
As we begin the final part of this chapter, it is by now understood that the heart of 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology of liberation is his presentation of the Church as the sphere whereby 
the world is perpetually invited to the “new worship” that configures the human person’s 
“whole” life to the Son’s obedience to the Father. As a final point, then, the virtue of hope 
comes into focus: hope based on the ecclesial vision of how God and humanity can reach one 
another throughout time and for eternity is a faith reality that constitutes a major component 
of Ratzinger’s approach to freedom. His aim is to achieve the appropriate equilibrium 
between the temporal pull in the human condition on the one hand, and the eschatological 
pull, on the other.  
This subdivision looks firstly at how Ratzinger shapes an eschatology that 
understands the Church as sphere which gathers a people who must contend with a “failed 
freedom.”156 And secondly, it looks at how Ratzinger comes to terms with the Church’s 
movements in the landscape of the final shape of freedom. The ground for his vision in this 
regard is based on the “last things” of hell, purgatory and heaven. Freedom is a major factor 
in his attempt to formulate an integrated eschatological vision that does justice to life here 
and here-after. The hope dimension of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology is a very good example of his 
treatment of freedom, and the importance which he places on the correct understanding of the 
Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom.  
  
                                                          
155 It is of note that all of Pope Benedict’s encyclica s have placed their emphasis on the theological vrtues of 
hope and love. Deus caritas est (DCE) is, in part, an extended treatise on how the Church becomes the concrete 
expression of the encounter between God and humanity wh ch, grounded in freedom, expresses itself as a love 
story. See in particular, DCE 17-30. Spe salvi (SS) advocates a renewal in a personal understanding of hope that 
is not individualistic or egotistical. Indeed, as a consequence of the findings of this dissertation, one can say that 
the entire orientation of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology f liberation has the same intention. For its perspctive on 
freedom, see SS, 24-31. Caritas in veritate (CV), a social encyclical, and somewhat more exhortative in nature, 
addresses the great challenge for the Church today – to love in truth. From the perspective of ecclesial life, see 
CV, 9, 17-18, 29-31, 56-57, 68-77. 
156 See Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 23. 
276 
 
5.4.1. Failed Freedom: Ecclesiology Shaped by an Integral Eschatology 
From Ratzinger’s ecclesiological perspective, Christian hope engenders a truthful 
acknowledgement of the human condition in addition o a realistic appreciation of what 
should be the legitimate parameters of human activity. In the first place, this means that 
humanity cannot go on living without truth. When the truth about humanity is denied, a 
subculture of illusion begins to inhabit civilisation under the guise of authenticity. Slowly, the 
discrepancy between truth and untruth demolishes reality. In Ratzinger, this scenario yields 
the following statement on the hope engendered by faith:  
Ich bleibe in der Kirche, weil ich den nur in ihr und nicht letztlich gegen sie 
vollziehbaren Glauben als eine Notwendigkeit für den Menschen, ja, für die Welt 
ansehe, wovon sie lebt, auch wo sie ihn nicht teilt. Denn wo es Gott  nicht mehr gibt – 
und ein schweigender Gott ist kein Gott – da gibt es di  der Welt und dem Menschen 
vorgängige Wahrheit nicht mehr.157  
This gives Ratzinger a focus which he subsequently described as “the integral 
character of Christian hope,”158 pointing to the eschatological pull upon the entire cosmos, as 
well as on the individual. He points out that a consta t feature of the history of ideas is that 
life is centrally marked by death such that “in every age man’s consciousness of life has been 
at the same time a consciousness of death, or at least of mortality.”159 Death is not something 
that simply marks the conclusion of a life; the very movement of life and death mutually 
                                                          
157 Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 1181 (“I stay in the Church because I recognise 
the faith that can be acquired only in the Church and not against it, as a necessity for people, and indeed for the 
world, for by it the world lives, even where it does not share it. For where God is no more – and a silent God is 
no God - there is no longer any truth antecedent to the world and people” [own translation]). See SS, 1-2, where 
Benedict XVI describes the content of Christianity as “life-changing.” In the opening paragraph, the int ntion of 
the Pope is to comprehend the nature of the conviction inherent in Christian hope and how it impacts upon 
Christian living: “the present, even if it is arduous, can be lived and accepted if it leads towards a goal, if we can 
be sure of this goal, and if this goal is great enough to justify the effort of the journey.” In the scond paragraph, 
he fleshes this out:  “[w]e see as a distinguishing mark of Christians the fact that they have a future: it is not that 
they know the details of what awaits them, but they know in general terms that their life will not end i  
emptiness. Only when the future is certain as a positive reality does it become possible to live the pr sent as 
well. So now we can say: Christianity was not only ‘good news’—the communication of a hitherto unknown 
content. In our language we would say: the Christian message was not only ‘informative’ but ‘performative.’ 
That means: the Gospel is not merely a communication of things that can be known—it is one that makes things 
happen and is life-changing. The dark door of time, of the future, has been thrown open. The one who has hope 
lives differently; the one who hopes has been granted the gift of a new life.” 
158 Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, trans. Michael Waldstein, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America, 1988), 158. 
159 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 243. 
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define one another. In the attempt to imbue life with meaning, one inevitably comes before 
the terror and senselessness of death. Simultaneously, Ratzinger says, a constant for the 
believer is the yearning for some form of transcendence. Immanence alone is too narrow for 
him. While denials of an after-life can cause an initial glorification of this present life above 
all else, there follows quite quickly “an enormous devaluation of life”: no longer surrounded 
by the seal of the holy, life can be thrown away when it no longer gives pleasure. Ratzinger 
says the denial of the after-life is the denial of eternal responsibility as well as eternal hope, 
the consequence being “the abolition of man.”160 The lust for life can change into disgust 
with life and its emptiness. Contrary to this line of reasoning, he says it is the prospect of the 
Rubicon of death that imbues life with meaning here now and hereafter. From this 
perspective, Ratzinger says, 
Der Mensch braucht das Ethos, um er selbst zu sein. Das Ethos aber braucht den 
Schöpfungs- und den Unsterblichkeitsglauben, das heißt es braucht die Objektivität 
des Sollens und die Endgültigkeit von Verantwortung d Erfüllung. Die 
Unmöglichkeit eines davon abgeschnittenen Menschseins ist der indirekte Beweis für 
die Wahrheit des christlichen Glaubens und seiner Hoffnung. Diese Hoffnung ist das 
Rettende für den Menschen, auch und gerade heute. . . . Ohne die frohe Botschaft des 
Glaubens besteht das Menschsein auf die Dauer nicht. Die Freude des Glaubens ist 
seine Verantwortung: Wir sollten sie mit neuem Mut in dieser Stunde unserer 
Geschichte ergreifen.161   
                                                          
160 See Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 45-46. Ratzinger borrows this phrase from a book by C.S. Lewis, 
which is entitled The Abolition of Man or Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of 
English in the Upper Forms of Schools, rev. ed. (London: Fount, 1999). See A Turning Point for Europe, 35-46.  
161 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 29 (“[m]an needs morality in order to be himself. But morality requires 
faith in creation and immortality, that is, it needs the objectivity of obligation and the definitiveness of 
responsibility and fulfilment. The impossibility ofa human existence cut off from these is the indirect proof of 
the truth of the Christian faith and of its hope. It is this hope that saves man, today, as ever – indeed, precisely 
today. . . . Without the good news of faith, human existence does not survive in the long run. The joy of faith is 
its responsibility: we should seize it with new courage in this hour of our history.” [Ratzinger, A Turning Point 
for Europe, 45-46]). See SS, 24-26. It is in the context of the possibility of preserving hope in the future that 
Ratzinger endeavours to formulate an integral eschatology straddling the spheres of eternity and this present life. 
He says the question for us is whether it is good t be alive and to be a human being? He says it is impossible to 
answer this question affirmatively unless there is a goodness that is bestowed on each person which is stronger 
than all one’s failures: “If we cannot show a picture of life in which even pain, hardship and death are 
meaningful and belong to a larger whole, then we cannot rehabilitate human existence” (Ratzinger, A Turning 
Point for Europe, 160).  
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In Ratzinger’s vision, the Church’s mandate to speak the truth about the human 
person ought to impact upon how its members engage with their surroundings.162 However, 
he also finds an inherent risk in the temptation of putting trust in idealistic or simplistic ideas 
of freedom. To his mind no one today can seriously claim that the world is free of suffering 
or on the cusp of unrestricted liberty. This is immortalised for him in the fact that no 
optimism can talk its way around the events at Auschwitz. Indeed, he says, the reality of 
Auschwitz begs the question for some as to whether the price of freedom in human history 
has been at too great a risk to the stability of the human race.163  
In light of this new consciousness about human behaviour and its capacity for 
destruction, Ratzinger argues that the source of human hope must be realistic and grounded in 
truth. Within the context of the eschatological pull on creation, human freedom is a complex 
reality to decipher. In the end, he says, the formulation of the question about whether it would 
be better if freedom had not existed is beyond our ability to understand. But we have to 
reckon with the fact that there exists “a failed freedom . . . which ‘rigidifies’ from below, 
which misuses the time that is given to it and leaves it a wreck.”164 The New Testament 
evidence, on the other hand, suggests the possibility that “fallen freedom” and “misused 
time” can be taken hold of and reconciled by a love that fills the space of the wreckage left in 
their wake. In a new action on God’s part which is centred in Christ, infinite love reaches 
beyond creation, because “only an infinite love, with its compassion, is strong enough to 
overcome hostility and make love credible again in the face of the fear of being dependent 
and the craving for the autonomy that, seemingly, is the only appropriate way for freedom to 
                                                          
162 His view is that there is the “real danger [today] of reducing Christianity to individualism and 
otherworldliness. Both of these rob the Christian fith of its vital power. Here in fact, lies the task of 
contemporary eschatology: to marry perspectives, so that person and community, present and future, are seen in 
their unity” (Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 12).   
163 See Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 23-24. See also Benedict XVI, Address during visit to Auschwitz Camp, 
Poland, 28 May 2006, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2006/may/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20060528_auschwitz-birkenau_en.html (accessed 8 February 2013).  
164 Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 23. 
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take.”165 For Ratzinger, encounter with love of this calibre informs and cultivates one’s 
attitude towards the possibilities of authentic freedom in this life.  
On three separate occasions in his writings Ratzinger weighs up the schema of time 
and history which had been passed down from Greek antiquity and taken up by medieval 
eschatology in a modified form. Within the medieval schema humanity has a special place 
grounded in the act of creation itself. It characterised creation and time according to the two 
directional elements “exitus-reditus,” i.e., “turning outwards” (Auskehr) and “turning inwards 
(Einkehr).166 In the ancient Plotinian construct of the formula, which was later very closely 
associated with Gnostic philosophy, exitus, by virtue of which there is any non-divine being 
in the first place, appeared not as a going forth but as a fall – a ruinous exclusion and 
distancing from divinity. As such, finitude itself was already a kind of sin. In this view, 
reditus means redemption or liberation from finitude, which, as such, “is the real burden of 
our existence.”167 By contrast, Ratzinger says, Christian thought strongly distinguishes 
between the movements of exitus and reditus. Christianity teaches that created, finite matter 
                                                          
165 Ibid. In allusions to kenosis, or the self-emptying of God, Ratzinger highlights the length to which infinite 
love goes in order to instil true hope in humanity: “Only a God who leaves behind the distant position of creator 
and lord, even taking on the dependency of a slave, who does the servant’s work of washing feet, only this God 
and his love have the power to take hold of the cosmos of freedom and to empower love as genuine autonomy, 
as true freedom. All of this may strike non-believers as naive or mythological, but how could the audacity of 
God not seem mythological to our emancipated rationl ty?” (ibid.)   
166 See Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 17-25; The Spirit of the Liturgy, 29-34; Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 
55-57, 61-2, 65. Ratzinger disproves of overly simpl stic demarcations of time and eternity which suggest that 
the Judeo-Christian tradition introduced a linear notion of time – with a beginning and end – as a replacement 
for the philosophical tradition which, up to that point had a cyclical notion bordering on the “timeless.” Even in 
the Christian view of the world, Ratzinger says, many small circles of individual life are inscribed in the one 
great cycle of history that moves from exitus to reditus: “The small circles carry within themselves the grat 
rhythm of the whole, give it concrete forms that are ever new, and so provide it with the force of its movement. 
And in the one great circle there are also the many circles of the lives of different cultures and communities of 
human history, in which the drama of beginning, development and end is played out. . . . The totality of the 
small circles reflects the great circle. The two – the great circle and the small circles – are interconnected and 
interdependent. And so worship is bound up with all three dimensions of the cross-shaped movement: the 
personal, the social, and the universal” (Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 29-30). 
167 Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 19. Ratzinger says it i easy to see how such views are readily identifiable 
with the Christian message. Original Sin can be equated with the fall into the finite, for it is a product of the fall 
and is revoked in the new ascent. But there can be hop lessness here in this vision too because “the finit time 




does not have a negative origin. In God’s creative act carried out in freedom, the dialogue of 
love between Creator and creature begins: 
Exitus ist nicht zunächst Abfall aus dem Unendlichen, die Entzweiung des Seins und 
damit die Ursache allen Elends der Welt, sondern exitus ist vorab etwas durchaus 
Positives: der freie Schöpfungsakt Gottes, der positiv w ll, daß es das Geschaffene als 
etwas Gutes ihm gegenüber gebe, aus dem eine Antwort der Freiheit und der Liebe zu 
ihm zurückkommen kann. Nichtgöttliches Sein ist daher nicht in sich schon etwas 
Negatives, sondern ganz im Gegenteil positive Frucht eines göttlichen Wollens. Es 
beruht nicht auf einen Sturz, sondern auf einer Setzung Gottes, die gut ist und Gutes 
schafft. Der Seinsakt Gottes, der geschaffenes Sein bewirkt, ist ein Freiheitsakt. 
Insofern ist im Sein selbst von seinem Grund her das Prinzip Freiheit anwesend.168  
The challenge facing an integral eschatology, as itcomes to terms with the present 
and the future, is that the freedom of the creature tends towards “bend[ing] back the positive 
exitus of creation.”169 It is the creature’s freedom that brings about the disintegration into 
“fall” and the will to independence that says “no” t  reditus. Freedom creates an 
eschatological tension in the human person, equipping one with a disposition capable of 
rejecting one’s Creator and defying the eschatological pull towards eternity. In such a 
scenario, “love is understood as dependence and is rejected; in its place comes autonomy and 
self-sufficiency: to exist only from oneself and in o eself; to be a god sui generis.” 170 On the 
other hand, it is also the case that the will to turn back inwards proves impossible for the 
creature alone. This is the place of christology in Ratzinger’s schema, for now, he says, 
redemption needs a redeemer, who freely sets in motion a power to heal. The Church is the 
                                                          
168 Ratzinger, “Das Ende der Zeit,” 27 (“Exitus is not primarily a fall from the infinite, the splitting of being and 
thereby the cause of all the world’s misery; rather, exitus is to begin with something completely positive: the
free creative act of God whose positive will is that there be created beings as something good in contrast to God, 
from which the response of freedom and love can come back to God. This is why non-divine being is not i  
itself already something negative, but the opposite: th  positive fruit of the divine will. It is not rooted in a fall 
but in the positing of God who is good and who creates what is good. The act of being on the part of God that 
effects created being is an ct of freedom. To this extent the principle of freedom is present in being itself from 
the ground up” [Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 20]). Christianity’s exitus – the free creative act of God – aims 
at reditus, but not to the detriment of created being. As a result, “the coming-into-its-own of the creature as an 
autonomous creature answers back in freedom to the l ve of God, accepts its creation as a command to love, so 
that a dialogue of love begins – that entirely new unity that only love can create. In it the being of the other is 
not absorbed, not annulled, but rather becomes wholly what it is precisely in giving itself” (Ratzinger, “The End 
of Time,” 20-21). For Ratzinger, freedom is central o making the dialogue of love operative and consequently 
an integral part of coming to terms with a realistic appraisal of the creaturely encounter with the Crator. See 
this dissertation §§ 4.1.4 and 5.3.1. 
169 Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 21. 
170 Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 21. 
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prolongation of this loving transformation in time as it attempts to orient the human race into 
an authentic posture in regard to God, just as Christ did in his own person in the hour of his 
departing. Christ’s metábasis [“departing”] from this world is the hour to which his ministry 
is directed, the hour of love (ἀγάπη) that reaches to the end. Thus, Christ in the Church 
effects the formation of the great family of God:  
Das Ausgehen Jesu hingegen setzt zunächst einmal schon die Schöpfung nicht als 
Abfall, sondern als positiven Willensakt Gottes voraus. Es ist dann ein Prozess der 
Liebe, die gerade im Absteigen ihr wahres Wesen erweist – aus Liebe zum Geschöpf, 
aus Liebe zum verlorenen Schaf – und so im Absteigen das wahrhaft Göttliche 
offenbart. Und der heimkehrende Jesus streift nicht seine Menschheit wie etwas 
Verunreinigendes wieder ab. Das Ziel seines Abstieg war das Annehmen und 
Aufnehmen der ganzen Menschheit, das Heimkehren mit allen Menschen – die 
Heimkehr von “allem Fleisch.” Neues geschieht in dieser Heimkehr: Jesus kehrt nicht 
allein zurück. Er streift das Fleisch nicht ab, sonder  zieht alle in sich hinein (John 
12:32). Die Metabasis gilt dem Ganzen. Wenn im 1. Kapitel des Johannes-
Evangeliums gesagt ist, dass die “Seinigen” (ídioi) ihn nicht annahmen (1:11), so 
hören wir nun, dass er die “Seinigen” bis ans Ende liebt (13:1). Im Absteig hat er neu 
die “Seinigen” – die große Familie Gottes – gesammelt, si  aus Fremden zu 
“Seinigen” gemacht.171 
To Ratzinger’s mind, therefore, the sphere of time and space essentially has to do with 
freedom and the great movement of love. There is aneschatological tension in divine-human 
relationality that entails both love and freedom. God’s creative freedom creates a space for 
human freedom by means of a cosmic movement. Above all, it is Christ’s foundational 
breakthrough as prototype of the exitus-reditus pattern that enables the human person to 
accomplish an analogous metaphysical journey, a journey based on mutual love. It is because 
of the “double” action of Christ’s original movement that human freedom can effect the 
creature’s reditus. Hence, humanity is not neutral within creation. Human freedom has an 
                                                          
171 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth: Von Einzug in Jerusalem, 72-73 (“Jesus’ going out . . . presupposes that 
creation is not a fall, but a positive act of God’s will. It is thus a movement of love, which in the process of 
descending demonstrates its true nature – motivated by love for the creature, love for the lost sheep – and so in 
descending it reveals what God is really like. On returning, Jesus does not strip away his humanity again as if it 
were a source of impurity. The goal of his descent was the adoption and assumption of all mankind, and his 
homecoming with all men is the homecoming of ‘all flesh.’ Something new happens in this return: Jesus doe
not return alone. He does not strip away the flesh, but draws all to himself (cf. John 12:32). The m tábasis 
[‘departing’] applies to all. If in the Prologue of John’s Gospel w  read that ‘his own’ (ídioi) did not accept him 
(cf. 1:11), we now hear that he loves ‘his own’ to the end (cf. 13:1). In descending he has reassembled ‘his own’ 




inner trajectory that can bring humanity to their goal: “the homecoming that is the goal of 
[humanity’s] movement can only happen as a freedom that gives itself back and finds itself 
completely in so doing.”172 Crucially then, and contrary to the views of antiquity, reditus is 
not a re-absorption of time into non-time but the way that time becomes definitive. This 
homecoming’s end is not time’s dissolution but a way of continuing in existence through “an 
illuminated freedom that finds its definitive state in the fusion of love and truth.”173  
In brief, valuing freedom is the ground of Ratzinger’s schatology. From the ecclesial 
perspective, the relationality between God and humanity is approached solely on the basis of 
the freedom specific to both partners. The union of the two gradually comes to pass over the 
course of time and history. It is a loving transformation of humanity from “going it on one’s 
own, around not needing the other . . . [to] being turned towards the other, who must rescue 
me from the snare that I can no longer undo on my own.”174  
5.4.2. Final Freedom: The Landscape of the Definitiveness of Responsibility and 
Fulfilment  
 
   From an ecclesial perspective, hope is grounded on God who, by a sovereign and free 
act, has created a “space” or “time” for the life o freedom to come into force. But this space 
or time must have value and cannot be purely provisional in nature if it is to be meaningful.175 
                                                          
172 Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 22. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid., 21. 
175 Introductory remarks in Ratzinger’s monograph, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 1-15, are informative 
in this regard. He says in our day, “[h]umanity is waking up to the significance of eschatology because the 
question of the future of the whole has once more become urgent” (15). While having been for centuries a final 
tract in theology centred on the doctrine of the last things, suddenly, with the historical process in cr sis, 
theologies of hope, futurity and liberation place th ology, per se, before the alternatives of faith in God or a 
religious pathos and appeal to human emotion directed exclusively towards the future. To Ratzinger’s mind, this 
leads to a situation where it almost seems legitimate for theology to choose religion against God. This calls to 
mind Ratzinger’s study of Bonaventure and thirteenth-century theology. We can recall here that a program of 
practical action, begun through Joachim of Fiore’s (c.1130-1202) threefold periodization of history calibrated 
via the triune God, is pinpointed by Ratzinger as initiating an unprecedented interest in concrete utopias. He 
says the belief in progress engendered by the assurances of these utopias has become the determinative element 
in political thought since the nineteenth century. He considers Marxism as a particularly notorious example. See 
this dissertation §§ 1.2 and 2.1. Ratzinger observe that such secularisation of Christian eschatological thought 
sucks the sap out of faith awareness. In his view, the new faith placed in progress has sometimes meant th t the 
quest for happiness goes into temporary suspension for the sake of the future of the world. As a result of this 
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Ratzinger knows that at its most radical the issue of time must eventually wrestle with the 
question about “time’s end.” This is why he devotes his resources to developing an 
eschatology which informs the vocation of the Churc. To his mind, “whoever investigates 
the beginning and end of time must also ask what there is outside of and above time.”176 
Thus, he believes, the way we see God – and the rationally responsible free decision of our 
“yes” or “no” to him – determines our capacity to appropriate or squander time through our 
actions. As this response become definitive over th course of one’s lifetime, the human 
person enters into their final posture with regard to God.    
The ecclesiological implications of the eschatological pull upon creation requires that 
the Church’s collective worshipping posture – which enables the individual creature’s 
freedom to utter “yes” or “no” to God – is a theme that must be addressed. Ultimately, it is 
through the lens of the last things that Ratzinger will deal with the prerogative inherent in 
human freedom to respond to the Creator’s invitation o authentic encounter and unity. This 
subdivision shows how Ratzinger connects hell, purgatory and heaven in a way that fosters 
personal, authentic freedom without losing sight of the Church’s legitimate concern for unity, 
and for reality as a whole. He builds up a doctrinal landscape, so to speak, whereby hell 
underscores the seriousness with which the Creator takes human freedom, purgatory renders 
the Church as central to accomplishing the authentic human posture before the merciful God, 
while heaven constitutes the final shape of this posture.    
Firstly, Ratzinger is convinced that the existence of hell corroborates the seriousness 
with which God takes human freedom. 177 What God gives his creature is the love through 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
new interest in the creation of a new world, an older eschatology has been pushed back into a corner where it 
stands bearing the dismissive label “salvation of the soul.”  This is detrimental to the understanding of freedom 
because, somehow, its personal aspect gets lost within the striving towards a soon-to-be- realised “whole.” This 
is the context in which he presents his doctrine of the last things.  
176 Ratzinger, “The End of Time,” 25. 
177 See Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 216-18. Ratzinger says that Christ, as it were, “d scends 
into Hell and suffers it in all its emptiness; but God does not, for all that, treat man as an immature being 
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which all creaturely dependence and limitation can be transformed. The human person does 
not create the assent to such love solely by his own power and “yet the freedom to resist the 
creation of that assent, the freedom not to accept it as one’s own, this freedom remains.”178 
Crucially, Ratzinger adds, “[h]eaven reposes upon freedom, and so leaves to the damned the 
right to will their own damnation.”179 This perspective unreservedly takes the wilful activity 
of the human person seriously because, through the definitiveness of responsibility and 
fulfilment, the irrevocable takes place, including perdition.  
The doctrine of everlasting punishment preserves th real content of hope because the 
idea of mercy which accompanies it is the ground for a suffering, hope-filled faith that trusts 
the One who enters the nothingness of hell freely, and on our behalf. To Ratzinger’s mind, 
this seriousness takes tangible form in the Cross. Thi  teaches us, firstly, that evil is not 
unknown to God and that “he himself entered into the distinctive freedom of sinners but went 
beyond it in that freedom of his own love which descended willingly into the Abyss.”180 
Secondly, this descent means that the divine response is able to draw freedom, precisely as 
freedom, to itself. As a consequence, Christ’s descent and dark night of the suffering soul 
cannot be fully appreciated except by entering intocommunion with his darkness via 
suffering faith. At this point, the social nature of the Church requires that “[o]ne draws near 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
deprived in the final analysis of any responsibility for his own destiny” (216). The article of faith from the 
Apostles’ Creed, Christus descendit ad infernos – Christ’s decent into hell – has been considered part of the 
catholic tradition from a very early stage (cf. CCC, 631-35). Hans Urs von Balthasar has been credited with 
engaging with this in the twentieth-century. See, for example, Theologie der Drei Tage (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 
1970). However, his theology of descent has been critiqued by Alyssa Lyra Pitstick as containing significant 
differences to the traditionally received doctrine. S e Alyssa Lyra Pitstick, Light in Darkness: Hans Urs von 
Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ’s Desc nt into Hell (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2007), 
where she outlines in great detail Balthasar’s thoug t and her critique of how he over-extends the meaning of 
the tradition on Christ’s descent into hell. Ratzinger enters into nothing of the same detail on this issue as 
Balthasar or Pitstick, but nevertheless, he says the idea of eternal damnation has a firm place in the New 
Testament and in Jesus’ words, having also been shaped within the Judaism of the two centuries prior to Christ. 
In this regard Ratzinger references a variety of texts: Matt 25:41; 5:29 and parallels; 13:42, 50; 22:13; 18:8 and 
parallels; 5:22; 18:9; 8:12; 24:51; 25:30; Luke 13:28; 2Thess 1:9; 2:10; 1Thess 5:3; Rom 9:22; Phil 3:19; 1Cor 
1:18; 2Cor 2:15; 4:3; 1Tim 6:9; Rev 14:10; 19:20; 2:10-15; 21:8. See also Ratzinger’s “Farewell to the Devil?” 
in Dogma and Preaching, 197-205; and SS, 41-48. 
178 Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 216. 
179 Ibid.  
180 Ibid., 217.  
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to the Lord’s radiance by sharing his darkness. One serves the salvation of the world by 
leaving one’s own salvation behind for the sake of others.”181 Therefore, hell is not a threat to 
be hurled at people, but neither is it a neutral logic that discounts human actions as 
inconsequential for salvation. Rather, it, and the merciful action of God accompanying it, 
corresponds to the Church’s presence in time: “[. . .] a challenge to suffer in the dark night of 
faith, to experience communion with Christ in solidarity with his descent into the Night. One 
draws near to the Lord’s radiance by sharing his darkness.”182 
If hell is the doctrine that expounds the seriousnes  with which God respects human 
freedom, then purgatory, for Ratzinger, expresses th  ecclesial nature of hope. It highlights 
that the Christian promise has proven its worth for it “signifies that the walls separating 
                                                          
181 Ibid., 218. Here the issue of definitive damnation is present. For Ratzinger, hell and God’s mercy reside 
together throughout history. However, apart from what as been revealed by God, divine mercy and judgement 
remain, in all truth, beyond our full comprehension. Theology in general is very reticent to delve too deeply here 
for we dare not claim to know the mind of God in relation to individual judgement at the end of time. Ratzinger 
is no different in that regard. However, in Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 65-72, he does seem to broach the 
issue of the possibility of definitive damnation via John 13. He takes the characters of Peter and Judas an  deals 
with their respective responses to the gift of friendship with the Lord. In the period prior to his passion, Jesus 
even had to endure the infidelity of his inner circle of friends in order to fulfil the Scriptures and the anguish of 
history to the bitter end. Of Judas’ actions in John’s Gospel, which states that “after the morsel, Satan entered 
into him” (John 13:27), Ratzinger says “[a]nyone who breaks off friendship with Jesus, casting off his ‘easy 
yoke,’ does not attain liberty, does not become fred, but succumbs to other powers. . . . [H]e betrays this 
friendship because he is in the grip of another power to which he has opened himself” (68). The fall of Judas 
was ultimately definitive because he could no longer believe in forgiveness. Even his remorse turns to despair – 
he no longer sees Christ’s light; he only sees himself and his dark side. Ratzinger says Judas “shows us the 
wrong type of remorse: the type that is unable to hope, that sees only its own darkness, the type that is 
destructive and in no way authentic. Genuine remorse is marked by the certainty of hope born of faith in the 
superior power of the light that was made flesh in Jesus” (69). John concludes his passage about Judasby 
saying: “[a]fter receiving the morsel, he immediately went out; and it was night” (John 13:30). In Judas we 
encounter one who passes from the light into the night by no longer being capable of conversion. On the ot er 
hand, when Peter falls, it remains possible for himto be healed through conversion. He refused Jesus’ approach 
to wash his feet, but Jesus must help Peter to see that God’s power is different – the Messiah must pas through 
suffering into glory, leading others on the same path. The theme then turns to martyrdom. Peter enthusiastically 
wants to follow Jesus: “Why can I not follow you now? I will lay down my life for you?” (John 13:37) Shortly 
after, Peter will rashly follow up on his words by rushing in with his sword to the Mount of Olives. But 
“martyrdom,” Ratzinger says, “is no heroic achievement: rather is it a grace to be able to suffer for Jesus. [Peter] 
must bid farewell to the heroism of personal deeds and learn the humility of the disciple” (70). He still had some 
way to go for, in order to keep abreast of the developments in the forecourt of the High Priest’s palace, Peter 
claimed not to know Jesus: “[Peter’s] desire to rush in – his heroism leads to his denial (John 18:17). . . . His 
heroism falls to pieces in a small-minded tactic. He must learn to await his hour” (71-72). Learning the posture 
of freedom as a disciple of the Lord is to receive the grace of martyrdom. It consists of “[n]ot telling God what 
to do, but learning to accept him as he reveals himself to us; not seeking to exalt ourselves to God’s level, but in 
humble service letting ourselves be slowly refashioned into God’s true image” (72). 
182 Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 218. 
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heaven and earth, and past, present and future, are now as glass.”183 Following Clement of 
Alexandria, who speaks about the “purifying” and “eucative” power of the fire (cf. 1Cor 
3:10-15), Ratzinger says there takes place an ascending transformation whereby the soul is 
transformed into a sōma or “body” of ever greater pneumatic perfection. The eccl sial aspect 
of Christian existence finds space here. There is no room in this for unjustifiable 
demarcations of the personal life-principle of the soul and the glorified body. Ratzinger says: 
“[t]he process of purification is, on all its levels, an activity of reciprocal caring. . . . [T]he 
anchoring of a person in the Church is not something which death disrupts or destroys. Even 
when they have crossed over the threshold of the world beyond, human beings can still carry 
each other and bear each others’ burdens.”184   
The “fire” is the Christ-transforming power liberating a closed-off or autonomous 
human heart. Ratzinger says that gauging this purification by temporal measurement is 
unproductive for it ignores the specificity of the uman spirit in its simultaneous relationship 
with, and differentiation from, the world. For Ratzinger, purgatory is a thoroughly ecclesial 
reality. It is not “some kind of supra-worldly concentration camp” administering 
indiscriminate punishment but “the inwardly necessary process of transformation in which a 
person becomes capable of Christ, capable of God and thus capable of unity with the whole 
communion of saints.”185  
Two lines of Ratzinger’s ecclesiological reflection respond to whether the purgative 
dynamic amounts to some form of spiritual barter. Some query whether so highly 
                                                          
183 Ibid., 9.  
184 Ibid., 225-27. Ratzinger follows the thought of Clement of Alexandria here. Indicative of the Alexandrian 
rather than western tradition, Ratzinger says the Pauline and Johannine belief is that the real frontier is not that 
of earthly life and non-life but rather, between that of being with Christ, on the one hand, and being without him 
or against him, on the other (cf. Phil 1:21; John 3:16-21): “The decisive step is taken in baptism: while the 
fundamental option of the baptismal candidate becomes definitively established with death, its full development 
and purification may have to await a moment beyond death, when we make our way through the judging fire of 
Christ’s intimate presence in the companionable embrace of the family of the Church” (227). 
185 Ibid., 230. 
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personalised a process of encounter and transformati n of the “I” in the “fire” of purgatory 
can have the intercessory Church as a third party. Ratzinger himself asks whether substitution 
can form part of so personal a process. In the first instance, he says that because the human 
being is not a closed monad, the whole ecclesial body has a role in “intercession.” He says 
there is even a sense in which the “whole” Church “judges” or “straightens out” the “I” 
because the encounter with Christ is encounter with his whole body. There is a fundamental 
element to this “straightening out” of the “I” that is essential to grasp in order to avoid 
misunderstanding the Church’s role in the judgement r served to God alone. When Ratzinger 
speaks of the Church’s “straightening” role, he is th nking of intercessory “judgement”:  
Ob die anderen ihm fluchen oder ihn segnen, ihm vergeben und seine Schuld in Liebe 
umwandeln – das ist ein Teil seines eigenen Geschicks. Daß auch die Heiligen 
“richten,” das heißt, daß die Begegnung mit Christus eine Begegnung mit seinem 
ganzen Leib, mit meiner Schuld gegen die leidenden Glieder dieses Leibes und mit 
seiner aus Christus quellenden verzeihenden Liebe ist. . . . Diese Fürbitte ist der eine, 
grundlegende Aspekt ihres “Richtens” – eben durch [die Heiligen] Richten gehören 
sie als Betende und Rettende in die Fegfeuerlehre und die ihr entsprechende 
christliche Praxis hinein. “J’espère en toi pour moi” – ich hoffe in dir für mich, hat 
Péguy einmal großartig gesagt; gerade wenn es um das Ich geht, ist das Du als 
Hoffnung angerufen.186 
The second approach to the possibility of substitution is the relation between 
purgatory and the Church’s penitential practice. Self-substituting love, by which Ratzinger 
means simply the possibility of helping and giving, is a central Christian reality, and 
purgatory implies that such love is not limited by death.187 Rather, it stretches out to 
encompass the entire communion of saints, on both sides of the portals of death. In the 
                                                          
186 Ratzinger, Eschatologie: Tod und ewiges Leben, 184 (“Whether the other curses or blesses, forgives and 
transforms our guilt in love – it is a part of our fate. The saints ‘judge’ [‘straighten’], that is, the encounter with 
Christ is an encounter with his whole body, with mydebt to the suffering members of this body and with the 
overflowing forgiving love of Christ. . . . Intercession is one fundamental aspect of this ‘straightening’ – [the 
saints] are, by their straightening, praying and saving power, part of the doctrine of Purgatory and its 
corresponding Christian practice. [Charles] Péguy once beautifully said, ‘J'espère en toi pour moi’ - I hope in 
you for me. Especially when it comes to the ‘I,’ the ‘you’ is invoked as the form of hope” [own translation]). 
The Church’s role in “judging” could easily be misunderstood. It is therefore important to keep in mind that 
intercessory “judgement” has its source in the divine and just Judge. As relational beings, Ratzinger says, we 
share in the lives of others. In fact we are ourselves only by being in relation to others by love or hate – in guilt 
or in grace. Therefore my “I” has a “say” in the lives of all the saints and all the saints have a “say” in my “I.” 
187 See Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 233. 
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relation between purgatory and the Church’s penitential practice, Ratzinger outlines “the true 
primordial datum,” as specified in the earliest days in 2Macc 12:42-45: “the capacity, and the 
duty, to love beyond the grave.” For the Church, “what is primary is the praxis of being able 
to pray, and being called upon to pray.”188 
  With this connection between prayer and the Christian idea of self-substitution, 
Ratzinger comes to acknowledge heaven as the final shape of love. For him, Christian 
tradition says that what is “above” expresses the “definitive completion of human existence 
which comes about through the perfect love towards which faith tends.”189 In keeping with 
the primacy of christological interpretation, he says heaven is not a futuristic wish list but the 
sheer description of what happens in the encounter wi h Christ:  
Nach dem “Himmel” fragen, heißt daher nicht, in schwärmerische Phantasie 
angleiten, sondern jene verborgene Gegenwart tiefererk nnen, die uns wahrhaft leben 
läßt und die wir uns doch immer wieder durch das Vordergründige verdecken und 
entziehen lassen.190 
In ecclesiological terms, Ratzinger says heaven is not some extra-historical place to which 
one goes. Essentially, “[h]eaven’s existence depends upon the fact that Jesus Christ, as God, 
is man and makes space for human existence in the exist nce of God himself. One is in 
heaven when, and to the degree, that one is in Christ.” This means that heaven is, first and 
foremost, “a personal reality,” forever shaped by its historical origin in the paschal 
mystery.191 In a sense, “heaven” is the word used in Christianity to locate die Kultstätte 
Gottes – the cultic sphere where the dialogical worship posture which the Church takes up 
with respect to God identifies most fully with the posture which the Son takes up with respect 
to his Father.192 The glorified Christ stands in a continuous posture of self-giving with his 
                                                          
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ratzinger, Eschatologie: Tod und ewiges Leben, 185 (“To raise the question of ‘heaven’ is not to slip into a 
rapturous fantasy, but to recognize that deep hidden pr sence that makes us truly live, even if we cover it over 
again and again with the superficial and let it escape from us” [own translation]). 
191 Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 234. 
192 See Ratzinger, Eschatologie: Tod und ewiges Leben, 186. 
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Father to the point, in fact, where Jesus himself i that self-giving. Therefore, if heaven is our 
becoming one with Christ, it takes on the nature of adoration: 
[. . .] in [Christus] ist der vordeutende Sinn jedes Kultes erfüllt: Christus ist der 
endzeitliche Tempel, der Himmel das neue Jerusalem, die Kultstätte Gottes. Der 
Bewegung der mit Christus vereinten Menschheit auf den Vater hin antwortet die 
Gegenbewegung der Liebe Gottes, die sich dem Mensch schenkt. So schließt der 
Kult in seiner himmlischen Vollendungsform die trennu gslose Unmittelbarkeit von 
Gott und Mensch ein, die von der theologischen Überlief ung als Anschauung Gottes 
bezeichnet wird. . . . die reine Durchdringung des ganzen Menschen von der Fülle 
Gottes und seine reine Offenheit, die Gott “alles in allem” und so ihn selbst 
grenzenlos erfüllt sein läßt.193 
While this christological statement absolutely enshrines the personal nature of heaven, 
Ratzinger notes its associated ecclesiological featur . If heaven depends on being in Christ, 
then it must equally involve a co-being with all others making up the body of Christ. The 
heavenly sphere, and by extension, the doctrine of the last things, enshrines in Christianity 
the belief that the communal elevates the personal while simultaneously dismissing isolation. 
Heaven is the open society of the communion of saint  – this is how it becomes the fulfilment 
of all human communio. This is why the Church knows about a cult of the saints: “That cult 
does not presuppose some mythical omniscience on the part of the saints, but simply the 
unruptured self-communion of the whole body of Christ – and the closeness of a love that 
knows no limit and is sure of attaining God in the neighbour, and the neighbour in God.”194 
                                                          
193 Ibid. (“[. . .] In [Christ] the meaning of all worship is fulfilled: Christ is the eschatological Temple of Heaven, 
the New Jerusalem, the cultic space for God. The move ent of humanity united with Christ to the Father is 
answered in the counter-movement of God's love that gives itself to man. Thus worship in its heavenly 
perfection includes a form of immediacy between God an  man that knows no separation. The tradition refers to 
this as the contemplation of God . . . the pure penetration of the entire people by the fullness of God. God is ‘all 
in all’ [cf. 1Cor 15:28] and so the human person enters his boundless fulfilment” [own translation]).  
194 Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 235. Ratzinger says that the glorification of the human is 
not at the expense of the disclosure of God’s face but rather its consequence. In Christ, the definitiveness of 
responsibility and fulfilment becomes not only the expression of divine reverence for human freedom in its 
response to the will of the Father in heaven. It equally pledges the Creator’s responsibility toward ceation and 
the ceaseless invitation to loving unity in the new creation that is being prepared in freedom and justice within 
the body of Christ. As the advent of the final and wholly Other, Ratzinger says heaven’s “definitiveness stems 
from the definitiveness of God’s irrevocable and inivisible love” (237). In the Christian world-view, every 
moment is taken seriously, entering definitiveness, and must be accounted for. Otherwise human life itself lacks 
consistency and human freedom is devoid of genuine co tent. See also ibid., 215-16, 237; A Turning Point for 
Europe, 46; “The End of Time,” 22-25. 
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Contrary to the principles of anarchic freedom, the int gration of the “I” into the 
“whole” body of Christ is not its self-dissolution but its purification, and the actualisation of 
its highest potential. Ratzinger says that heaven is thereby individual for everyone because 
each receives the love offered by the totality in the manner suggested by one’s irreplaceable 
uniqueness (cf. Rev 2:17b). In Christian tradition, heaven is not merely the gift of sheer grace 
but also personal “reward”: 
[. . . ] das will sagen Antwort auf diesen Weg, auf dieses Leben, auf diesen Menschen 
mit seinem Tun und seinen Erleidnissen, daß er aber zugleich doch ganz Gnade 
geschenkter Liebe ist. . . . [E]s genügt, zu wissen, daß Gott jeden auf seine Weise und 
jeden ganz erfüllt.195  
At the very point of our most definitive and personal status before God, we are at our most 
free as members of Christ’s body, because “reward” ought to encourage us not to ponder on 
our access to this or that privilege of Church membrship. Ratzinger says concern for the size 
of one’s barn as collection point for wealth in theworld to come is not freedom. Rather it is 
being enabled to give unreservedly to others who make up the “whole.” Therefore “[i]n the 
communion of the body of Christ, possession can only consist in giving, the riches of self-
fulfilment in the passing on of gifts.”196 
 Ratzinger presents a landscape of the last things which is very relevant to the Church 
and its mission in the world. Christ’s exaltation – “the entry of his humanity into the life of 
the triune God through the resurrection”197 – is not his departure from the world but rather his 
new mode of presence to the world. Ratzinger says that from this perspective heaven means 
participation in this new mode and thus the fulfilment of what baptism began in us. That is 
why heaven escapes spatial determination for it is ne ther inside nor outside the space of our 
world and it cannot be detached from the cosmos as a mere “state.” Much more concretely, it 
                                                          
195 Ratzinger, Eschatologie: Tod und ewiges Leben, 187 (“[. . .] that is to say that it is a response to this way, in 
this life, on this man with his deeds and experiences but at the sametime that it is still purely giftedness of grace 
and love. . . . [I]t is enough to know that God hasfulfilled each in his own way and to the fullest” [own 
translation]). 




demonstrates “that power over the world which characterises the new ‘space’ for the body of 
Christ, the communion of saints. Heaven is not a ‘sp tial’ above but an ‘essential’ above.” 198
Ratzinger says heaven comes about in two historical ph ses – in the first instance it is “the 
open history of Christ’s body, and therewith of all creation which is still under construction . . 
. [and] . . . will only be complete when all the mebers of the Lord’s body are gathered 
in.”199 Secondly, there comes the perfecting of the body of Christ in the plērōma or fullness 
of the “whole Christ” in cosmic completion: “the individual’s salvation is whole and entire 
only when the salvation of the cosmos and all the elect has come to full fruition.”200   
In Ratzinger’s presentation of the last things, human freedom is given the utmost 
seriousness and respect by God, while the Church is viewed as the convocation of human life 
into an orientation of worship or adoration in respct of God. The existence of hell upholds 
that seriousness, purgatory displays the Church’s intercessory posture, while heaven is the 
essence of true freedom where the human is definitively set in a posture of adoration and love 
of the divine; it is the definitive upholding of the covenantal pledge between Creator and 
creation. With this doctrine, which Ratzinger is keen to re-establish in the mind of Christian 
theology because it furnishes humanity with hope, definitive liberation consists in the 
necessary balance of the personal, communal and social aspects of authentic human freedom:  
Das Heil des einzelnen . . . ist erst ganz und voll, wenn das Heil des Alls und aller 
Erwählten vollzogen ist, die ja nicht einfach nebeneinander im Himmel, sondern 
miteinander als der eine Christus der Himmel sind. Dann wird die ganze Schöpfung 
“Gesang” sein, selbstvergessene Gebärde der Entschränkung des Seins ins Ganze 
                                                          
198 Ibid., 237. For this reason, Ratzinger believes th traditional images of heaven, such as “above,” or as “on-
high,” can be both legitimate and limited in scope. H avenly imagery is false when it removes heaven’s relation 
to the world, or integrates it totally as the world’s “upper story.” He believes that images of heaven in the human 
mind retain their truth when they evoke transcendence over, and freedom from, the world’s constraints. 
Ratzinger says that the Scriptures do not tolerate the supremacy of a single image. Instead many images ke p 
open a perspective on the indescribable. Personally he has a preference for the image of the new heaven nd 
new earth, whereby all of created reality is to be drawn into blessedness. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid., 238. 
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hinein und zugleich Eintreten des Ganzen ins Eigene, Freude, in der alles Fragen 
aufgelöst und erfüllt ist.201 
 
5.5.   Conclusion 
This chapter builds on the findings of Chapter 3 and 4, thereby bringing Section III to 
its conclusion. It presents Ratzinger’s ecclesiology from the perspective of his christological 
and anthropological approaches to the theme of freedom. During the course of his study of 
the Church, Ratzinger underlines the three theological virtues and these have provided 
direction to this exposition of his ecclesiology. His treatment of these virtues, however, takes 
place in the context of an overarching sacramental framework which is dedicated to the 
receptivity of gift whereby humanity is continually enabled to encounter and share 
communion with God.  
In the first instance, Ratzinger’s reflections on the Church develop from the Father’s 
loving will, through Christ and in the Spirit, to be at one with humanity. While trinitarian 
communio is the primordial basis for unity, it cannot be unilaterally applied to the Church’s 
role of bringing Creator and creature into authentic relationality. Such union cannot merely 
take cognisance of the dynamics of divine freedom, but must also integrate the specific 
characteristics of human freedom. Over the course of Section III as a whole, it has been 
demonstrated that Ratzinger works out the shape of human freedom through his reflections 
on christological anthropology.  
In Chapter 3, we saw Ratzinger makes three foundation l points concerning the divine 
initiative in Christ. In his narrative christology, he points to Christ as the new Moses, the one 
who truly leads the way to liberation; in his neo-chalcedonian christology he finds the 
                                                          
201 Ratzinger, Eschatologie: Tod und ewiges Leben, 188 (“The salvation of the individual . . . is total and full 
when the salvation of the cosmos and all of the elect is complete, which means not simply being side by side in 
heaven, but, heaven is being with each other as the one Christ. Then the whole of creation will be ‘song,’ 
discharged of the limitations of self, the individual permeates the whole and, at the same time, there is th  




necessary ground for the personal union of the divine and human wills; and finally, through 
the pauline doctrine of ontological citizenship in Christ, he explains that the human race gains 
participative access to the Father’s loving will. Then, in Chapter 4, in relation to the human 
receptivity of the divine initiative, Ratzinger addresses the need to purify the human desire to 
“be like God,” since erroneous understandings of this desire are what have continually 
hampered the human approach to God. Ratzinger perceiv s a need to clarify the categories of 
authentic human freedom. He does this through the concepts of monotheism and 
creaturehood. When these are properly understood, he believes the truth about the Creator, on 
the one hand, and the truth about creation, on the other, make possible a relationship that 
leads to authentic union. It requires a dialogical orientation which, on the part of the human 
person, entails a worshipping posture. The person of Christ is, in himself, the new worship in 
which God’s people can participate, but in order to do so, the wholehearted acceptance of our 
creaturely disposition is required. To Ratzinger’s mind, this means being bound to the truth of 
who we are. He believes this implies an acceptance of reaturely dependency, relationality 
and limitation. This acceptance creates the conditions for sincere openness to relationship. 
Then, as this dissertation moves into Chapter 5, it comes to light that this openness to 
relationship on the part of the human person grounds Ratzinger’s view of the Church as 
sphere of growth in authentic freedom. He finds the C urch to be the means and the goal of 
God’s convocatory will for unity, on the one hand, and the means and goal of humanity’s will 
for transcendence, on the other. In broad terms, the “knowledge” which one comes into 
contact with in the Church consists of an active understanding of the origin and goal of one’s 
life. This is what shapes growth in authentic freedom. The Christian philosophy of freedom, 
dedicated as it is to the whole person’s assent to the Father’s will, is designed to promote such 
growth. The knowledge which one comes into contact with in the communal sphere of 
ecclesial life is an ecclesio-knowledge of the primacy of God and the divine will for unity. In 
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other words, it is knowledge that comes to us in, and through the community. Because this 
“sustaining” knowledge comes to us as gift, both our willing and our acting are called to give 
wholehearted assent to it. The whole person is thereby brought into deeper contact with the 
truth that frees. Ultimately, this knowledge is encounter and union with the person of Christ, 
who is the full revelation of God’s will.  
Chapter 5 points to Ratzinger’s contention that when one authentically embraces the 
“call and response” dynamic of Christianity, one is led “out beyond [oneself] into the infinite 
breadth of God’s greatness and love.”202 As the sphere gifted with bestowing meaning upon a 
created realm that wrestles with the significance of its own existence, he argues that the 
Church makes known the living God by being the domain of Christ’s eucharistic presence in 
the world. It is in this presence that humanity encounters God’s will. Therefore, upholding a 
belief in the nature, dignity and duty of true Christian freedom, such as this thesis is dedicated 
to articulating on the basis of Ratzinger’s writings, has a communal or social aspect. Chapter 
5 brings out this aspect of his ecclesiology. The faculty to relate socially in a way that 
upholds human relationality and dependency comes from theological communio, in the strict 
sense – i.e. the communion present in God, and ontologically opened out unto creation, so to 
speak, through Christ and in the Spirit. However, it is the introduction of what Ratzinger calls 
the all-embracing “third,” or personalist element of c mmunio which leads the human person 
forth towards the true shape of human freedom. Human resources alone are not enough: only 
through communion with the living God can we come to our true selves. In Ratzinger’s 
succinct axiom: “we touch ourselves in him.”203 Ratzinger says the communal aspect 
supports a personalist transformation that leads from encounter to union. In order that “self-
expropriation” be a positive expression of this transformation and growth in freedom, the 
dispositions of trust and receptivity are required. These can exist only on the basis that they 
                                                          
202 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 93. 
203 Ratzinger, “Communio – ein Program,” 460.  
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are not imaginary and have their source in a truth and a meaning that is prior to the human 
agent in whom they are active.  
At the conclusion of Section III, another important fi ding is that Ratzinger speaks of 
human freedom as something that is the object of the u most respect on the part of God. On 
this issue, Chapter 5 explains Ratzinger’s use of the language of divine gentleness and human 
vigilance. The response on the part of the human race to God’s gentleness ought not to be a 
presumptuousness about our capacity to act but a vigil nce which acknowledges that true 
justice is correlative with divine judgement. Vigilance on the part of the creature, as 
Ratzinger views it, consists of openness to the good and the true. This brings a sobriety to the 
way persons endowed with freedom approach life. For the human race, Ratzinger says, being 
loved in freedom by God is both a risk and a responibility. This could hardly be more 
applicable than when one discusses the possibility of “loving the Church” – particularly in 
light of the present-day discredit and shame brought pon it by some of its members. As we 
saw in the discussion of loving the Church in Chapter 5, Ratzinger believes that such love 
needs to steer a course between perfunctory blindness to the failings of the Church’s 
membership, on the one hand, and irrational vilification of the mission of Christ’s Church, on 
the other.  
Ratzinger believes that in order to preserve the seriousness of human freedom, it has 
to operate in tandem with the truth of both creatureliness and monotheism. The alternative to 
the human race being illuminated by the truth about itself – i.e. the descent into a subculture 
of illusion – would amount, in Ratzinger’s eyes, to the irreparable ruination of human life. 
Therefore, as we see from his treatment of our “failed” and “final” freedoms,  it is when 
one’s freedom and eschatological destiny together impact upon one’s present that one’s 
actions correspondingly impact upon one’s destiny. If they don’t, then being human and free 
is a contradiction. For Ratzinger, the only position that bestows appropriate dignity on human 
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nature is one that respects its freedom to the greatest possible extent. In his view, there is 
finality about the passage of time which ensures that each moment of human life is valuable. 
The human person, therefore, shoulders a responsibility for the proper use of their freedom in 
the choices they make, in an effort to ensure that every moment of time is accounted for to 
their credit in the sight of God. From an ecclesiological perspective, there is in this a process 
of growth in authentic freedom, which has its primary source in Christ’s obedience to the will 
of the Father and its secondary source in humanity’s participation in that obedience. In the 
end this obedience takes the form of a self-giving posture of adoration.  
Ultimately, it is Ratzinger’s contention that no Christian account of human freedom 
can get off the ground without acknowledging the nature of the gift of love freely offered and 
reciprocated. In all this the human person is no mere n utral receptacle of sacramental grace. 
Christ is the guardian of the balance between personal and communal encounter which 
anarchic freedom threatens to destroy. He enables the human person to live fidelity within the 
truth of human nature by empowering him or her to tust the “Other” and live authentically in 
relation to all others. The human person grows in freedom by being true to the self. The 
Church is the custodian of the ecclesio-knowledge that enables humanity achieve its full 
potential. It is a high calling. Ratzinger believes that despite the blunders which the Church 
has been party to in the centuries of its earthly pilgrimage, it remains witness to, and 
communicates the truth about, human dignity. In this way, it remains the sphere of growth in 








SECTION III: MANIFESTATIONS 
An ecclesiology of liberation is primarily the study of the Church from the perspective of the 
human person’s yearning for freedom. Based upon resea ch from Sections I and II, as well as 
a number of significant statements from the period of Benedict XVI’s papacy, Section III sets 
forth a three-fold manifestation of the Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom: the 
Church at worship, the Church in oversight, and the C urch as witness. Chapter 6 describes 
how the Church at worship operates as a school of frmation in the way of authentic freedom. 
It finds that the truly personal heart of human freedom extends beyond the strictly cultic 
sphere of the Church’s liturgy, so that it is the human person who becomes a living sacrifice 
of praise in harmony with the truth of the divine will for creation. Chapter 7 considers how 
the Church’s mode of oversight exists as a vehicle and advocate for growth in freedom. It 
assesses the competency of the episcopal ministry and how this opens up five avenues of 
enquiry in Ratzinger’s ecclesiology. Finally, Chapter 8 presents Ratzinger’s vision for the 
practice of authentic freedom in the world, a vision that consists of a personal, communal and 
societal dimension. As a whole, the various “levels” of Ratzinger ecclesiology of liberation 
ensure that the Church can never exhaust itself through personal aggrandisement, institutional 
supremacy or social work. In addition to the personal responsibility of ecclesial membership, 
Ratzinger maintains that the Church must contend with its communal life ad intra and 
missionary endeavour ad extra. All of these elements are interlinked and mutually inclusive. 
Consequently, growth in freedom requires taking personal responsibility, acknowledging the 












At the indispensable personal level of relationality, it is Ratzinger’s contention that 
the contours of authentic freedom find their orientation in the matrix of Christian worship. In 
this dissertation, we have seen Ratzinger establish that the link between dialogical worship 
and growth in authentic freedom requires total worship, or the assent of the whole self – at 
least to the best of one’s ability. The Son’s praye to the Father consists in the synergy of two 
wills as the perfect “laboratory” of freedom. To the extent that the human person participates 
in the total worship of the Son, one is growing in authentic freedom. Worship is the firmest 
expression of this relationality: “Only if man, every man, stands before the face of God and is 
answerable to him, can man be secure in his dignity as a human being. Concern for the proper 
form of worship, therefore, is not peripheral but central to our concern for man himself.”1 
Worship, for Ratzinger, is something that can never be confined to liturgical rites alone, 
although these, in themselves, carry immense respect in his work.2 For him, a posture of 
dialogical worship is an on-going deeply personal event of encounter, uniting the themes of 
freedom, and the Church as Christ’s body. As the space where, over the course of time, 
worship becomes a ritualised reality in the personal life of a believer, the Church exists as a 
recognisable school of freedom. 
This opening chapter of Section III deals with the personal nature of the Church as 
sphere of growth in authentic freedom. The discussion will be taken in three stages. Firstly, 
by considering Ratzinger’s demonstration of the affirmatory nature of prayer, his whole 
approach to the theme of human freedom re-emerges, with “worship” serving as a leitwort, so 
                                                          
1 Joseph Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith: Approaches to a Theology of the Liturgy, trans. Graham Harrison (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 7.  
2 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Zum sakramentale Begründung christlicher Existenz,” in GS:TL, 197-214, where he 
outlines the basic tone of his sacramental theology. This ought to be read in conjunction with his article “Zum 
Begriff des Sakrament,” in GS:TL, 215-32, a work which has been referred to previously in Chapters 1 and 3 of 
this dissertation. These articles were originally delivered as academic lectures by Ratzinger in 1965 and 1978 
respectively.    
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to speak, grounding a substantial portion of his overall argumentation on the matter. 
Ratzinger presents worship as the primordial ecclesial vehicle for progressing human 
liberation. In essence, prayer is a communication and therefore an act of fellowship that 
implies an ecclesial identity. Secondly, the chapter looks at two elements of the act of faith 
which impact greatly on the discussion of freedom, namely trust and obedience. Thirdly, this 
chapter draws upon a particular teaching from Benedict XVI’s pontificate, namely “human 
ecology.” This expresses the Church’s responsibility to abide by God’s will in its advocacy of 
a society that protects and respects the “laws” that govern creaturehood, thereby helping the 
human family to grow in authentic freedom.  
6.1.   Prayer as Affirmatory, Purificatory and Identificatory 
The primary way in which the Church manifests itself as sphere of growth in human 
freedom is through the prayer of its members – in both a personal and communal sense. To 
Ratzinger’s mind, the Church at worship is the inter al ground upon which it can be the 
school of human freedom. Prayer facilitates assent to the ground of being which purifies us 
and furnishes us with an identity by which we can live our freedom in a worthy manner. By 
way of contrast with a “religious impersonalism” tha  is the consequence of an intensifying 
“faint-heartedness which no longer believes in the power of God over nature, in the Creator 
of heaven and earth,”3 Ratzinger proposes a threefold structural basis to prayer. He describes 
                                                          
3 Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 47. Religious impersonalism – namely, the idea that God cannot hear and speak, 
that God is not a person – runs counter to the heart of Christianity. Ratzinger says that an important strand in the 
history of religion has been consistent with such an idea. For example, he says the Asiatic religions are one such 
strand and the Gnostic phenomenon of the separation of creation and redemption has been another. In fact he 
holds that a revival of Gnosticism is “perhaps the most sober threat to the spiritual and pastoral work of the 
Church” (46). In terms of prayer, he says, Gnosticim presents itself as a refuge for religious terminology and 
ritual where religion can continue even after faith has been lost: “it is nostalgia for the beauty of religion, but it 
is also weariness of the heart, which no longer has t e trength of faith” (ibid.). This loss of fervour and personal 
faith generates a contempt for creation and bodily th ngs which leads to contempt for salvation history. In this 
progressive religious impersonalism, Ratzinger says, “[p]rayer is replaced by interior exercises, the search for 
the void as a place of freedom” (47). The other term which Ratzinger uses to capture this phenomenon is “self-
transcendence,” which, in his view is the product of a retreat from trinitarian faith into a form of “ephemeral 
monotheism” (Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith,22): “Initially what happens is that people become uncertain about 
the christological and trinitarian mystery; its relationship to exegesis is felt to be problematical; it is regarded as 
a Hellenistic scheme projected into the universe of linear time, a necessary element of its age but now no longer 
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it as affirmatory of the one source of love, power and the good, as purificatory of the self, and 
as identificatory with our social nature. This does not represent a “method” of prayer per se 
but rather its “inner intentionality.”4  
In the first place, prayer is an act of consent whose tenor is affirmatory of reality. 
Ratzinger says prayer is a free act of intimacy made possible because one’s affirmation of the 
world, of being and of oneself rests on the ground of being that in itself is good: “it is good to 
be. . . . [W]henever I am able to say Yes, I am (to that extent) free, liberated.”5 Therefore 
“man could speak with God if he were drawn to share in this internal speech.”6 Consequently, 
prayer “is essentially a relation between persons and hence ultimately the affirmation of the 
person.”7 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
intelligible. But the retreat to a rationally present d monotheism is always merely the first step. The next step is 
the abandonment of the relational categories of creation and revelation. Thus this God himself fades into the 
concept of ‘transcendence.’ The possibility of prayer being ‘heard’ dwindles, and faith becomes ‘self-
transcendence’. . . . This pseudo-religiosity cannot be expected to last, however, all the more since its content is 
too unstable, following every wind of change because it is not oriented to truth, being merely a matter of 
‘relation,’ addressing a something which does not reciprocate that relation. It is trying to be a relatio pura which 
no longer contains anything that can be objectified. . . . I believe that as far as religion in concered, the present 
age will have to decide ultimately between the Asiatic religious world view and the Christian faith. I have no 
doubt that both sides have a great deal to learn from each other. The issue may be which of the two can rescue 
more of the other’s authentic content. But in spite of this possibility of mutual exchange, no one will d spute the 
fact that the two ways are different. In a nutshell one could say that the goal of Asiatic contemplation is the 
escape from personality, whereas biblical prayer is ssentially a relation between persons and hence ultimately 
the affirmation of the person” (22-24).                
4 Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 27. For further reflection by Ratzinger on the inner structure of petitionary 
prayer, see “Praying in Our Time” inDogma and Preaching, 104-115. 
5 Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 27. Ratzinger says that the affirmatory nature of Christian prayer holds the key 
to making the whole world a celebration.  
6 Ibid., 25-6. 
7 Ibid., 24. For Ratzinger, the contextual framework here is the affirmative relationality found in the tri-personal 
God. The ability of the human person to consent via one’s free “yes” to God is possible precisely because God is 
speech or word. God’s nature is to speak, hear and eply: “Only because there is already speech, ‘Logos,’ in God 
can there be speech, ‘Logos’ to God. Philosophically we could put it like this: the Logos is the onto-logical 
foundation for prayer. . . . Since there is relationship within God, there can also be a participation in this 
relationship. We can relate to God in a way which does not contradict his nature” (25). The tri-personal God of 
Christianity is someone who addresses the creature nd to whom the creature can turn. See ibid.16-18. The 
novelty and vulnerability of “the Christian synthesis” – Ratzinger’s favoured term for the Christian theology of 
freedom – lies in the fact that it adopts what the enlightened philosophers call absolute and incommunicable 
“ground”,  “being” or “god,” attributing to “it” a relativity that shares in the status of  Creator, Redeemer and 
personality. The prospect of timeless eternity receives its response in the Incarnation: “[i]t is not that God is 
time, but he has time” (26). In this way, Ratzinger says, human speech becomes, in an unconfused but 
inseparable way, a component in divine speech – that w ich is God’s inner nature. Ratzinger draws thisinsight 
from Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theology of History (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 29-50. At the same 
time, however, Ratzinger emphasizes the importance of the distinction between the uniqueness of the Son’s 
301 
 
Secondly, Ratzinger says the affirmatory nature of Christian prayer is, by definition, 
purificatory because it is an act of being. It is very specifically an act of consent to the one 
source of goodness at the heart of reality: “[p]raye  is an act of being . . . not affirmation of 
myself as I am and of the world at it is, but affirmation of the ground of being and hence a 
purifying of myself and of the world from this ground upward.” All purification, he 
continues, stems from Christ who, as the “rocklike basis of affirmation,” 8  is always “yes” in 
himself (cf. 2 Cor 1:19f). Ratzinger says purificaton leads to the discovery of the active 
power of prayer. In words crafted to counter the influence of the modern synthesis in 
contemporary culture, Ratzinger depicts prayer as th t which yields a deep security, which 
acts as “a foil to the hectic world of self-made man,” but which “is by no means a flight from 
the world but rather entrusts people with the task of purifying the world and empowers them 
to carry it out.”9  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
relationship with the Father and our participation in that relationship. He points out that “Abbā” can only be said 
together with Jesus for “only in fellowship with him can we recognise the world’s ground in a way that invi es 
our Yes” (The Feast of Faith, 28). In relation to us then, “the ‘Our Father’ is this same ‘Abbā’ transposed into 
the plural for the benefit of those who are his” (27). The Father remains somehow ambivalent without the 
response of the Son. Ratzinger says the perceived “patrocentrism” of “Abbā” presupposes the christological 
character of prayer. Hence it is the Son who guides th  path of purification which leads to, what Ratzinger calls, 
the door of the Yes. As fellowship with the “Son,” Christian prayer is a continual “looking to,” “talking with,” 
“being silent with,” “listening to,” “doing and suffering with,” Christ. 
8 Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 27. 
9 Ibid., 28. One of the major contemporary theological ssues of concern to Ratzinger is the seeming 
contradiction in the modern cultural value system between love and truth. In order to bolster the idea of prayer 
as an act of affirmation of being, Ratzinger puts forward an argument for the consistency of the power, love and 
goodness present at the core of reality. He says that contemporaneous with an attitude of religious 
impersonalism, there develops a doubt about the nature of reality. People query whether God can help us if
natural laws are required to run the course of their nature without the possibility of divine interventions. This 
allows him to comment on the inconsistency at the heart of the contemporary social narrative on truth and love. 
If God does not act, then, he surmises, how “God” is God? If God doesn’t help, love is not the ultimate power in 
the world and love is not in harmony with the truth: “if love and truth are at variance, what ought we to do: 
follow love as against truth, or follow truth as against love? The commandments of God, whose heart is love, 
would no longer be true, and what contradictions would we not find then at the centre of reality?” (Ratzinger, 
Journey to Easter, 44-45). He believes the whole history of ideas would be confronted with a major dilemma if 
power, love and truth do not go together. If that were the case, then reality would be marked by a fundamental 
contradiction because it would be inherently tragic. Ratzinger believes natural philosophy and religion 
ultimately fails human thought at this point in the uman dilemma. He looks to Jesus’ simple invocation to pray 
– “Ask and you will receive” (cf. Matt 7:7; 21:22; Luke 11: 9). It is the response to “the most profound 
questions of human thought with the assurance that only the Son of God can give” (ibid.). Understanding the 
harmony of power, truth and love at the core of reality leads Ratzinger to a view of reality imbued with meaning 
rather than contradiction. Nothing is excluded. God’s goodness and power knows only one delimiting factor: 
evil. The good God gives only good things. Prayer for everything that is good means there are no boundaries for 
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When Ratzinger speaks about the constancy of the “yes” of Jesus Christ, and the order 
of good at the core of reality, he brings the discus ion on prayer into the realm of christology 
as an act of fellowship. In this way, prayer becomes th  task of those who come to know that 
God is at the heart of reality, is always free to act, nd can always act in favour of that which 
is good. Ratzinger says that God, in Christ, participates and operates in time in the form of 
love.10 In Jesus, love becomes the “causality” operative in the transformation of creation. 
This means that in any place or at any time, love-causality can freely exercise its influence. 
As a cause, love does not render invalid mechanical causality, but uses and adopts it. God is 
free to exercise the power of love always in answer to prayer. To Ratzinger’s mind, 
Christians, as those who pray, have a high calling: “To pray is to put oneself on the side of 
this love-causality, this causality of freedom, in opposition to the power of necessity.”11 Here 
then, the freedom to love is opposed to the bondage of a necessity which, by definition, 
usurps the possibility of selfless, heroic acts of love. Only God, who is ultimate power and 
trustworthiness, can be the source of a reality that is not a tragedy: “[p]ower and goodness, in 
this world so often taken as separate, are identical in the ultimate root of being.”12 This 
ultimate power, this supreme reason is, at the same time, pure goodness and the source of all 
confidence.13 To Ratzinger’s mind, then, prayer is very specifically an act of consent to the 
single source of love, power and the good.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the praying person who consents to the goodness of being. Such a person can ask for everything because ther  is 
no boundary between the big and little things, betwe n material and spiritual things, body and soul, the daily 
bread and the kingdom of heaven. Ratzinger says, prayer is “completely human, prayer is communion with the 
God-man, with the Son. . . . [P]rayer which with a fe rless confidence brings all the reality and poverty of life 
under the eyes of omnipotent goodness” (48).   
10 The act of fellowship, which is prayer becoming a re l exchange between God and man, occurs “[t]hrough the 
Spirit of Christ, who is the Spirit of God.” It is through the Spirit that we share in Christ’s human n ture: “in 
sharing in [Christ’s] dialogue with God, we can share in the dialogue which God is” (Ratzinger, The Feast of 
Faith, 26). 
11 Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 32. 
12 Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 45. 
13 Hence, one finds Ratzinger saying that prayer which is permeated by a christology conversant with the 
goodness of the Creator of heaven and earth is the bulwark against Gnostic diminutions: “A Redeemer without 
power, a redeemer divorced from the Creator would not be in a position to give us true redemption. And 
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The theme of prayer allows Ratzinger demonstrate that w at has been said about 
prayer as the human person’s participation in the divine dialogue of love between the Father 
and the Son takes place in the personal sphere of one’s freedom. The following passage, 
which reflects his interest in neo-chalcedonian theology, is of key importance in coming to 
terms with Ratzinger’s notion of an authentic Christian freedom. At Constantinople III, he 
says, the Church clarified that  
[. . .] che esiste una specifica volontà dell’uomo Gesù, che non è assorbita dalla 
volontà divina. Ma questa volontà umana segue la voluntà divina e così diventa con 
essa una sola volontà, non però in modo coatto, ma per via di libertà. La duplicità 
metafisica di una voluntà umana e di una divina non vie e eliminata, ma nell’ambito 
personale, nell’area della libertà, si compie una fusione di tutte e due, così che essa 
diventa non un’unica voluntà naturale, ma una voluntà personale. Questa libera unità 
– un modo di unità creato dall’amore – è un’unità pù alta è più intima di un’unità 
puramente naturale. Essa corrisponde alla più alta uni à che possa esistere, quella 
trinitaria.14  
The doctrine of the synergy of wills reveals the sphere we have seen Ratzinger describe as the 
“laboratory of freedom.”15 What happens in this laboratory is that the Church at worship joins 
the prayer of Christ. Therefore, the laboratory of freedom can be extended to incorporate the 
Church within the scope of its meaning in the sense that it “springs from sharing in the prayer 
of Jesus.”16 From the perspective of the believer, the unity of wills attains “the greatest 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
therefore we glorify the immense glory of God. Prayer and praise are inseparable. Prayer is the concrete 
recognition of God’s immense power and glory” (Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 45). 
14 Ratzinger, Il Cammino Pasquale, 89 (“[. . .] there exists a specific will of the man Jesus that is not absorbed 
into the divine will. But this human will follows the divine will and thus becomes a single will with it, not, 
however, in a forced way but by way of freedom. The metaphysical duplicity of a human will and a divine will 
is not eliminated, but in the personal sphere, the area of freedom, there is accomplished a fusion of the two, so 
that this becomes not ne single natural will but one personal will. This free union – a mode of union created by 
love – is a union higher and more intimate than a purely natural union. It corresponds to the highest union which 
can exist, the union of the Trinity” [Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 101]). With regard to the prayer of Jesus on 
the Mount of Olives, Ratzinger offers an explanation of the synergy of wills from the perspective of human 
nature:  “Jesus assumes, as it were, the fall of man, lets himself fall into man’s fallenness, prays to the Father out 
of the lowest depths of human dereliction and anguish. He lays his will in the will of the Father’s: ‘Not my will 
but yours be done.’ He lays the human will in the divine. He takes up all the hesitation of the human will and 
endures it. It is this very conforming of the human will to the divine that is the heart of redemption. For the fall 
of man depends on the contradiction of wills, on the opposition of the human will to the divine, which the 
tempter leads man to think is the condition of freedom. Only one’s own autonomous will, subject to no other 
will, is freedom. ‘Not my will, but yours. . .’ – those are the words of truth, for God’s will is not in opposition to 
our own, but the ground and condition of its possibility. Only when our will rests in the will of God oes it 
become truly will and truly free” (Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 187). See this dissertation § 3.2.2.  
15 Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 103. See this dissertation §§ 3.2.2.1. to 3.2.2.2.  
16 Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 93. 
304 
 
conceivable transformation of any person, which is at the same time the one thing ultimately 
desirable: divinization.”17 Ratzinger says that the profound change in the person which can 
occur in this laboratory is precisely what the world needs. It leads to a “vigilant” human 
conscience, which needs to be born anew in every generation, for the on-going ordering of 
human affairs that corresponds to human dignity and defends it.18 
Thirdly, Ratzinger says the impact of worship centrd upon an act of fellowship with 
Christ implies an ecclesial identity. The locus of this identification with Christ will 
necessarily mean that all those involved in this worship are identified with one another in 
Christ. Facilitated by the Spirit, this locus is what we know as “Church.” Ratzinger says the 
Church that suggests itself in Christian worship can be defined as “the realm of man’s 
discovery of his identity through the identification with Christ which is its source.”19 The 
reality which “Church” signifies excludes the limited individualistic personalism that inspires 
anarchic freedom. The Church allows all the “I’s” along with my “I” to have genuine 
encounter with the “Thou” of God: “[t]he Christian believer discovers his true identity in 
[Christ] who, as ‘the first-born of all creation,’ holds all things together (Col. 1:15ff.), with 
the result that we can say that our life is hidden with him in God (Col 3:3).”20  
Ratzinger says the Church as a whole is a model for authentic personal identity. As it 
is a “body,” its bodily unity welds the two-ness of “I” and “Thou” into a profound one-ness. 
It is unity through the unifying power of love. As he envisages it, prayer facilitates this union 
and unity: “In finding my own identity by being identified with Christ, I am made one with 
him; my true self is restored to me, I know that I m accepted, and this enables me to give 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 103. 
18 See Ratzinger’s understanding of human vigilance i this dissertation § 5.3.3. On the issue of conscience, see 
this dissertation § 8.1. 
19 Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 26. 
20 Ibid., 29. For more on the concepts of identity and identification in the Church, see Joseph Ratzinger and Karl 
Lehmann, Mit der Kirche leben (Freiburg: Herder, 1977).  
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myself back to him.”21 Through this act of fellowship, whereby personal identification within 
the “whole” is initiated, the key to authentic freedom is found – the gift of speech that 
becomes a prayer: 
Die Vorgabe des Wortes aus ihrem die Zeiten hindurchgehenden  Dialog der Liebe 
mit dem, der mit ihr ein Fleisch werden wollte, wandelt sich zur Gabe der 
Sprachfähigkeit. In der Gabe der Sprache aber bin ich erst wirklich mir selbst gegeben 
und so gerade allen anderen von Gott her zurückgegeben, übergeben und damit frei.22 
Echoing the mariology of the Second Vatican Council,23 Ratzinger concludes that it is within 
the perspective of the maternal Church that the “words” of prayer becomes very practical. As 
“mother,” the language of the Church becomes our langu ge.24 I learn to pray by praying 
with others. Prayer is impossible in isolation, or s lely through one’s own strength. For the 
Church at worship to be a school of freedom, it must primarily express itself in a relational 
act of communication. Ratzinger takes the example of the intimate relationship of a mother 
and child to explain his insight. Over time the words of the prayers learned from one’s elders 
enable one to feel one’s way more and more into the fullness of the mystery. The words are a 
growing organism, so to speak, lived and prayed by countless people that simultaneously 
transform those who pray them. However, Ratzinger says that linguistic or rational 
understanding alone, if held as a sole criterion, would be the completely wrong approach to 
                                                          
21 Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 29. 
22 Joseph Ratzinger, Das Fest des Glaubens: Versuche zur Theologie des Gottesdienstes (Einsiedeln: Johannes 
1981), 28 (“We are given an anticipatory share in the Church’s perennial dialogue of love with him who desired 
to be one flesh with her, and this gift is transformed into the gift of speech. And it is in the gift o  speech, and 
not until then, that I am really restored to my true self; only thus am I given back to God, handed over by him to 
all my fellow men; only thus am I free” [Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 30]). This emphasis on identification 
causes Ratzinger to invoke the patristic and medieval schema of the anima ecclesiastica. Through the 
affirmation of Being in itself and the purification of my being that occurs in prayer, the human person i  
supported in becoming an anima ecclesiastica – a personal embodiment of the Church. The anima ecclesiastica 
contains the themes of both identity and purification: “it is a surrendering of oneself and a being drawn into the 
innermost nature of what we mean by ‘Church’” (29-30). The praying Church renders the gift of speech 
operative within us and makes of us a gift to other people. See Robert W. Jenson, “Anima Ecclesiastica” in God 
and Human Dignity, eds. R. Kendall Soulen and Linda Woodhead (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2006], 59-71; Stephen Ackermann, “The Church as Person in the Theology of Hans Urs 
von Balthasar,” Communio29 (2002), 238-249. 
23 See esp. LG, 52-69. See also Tom Norris, “The Church’s Marian Profile and the Reception of Vatican II’s 
Ecclesiology,” in Proceedings of the International Symposium of Theology: The Ecclesiology of Communion 
Fifty Years after the Opening of Vatican II, vol. 2 of 50th International Eucharistic Congress (Dublin: Veritas, 
2013), 362-81. 
24 On the Mother of God as a type of the Church and the a tribution of maternal language to the Church itself in 
the order of faith, charity and perfect union with C rist, see LG, 60-65. 
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prayer for “[h]ow could reason grow and develop if it regarded its own premature limitations 
as normative”25:  
Ich lerne beten im Mit-Beten, nämlich mitbeten mit der Mutter, im Annehmen der 
Vorgabe ihrer Wörter, die sich mir allmählich im Mitreden, Mitleben und Mitleiden 
mit Sinn füllen. Näturlich muß ich nach dem Sinn dieser Worte immer wieder 
nachfragen. . . . Schon weil es so ist, kann ich nit einfach anfangen, unter 
Überspringung der Kirche mit Christus allein reden zu wollen: eine christologische 
Gebetsform ohne Kirche läßt das Pneuma aus und läßt en Menschen aus.26 
There is one final important aspect to Ratzinger’s notion of prayer, namely, the ability 
to discern good from evil. The structure of prayer as an “authorisation,” so to speak, to seek 
all that is good with regard to the human person, means that prayer becomes “a road to 
conversion, the way of divine education, the way of grace: by praying we must learn which 
things are good or not.”27 In learning the difference between good and evil, he says, our 
baptismal promise to renounce Satan and all his works is fulfilled. In this way, Christian 
prayer is the reception of a mode of vision and it becomes the responsibility of every 
believer. The request for a heavenly endorsement of my way is not Christian prayer. Prayer is 
a process of transformation into God’s way, in and through the faith communio. To 
Ratzinger’s mind, this purificatory approach to personal prayer makes the Church at worship 
the school of human freedom. Because prayer is the purification of our desires, the sincere 
and total human posture required for it is the way of growth towards the true and free self:     
La preghiera separa nella nostra vita la luce dalle ten bre e compie in noi la creazione 
nuova, ci fa creatura nuova. Perciò è così importante che nella preghiera presentiamo 
di fatto tutta la nostra vita agli occhi di Dio, noi cattivi, che desideriamo tante cose 
cattive. Nella preghiera noi impariamo la rinuncia a questi nostri desideri, 
cominciamo a desiderare le cose buone, per diventare buoni parlando con lui, che è la 
                                                          
25 Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 31. 
26 Ratzinger, Das Fest des Glaubens, 28 (“I learn to pray by praying with others, with my mother for instance, 
by following her words, which are gradually filled out with meaning for me as I speak, live and suffer in 
fellowship with her. Naturally I must be always asking what these words mean. . . . And that is precisely why it 
is impossible to start a conversation with Christ alone, cutting out the Church: a christological form of prayer 
which excludes the Church also excludes the Spirit and the human being himself” [Ratzinger, The Feast of 
Faith, 30]). 
27 Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 48. 
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bontà stessa. L’esaudimento divino non è una semplice conferma della nostra vita, è 
un processo di trasformazione.28 
When he discusses prayer, it can be said that Ratzinger prioritises neither quantity nor 
formulary. He speaks instead about the ground and purpose of the whole notion of prayer as 
“the deepest root and enduring premise of faith.”29 His portrayal is based on prayer as an act 
of communication and affirmation where one cannot pray alone because the “I” cannot 
communicate without a “thou.” While this can seem rest ictive of personal freedom in a 
cultural milieu imbued with the modern synthesis, Ratzinger maintains that prayer is an act of 
fellowship that compels an ecclesial identity and maternal purification.  
6.2.  Ecclesial Faith and Freedom: The Act of Trust and Obedience  
The suspicion that forms of faith entailing submission of one’s person to the greater 
corporate subject of the one Church are a violation of one’s freedom provokes the question of 
the effect of worship in the human person: in what w y specifically is the Church the sphere 
that turns us towards God and others? Ratzinger understands faith as an act of trust, on the 
one hand, and an act of obedience, on the other. He sees growth in an ecclesial faith as 
consistent with the relational structure of human nture. This, in turn, effects a revolution 
within the self that opens the “I” to the whole body of the Church. 
According to Ratzinger, affirmation of God in one’s prayer life stems from the gift of 
understanding how God lives: “[God] loves us not, because we are good, but because h is 
good.”30 Committing ourselves to a life lived in this way is the inception within us of what he 
                                                          
28 Ratzinger, Il Cammino Pasquale, 39 (“Prayer separates light from darkness in our life and accomplishes in us 
the new creation, makes us new beings. Therefore it is so important that in prayer we do in fact present our 
whole life before the eyes of God, we who are evil, who desire so many bad things. In prayer we learn 
renunciation of our own desires. We begin to desire good things, to become good by talking to him who is 
goodness itself. The divine response is not simply confirmation of our life but a process of transformation” 
[Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 48]).  
29 Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 93. 
30 Ratzinger, What it Means to be a Christian, 69. 
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calls a “Copernican Revolution.” Faith then consists of a movement of trust, so to speak, in 
God’s goodness from a pre- to a post- Copernican matrix: 
Denn wir alle tragen jene angeborene Illusion mit uns, kraft deren ein jeder sein Ich 
als den Mittelpunkt nimmt, um den herum sich die Welt und die Menschen zu drehen 
haben. Wir alle müssen uns immer wieder dabei entdecken, dass wir die anderen 
Dinge und Menschen nur in Beziehung zum eigenen Ich konstruieren und sehen, sie 
gleichsam als Satelliten betrachten, die sich um den Mittelpunkt unseres Ich 
herumdrehen. Christwerden ist . . . etwas sehr Einfaches und dennoch sehr 
Umwälzendes. Es ist genau dieses, dass wir die kopernikanische Wende vollziehen 
und uns nicht mehr als den Weltenmittelpunkt betrachten, um den die anderen sich zu 
drehen haben, weil wir stattdessen anfangen, im vollen Ernst zu bejahen, dass wir eins 
von vielen Geschöpfen Gottes sind, die gemeinsam sich um Gott als die Mitte 
bewegen.31 
Ratzinger says that when God becomes my centre, lov is orientated correctly, with the result 
that the believer reaches the “inward freedom of love.”32 In Ratzinger’s presentation, faith 
and love meet at the point where the believer comes to know the reorientation of the self 
towards God and articulates a response of “yes” in favour of it. To his mind, faith, and the 
finding of one’s true self, begins precisely at the point where we realise we tend to suffer 
from a “deficiency” based on a pre-Copernican illuson of life: 
Glauben heißt letztlich gar nichts anderes als zugeben, dass wir ein solches Defizit 
haben; es heißt, die Hand aufmachen und sich beschenken lassen. In seiner 
einfachsten und innersten Form ist der Glaube nichts anderes als jener Punkt in der 
Liebe, an dem wir erkennen, dass wir auch selbst nötig haben, beschenkt zu werden. 
Glaube ist so jener Punkt in der Liebe, der sie erst als Liebe wirklich ausweist; er 
besteht darin, dass wir die Selbstgefälligkeit und Selbstzufriedenheit dessen 
überwinden, der sich genug ist und sagt: Ich habe alles getan, ich brauche keine Hilfe 
mehr. Erst in solchem “Glauben” endet der Egoismus, der eigentliche Gegenpol der 
Liebe. Insofern ist Glaube in der wahren Liebe mit anwesend; er ist einfach jenes 
Moment an der Liebe, das sie wahrhaft zu sich selber führt: die Offenheit dessen, der 
                                                          
31 Joseph Ratzinger, Vom Sinn des Christseins: Drei Predigten (München: Kösel, 2005), 93-94 (“For we all 
carry within us that inborn illusion by virtue of which each of us takes his own self to be the centre of things 
around which the world and everyone else have to turn. We all necessarily find ourselves, time and again, 
construing and seeing other things and people solely in relation to our own selves, regarding them as satellites, 
as it were, revolving around the hub of our own self. Becoming a Christian . . . [is] something quite simple and 
yet completely revolutionary. It is just this: achieving the Copernican revolution and no longer seeing ourselves 
as the centre of the universe, around which everyone else must turn, because instead of that we have begun to 
accept quite seriously that we are one of many among God’s creatures, [all of which circle around God as the 
centre]” [Ratzinger, What it Means to be a Christian, 70-71]). This English translation is perfectly acceptable to 
me except for the final phrase, which I have italicised in order to indicate that I have translated it more 
accurately for the reader. See also The Yes of Jesus Christ, 112-15; Faith and the Future, 41.  
32 Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 113. 
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nicht auf seinem eigenen Können besteht, sondern sich als Beschenkten und als 
Bedürftigen weiß.33 
Hence Ratzinger concludes that, as the form of human trust, the consequence of faith is a 
movement drawing the believer closer to the truth of their existence and, hence, towards 
authentic freedom. It is “the finding of a ‘you’ that upholds me.”34 Faith, he says,  
[. . .] ist eine Eröffnung der Wirklichkeit, die nur dem Vertrauenden, dem Liebenden, 
dem als Mensch Handelnden zukommt, und als solche ni t abkünftig von Wissen, 
sondern ursprünglich wie dieses, ja tragender und ze traler für das eigentlich 
Menschliche als dieses.35 
Here Ratzinger implies the inadequacy of scientific rationalism because technical and 
scientific knowledge alone is insufficient as a technique by which to order one’s life. 
Ratzinger believes this insight liberates if taken s riously because it means that faith “is not 
primarily a colossal edifice of numerous supernatural facts, standing like a curious second 
order of knowledge alongside the realm of science, but an ascent to God, who gives us hope 
and confidence.”36 
To Ratzinger’s mind, however, the message behind the Copernican imagery is as 
disconcerting as it is liberating for he maintains that few, if any, of us could claim to be 
definitively “post-Copernican.” The pre-Copernican illusion lingers on, whereby other people 
                                                          
33 Ratzinger, Vom Sinn des Christseins, 98-100 (“Ultimately, faith means nothing other than admitting that we 
have this kind of shortfall; it means opening our hand and accepting a gift. In its simplest and innermost form, 
faith is nothing but reaching that point in love at which we recognise that we, too, need to be given something. 
Faith is thus that stage in love which really distinguishes it as love; it consists in overcoming the complacency 
and self-satisfaction of the person who says, ‘I have done everything, I don’t need any further help.’ It is only in 
‘faith’ like this that selfishness, the real opposite of love, comes to an end. To that extent, faith is already present 
in and with true loving; it simply represents that impulse in love which leads to its finding its true s lf: the 
openness of someone who does not insist on his own capabilities, but is aware of receiving something as a gift 
and of standing in need of it” [Ratzinger, What it means to be a Christian, 74-75]). As is eminently clear from 
Ratzinger’s approach to worship, the “yes” of faith, as an act of communication, is a participation in the “yes” of 
Jesus Christ to the Father and all that flows from it. The consequence is “liberation from the repression that is 
opposed to the truth, liberation of my ego from its going against the grain of its being, so as to respond to the 
Father and say ‘yes’ to love, ‘yes’ to being, to say that ‘yes’ that is our redemption and that overcomes the 
‘world.’ In this way faith by its inmost essential nature involves other people: it is a breaking out of the isolation 
of my ego that is its own illness” (Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 36). 
34 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 80. See this dissertation § 4.1. 
35 Ratzinger, Glaube und Zukunft, 35 (“Faith is a disclosure of reality that comes only to the one who trusts, 
loves, and acts as a human being; as such it is not a derivative of knowledge but is more primordial than this, 
indeed more basic and central to what is essentially human than this” [own translation]). 
36 Ratzinger, Faith and the Future, 30. 
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are deemed “real” only with regard to their association with the “self.”  Ratzinger addresses 
this existential situation through the law of superabundance.37 He says the idea behind 
superabundance reveals the characteristic of the whole story of God’s dealings with humanity 
and it points towards that sphere of encounter where one comes to the freedom to live as God 
wills. Indeed, the characteristic trait of divinity n creation itself is revealed, namely, “that 
superabundance of generosity which is essential to God’s way of acting, that way of doing 
things which in the process of creation squanders millions of seeds so as to save one living 
one.”38 Ratzinger says that this “lavishness” – which is the personal mark of the Creator – 
ought likewise to become our basic rule of existence before God and others.  
This law of superabundance, or the life of grace, gives Christianity its seriousness: 
“First, God moves to meet us, and then we can go along with him; then our inner powers are 
freed.”39 The act of faith, as a pre-eminent form of trust, so to speak, is the breaking down of 
subjectivity to the point where the ego finds itself in a new and greater ego through a process 
of dissolution of the former and rebirth into the latter (cf. Gal 2:20). This new ego, into which 
the “I” is liberated by faith, not only unites one with Jesus but, in fact, with all those taking 
the same path. Faith, in other words, is necessarily what Ratzinger calls kirchlicher Glaube 
(“churchly” or ecclesial faith)40: 
Er lebt und bewegt sich im Wir der Kirche, eins mitdem gemeinsamen Ich Jesu 
Christi. In diesem neuen Subjekt fällt die Mauer zwischen mir und dem anderen; die 
Mauer, die meine Subjektivität von der Objektwelt trennt und sie mir unzugänglich 
macht, die Mauer zwischen mir und der Tiefe des Seins. In diesem neuen Subjekt bin 
                                                          
37 See Ratzinger, What it Means to be a Christian, 77-83. 
38 Ibid., 79-80. At the heart of Ratzinger’s reflection here is the Paschal Mystery, which in itself is the “ultimate 
and unheard-of event” that always defies the calculting minds of “correct thinkers,” constituting “a final 
unheard-of lavishness” that gives God’s very self away in order to save humanity and bring them to their goal. 
All of this was done after lavishly producing an entire universe in order to prepare a place on earth fo  the 
mysterious creature – the human being.  
39 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 294. Ratzinger says that in prayer we experience the primacy of grace 
which “makes it possible for us to experience the primacy of Christ and the primacy of inwardness and of 
holiness” (ibid.). When speaking of pastoral practice from this perspective, he says that if such primacy is not 
respected, it is hardly surprising that pastoral initiatives fail, leaving us frustrated and disheartened. Therefore, 
he suggests: “[o]ver and above all our activism, we have to learn anew the primacy of inwardness – the mystical 
component of Christianity has to gain renewed force” (295). See this dissertation §§ 2.3.3. and 7.2. 
40 See Ratzinger, Auf Christus schauen, 44.  
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ich gleichzeitig mit Jesus, und alle Erfahrungen der Kirche gehören auch mir, sind mir 
zu eigen geworden.41 
 
Just as Ratzinger envisages prayer effecting a “Copernican revolution” in the human 
ego, this is equally the case for the whole community that makes up the Church. As the 
communion of those who pray, it must always be consi u  of the need for transparency in 
respect of the source of its collective authority. Only in this way does the Church have a 
contribution to make to the societal situation within which it resides. Therefore, the freedom 
to be a positive force for society requires that the Church “must not be spared the pain of 
conversion, which expects of us what we cannot achieve on our own.”42  
This act of trust, as part of an ecclesial manifestation of faith, carries an implicit 
requirement of obedience in faith to God’s will. For Ratzinger, there is a sense in which the 
believer must become a “foreigner,” so to speak, if faith is to be experienced as assembly and 
as unity. The “revolution” calls for a counter-intuitive process whereby “people entering the 
realm of faith must leave behind what is merely their own and let catholicity, the turning of 
themselves over to the whole, happen to them as an on-going process.”43 In Ratzinger’s view, 
detachment based on the decentralisation of the ego b c mes the route to wholeness and 
genuine catholicity:   
Es ist notwendig, dass [die Glaubende] die Fremdheit . . . auf sich nehmen, die dazu 
nötig ist, dass Heimstatt für das Ganze an allen Orten werde, dass gleichsam dasselbe 
Haus an allen Orten begegne. . . . Nur wer sich selbst auf den Weg gemacht hat, von 
sich frei zu werden, wenigstens ein paar Schritte ge an hat, kann dem Fremden 
begegnen und Heimat anbieten.44 
                                                          
41 Ibid. (“It lives and moves in the ‘we’ of the Church, one with the common ‘I’ of Jesus Christ. In this new 
subject the wall between myself and others falls down: the wall that divides my subjectivity from objectivity and 
makes it unattainable for me, the wall between me and the depth of being. In this new subject I am 
contemporaneous with Jesus, and all the experiences of the Church are mine too, and have become my own”
[Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 36-37]). See also Principles of Catholic Theology, 82ff. 
42 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 67. 
43 Ibid., 113. 
44 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 126 (“[. . .] it is imperative that the faithful take upon themselves the 
condition of being foreign, which is necessary so that here be a home for the whole in all places, so that the 
same home, as it were, is encountered everywhere. . . . Only those who have set out on the path to becm  free 
of themselves, only those who have taken at least a few steps can meet foreigners and offer them a home” 
[Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 114]).  
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Furthermore, Ratzinger argues for the ecclesial aspect of obedience from the 
viewpoint that if we are to render God concrete andrelevant in the world, we must guard 
against turning him into a mere projection of our own desires. This means maintaining a 
“relationship of awe and obedience towards the Bible” which does not “turn [the Scripture] 
into a dead thing that we assemble and disassemble at our pleasure.” 45 For Ratzinger the 
condemnation of the “living Speaker” of the biblica texts to the past by certain forms of 
scriptural exegesis is the enslavement of the C ristusgehalt or christological form of the 
Bible.46 He believes that if we are to know the meaning of obedience, we have to dispense 
with privatised understandings of God made in our image and recover respect for the true 
image of God revealed and taught in the “inner self-transcending of the words into the word 
of God.”47 Only this type of faith is worthy of the God found in the Scriptures and avoids 
humanistic reductionisms.48  
The contemporary antagonism towards institutional re ities, something of which is 
expressed in the debate regarding the relationship between the Church and Scripture, has an 
acute effect on the impression that obedience in faith knowingly destroys individuality and 
deliberately seeks to invalidate personal choice. With the burgeoning of institutional 
structures in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council, Ratzinger believes the temptation 
to let “authority” turn into a power struggle has increased. In other words, to his mind, an 
                                                          
45 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 61-62. 
46 See this dissertation § 1.6.   
47 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 62. See this dissertation § 3.1.  
48 To the fore of Ratzinger’s criticisms here are the modern forms of scriptural exegesis that do not respect the 
canonical and inspired nature of the biblical texts, nor the emergence of texts from within the Judaeo-Christian 
community: “If individuals or different groups conti ually create their own Bible by means of separating he 
sources and criticizing the tradition and then place this Bible in opposition to the unity of Scripture and the 
Church, this is no longer obedience to God’s word. It is rather an apotheosis of their own position with the help 
of a text-montage whose selection and omissions are ultimately based on the positions they want. Histor cal-
critical exegesis can be a wonderful means for a deeper understanding of the Bible if its instruments are used 
with that reverent love which seeks to know God’s gift in the most exact and careful way possible. It does not, 
however, achieve its purpose when it is no longer a path to more careful listening but keeps the texts on 
tenterhooks, so to speak, in order to coerce answers from it which it wanted to withhold” (Ratzinger, A New 
Song for the Lord, 61-62).   
   
313 
 
institution can be overburdened by too many institutionalised structures. In this situation, a 
turning towards communities and against institutions escalates by means of seeking refuge in 
small autonomous groups. This has happened to varying degrees within the Church.49 
From the ecclesiological perspective, Ratzinger says, overbearing institutional 
structures can rapidly overwhelm the personal “space” of the individual. This quickly turns 
into a debate about the nature of authority and the mandate to exercise it. He believes that 
when there is a competitive atmosphere in a parish community between the person of the 
priest or lay leader, and the universal Church, there is a distinct possibility that the former is 
someone speaking in his or her name only. If that is the case, then “[t]he motivator’s personal 
ability now counts more than the authority in which he or she stands.”50 The result is that 
“authority is being replaced with power, power that s been given and must be returned 
through one’s own ability.”51 When the authority exercised in the Church is motivated by 
reliance upon the self and is not transparent to God’s power, then that which is essential in 
the Church is lost: 
Das Eigentliche an der Kirche ist nicht, dass es sympathische Menschen in ihr gibt, 
was wahrhaftig immer zu wünschen ist und was gewiss auch immer der Fall sein 
wird. Das Eigentliche ist ihre Exusia: Ihr ist Macht, Vollmacht gegeben, Worte des 
Heils zu sagen und Taten des Heils zu tun, die der Mensch braucht und die er aus 
Eigenem nie zu geben vermag. Niemand kann sich selbst das Ich Christi oder das Ich 
Gottes zueignen. Mit diesem Ich aber spricht der Priester, wenn er sagt: “Dies ist mein 
Leib” und wenn er sagt: “Ich vergebe dir deine Sünden.” Nicht der Priester vergibt sie 
– das würde wenig zählen –, sondern Gott vergibt sie, und das allerdings ändert alles. 
Aber welch schaudererregender Vorgang ist es, dass ein Mensch das Ich Gottes in den 
                                                          
49 Ratzinger observes that from an ecclesiological perspective, small groups have manifested themselves in 
designations such as “base communities,” “voice of the faithful” and “the Church from below.” He provides a 
very incisive commentary on the rationale for these groups: “Here [people] experience sympathy and good will; 
here mutual understanding rules, not laws. A little oasis of humanness in the spirit of Jesus seems to open up, 
but unfortunately it is constantly being disrupted by the unreasonable demands and manifestations of the larger 
Church, which exercises her power and, with her ancient ideas, mercilessly rides roughshod over the group’s 
beautiful world. The result is group against Church, parish community against institution. Where the community 
represents the place for hope, the institution stands for the threat of the powerful” (Ratzinger, A New Song for 
the Lord, 65). The instinct to concretise the faith in localised situations is valid. However, Ratzinger suspects 
that the motive behind such groups stems from the present-day dissatisfaction with excessive amounts of 
ecclesiastical institutionalisation rather than from the desire to build up the body of the faithful, and the 
missionary outreach which flows from that.     




Mund nehmen darf! Er kann es nur von jener Vollmacht her, die der Herr seiner 
Kirche gegeben hat. Ohne diese Vollmacht ist er ein Sozialarbeiter, nichts sonst. Das 
ist ehrbar, aber in der Kirche suchen wir eine höhere Hoffnung, die aus einer größeren 
Macht kommt. Wenn diese Worte der Vollmacht nicht mehr gesprochen werden und 
wenn sie nicht mehr durchsichtig bleiben auf ihren Grund hin, hilft die menschliche 
Wärme der kleinen Gruppe wenig. Das Wesentliche ist verloren, und die Gruppe wird 
es sehr bald spüren.52  
The act of obedience required of the believer merges with the act of trust necessary for faith. 
Both obedience and trust challenge a culture that privileges egocentric freedom and esteems 
some form of the “modern synthesis” amongst its pre-eminent belief structures. Ratzinger 
makes two approaches to this challenge based on the christological teachings of the 
communion of wills and the spectacle of the cross.  
Firstly, obedience in faith to God’s will – albeit initially counter-intuitive – sets up the 
direction and posture which permits the human person gr w in authentic freedom. In line 
with the neo-chalcedonian perspective of his christology, Ratzinger says faith is obedience in 
the sense that  “[i]t is the unity of our will with God’s will and precisely in this way imitation 
of Christ, for the essential aspect of his own path is is journey into unifying his will with 
God’s will.”53 Ratzinger says the Marian dimension of faith helps in understanding what, in 
                                                          
52 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 80-81 (“What makes the Church real is not that there are likable 
people in her, which is really always desirable andwill certainly always be the case as well. The reality is her 
exousia: she is given the power, the authority to speak words f salvation and to perform deeds of salvation 
which humans need and can never achieve on their own. No one can usurp the ‘I’ of Christ or the ‘I’ of God. 
The priest speaks with this ‘I’ when he says ‘This is my body’ and when he says ‘I forgive you your sins.’ It is 
not the priest who forgives them – that would not count for much – but God who forgives them, and this
definitely changes everything. But what a shaking event it is that a human being is permitted to utter th  ‘I’ of 
God! The priest can do it only on the basis of thatauthority which the Lord has given his Church. Without this 
authority he is nothing but a social worker. This is an honourable profession, but in the Church we are looking 
for higher hopes, which come from a greater power. If these words of authority are no longer spoken and if they 
no longer remain transparent so that their foundation is visible, then the human warmth of the small group is of 
little use. What is essential has been lost, and the group will become aware of this very soon” [Ratzinger, A New 
Song for the Lord, 66-67]). Ratzinger uses the Greek word ἐξουσία in a precise sense. It implies a conferred 
power based upon an underlying power inherent in a leg l justice system. Therefore it is a power arising out of 
obedience, grounded in the right to do something or the right over something. It implies an influence over 
something or someone (cf. Luke 12:11; 1Cor 11:10; 1Pet 3:22). See Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 51. It 
is therefore very close to the pauline appropriation of the Greek term ἐλευθερία. See this dissertation § 3.2.3.2. 
53 Joseph Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 59. See this dissertation § 3.2.2.1. 
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essence, is the ability to affirm the power of God as the source of the good.54 To his mind, 
Mary displays the authentic posture of Christian obedience: 
Der Akt des Glaubens, durch den [Maria] Gottes Tür in die Welt wurde und so den 
Raum der Hoffnung, des “Selig” in ihr freigab, ist seinem Wesen nach ein Akt des 
Gehorsams: Mir geschehe nach deinem Willen – ich bin mit meinem Sein in einem 
Dienstverhältnis zu dir hin. Glauben heißt bei ihr:Sich-zur-Verfügung-Stellen, Ja 
sagen. Im Akt des Glaubens bietet sie Gott ihre eigne Existenz als Raum seines 
Wirkens an. Glaube ist nicht eine Haltung neben anderen, sondern Verfügung über 
das eigene Sein – in den Willen Gottes und so in den Willen der Wahrheit und der 
Liebe hinein.55 
 In the second instance, to comprehend obedience as a liberating virtue in the Christian 
context, Ratzinger calls us to relearn “the piety of the cross”56 which Mary endured in her 
Son’s abandonment: “precisely the darkness in which Mary stands is the completion of the 
communion of wills with him. The cross is the place of completion of the communion of 
wills and, he continues, this “place of final non-deliverance is the place where redemption 
really emerges.”57 Ratzinger says practising the cross is not some nostalgic, sentimental or 
passive piety but the accompaniment of the crucified Christ and being taken up into his way. 
He says the “piety” of overcoming the self to the point where one becomes a freely offered 
sacrifice, inwardly accepting whatever suffering may be imposed, is to gain one’s serenity 
and allow the “brilliance of faith [to] shine forth for all to see.”58 In this way, Ratzinger 
believes we actually move into a posture of responsibility with regard to our true nature, 
                                                          
54 See Joseph Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 45-56. 
55 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 72-73 (“The act of faith by which [Mary] became God’s door to the 
world and thus set free the place of hope, the ‘blessed’ in her is by its very nature an act of obedience: Let it 
happen to me according to your will – with my very being I am in a relationship of service to you. Faith for her 
means making oneself available, saying yes. In an act of faith she offers God her own existence as a place for 
his work. Faith is not just one posture among others but directing your own being – toward the will of God and 
thus toward the will of truth and love” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 59]). Echoing John Paul II’s 1987 
Encyclical, Redemptoris mater, Ratzinger highlights the need for every member of the Church to strive for this 
Marian “yes.” The word freedom in the Christian life represents the giving up of one’s body for God’s work as 
exemplified in Mary – the obedient making of “her whole self available as the place of God’s action. In this 
word Mary’s will and the will of the Son coincide. . . For God’s entry into this world, for God’s birth to come 
about, there must be this Marian yes, this coincidence of our wills with his will over and over again” (Ratzinger, 
A New Song for the Lord, 60). See also Joseph Ratzinger and Hans Urs von Balthasar, Maria – Gottes Ja zum 
Menschen: Papst Johannes Paul II, Enzyklika “Mutter d  Erlösers” (Herder: Freiburg, 1987), 116ff. 
56 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 60. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid., 61. On this point, Ratzinger refers to Romano Guardini’s work Die Macht: Versuch einer Wegweisung 
(Arche: Würzburg: 1952), 99.  
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thereby removing the myth that obedience necessarily triggers a destructive injury to personal 
freedom: 
Glaube ist Gehorsam; er bedeutet, dass wir Wesengestalt unseres Seins – die 
Geschöpflichkeit – wieder erlernen und damit wahr we den. Er bedeutet, dass wir die 
Beziehung der Verantwortung als Grundform unseres Lebens erkennen und damit 
Macht aus Bedrohung und Gefahr zur Hoffnung wird.59 
Through a faith built on trust and obedience, the human person is enabled to become 
the living sacrifice of praise within the sphere of the Church (Rom 12:1; Heb 13:15; cf. Lev 
7:11-18) and in this way accomplishes the posture of the true self. What is taking shape here 
is an ecclesiology of liberation in the writings of Ratzinger that is founded on the 
efficaciousness of the personal worshipping posture of each believer. This posture is 
premised on the worshipper’s intensifying “yes” to G d in the act of ecclesial faith. Before 
concluding this examination of the liberating quality of worship, it would be beneficial to 
explore a very concrete manifestation of growth in freedom which Pope Benedict XVI 
proposed, namely, human ecology – the respecting of ature, its possibilities and its 
constraints. Arguably, it is the synthesis and culmination of much of his life’s work on the 
theme of freedom.  
6.3.  Worship and Human Ecology 
When Benedict XVI wrote the social encyclical, Caritas in Veritate (CV), in 2009, he 
acknowledged his immediate predecessor’s contribution to the themes of “social” and 
“human” ecologies. In the encyclical, Benedict carries forward this idea by giving its 
anthropological premise an ecclesiological context capable of shaping human coexistence. 
“The Church,” he says, “has a responsibility towards creation and she must assert this 
responsibility in the public sphere. In so doing, she must defend not only earth, water and air 
                                                          
59 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 74 (“Faith is obedience; it means we relearn the essential form of 
our being – our nature as creatures – and in this way become authentic. It means that we recognise the 
relationship of responsibility as the basic form of our lives and that as a result power changes from being a 
threat and a danger to hope” [Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 61]). 
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as gifts of creation that belong to everyone. She must above all protect mankind from self-
destruction.”60 Calling for a human ecology, correctly understood, the Pope is harnessing a 
theme which has been at the core of his own studies ov r many years, namely, the idea that 
humanity fails to grow in authentic freedom to the extent that it denies or rejects the 
possibilities and limits inherent in its nature.61 The Church at worship opens the window onto 
the parameters of nature consistent with being human. In this way, it becomes an authentic 
living sacrifice of praise.  
Two of the most significant references to human ecology can be identified in the 
Pope’s address to the Curia at Christmas 2008 and in his address to the Bundestag in Berlin 
in 2011.62 Reflecting on various aspects of pneumatology in 2008, he said that the Church’s 
profession of faith in the Creator Spirit means that e Church cannot limit itself to passing on 
the message of salvation to the faithful. It has a responsibility towards creation which 
includes protecting humanity from self-destruction: 
If the Church speaks of the nature of the human beig as man and woman, and 
demands that this order of creation be respected, this is not some antiquated 
metaphysics. What is involved here is faith in the Cr ator and a readiness to listen to 
                                                          
60 CV, 51. Benedict XVI cites John Paul II’s 1991 Encyclica  letter Centesimus Annus, 36.  
61 This has been confirmed recently through the publication in Germany of a combined anthology of lectures 
from both Ratzinger’s theology and Benedict XVI’s teachings. The selection of texts was guided by Prof. Dr. 
Siegfried Wiedenhofer, a long-time assistant of Professor Ratzinger at Tübingen and Regensburg Universities. 
Wiedenhofer selected writings which date from 1970 to 2011. See Benedikt XVI, Die Ökologie des Menschen: 
Die großen Reden des Papstes (München: Pattloch, 2012).   
62 William L. Patenaude has noted that Benedict XVI’s message on the Occasion of World Food Day 2011 
contains striking similarities to both the Pope’s social encyclical and his speech at the Bundestag. In the 
message, the Pope says “it is a question of adopting an inner attitude of responsibility, able to inspire a different 
life style, with the necessary modest behaviour and consumption, in order thereby: to promote the good f future 
generations in sustainable terms; the safeguarding of the goods of creation; the distribution of resources and, 
above all, the concrete commitment to the development of entire peoples and nations.” Patenaude goes on to say 
that here is a Pope who, with his call for “an inner attitude of responsibility,” is attempting to bridge the 
ideological divide between environmentalists who exclude Divine Revelation, on the one hand, and forms of 
spirituality which disregard any talk of creation ad ecology, on the other: “These are the words of no mere 
secular ecologist. These exhortations to temper consumption through adopting an inner attitude of respon ibility 
are the prophetic proclamations of the Catholic view of ecology: one rooted in faith as well as reason; one 
concerned not just for the good of the natural world, but also for the common good of the fallen human race; one 
that seeks to offer the laws of life to a world revelling in death; and one that presupposes that before y u or I can 
consider saving the world, we must first seek to save souls” (William L. Patenaude, “The Orthodoxy of Catholic 
Ecology,” 
http://www.catholicworldreport.com/Item/1434/the_orthodoxy_of_catholic_ecology.aspx#.UXEWIbWG1kI  
[accessed 20 August 2012]).     
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the “language” of creation. To disregard this would be the self-destruction of man 
himself, and hence the destruction of God’s own work. What is often expressed and 
understood by the term “gender” ultimately ends up being man’s attempt at self-
emancipation from creation and the Creator. Man wants to be his own master, and 
alone – always and exclusively – to determine everything that concerns him. Yet in 
this way he lives in opposition to the truth, in opp sition to the Creator Spirit. Rain 
forests deserve indeed to be protected, but no less so does man, as a creature having 
an innate “message” which does not contradict our freedom, but is instead its very 
premise.63   
What is interesting here is the way in which the Pope uses the standard language of 
environmentalists to remind his audience that humanity is called to respect the parameters of 
nature in general, and of human nature in particular. He takes the widely acknowledged 
principle of environmental protection and expands it into an ecclesial anthropology based on 
the notion of growth in authentic human freedom. The Church’s proclamation of “human 
ecology” requires it to “witness to the Creator Spirit present in nature as a whole, and, in a 
special way, in the human person, created in God’s image. . . to defend love against sex as a 
consumer good, the future against the exclusive claims of the present, and human nature 
against its manipulation.”64 
                                                          
63 See Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Members of the Roman Curia for the Traditional Exchange of 
Christmas Greetings (22 December 2008): ASS 101 (2009): 48-54. 
64 Ibid. Indeed, earlier still in his Pontificate, the seeds of this “ecology” can be deciphered. Participating in a 
theological discussion with Italian clergy in 2007, he spoke about the human capacity and need to practice 
“education in listening” in the face of all the forms of modern deafness in order to avoid the destruction of the 
foundations of human existence. Freedom must be undrstood as a shared freedom whereby we listen to, and 
respect the common values of nature in general and human nature in particular. See Meeting of the Holy Father 
Benedict XVI with the Clergy of the Dioceses of Belluno-Feltre and Treviso in the Church of St Justin Martyr, 
Auronzo di Cadore, 24 July 2007, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2007/july/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20070724_clero-cadore_en.html (accessed 19 August 2012). While there are numerous times 
throughout the meeting where this idea of listening a d respecting the laws of nature are present in the Pope’s 
words, the key passage is found in his dialogue with Fr. Claudio: “In the depths of our being, not only can we 
listen to the needs of the moment, to material needs, but we can also hear the voice of the Creator himself and 
thus discern what is good and what is bad. . . . Today, we can all see that man can destroy the foundations of his 
existence, his earth, hence that we can no longer simply do what we like or what seems useful and promising at 
the time with this earth of ours, with the reality entrusted to us. On the contrary, we must respect th  inner laws 
of creation, of this earth, we must learn these laws nd obey these laws if we wish to survive. Consequently, this 
obedience to the voice of the earth, of being, is more important for our future happiness than the voices of the 
moment, the desires of the moment. . . . We need th experience that human freedom is always a shared fre om 
and can only function if we can share our freedom with respect for the values that are common to us all. It seems 
to me that with these steps it will be possible to make people see the need to obey the voice of being, to respect 
the dignity of the other, to accept the need to live our respective freedom together as one freedom, and through 
all this to recognise the intrinsic value that can make a dignified communion of life possible among human 
beings.” In his World Day of Peace Message of 2007, Pope Benedict made a reference to human ecology which, 
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In his address to the Bundestag in Berlin in 2011, Benedict XVI returned to the theme 
of human ecology in the context of human freedom and its prerequisite of respect for the 
parameters of human nature. The address was a critique of the positivistic thinking that 
blocks humanity from its truest nature and destiny.65 The Pope said in Berlin that “[m]an too 
has a nature that he must respect and that he cannot ma ipulate at will. . . . Man is not merely 
self-creating freedom.” The Pope went to the very core of this idea when he said that “[m]an 
does not create himself. He is intellect and will, but he is also nature, and his will is rightly 
ordered if he listens and accepts himself for who he is, as one who did not create himself. In 
this way and in no other, is true human freedom fulfilled.” The allusion here to Ratzinger’s 
own presentation of the “Christian synthesis” of human freedom gives a clear indication that 
human ecology is not a foreign concept to his own theological endeavours.  An important 
ecclesial expression of growth in freedom manifests it elf in this concept, namely, the idea of 
the Church on pilgrimage seeking a conversion of heart consistent with the nature of the 
human person.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in turn, he says must lead to a “social ecology” and “ecology of peace”: “All this means that humanity, f it truly 
desires peace, must be increasingly conscious of the links between natural ecology, or respect for nature, and 
human ecology. Experience shows that disregard for the environment always harms human coexistence, and 
vice versa. It becomes more and more evident that there is an inseparable link between peace with creation nd 
peace among men. Both of these presuppose peace with God. The poem-prayer of Saint Francis, known as “the
Canticle of Brother Sun”, is a wonderful and ever timely example of this multifaceted ecology of peace” (Pope 
Benedict XVI, Message for World Day of Peace 2007 [8 December 2006], 8, Insegnamenti II, 2 [2006], 
779).The Pope’s annual World Day for Peace messages provide  interesting material for anyone wishing to 
follow up on the notion of a peace ecology and the prerequisite necessary for its flourishing – i.e. respect for the 
environment alongside respect for a true humanism that doesn’t exclude the Creator. Of particular interest are 
the messages for the years 2006-08 and 2010-12. See 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/index_en.htm (accessed 20 August 2012).    
65 See Benedict XVI, Address to the Members of the Federal German Parliament in Berlin (22 September 2011): 
AAS 103 (2011), 663-69. The Pope used the image of a man-made concrete bucker to capture the suffocating 
atmosphere created by a monopoly of positivist reason: “The positivist approach to nature and reason, the 
positivist world-view in general, is a most important dimension of human knowledge and capacity that we may 
in no way dispense with. But in and of itself it is not a sufficient culture corresponding to the fullbreadth of the 
human condition. Where positivist reason considers itself the only sufficient culture and banishes all other 
cultural realities to the status of subcultures, it diminishes man, indeed it threatens his humanity. . . . In its self-
proclaimed exclusivity, the positivist reason which recognises nothing beyond mere functionality resembl s a 
concrete bunker with no windows, in which we ourselves provide lighting and atmospheric conditions, being no 
longer willing to obtain either from God’s wide world. And yet we cannot hide from ourselves the fact tha even 
in this artificial world, we are still covertly drawing upon God’s raw materials, which we refashion into our own 
products. The windows must be flung open again, we must see the wide world, the sky and the earth oncemor  
and learn to make proper use of all this.”  
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The motif of pilgrimage in Ratzinger is the forerunner to the call for “ecology” in 
Pope Benedict’s teaching. In Ratzinger’s presentation of anthropology, he perceives the call 
of the human person as a pilgrimage centred on the divine will that purifies him or her. In 
Ratzinger’s theology of freedom, a pilgrimage focused on the divine will is not, as can be 
perceived today, a sort of “heteronomous rule being imposed upon man.” Rather, he says, it 
is “in the assenting to the will of God that our being made truly similar to God is actually 
effected, and we become what we are: the image of God.”66 Because its nature is that of 
pilgrimage, Christian conversion “cannot come about in a single moment of conversion, but 
rather, is the path of an entire life.” No human life is over and done in one moment and 
therefore the “rectification of a life can be accomplished only in the totality of this path.”67  
On the other hand, however, even for Christianity which claims to know God and 
various tenets of faith, Ratzinger says the reality is that every so often over the course of our 
lives, God’s presence slips from our living memory: 
[. . .] brauchen wir es daher nicht alle immer wieder, dass er sich gleichsam unseren 
Sinnen in den Weg stellt, dass er unser Gesicht berührt, in unsere Ohren hineinredet 
und damit Erinnerung lebendig werden lässt und so un  Leben gibt. – Leben, das 
immer fortschreitet und das daher bis zum Tode hin nicht zu Ende getan ist, sondern 
das Bekehrung bis zum Tode bleibt.68  
   
                                                          
66 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 296. 
67 Ratzinger, Credo for Today, 139. This quotation comes from an essay entitled “The Communion of Saints: 
What do they really mean for us?” which originally appeared in Franz Breid, ed., Βuße-Umkehr: Formen der 
Vergebung (Stetr: W. Ennsthaler Verlag, 1992), 250-56. During the course of the essay, Ratzinger takes up 
Augustine’s philosophy of memory and uses it to explain how the bringing forth of the remembrance of Gd in 
our fading memory of God is conversion – the setting of one’s life to rights again. He says that it is through the 
saints that God reminds us of himself. Ratzinger’s tripartite structure of the human person’s freedom as 
understanding, will and heart resembles very closely Augustine’s analogy of the human mind as “memory, 
understanding and will,” which, in itself was a series of psychological analogies or images of the thre Persons 
in one God. The three aspects of the mind are distinguished by their mutual relations but not as three separate 
human “minds”. The wholeness of the person as a reflection of the imago dei is important (Conf. X-XI; Trin. X-
XV). See this dissertation §§ 4.2. to 4.2.2.     
68 Joseph Ratzinger, Credo für heute: Was Christen glauben, ds. Holger Zaborowski and Alwin Letzkus 
(Freiburg in Breisgau: Herder, 2006), 145 (“[. . .]do we not all . . . need again and again for him to stand in the 
way of our senses, as it were, to touch our face, to speak to our hearing, and thereby to make remembrance come 
alive and thus give us life? – a life that continues to march onward and that, therefore, is not over until death but, 
rather, continues to be conversion until death” (Ratzinger, Credo for Today, 139). 
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Just as the whole human person – understanding, will and heart – is required for assent to 
knowledge of the divine will, only the whole person can embark upon a pilgrimage towards 
God. Therefore, pilgrimage comes by way of the gift of ecclesio-knowledge of God. This 
informs the ground of the believer’s hope which, in turn, motivates love without cost and 
self-denial without anxiety:  
Praktisch bedeutet dies, daß wir Gott nicht kennen können, wenn wir nicht bereit sind, 
uns auf seinen Willen einzulassen, ihn zum Maß und zur Richtung unseres Lebens zu 
nehmen. Noch konkreter heißt das: Zur Weggemeinschaft des Glaubens, zur 
Weggemeinschaft auf Gott zu, gehört das Leben nach den Geboten.69 
     To illustrate the way of pilgrimage from the prspective of freedom, Ratzinger refers 
to St. Augustine’s personal experience of “remembrance.”70 In Augustine’s own pilgrimage, 
he had received the “remembrance” of God quite some ti  prior to his whole person being 
able to convert. The will, in other words, does not simply do what the intellect knows. It took 
time before Augustine “became capable of pronouncing the ‘yes’ of the whole man who not 
only knows something about God in his intellect but gives his will over to the will of God and 
thereby becomes true.” Ratzinger highlights four important insights from Augustine’s 
experience of the operation of the human will. Firstly, as just stated, the will is both free and 
not free at the same time for it cannot simply do what knowledge recommends to it. Second, 
the will is embedded in our emotions and sentiments. These are the “unconscious and 
preconscious preliminary decisions of our life, ourpassions, our feelings.” In the third place, 
then, should God want remembrance of himself to be truly a breaking in and a becoming of a 
way in us, it is not enough for him to manifest himself to our intellect. Consequently, and 
                                                          
69 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 258 (“In practice this means we cannot know God unless we are 
prepared to accept his will, to take it as the yardstick and the orientation for our lives. In still more practical 
terms, that means that living in accordance with the Commandments is a part of belonging to the pilgrim 
fellowship of faith, the fellowship of those travelling towards God” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 
296]). 
70 The following quotations in the text are from Ratzinger, Credo for Today, 141-2. Two recent collections in 
English translation that gather together many of Augustine’s writings on grace and freedom are On the Free 
Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, ed. & trans. Peter King (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Selected Writings on Grace and Pelagianism, ed. Boniface Ramsey; trans. 
Roland Teske (New York: New City Press, 2011).    
322 
 
finally, God has to enter and make himself present to our feelings, emotions and preconscious 
decisions.  
Therefore, human affectivity becomes both the sphere which can, on the one hand, 
weigh down and hinder while, on the other, it is can also open and liberate. Ratzinger says 
that here, in the emotions, a most profound centre of the mystery of God is revealed: “the 
God who takes upon himself the trouble of reminding . . . has not only touched our 
understanding, but our hearts.” The God who reaches into our heart and our feelings is 
capable of making our intellect and will free. Therefore, to Ratzinger’s mind, the human 
person becomes free, and is enabled to say “yes” to the divine will when God shows us, in 
our heart, that he is “kind” and can be trusted. The will is freed and we become pilgrim 
converts. Life really opens up in us “[o]nly when we begin to love God, that is, only when we 
begin to recognise that the truth is worth living, that the Commandments are not an external 
imposition but, rather, are in the service of love, only when we learn to see this in Christ does 
our will become free; only then do we become converts; then life really begins in us.”  
To Ratzinger’s mind, the urgent task for members of the Church on their way of 
pilgrimage is the “reawakening of joy in God, joy in God’s revelation and in friendship with 
God.”71 Reawakening joy in an ecclesial context is a considerable challenge in an 
environment where the collective consciousness comprises varying degrees of suspicion 
towards the authoritarian motives of institutions. Ratzinger endeavours to show that the joy 
                                                          
71 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 297. He believes that in our time the Commandments are an example 
of how people tend to recoil from references to law and obligation by perceiving them as negative ideas th t 
remove joy, and as a barrier to friendship based on genuine equality. The result is that references to the 
Commandments as the expression of God’s law have becom  quite muted. He surmises that a suspicion of 
legalism and moralism has played no small part in this situation. Indeed, he says their content remains external 
when they are not illuminated by the inwardness of G d within us and by the way of Christ going before us. If, 
as is very often the case, God’s  will for creation is ot viewed in the light of the law of superabunda ce, then its 
expression, as articulated in the Commandments, is certainly legalism and  moralism. On the other hand, Israel 
repeatedly rejoiced in outbursts of joy and thankfulness at knowing God’s will (cf. Ps 119). For example, when 
the courage of the Israelites ebbed after the exile, the priest Ezra cried out: “The joy of the Lord is your 
strength” (Neh 8:10). As argued in this dissertation § 2.3.2., Ratzinger believes that the Church is experiencing a 
type of exilic wilderness at present.  
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inherent in human liberation consists precisely in the opening up of the possibility of 
affirming an authority figure that loves and that cn be trusted. He believes the Church is 
called to refocus attention on the insight that not only does humanity need an authority figure 
but it needs to know that this authority figure loves, even to the point of forgiveness. Only an 
authority in which love and power unite can satisfy this need. This explains why Ratzinger is 
so keen to view worship as an action of affirmation of the ground of being. In Ratzinger’s 
understanding, the Church is the sphere in which humanity can discover such authority – the 
personal God – and be reconciled with him.  
Ratzinger’s underlying critique of suspicion towards authority consists in the 
observation that “man cannot bear sheer morality, he cannot live by it; it becomes a ‘law’ for 
him that provokes contradiction and engenders sin.”72 The temptation is to redefine the law to 
the point where it is expedient and human guilt can be dissolved more readily. Here again, the 
principle Ratzinger invokes is that the human person’s authentic liberation requires the 
experience of being acknowledged and loved by the Ot r. In the realm of reconciliation, this 
implies that the human person needs an authority to rec gnise the presence of human guilt, 
for without it human existence gradually erodes as people go into denial about the reality of 
their being and of Being itself. The denial of human guilt induces an ever-increasing spiral of 
enslavement: “where forgiveness – true forgiveness guaranteed by authority – is not 
recognised or believed, morality must be cut down to size so that the conditions of sinful 
action can never actually occur for the individual.” 73 Ratzinger’s argument is that a 
methodology of freeing the world through changing the conditions of the very possibility of 
                                                          
72 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 150. While there is a growing realisation today that technical progress is 
questionable, even destructive, when decoupled fromm ral responsibility, and that there can be no refrm of 
humanity without moral renewal, nonetheless, to Ratzinger’s mind, there remains “a fog of discussions” veiling 
the criteria for human morality. See Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 66-83. 
73 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 150.  
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guilt is ultimately too cheap.74 He believes that liberation based on the denial of human 
sinfulness and guilt is fictional and cannot bring about the renewal to which it aspires. He 
proposes that the true structure of forgiveness and reconciling renewal consists of a circular 
link between morality, forgiveness and expiation which ought not to be forced apart at any 
point. Whether a person can find redemption depends o  the undivided existence of this 
circle: 
Moral behält ihren Ernst nur, wenn es Vergebung – wirkliche, vollmächtige 
Vergebung – gibt; sonst fällt sie in den reinen undleeren Konditionalis zurück. 
Wirkliche Vergebung aber gibt es nur, wenn der “Kaufpreis” da ist, der “Gegenwert,” 
wenn die Schuld ausgelitten ist, wenn Sühne existiert.75 
                                                          
74 Ratzinger finds this view in the work of Albert Görres, “Schuld und Schuldgefühle,” Internationale 
katholische Zeitschrift 13 (1984): 430-43. He highlights two sections from Görres’ argument: “Psychoanalysis 
has found it difficult to admit that among other guilt feelings there are also some that can be traced back to real 
guilt. It cannot accept these data without embarrassment . . . because its philosophy does not recognise freedom . 
. . its determinism is the opium of the intellectuals. In the psychoanalytic mind, Sigmund Freud far surpassed the 
poor unenlightened Rabbi Jesus. He, in fact, could n y forgive sins and still found it necessary to do so, 
whereas Sigmund Freud, the new Messiah from Vienna, did far more: he rid the intellectual world of sin a d 
guilt” (ibid. 438). Yet it remains the case that “[i]n the household economy of the soul, feelings of guilt are . . . 
necessary, indispensable . . . for psychic health. Thus anyone who is so cool that he no longer experiences 
feelings of guilt where they are appropriate ought to try with all his might to recover them” (433). Ratzinger 
touches on this himself in a lecture he delivered in Munich in 1974 entitled “Die Zukunft des Heils,” in GS:AEL, 
489-509.  
75 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 146 (“Morality retains its seriousness only where th re is forgiveness – 
real forgiveness ensured by authority; otherwise it lapses back into the pure empty conditional. But true
forgiveness exists only when the ‘price,’ the ‘equivalent value,’ is paid, when guilt is atoned by suffering, when 
there is expiation” [Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 151]). Ratzinger makes the point that the Torah knits these 
three elements of morality, forgiveness and expiation together, whereas the Enlightenment attempted to xtract 
an eternally valid moral law from the Old Testament while discarding the rest. In other words the latter sought a 
universally valid morality through the exclusion of guilt and the need for forgiveness through expiation. 
Ratzinger says the attempt was bound to fail as it was a classic expression of Pelagianism, where the active-
passive balance of divine and human action somehow gets skewed. For more detailed discussion on Ratzinger’s 
views of modern day pelagianism, see Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 81-87. He suggests there are two 
recurring forms of pelagianism which, on the face of it, appear relatively harmless. On the one hand,  
“bourgeois liberal pelagianism” says that if God exists and cares, he won’t make demands of the moral agent in 
the way the Church teaches, while, on the other hand,  “pelagianism of the pious” doesn’t want any forgiveness 
from God but rather the security, reward and right to blessedness that comes from rigorous religious practice. 
These attitudes harden the human heart against itself, others and God: “man needs God’s divinity but no longer 
his love. [Man] puts himself in the right, and a God that does not cooperate becomes his enemy. The Pharisees 
of the New Testament are an eternally valid representation of this deformation of religion. The core of this 
Pelagianism is a religion without love that in this way degenerates into a sad and miserable caricature of 
religion” (82). Especially in the latter form, one finds a fear and inability to endure the tension of awaiting the 
giftedness of love. When the hope of being loved is impoverished, anxiety gives rise to a striving for security in 
which no uncertainty can be allowed to remain. Ratzinger says that in such a scenario, “[l]ove does not now 
overcome fear because the egoistic person does not want to entrust himself or herself to its kind of certainty that 
can always only be a certainty of dialogue” (83). On the other hand, he says, there is also a form of “fear” which 
is compatible with love and is central to Christian freedom: “the fear of hurting the beloved, of destroying the 
foundations of love by one’s own fault. Liberalism and the Enlightenment want to talk us into accepting a world 
without fear: they promise the complete elimination of every kind of fear. They would like to get rid of every 
‘not yet,’ every reliance on other people and their inner tension, even though this is something that belongs 
essentially to hope and love. Anyone who liberates man from fear in this way liberates him from hope and love 
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When this circle is taken with the seriousness with hich Ratzinger credits it, he says   
morality comes to exert a very concrete claim over Ch istians because it becomes, as it were, 
more “reasonable,” while the freedom to accept or reject the way of forgiveness comes to be 
treated with the utmost seriousness in God’s eyes. The pilgrimage of faith is truly something 
to which assent in freedom is necessary. In the act of faith, a double ablatio (removal) occurs 
through the action of purification and renewal which “allow[s] the true inherent form to re-
emerge and . . .  restore to us in a wholly new waythe feeling of freedom and of being at 
home.” Active faith, he continues, “breaches the wall of finitude and opens up an 
unobstructed view into the broad spaces of eternity.” Ultimately, as understood by Ratzinger, 
the human person “is in need of liberating ‘removal’.” 76 In the human person’s existential 
situation– not totally corrupt but nonetheless fallen – the noble form is not immediately 
visible: “we all stand in need of a true sculptor who removes what distorts the image; we are 
in need of forgiveness, which is the heart of all true reform.”77 Ratzinger says the Church “is 
not a communion of those ‘who have no need of the physician’ (Mark 2:17) but a communion 
of converted sinners who live by the grace of forgiveness and transmit it themselves.”78  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
too” (83-4). The psalmist’s tradition that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom (Ps 111:10) means that 
being able to sin belongs to the existential situation of humanity since the Fall, and this “risk” is,as it were, the 
ontic-ground of a properly ordered fear. The Christian ask, Ratzinger says, is to purify fear and build p the 
right kind of courage to deal with the ultimate fear of death which is an alarming fear surrounding the finiteness 
of human life: “Anyone who loves God know that there is only one real threat for man, the danger of losing 
God. . . . Anyone who abandons God in order to be fre  from this true fear comes under a tyranny of fear
without hope” (85). 
76 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 148. 
77 Ibid. Ratzinger says the Church’s role in forgiveness can be seen from the three decisive steps of its birth in 
the New Testament (cf. ibid. 148-9). Firstly, consigning the keys to Peter (Matt 16:19) reveals that te Church’s 
core authority is “an authority to let in, to bring home, to forgive.” Secondly, the same reality is again revealed 
during the course of the Last Supper in the inauguration of the new communion from and in the Body of Christ. 
It is made possible in the shedding of the Lord’s blood “for many, for the forgiveness of sins” (Matt 26:28).  
Finally, when Jesus establishes the communion of peace with the Eleven, he does it by giving them the authority 
of forgive (John 20:19-23). 
78 Ibid., 149. An attentive reading of the New Testament reveals, to Ratzinger’s mind, that forgiveness is neither 
a magic formula nor a superficial forgetting of the“crust of dirt and filth that has overlaid the image” (ibid.). 
Forgiveness can never be licence to forget the unpleasant aspects of human nature. In actual fact, Ratzinger 
invokes the image of God as “Sculptor” to demonstrate that forgiveness is the acknowledgement of a real 
process of change being carried out: “[t]he removal f guilt truly gets rid of something; the proof that 
forgiveness has come in us is that penance springs up from us” (ibid.). Ratzinger believes the Church’s task 
today is to remind the world of the seriousness of the action of forgiveness and to reintroduce the world f 
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Finally, through the removal of the “dust and filth that disfigure God’s image in 
me,”79 Ratzinger returns to the ecclesial action of pilgrimage in the meeting of the “I” and all 
the other “I’s” who are likewise in God’s image. This is true above all in the configuration of 
each believer to Christ – the image of God without qualification. Ratzinger looks to the 
pauline imagery of giving birth and dying (cf. Gal 2:20; 2Cor 5:17) to demonstrate that the 
Church is gradually being formed and brought to fullness by the freely undertaken renewal of 
each individual member who is incorporated into it. This captures his understanding of the 
structure of prayer as an affirmation of the Other who becomes my motivating centre. In this 
way, the Church at worship is a school of human freedom – true to both its existential, and its 
as yet-to-be realised nature: 
Ich bin meiner Isolation entrissen, in eine neue Subjektgemeinschaft aufgenommen; 
mein Ich ist dem Ich Christi eingefügt und damit demj nigen aller meiner Brüder 
verbunden. Nur von solcher Tiefe der Erneuerung des Einzelnen her wird Kirche, 
wird Gemeinschaft, die im Leben und Sterben verbindet und trägt. Erst wenn wir das 
ganz bedenken, sehen wir die Kirche in der rechten Größenordung.80 
 
6.4. Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates three avenues of approach in Joseph Ratzinger’s 
ecclesiology, whereby worship is not a word restricted to formal liturgies or expressions of 
popular piety. Instead, it is extended to a wide-ranging vision inclusive of several aspects of 
relationality. In the first place, when human beings come to know the source of power, love 
and goodness in their world as trustworthy, worship becomes an act of communication and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
human beings to its Sculptor without whom it cannot be renewed. Encountering one’s Sculptor, albeit init ally 
painful and counter-intuitive, is the source of true joy. Forgiveness is “an active-passive event” which, n light 
of human freedom, means that the pain of conversion becomes an active self-transformation, where 
“[f]orgiveness and penance, grace and personal conversion are not contradictions but two sides of one a d the 
same event” (ibid.). The integrated event of reconciling renewal in each of us is made up of the passive 
reception of forgiveness and grace as a gift from outside oneself, and the active deed of penance and personal 
conversion: “This fusion of activity and passivity expresses the essential form of human existence, for all ur 
creativity begins with our having been created, with our participation in God’s creative activity” (ibid.). 
79 Ibid., 153. 
80 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 147 (“I am wrested from my isolation and incorporated into the 
communion of a new subject; my ‘I’ is inserted into the ‘I’ of Christ and consequently joined to the ‘I’ of all my 
brothers. Only from such deep renewal of the individual does Church come into being as a communion that 
binds us together and sustains us in life and death. Only if we think this entirely through do we see th  Church 
in the right order of magnitude” [Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 153]).  
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fellowship, and the Church manifests itself ad intra as sphere of freedom by becoming a 
living sacrifice of praise. Secondly, the Church at worship effects a “revolution” within the 
individual who prays. This motivates them to live for the other person, even to the point of 
forgetfulness of the self. Thirdly, when worship is understood in this comprehensive way, it 
impacts on the Church as sphere of freedom by engagi  it in a pilgrimage through history. 
At this ad extra level, above and beyond the Church’s inner workings, each pilgrim who 
participates in liberating ablatio reminds the world of God’s will for humanity, and the 
boundaries and possibilities of human nature. 
Furthermore, the self-sacrificial posture of the Churc  at worship depends on the act 
of faith grounded in trust and obedience. As a result, h manity can joyfully participate in the 
discovery of the merits of creaturehood. The Church must avoid tendencies that diminish the 
possibility of believers being enabled to assent in trust and obedience to God’s will. Its 
authority derives from God, in whom power and love converge. When people feel unable to 
trust, they easily become suspicious of any advances made in their direction. On the other 
hand, knowing one is accepted and loved by the “Other” who is trustworthy, makes it 
possible for one to freely and authentically love all others in an act of obedience of the will.  
For Ratzinger, the Church that suggests itself in worship is the pilgrim fellowship of 
faith together with Christ who is its source. As the depository of a new mode of vision, 
worship grows into a responsibility – a call for detachment from one’s “ego” and for the 
assumption of a life of fellowship and ecclesial identity amongst other pilgrims for the good 
of the “whole.” In this movement towards responsibility, the creaturehood of humanity is part 
of the tension between nature and grace – a pre- and post-Copernican mix, so to speak. 
Ratzinger says the finding of the true self begins with the realisation that we suffer from a 
“deficiency” belonging to a pre-Copernican phase of faith. Hence true faith is the recognition 
of the need to be given something. The sacramental framework of the Church is operative 
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here because technical and scientific knowledge is not enough to sustain the human intellect. 
However, on the other hand, ecclesio-knowledge – collective listening and comprehension of 
the primacy of God’s will – while necessary, can seem to pose a threat to individual freedom. 
In Mary, Ratzinger finds a model of someone whose self-giving throws light on the Cross as 
the place of God’s action. From the human perspectiv , she exemplifies the place of 
completion of the communion of wills. The task for the Church is to remind the human race 
that trust in God is a virtue that liberates; pilgrimage focused on the divine will is the way of 
truth; and renewal in the world comes about through acknowledging the seriousness of love 
in the divine gift of forgiveness.  
At the heart of this two-fold worshipping dynamic of trust and obedience, Ratzinger 
envisages a pilgrimage of purification for the human person. Humanity is purified along the 
way in order to attain its full identity and dignity. During the pontificate of Benedict XVI, 
human ecology manifested itself as one of the highlights of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology of 
liberation. It was a call for the “laws” that govern creaturehood to be respected. Like one of 
the early Church Fathers, the Pope took the language of the day and christianised it by 
imbuing the contemporary compulsion towards environme tal protection with the equally 
valid necessity of human protection. 
In all this, Ratzinger argues that the Church at worship is the Church visibly 
transparent to the source of its authority, but without being tempted to take the power of the 
institution into its own possession. In other words, Ratzinger believes the Church can be a 
sphere of growth in authentic freedom for the individual believer, as well as for local Church 
communities and for the world at large, provided the “I” of the self does not replace the 
common “I” of Christ as the source of ecclesial authority. Taken together, the concrete 
implication would be a genuine catholicity – the turning of the self over to the “whole” so 
that the Church lives as a “home” that may be encoutered everywhere. In this context, 
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ecclesial office must be a “window” and not a “wall” within the local Church while, at the 
same time, the individual believer is called to be a “foreigner” in that same Church. For 
example, he maintains that if authority is misapproriated in the Church, “the officeholder 
who should personalise the institution and make it present in his person becomes a wall 
instead of a window, opposes it instead of letting it become, in the suffering and struggle of 
his own faith, something close to us worthy of trust.”81 In any discussion regarding freedom 
in the modern context, it will be important to capture the essence and direction whereby the 
office-holder should order their office. This will be taken up in Chapter 7 in relation to the 
episcopal office since this is the form of office which Ratzinger most frequently reflects 
upon.
                                                          
81 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 67. 
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CHAPTER 7: The Church and the Office of ἐπίσκοπος: Overseeing Growth in  
 Authentic Freedom 
 
7.0. Introduction  
In recent decades, and particularly since the Second Vatican Council, ecclesiology has 
come to view episcopal ministry in terms of the interplay between the common priesthood of 
the faithful and the ministerial priesthood. In 2003, Pastores gregis (PG) pointed to three 
“layers,” so to speak, operative in this interplay, namely witness, holiness, and responsibility. 
Indeed, a sign of the importance being attached to the interplay was the language of 
perichoresis – a term more commonly associated with trinitarian theology: 
The interplay between the common priesthood of the aithful and the ministerial 
priesthood, present in the episcopal ministry itself, is manifested in a kind of 
''perichoresis'' between the two forms of priesthood: a perichoresis between the 
common witness to the faith given by the faithful and the Bishop's authoritative 
witness to the faith through his magisterial acts; a perichoresis between the lived 
holiness of the faithful and the means of sanctification that the Bishop offers them; 
and finally, a perichoresis between the personal responsibility of the Bishop for the 
good of the Church entrusted to him and the shared responsibility of all the faithful 
for that same Church.1 
Ratzinger’s own reflections on episcopal ministry are very much in keeping with these 
emerging features of the Church’s self-understanding. Chapter 6 considered in detail the life 
of sanctification in the context of human freedom as understood by Ratzinger. The remainder 
of Section III will focus more closely on the notions of responsibility and witness. 
Chronologically, and logically, this present chapter follows from the study of the Church at 
worship and precedes the examination of the Church as witness – the former mainly 
concerned with the Church ad intra, the latter with the Church ad gentes. This scheme 
corresponds to the way in which Ratzinger envisages th  vocation of the ἐπίσκοπος. To his 
                                                          
1 John Paul II, Pastores gregis, 10. The apostolic exhortation points out that “the Bishop is above all else, like 
every other Christian, a son and member of the Church. . . . Together with all the faithful he shares in the 
incomparable dignity of the children of God, a dignity to be lived out in communion and in a spirit of gratitude 
and fraternity. On the other hand, by virtue of the fullness of the sacrament of Holy Orders, the Bishop is also 
the one who, before the faithful, is teacher, sanctifier and shepherd, charged with acting in the name nd in the 
person of Christ.” Moreover, in its chapter on the hi rarchical constitution on the Church, Lumen genitum says: 
“those ministers, who are endowed with sacred power, serve their brethren, so that all who are of the People of 
God, and therefore enjoy a true Christian dignity, working towards a common goal freely and in an orderly way, 
may arrive at salvation” (LG, 18). 
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mind, there are elements of responsibility pertaining to both the internal life of the Church, 
and the mission to the nations, for which the episcopal ministry is accountable. The bishop is 
called to exert a centrifugal effect upon the Churc towards the society in which it lives. He 
thereby oversees the centripetal movement of all creation in Christ. This recalls the famous 
dictum of Augustine, “Vobis enim sum episcopus; vobiscum sum christianus.”2  
This chapter follows the responsibilities of bishops from Ratzinger’s perspective on 
freedom. It affords this study the opportunity to open up some of the main issues pertaining 
to the Church and freedom today, namely, religion lberty, the status of reason, the attitude 
towards authority, the flow of charisms in ecclesial life, and the readiness to suffer for the 
sake of the truth. This takes us into a number of important areas confronting the Church today 
in its commission to oversee the work of God’s plan of salvation. Therefore, while the 
episcopal ministry is the subject of this chapter, i  is the subject only in so far it as it creates 
the conditions enabling the Church as a whole to be the sphere of growth in authentic 
freedom. It becomes clear that a bishop’s immediate physical presence is not required in 
every geographical space where there is to be the realisation of human liberation. For 
Ratzinger the link between the bishop and authentic freedom is indirect.3 He believes the 
bishop is the servant of God’s will by being an indispensable custodian of the sphere chosen 
for the realisation of God’s definitive union with creation. 
7.1. Custodian of Religious Liberty 
 
One characteristic of the episcopal ministry upon which Ratzinger reflects is the 
bishop as custodian of religious liberty. He points out that the Gospel is for all and the 
                                                          
2 Augustine, Sermo 340, 1: PL 38, 1483 (“For you I am a Bishop and with you I am  Christian''). 
3 The Greek word which later becomes associated with the episcopal office aptly captures Ratzinger’s vision of 
the figure of the bishop in the growth of authentic freedom. The bishop is one who is literally looking (σκοπος), 
or a watcher (σκοπός) on (ἐπί). The theme of freedom is a paradigmatic example of this ministry. On the one 
hand, the indirect nature of the bishop’s ministry gives requisite space for each person to formulate their free 
response to God. While, on the other hand, the bishop is charged with continually reminding the Church, and 
society in general, of the need for “oversight” motiva ed by the responsibility of care for others (Acts 20:28; Phil 
1:1; 1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:7; 1 Pet 2:25; cf. Heb 13:17). 
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responsibility of the apostles’ successors is to guarantee this possibility. From the perspective 
of episcopal ministry, he says this principle is true in two ways: there is the right to be able to 
choose one’s faith freely, and secondly, the right to live as a believing Christian.4 From the 
bishop’s perspective, this implies the need to preserve the integrity of the Christian faith and 
to bear a responsibility for the public affairs of s ciety. The Church, therefore, must be 
attentive to the claims of religious freedom and, consequently, to the free space that must be 
safeguarded in order to articulate the right to believ :     
In diesen Zusammenhang gehört auch das klassiche Thema der libertas ecclesiae, das 
Recht der Kirche, Kirche zu sein und auf die ihr eigene Weise zu leben. Das Recht zu 
glauben ist der eigentliche Kern menschlicher Freiheit; wo dieses Recht verfällt, folgt 
der Verfall aller weiteren Freiheitsrechte mit innerer Logik nach. Dieses Recht ist 
zugleich die eigentliche Freiheitsgabe, die der christliche Glaube in die Welt getragen 
hat.5 
Ratzinger discusses the right to be able to choose ne’s faith freely from the 
perspective of the Christian religion. He says it ithe Church’s responsibility to present the 
objective content of faith in a full and authentic manner so that, in effect, one can make a 
properly informed decision with regard to it. Neverth less, he says it is always an important 
task to strike the balance between the unity of faith nd the freedom of theology because 
“what is at stake is, on the one hand, the fundamental right of the faithful to the authentic, 
unadulterated faith, and, on the other hand, the right to a faith that is presented in 
contemporary thought patterns and language.”6 For him a purely institutional understanding 
                                                          
4 See DH, 2-15. 
5 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 181 (“Pertinent to this also is the classical theme of libertas ecclesiae, 
the Church’s right to be Church and to live in the way that is her own. The right to believe is the real core of 
human freedom; when this right is forfeited, it follows logically that all further rights and freedoms fail. This 
right is at the same time the authentic gift of freedom that the Christian faith has brought into the world” 
[Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 192]). Ratzinger goes on to say that despite the common opinion 
to the contrary, libertas ecclesiae cut asunder for the first time the identification of state and religion – 
“depriving the state of its totalitarian claims, and, with its distinctive character vis-à-vis the governmental 
sphere, the faith has given man the assurance that his own being with God and in the presence of God is 
reserved for him, an assurance in which God calls him with a name that no one else knows (Rev 2:17). Freedom 
of conscience is the core of all freedom” (ibid.). See Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. "libertas ecclesiae," 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/339325/libertas-ecclesiae (accessed 6 November 2011).     
6 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 192. On occasion in recent years, Ratzinger has pointed out that 
the task of representing the content of faith must become a priority because many of its concepts can seem 
outmoded to the present generation. He views it as a challenge of “translation,” and Verwesentlichung . . . das 
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of Church remains superficial, while a purely sociological understanding causes one to 
always be frustrated by individual people or particular events. Consequently, he believes that 
if we want to see the Church in its proper liberating perspective, “we must look at her . . . 
above all from the standpoint of her liturgy. That is where she is most herself; that is where 
she is ever and ever again touched and renewed by the Lord. For in the liturgy we must in 
fact live the Church by starting from the Holy Scripture, from the sacraments, from the great 
prayers of Christendom.”7 In the liturgy, he says, the Church is a “living or anism, whose life 
cycle derives from Christ himself.”8  
Chapter 6 has already identified the emphasis which Ratzinger puts on the Church at 
worship as a school of authentic freedom. The bishop is to make this a possibility in the life 
of the Church. The motive that ought to inform the episcopal task in this regard is the 
possibility of participation in the unadulterated faith and sacraments of the Church.9 This 
grounds access to a worshipping posture that grounds the basis for divinisation and true 
freedom:     
In der Kirche geht es um Freiheit im tiefsten Sinn des Wortes, um die Eröffnung der 
Teilhabe am göttlichen Sein. Die grundlegende Freiheitsordnung der Kirche muß es 
daher sein, daß Glaube und Sakrament, in denen diese Seinsteilhabe vermittelt wird, 
ungeschmälert und unverfälscht zugänglich sind. . . . Nur so wird das Grundrecht der 
Gläubigen gewahrt, den Glauben zu empfangen, die Liturgie des Glaubens zu feiern 
und nicht der Privatmeinung der Amtsträger ausgeliefert zu sein.10 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Grundlegende (“essentialisation” of the basics) of the Christian f ith. See Ratzinger, Gott und die Welt, 383. See 
also Benedict XVI, Light of the World, 63,135-6.     
7 Ratzinger, God and the World, 343.  For his comments on overbearing institutionalism n the Church, see Salt 
of the Earth, 173,192; God and the World, 361; Ratzinger Report, 66-7.  
8 Ratzinger, God and the World, 343. 
9 With due regard for Can. 843 of the Code of Canon Law regarding the proper disposition and preparation for 
the reception of the Church’s sacraments, Ratzinger is choing here the right of the faithful to be assisted in their 
worship by their Pastors. It is specifically mentioed that such assistance includes the spiritual riches of the 
Church, especially the word of God (cf. Can. 213 and 214). See also CCC, 1269. 
10 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 180 (“The Church is concerned with freedom in the de pest sense of 
the word, with opening up the prospect of participation in divine being. Hence the Church’s fundamental 
ordinance with regard to freedom must be that the faith and the sacraments, in which this ontological 
participation is communicated, are accessible in an undiminished and unalloyed form. . . . Only in this way is 
the fundamental right of the faithful safeguarded: the right to receive the faith and to celebrate the li urgy of the 
faith, and not to be at the mercy of the private opini n of those in ecclesiastical authority” [Ratzinger, Church, 
Ecumenism and Politics, 180]). In this context, libertas ecclesiae copperfastens the right of people to the 
Church’s liturgy in the public space. With this freedom, the Church can present an authentic, unadulterated faith 
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   With regard to the bishop’s responsibility for the public affairs of the world, Ratzinger 
links this role with Christianity’s claim to truth. He claims to have reflected at length on the 
idea of the truth of Christianity being used in a wy that demonstrated “sheer arrogance . . . 
and even a lack of respect for others.”11 After much reflection on the issue, he has come to 
the conclusion that “if we abandon the concept of truth, then we abandon our foundations.”12 
He says the basic claim of Christianity is to tell he truth that enlightens us about God, the 
world, and ourselves. His stance on this aspect of religious liberty in society seems to be 
influenced not only by the religious persecution in the Europe of his own formative years, but 
also by the on-going, sometimes quite subtle persecution of religion in the drive towards the 
primacy of the secular in societies increasingly portrayed as post-Christian. Ratzinger is 
convinced that humanity “is capable of truth” which “ omes to rule not through violence but 
rather through its own power.”13 However, he balances this out by emphasising that 
“Christianity works only indirectly, through men, through their freedom, on the shaping of 
the world. It is not itself already the establishment of a new political and social system, which 
would banish calamity [emphasis added].”14 Ratzinger says that the Church, by not 
conforming to a uniform world-view, is free to remain  “counterpole; she is present as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to the human person who, as the Second Vatican Council states, “has the right to seek the truth in religious 
matters so that, through the use of appropriate means he may prudently form judgements of conscience which 
are sincere and true” (DH, 3). In this regard, Ratzinger says the freedom requi d by the Church is exemplified 
in the nature of the Vatican State and the Pope’s need for freedom in his ministry: “the Vatican State . . . is in 
fact only a provisional arrangement. The Pope does n t trictly need to have a state – but he does need fr dom, 
a guarantee of secular independence; he cannot stand in the service of some government” (Ratzinger, God and 
the World, 381). After becoming Pope himself, Ratzinger commented on the freedom which binds people to the 
petrine ministry. The Pope, he says, does not possess coercive power: “his ‘power’ exists only to the extent that 
there is conviction, that people realise that we belong together and [that] the Pope has a task that he has not 
given himself. It is only when there is [such] conviction that the whole enterprise can succeed. Only through the 
conviction of the common faith can the Church maintain a common life” (Benedict XVI, Light of the World, 
138). Hence while the Pope is precisely one who does n t create his program of governance, he “incarnates this 
constraint laid upon the Church” and, by conviction of faith, is “a protective barrier against arbitrary ction” 
(Ratzinger, God and the World, 377, cf. 381). 
11 Ratzinger, God and the World, 263. See Light of the World, 50-51.  
12 Joseph Ratzinger, God and the World, 263. He has provided an extended analysis of the cultural issues that 
challenge Christianity’s claim to truth in Truth and Tolerance, 138-258. On the issue of the search for truth 
which is often set against the present-day assumption that the possession of truth is an arrogant presumption, see 
this dissertation § 8.3. 
13 Benedict XVI, Light of the World, 51. 
14 Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 220. 
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worldwide communion, as a force against repression.”15 In light of the twentieth-century’s 
experience of coercive regimes, Ratzinger insists the Church “gives men a place of freedom 
and sets a sort of ultimate limit to oppression.”16 Furthermore, in a cultural milieu where the 
authority of the natural sciences is predominant and the questions essential to humanity are 
often side-lined into the subjective realm, Ratzinger says the courage to recognise truth is 
essential, as is “in all humility . . . knowing [one’s] own fallibility, [so as to] seek to be a co-
worker of the truth.”17 
 Ratzinger wants to stress the fact that the “indirect” role of the Church in the civic 
well-being of a society must be understood in a very precise way, for otherwise the bishop 
would endanger the principle of religious freedom as enunciated by the Second Vatican 
Council. Religious freedom requires the bishop to acknowledge the autonomy of earthly 
things and the competence of the State. In this way a bishop “avoids mixing faith and politics 
and serves the freedom of all by refusing to allow faith to be identified with a particular form 
of politics. The Gospel prescribes certain truths and values to politics, but it does not respond 
to concrete questions concerning particular political and economic issues.”18 He says that all 
members of the Church are bound precisely by the autonomy of earthly realities because 
“[o]nly in this way does the Church remain an open space of reconciliation among the 
parties; only so is she preserved from becoming a party herself.”19 This indirect contribution 
of the Church to society is based upon a freedom which, transparent to truth and goodness, 
safeguards against theocracy on the one hand, and ensures that the Church remains authentic 
“salt” and “light,” on the other.20 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 165. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ratzinger, God and the World, 263. 
18 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 101. 
19 Ibid., 102. See GS, 36; AA, 7.  
20 See Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 272. As Pope, Benedict XVI proposed a noteworthy analysis of the pressure 
sometimes being exerted on the Church in the area of religious liberty. He suggests that a “negative tol rance” – 
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In parallel with the two directions he proposes for the analysis of the theme of 
religious freedom, i.e. to right to choose one’s faith freely and the right to live as a believing 
Christian, Ratzinger distinguishes two corresponding directions in the bishop’s ministry: to 
bear responsibility for presenting the truths of the Christian faith in their integrity, and to bear 
due responsibility for the public affairs of the world. Against coercive forces and oppressive 
ideologies which rise up from time to time within human history, the bishop is called to be 
the ἐπίσκοπος, the overseer of a sphere where growth in authentic freedom is communicated 
as a permanent and viable manifestation of God’s will for the human person. In large 
measure, the theme of religious liberty has a bearing on all the other characteristics of the 
bishop’s ministry which Ratzinger highlights, and which the remaining subdivisions of this 
chapter will examine: advocating creative reason and bearing magisterial authority as d intra 
prerequisites for presenting the integrity of the faith; testifying to a readiness to suffer and a 
willingness to bear the prophetic voice in the Churc  as ad extra consequences of 
maintaining a dialogue with the cultural and historical progress of human civilisation. 
 
 
    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
i.e. the imposition upon everyone of well-established modes of thought in the name of tolerance – is growing 
and is resulting in the abolition of tolerance. From the Christian perspective, this would potentially lead to the 
Church being unable to meaningfully express itself visibly, as well as the suppression of the living-out f the 
tenets of one’s religious convictions. One can point to the closure of Catholic adoption agencies in the UK as a 
concrete example of this phenomenon. The Pope says the following: “When, for example, in the name of nn-
discrimination, people try to force the Catholic Church to change her position on homosexuality or the 
ordination of women, then that means that she is no lo ger allowed to live out her own identity and that, instead, 
an abstract, negative religion is being made into a tyrannical standard that everyone must follow. That is then 
seemingly freedom – for the sole reason that it is l beration from the previous situation. In reality, however, this 
development increasingly leads to an intolerant claim of a new religion, which pretends to be generally valid 
because it is reasonable, indeed, because it is reason itself, which knows all and, therefore, defines the frame of 
reference that is now supposed to apply to everyone. In the name of tolerance, tolerance is being abolished: that 
is a real threat we face. The danger is that reason – so-called Western reason – claims that it has now really 
recognised what is right and thus makes a claim to totality that is inimical to freedom. I believe tha we must 
very emphatically delineate this danger. No one is forced to be a Christian. But no one should be forced to live 
according to the ‘new religion’ as though it alone w re definitive and obligatory for all mankind” (Ben dict 
XVI, Light of the World, 52-53).   
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7.2.   Advocate for Creation and Creative Reason 
 Alongside wanting bishops to be custodians of religious liberty in society, Ratzinger 
calls for the episcopal ministry to be an advocate for creation and creative reason.21 This 
insight is grounded on the fact that Ratzinger does not deem the autonomy of earthly realities 
absolute while, at the same time, he is conscious that the boundary between civil society and 
anarchy becomes dubious when a certain ethical minimum is disregarded. When Benedict 
XVI addressed leaders of civil society in Westminster Hall in 2010, he laid out the Roman 
Catholic perspective on ethical foundations for political choices and the avoidance of a crass 
rationalism:  
The Catholic tradition maintains that the objective norms governing right action are 
accessible to reason, prescinding from the content of revelation. According to this 
understanding, the role of religion in political debate is not so much to supply norms, 
as if they could not be known by non-believers – still less to propose concrete 
political solutions, which would lie altogether outside the competence of religion – 
but rather to help purify and shed light upon the application of reason to the discovery 
of objective moral principles. This “corrective” role of religion vis-à-vis reason is not 
always welcomed, though, partly because distorted forms of religion, such as 
sectarianism and fundamentalism, can be seen to create s rious social problems 
themselves. And in their turn, these distortions of religion arise when insufficient 
attention is given to the purifying and structuring role of reason within religion. It is a 
two-way process. Without the corrective supplied by religion, though, reason too can 
fall prey to distortions, as when it is manipulated by ideology, or applied in a partial 
way that fails to take full account of the dignity of the human person. Such misuse of 
reason, after all, was what gave rise to the slave trade in the first place and to many 
other social evils, not least the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century. This is why I 
would suggest that the world of reason and the world f faith – the world of secular 
rationality and the world of religious belief – need one another and should not be 
afraid to enter into a profound and ongoing dialogue, for the good of our civilisation.22         
To Ratzinger’s mind, the content of the natural lawcan never simply be produced at 
will by the State because what is in itself wrong cannot be made right by a legislative act. In 
other words, the natural law is antecedent to civillegislative acts and such acts respect human 
persons to the extent that they respect the natural law written into creation. The Church is 
                                                          
21 See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 102. See also Benedict XVI, Message for the World Day of Peace 
2011, Religious Liberty: The Path to Peace (1 January 2011), 8: AAS 103 (2011), 52-53.    
22 Benedict XVI, Meeting with the Representatives of British Society, including the Diplomatic Corps, 
Politicians, Academics and Business Leaders (17 September 2010): AAS 102 (2010), 636-37. 
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required to step forward, Ratzinger says, as an advocate of creation and of creative reason 
and the bishop has a prominent role to play in this regard. The prescribing of the bishop’s role 
here contains an undeniable correspondence to Ratzinger’s endorsement of human ecology:     
[. . .] obliegt den Christen die Aufgabe, die Hörfähigkeit für die Stimme der 
Schöpfung zu erhalten. Der Bischof muss darum ringen, dass die Menschen nicht taub 
werden für das Grundlegende, das Gott in jedes Herzeingeschrieben hat, in die Natur 
des Menschen und der Dinge selbst. Der heilige Gregor der Große hat einmal sehr 
schön gesagt, der Bischof müsse eine “Nase” haben, das heißt das Gespür, das ihn 
unterscheiden lässt zwischen positiv und negativ [Hom. In Ezech I,11,7: PL 76, 
909A]. Das gilt innerkirchlich und gilt der Welt genüber. Gerade der Respekt vor 
dem Eigenen der weltlichen Ordnungen verlangt, dassie Kirche auch als Anwalt der 
Schöpfung auftrete, wo im Gewirre des Selbstgemachten deren Stimme überschrien 
wird. Der Bischof wird es als seine Verantwortung asehen, dass die Gewissen 
geweckt werden und dass in diesen elementaren Bereich n nicht der Eindruck 
entstehen kann, die Kirche spreche nur für sich selbst.23 
In concrete terms, Ratzinger presents a three-fold interwoven philosophical, 
christological and ecclesiological approach whereby the bishop, within the mandate of the 
Church, is an advocate for creative reason. In the first instance, as a λόγος religion (John 1:1; 
cf. Gen 1:1), Christianity claims that creation is carried out through the “Word.” In biblical 
terms, this means “reason” has a creative power. Ratzinger says that the situation of the 
unknown God at the Areopagus (cf. Acts 17:27-28) demonstrates the agnostic mentality – 
people who don’t know God in a personal way, but yet fe l unable to exclude him. Ratzinger 
believes the Areopagus scene “presupposes that man is in some sense waiting for God and 
yet cannot of his own resources reach him, so that he is in need of preaching, of the hand that 
                                                          
23 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 100 (“[. . .] the task of preserving the capacity to hear the voice of 
creation falls upon Christians. The bishop must struggle to keep men from becoming deaf to the fundamental 
principles that God has inscribed in every heart, in he nature of man and of reality itself. St Gregory the Great 
once made the beautiful remark that the bishop must have a ‘nose,’ that is, that sense that allows him to 
distinguish between positive and negative [Hom. In Ezech. I,11,7: PL 76, 909A]. This is true within the Church 
and with regard to the world. The very respect for the proper identity of worldly laws requires that the Church 
should step forth as the advocate of creation wherever its voice is shouted down in the babble of self-constructed 
values. The bishop will consider himself responsible for the awakening of consciences and for the obviation of 
the impression that in these areas of fundamental concern, the Church is speaking for herself alone” [Ratzinger, 
Called to Communion, 102]). For a comprehensive account of Ratzinger’s understanding of the relationship 
between the Church and the State, see Hansjürgen Verwey n, Joseph Ratzinger – Benedict XVI. Die 
Entwicklung seines Denkens (Darmstadt: Primus, 2007), 114-34; Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI, 80-120; Thomas 
R. Rourke, The Social and Political Thought of Benedict XVI (New York: Lexington Books, 2010). 
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helps him over into the sphere of his presence.”24 In this regard, Christian faith appeals to 
creative reason as – in Ratzinger’s phrase – “the transparency of creation in revealing the 
Creator.”25 Therefore, to his mind, “an urgent task for the Churc  in our century” is for its 
preaching to engage with “the struggle for the new presence of the rationality of faith.” 26 He 
is clear that faith cannot afford to withdraw into a kind of system of symbols, devoid of 
reason, which would release an alluringly “homely” feeling of being able to choose a random 
vision of life with no basis in truth. This would be to maintain a “buffer” or “comfort zone” 
for the individual who wants to escape the truth of the existential nature of humanity as found 
in creation: 
[Der Glaube] braucht den weiten Raum der offenen Vernuft, er braucht das 
Bekenntnis zum Schöpfergott, denn ohne dieses Bekenntnis wird auch die 
Christologie verkleinert, sie redet dann  nur noch indirekt von Gott, indem sie sich auf 
eine besondere religiöse Erfahrung bezeiht, die aber notwendig begrenzt ist und eine 
unter anderen Erfahrungen wird.27 
This brings Ratzinger to the second and predominantly christological element of how 
the Church is of service as advocate for creative reason. Inspired by the text of John 1:18, 
where it is revealed that the Son makes known the Father in the world, Ratzinger says “the 
Church has to make [God] more widely known; she has to bring men to Christ and Christ to 
men, so as to bring God to them and them to God.”28 The Church shows that the face of 
Christ is God’s “bridge between man and God so that man may become truly himself.”29 
However, he says, the teachings about Christ must not linger simply upon a representative 
                                                          
24 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 286. 
25 Ibid., 290. 
26 Ibid., 291. 
27 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 254 (“[Faith] needs the wide realm of open reason; it eeds the 
confession of faith in the Creator God, for without this confession of faith even Christology is diminished; it 
then talks only indirectly about God, by referring to a particular religious experience, while this, however is 
necessarily limited and would then become just one experience among others” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of 
Faith, 291]). 




cultural figure from religious experience. It is necessary that the full dimensions of the figure 
of Christ the liberator be upheld.30  
Finally, then, the explicit place of ecclesiology emerges when Ratzinger says the 
Church’s task, in every age, is “to show people this path and offer a pilgrim fellowship in 
walking it.”31 Chapter 6 has already considered Ratzinger’s understanding of the liberating 
nature of pilgrimage. Now we look at the ecclesial conditions of pilgrimage, so to speak, 
which the bishop is required to uphold and guarantee. In the first place, pilgrimage is a rich 
description for the Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom: it conveys the 
knowledge of God’s will, growing and deepening within the human person and moving him 
or her into an authentic dialogical worship-posture with regard to God. As a path demanding 
the involvement of the whole of one’s being, it is he dawning of growth in authentic 
freedom. Ratzinger proposes the travellers to Emmaus (L ke 24: 13-35) as paradigmatic 
examples for the pilgrim fellowship path. The scene portrays  
[. . .] ein Unterwegssein mit dem lebendigen Wort Christus, der uns das geschriebene 
Wort, die Bibel auslegt, sie selbst zum Weg werden läßt, auf dem das Herz brennend 
wird und so am Ende sich die Augen öffnen: Die Schrift, der wahre Baum der 
Erkenntnis, öffnet uns die Augen, wenn wir gleichzeitig vom Baum des Lebens, 
Christus, essen. Dann werden wir wahrhaft sehend, und dann leben wir wirklich.32 
In Ratzinger’s description of the Emmaus scene, the C urch on pilgrimage is 
comprised of three components: “the fellowship of disciples, the Scriptures and the living 
                                                          
30 The journey of faith which Ratzinger envisages here is demonstrated in the examples of the centurion’s 
confession before the Crucified One (Mark 15:39), or Thomas’ confession in the Lord (John 20:28). In 
Ratzinger’s vision, this journey calls us to go theway of the great arc in Matthew from the Annunciation story 
to the great missionary speech of the risen Lord: God is with us always, to the close of the age (Matt 1:23; 
28:20). See also Ratzinger’s discussion of the ration le behind the dimensions of the figure of Christ in this 
dissertation § 3.1. 
31 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 293. See also Salt of the Earth, 264. On the nature of pilgrimage, see 
this dissertation § 6.3. 
32 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 255-56 (“[. . .] travelling together with Christ the living Word, 
who interprets for us the written word, the Bible, and turns that into the path, the path along which our heart 
starts to burn and thus our eyes are finally opened: Scripture, the true tree of knowledge, opens our eyes for us if 
at the same time we are eating of Christ, the tree of life. Then we become truly able to see, and thenw  are truly 
alive” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 293]). 
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presence of Christ.”33 In the broadest terms, fellowship or communio, the word of God, and 
the sacramental presence of Christ become the tasks to be attended to while on this 
pilgrimage. The bishop, as servant, ensures their possibility for pilgrims. The pilgrimage 
undertaken by the Church becomes communio through the presence of the living Christ in the 
opening of the scriptures and the breaking of bread in the upper room.34 Because the upper 
room is not an isolated space but the anticipated wding feast of the Lamb, Christ leads us 
not just to God but to one another. Pilgrim fellowship implies, by definition, that isolated 
autonomy is not God’s will for his people: 
Sie muß als Weggemeinschaft mit unseren Sorgen, mit de  Wort Gottes, mit Christus 
erfahrbar werden und uns auf die Gabe des Sakraments hinführen, in dem das 
Hochzeitsmahl Gottes mit der Menschheit immer wieder vorweggenommen wird.35  
Ratzinger points out that the giving of actual form to this pilgrimage in the concrete 
individual fellowships of diocese, parish and ecclesial movements is, and remains a central 
task of the Church. Therefore, the principal indiviual elements of this travelling require the 
attention of the bishop and are three-fold: prayer, c lebration and reconciliation36 – prayer 
that promotes the primacy of inwardness, and liberation from activism within the Church37; 
celebration, especially that of the “Sabbath,” that allows the world to regain the true rhythm 
of creation, and to rejoice, truly free, in all that is good38; and reconciliation, in the sacrament 
                                                          
33 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 293. 
34 See this dissertation § 5.3.1.  
35 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 256 (“It must become possible to experience this fellowship as a 
pilgrim fellowship with our cares, with the word ofGod, and with Christ, and it has to lead us onward to the gift 
of the Sacrament, in which the marriage feast of God with mankind is ever and again anticipated” [Ratzinger, 
Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 294]). 
36 See Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 295-98. 
37 See this dissertation § 6.1. The importance of the C urch at worship is essential to Ratzinger’s presentation of 
an ecclesiology of liberation, because, in the first in tance, prayer is “really what makes the Christian a 
Christian” (Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 294). 
38 See this dissertation § 4.1.4. Ratzinger believes that reclaiming Sunday as the first day of the week and the 
day of Resurrection is an urgent task for the Churc because it is the great family day for the family of God. 
Furthermore, the experience of celebration is necessary to come to understand the real value of the Church. He 
points out that the Church cannot be known merely through its committee meetings and discussion documents. 
To attempt to do so leaves the impression that the Church is “an offense, because she either becomes the object 
of our own constructive activities, or she appears as omething imposed upon us from outside, something al en” 
(Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 295). Here we can especially see the sacramental framework of 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology come to the fore – Church is a gift coming from God and transparent to him. We are 
free to be pilgrims to the extent that the Church can “vouchsafe [for] us the experience of celebration” and we 
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of which we are freed from the pride of self-sufficiency and pointed towards a reawakening 
of joy, even in the midst of the challenges that often seek to overwhelm and bind us. 
Ultimately, Ratzinger envisages pilgrimage as an inner journey of reconciliation towards the 
heights of God. From an ecclesiological perspective, pilgrimage is the discovery, in ecclesio-
knowledge, of the primacy of God’s will. By virtue of his office, the bishop must be to the 
fore in service and oversight of this pilgrimage of discovery, always conscious of creating the 
conditions conducive to prayer, celebration and reconciliation. In Ratzinger’s vision, 
pilgrimage has a strong mystical component and, through coming to know God’s will for 
one’s life, it is an essential factor in the discovery of joy: 
Die Weggemeinschaft des Glaubens, die wir Kirche nennen, soll eine Gemeinschaft 
im Steigen sein, Gemeinschaft, in der sich jene Reinigungen an uns vollziehen, die 
uns der wahren Höhe des Menschseins, der Gemeinschaft mit Gott fähig machen. Im 
Maß der Reinigung wird das Steigen, das anfangs so mühsam ist, zusehends zur 
Freude. Diese Freude muß immer mehr aus der Kirche herausleuchten in die Welt 
hinein.39 
 
7.3. Exercising Magisterial Authority 
 
A third element to which Ratzinger devotes attention is the bearing of magisterial 
authority in the Church. The matter of how a bishop administers this responsibility is 
multifaceted. From the contemporary perspective, th debate often pivots around the 
opposing elements of the autonomy of personal conscie ce, on the one hand, and the charism 
of infallibility, on the other. Ratzinger believes that a deeper comprehension of magisterial 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
assent to it: “We know the Church from within only if we experience her at that moment when she is 
transcending herself, when the Lord enters into her and makes her his dwelling and, thereby, makes us his 
brothers and sisters. That is why the dignified celebration of the Eucharist is so important, a celebration in which 
the Church’s dispossession of herself must appear. We do not make the liturgy ourselves. We do not think 
something up, as profane festival committees do, in the way that quizmasters proudly present something. The 
Lord comes. The liturgy derives from him, has grown up from the apostles in the faith of the Church; we enter 
into it; we do not construct it. That is the only way there can be celebration, and celebration – as the anticipation 
of future freedom – is essential for man” (295-96). 
39 Ratzinger, Weg Gemeinschaft des Glaubens, 260 (“The pilgrim fellowship of faith, which we call the Church, 
should be a fellowship in climbing, a fellowship in which those processes of cleansing are effected in us that 
render us capable of the true heights of human existence, of fellowship with God. In the same measure as we are 
cleansed, the climbing, which is at first so difficult, rapidly becomes a joy. This joy must more and more shine 
forth from the Church into the world” [Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 298]). 
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authority is necessary today in order to overcome the conflicting and polemical nature of 
much of the discussion in this area.  
In recent decades, Ratzinger believes exchanges relating to magisterial authority have 
been obscured by negative portrayals of the charism of infallibility. However, from the 
ecclesiological perspective, he point out that, “uctoritas cannot be reduced to infallibility.”40 
In the attempt to re-interpret the frequently held perception of episcopal heavy-handedness, 
he argues that binding authority, in general, could never be the prerogative of infallibility 
alone because then everything in society would be oriented to an ethos of the mandatory. 
That would make validity and invalidity the only measures in society. Such a society would 
become accustomed to believing that things which do not affect validity are trivial and, 
ultimately, interchangeable since they fall outside th  narrow limit of a legally defined 
minimalism. In the ecclesial context, where doctrinal decisions are often perceived to exist 
solely on the grounds of infallibility, the effect over time would be that “there could be no 
certainty shared by the whole community.”41 Ratzinger says the gift of making an infallible 
pronouncement that has been conferred upon the Church should not be withdrawn but it only 
makes sense when it is “embedded in a vital structue of common certainty in faith.”42  
In this regard, Ratzinger highlights the positive development in the CDF Instruction 
Donum Veritatis (DonV) with regard to the development of doctrine and the rol  of the 
Magisterium in defining the various forms of binding authority. He says that the document 
[. . .] sagt – wohl erstmalig in dieser Offenheit –, daß es Entscheidungen des 
Lehramtes gibt, die nicht ein letztes Wort in der Sache als solcher sein können, 
                                                          
40 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 113. 
41 Ibid., 111. 
42 Ibid., 112. See also God and the World, 356, 378-80; Salt of the Earth, 124. In terms of structuring social 
order, Ratzinger says a healthy society can exist only when its laws are regarded as binding and are issued by 
the legitimate authority. This is lived even more intensely in the Church: “For a community which is based 
essentially upon common conviction, auctoritas is indispensable where its principal tenets are concerned, and 
precisely an auctoritas whose word can mature and become purer through living development” (Ratzinger, The 
Nature and Mission of Theology, 113). That there are differing degrees of authoriy, up to and including the 
infallible, “does not imply however, that lower-ranki g auctoritas does not rate as auctoritas at all” (ibid.).  
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sondern bei aller grundsätzlichen Verankerung in der Sache zunächst auch ein Signal 
pastoraler Klugheit, eine Art einstweiliger Verfügung sind.43 
In other words, while the kernel of a teaching remains valid, the particulars can stand in need 
of improvement. Particular aspects of an individual te ching can be superseded after having 
fulfilled their pastoral function in a given situation. Thus magisterial authority, so inimical to 
modern sensibilities, is presented by Ratzinger as an example of how auctoritas remains 
indispensable for the health of human relationships, even to the point of being able to hold 
together the inevitable tension between perpetually v lid principles and pastoral 
circumstances.  
Ratzinger expressed the contours of this new approach to authority in his commentary 
on the 1990 Instruction.44 The Instruction itself was largely occasioned by a debate within the 
Church about the nature of academic freedom for theologians. The presupposition at the heart 
of Donum veritatis is the insight that faith precedes theology. This is a further invocation of 
the sacramental framework which guides so much of what Ratzinger says in ecclesiology. In 
this instance, if theology were to abandon the ground of what God has said and thought 
before us, it would annul its own constitution. He goes further by saying that for the people of 
God – as recipient of the gift of faith – theology remains a task which is never completely 
fulfilled in history, nor through the private ideas of an individual theologian: 
Die Wahrheit des Glaubens ist nicht dem isolierten einzelnen gegeben, sondern Gott 
hat mit ihr Geschichte und Gemeinschaft bauen wollen. Sie hat ihren Ort in dem 
gemeinschaftlichen Subjekt des Volkes Gottes, der Kirche. . . . [Die Kirche] ist als 
gemeinsames, als Enge der einzelnen überschreitendes Subjekt die Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit, daß Theologie überhaupt wirksam werden ka n.45 
                                                          
43 Ratzinger, Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie, 94 (“[DonV] states – perhaps for the first time with such candor 
– that there are magisterial decisions which cannot be the final word on a given matter as such but, despite the 
permanent value of their principles, are chiefly also a signal for pastoral prudence, a sort of provisi nal policy” 
[Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 106]).  
44 See Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 101-7. 
45 Ratzinger, Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie, 92-93 (“The truth of faith, in fact, is not bestowed upon the 
isolated individual, for God has willed instead to build history and community with it. It has its place in a 
common subject: the people of God, the Church. . . . Insofar as the Church is a corporate subject which 
transcends the narrowness of individuals, she is the condition which makes theological activity possible” 
[Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 104-5]). 
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When it comes to the issue of the magisterium and theology, the exercise of 
magisterial authority and the theologian’s mission c me into contact with each other in a very 
particular way. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ratzinger believes there is a triangular relationship 
between the people of God, understood as the bearer of the sensus fidei and the common 
locus of all faith, the Magisterium, and theology which forms a specific ecclesiological frame 
for dealing with diverse ecclesial vocations.46 In response to the issue of academic freedom 
for theologians, Ratzinger envisages the matrix of bishop, theologian and the people of God 
as a fruitful formula for the encounter with authority in the Church as it is vested in the 
Magisterium. He points out that such an encounter should not aim at undermining the 
competence of the bishop nor the theologian. On the one hand, bishops must exercise the role 
of the Church's living magisterium, i.e. as “the sole authentic interpreter of the Word of God, 
written or handed down, by virtue of the authority which it exercises in the name of Christ.”47 
On the other hand, the theologian is at the "servic of doctrine, implying as it does the 
believer's search for an understanding of the faith.” T is makes theology “something 
                                                          
46 See Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 104-5; this dissertation § 1.6. For Ratzinger, 
differentiating faith and theology is very importan. It is a distinction contingent on the authority of the truth and 
unity of faith across history, and is what allows faith and theology to be in relationship in the first nstance: “If 
the possibility of indicating the essentials of thefaith ‘without distortion’ is necessary to the faith tself, then 
there must be an authority able to exercise this function. In consequence the Church herself must havea voice; 
she must be capable of expressing herself as Church and of distinguishing false belief from the true faith. This 
implies that faith and theology are not identical and that each has its own characteristic voice but that the voice 
of theology is dependent upon that of faith and oriented toward it. Theology is interpretation and must remain 
such. When it no longer interprets but, so to speak, lays hands on the substance of the faith and alters it by 
inventing a new text for itself, it ceases to be thology. . . . Unity rests in faith, while theology is the domain of 
plurality. To that extent, the very act of fixing the common reference point – faith – makes plurality in theology 
possible” (92-3). Ratzinger also stresses the dynamic vested in the truth and unity of faith as theology comes to 
terms with making faith perceptible. He says theology needs to be capable of acknowledging the “plurality” of 
language inherent in the truth and unity of faith as it traverses history. Otherwise, it will become redundant: “the 
basic tension between the Old and New Testaments already indicates to what an extent the truth of faith can 
become accessible in language only within the inner coherence of the whole, and not in separate propositions. If 
one strikes out the continuity of the subject which organically traverses the whole of history and which remains 
one with itself throughout its own transformations, othing is left beyond contradictory speech fragments which 
cannot subsequently be brought into any relation. The tendency to search for what is most ancient and original 
behind present developments is the logical conclusion of the loss of the binding element which holds history 
together and unifies it in the midst of its contradictions. Theology becomes archaeology and busies its lf with 
exhuming the authentic ideal behind what really appears before our eyes as Christianity. Such reconstructed 
Christianity, however, is always a selective Christiani y, which loses the tension and the wealth of the whole. 
The disjointed pluralism of subjectively minted selective Christianities comes to replace the inner plu ality of 
the symphony of faith” (ibid., 94-5).   
47 See DV, 10. 
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indispensable for the Church.”48 In terms of the interface between these two spheres of 
competence, it is understandable that the work of a theologian can, by its very nature, invoke 
a certain tension with the Church’s pastors. Likewise, the triangular vision which Ratzinger 
espouses, and which is expressed in Do um Veritatis, is not without its inner tensions. 
However, in and of itself, such tensions are not necessarily something negative. In fact, 
provided the “tensions do not spring from hostile and contrary feelings, they can become a 
dynamic factor, a stimulus to both the Magisterium and theologians to fulfil their respective 
roles while practicing dialogue.”49   
From the perspective of those amongst the people of God who are neither professional 
theologians nor pastors – the third element of the ecclesiological frame, so to speak – 
Ratzinger also tries to heal the perception that Church authority is something negative and 
heavy-handed. In the first instance, he says it is incumbent on the bishop to duly respect the 
maturity of the laity and provide the conditions and resources whereby they are empowered 
to courageously witness to, and live out their beliefs n the conduct of daily life. A cross-
pressure operating against such collaboration, Ratzinger says, is an ideology of politics which 
views everything through the aspect of power. Thus, e says, “[i]f I see the Church only 
under the aspect of power, then it follows that everyone who doesn’t hold an office is ipso 
facto oppressed. . . . I think that this ideology, which suspects that everywhere and always 
what’s at stake is basically power, destroys the feeling of solidarity not only in the Church 
but also in human life as such.”50 Ratzinger strongly advocates the need to escape from the 
                                                          
48 DonV, 1. 
49 Ibid., 25. 
50 Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 165-66. On 14 February 2013, during a meeting with the clergy of Rome, 
Benedict XVI delivered a very personal address on his recollections of the Second Vatican Council. He 
presented an example of the ideology of power politics which he believes to be so destructive. He spoke of the 
fact that over and above the “real Council of the Fathers” which took place in the twentieth-century, a “virtual 
Council of the media” was also conducted whose voice at the time was more readily accessible and drowned 
out, to a large extent, the work of the Council Fathers. The Pope says, this virtual Council, whose influe ce is 
waning today, was based on a political hermeneutic. For the media, the Council was a political struggle between 
power blocs within the Church. The media then took the side of those who seemed most allied to their own 
perspective on the world. See     
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notion of power as the Church’s ultimate goal and the only category for explaining the world 
and the communion present within itself. The reason for there being a Church at all, he says, 
is to impart to us eternal life – true life. He say that were the exercise of power in the Church 
to descend to the level of a mere association of power politics, it would be nothing but an 
absurd spectacle.51 
One final point, which as yet in only in its infancy, is found in a contribution which 
Benedict XVI made in an address delivered to the diocese of Rome in 2009.52 In relation to 
the role of the laity, he said it is no longer acceptable for lay members of the Church to be 
viewed as “collaborators” of the clergy. Rather, against a backdrop of authentic formation in 
the vision of the Church as the people of God in the Body of Christ, consecrated and lay 
people must be recognised as “co-responsible” for the life of the Church, thereby fostering 
the consolidation of a mature and committed laity. In the world of the future, Ratzinger is 
convinced that the voice of Christianity will operate within a complex network of various 
levels of discipleship where not everyone has the same task, but consists of people who live 
out their faith in society together with those “who represent the central reserve of faith for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2013/february/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20130214_clero-roma_en.html (accessed 22 February 2013). 
51 See Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 166; God and the World, 275. In the context of the recent phenomenon of lay 
and clerical representative associations, it is Ratzinger’s view that a Church run as if it were made up of two 
groupings of laity and clergy rests on a false basis: “the notion has formed that [clergy and laity] have to 
determine together what it is possible to believe today, what kind of Church we should construct. And in oing 
this we would, so to speak, have to deprive the clergy of their power and to ensure that the laity have their due 
say” (Ratzinger, God and the World, 387). For him, the correct relationship has another basis. On the one hand, 
the normal form of being a Christian is that of thelay person who reshapes the world by living out the Gospel in 
society. And, on the other hand, clergy understand heir role correctly by standing in obedience to God as 
guaranteed by the Pope, thereby ensuring that people d  not shape the Church in accordance with their own 
wishes but that it remain in the hands of the Lord. See Ratzinger, God and the World, 388.  
52 See Benedict XVI, Address to the Opening of the Pastor l Convention of the Diocese of Rome on the theme 
“Church Membership and Pastoral Co-Responsibility,” 26 May 2009, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2009/may/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20090526_convegno-diocesi-rm_en.html (accessed 10 September 2012).  
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proclamation and for the spiritual life of the Church.”53 This greater attention to the vocation 
of each person is an important pathway ensuring genuin  growth in human freedom. 
7.4.  Living the Tension between the Prophetic and Hierarchic Charisms 
 In every generation of the Church’s life, there has to be a coming to terms with the 
necessary tension between the prophetic and hierarchic charisms. Chapter 5 considered how 
the successio principle ensures the Church does not descend into pneumatic anarchy.54 At the 
same time, however, discernment of the movement of the God’s Spirit is an undertaking 
which Ratzinger views not merely as a responsibility but as a duty. In this context, he insists 
that it is beyond doubt that the Christian tradition admits of differing emphases and that “it is 
necessary constantly to open and broaden the seductive, but unilaterally juridical, conception 
of Church as an institution by keeping our eyes on the dimension of pneumatology.”55 One of 
Ratzinger’s approaches to the episcopal exercise of authority is from the perspective of this 
tension, not in terms of the episcopacy opposing other believers but rather all believers 
standing before the truth which makes a claim on the w ole of humanity.        
In1962, Ratzinger reflected upon the criteria for justified criticism within the Church. 
His more recent contributions to this debate were la gely occasioned by events that led to the 
preparation and publication of Donum veritatis in 1990. These have been gathered into the 
book entitled The Nature and Mission of Theology.56 By looking at Ratzinger’s 1962 
                                                          
53 Ratzinger, God and the World, 388. Ratzinger highlights the common vocation of the laity and the 
Magisterium to serve the good in society: “The Magisterium can credibly and effectively state only what is also 
present and living in the Church as a whole. And the converse is also true, of course: the living communities of 
the Church constantly need the encouragement that assures them of their identity and through which they 
themselves again are then stimulated to live what they are. When we say: ‘The Church must be a force of 
resistance,’ then we should have in mind precisely this common obligation of Christians as a whole andnot 
merely the Magisterium. As I said, the discernment of spirits – not everything that is modern is bad, not 
everything that is modern is good – is also, I believe, a very important virtue, without which the Church cannot 
proclaim her word and perform her service” (Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 273). 
54 See this dissertation § 5.1.3. 
55 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 119. See also LG, 4, 12. 
56 See Ratzinger, Das Neues Volk Gottes: Entwürfe zur Ekklesiologie, 249-66. The original article appeared as 
“Freimut und Gehorsam. Das Verhältnis des Christen zu seiner Kirche” in Wort und Wahrheit 17(1962): 409-
21. Ratzinger wrote this article at the time of the Second Vatican Council when the need for justified criticism 
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reflections and their continuation in his more recent considerations, this subdivision presents 
the bishop as a catalytic figure weighing up the nuances and necessary tensions in the 
relationship between the prophetic and hierarchic carisms in ecclesial life. If Ratzinger’s 
1962 reflections may be described as his attempt to come to terms with the prophetic charism 
of critical protest in the Church from the point of view of the “activist,” his 1990 reflections 
were undertaken more from the perspective of magisterial responsibility. The former dealt 
largely with the need for a sincere critique of theinner life of the Church, whereas the latter 
leaves an opening for the responsibility which the Church bears – particularly in the person of 
the bishop – for the affairs of the world.    
In his 1962 essay, Ratzinger laid out five criteria for consideration when one feels 
impelled to give critical protest or witness within the Church. Discerning one’s prerogative in 
terms of the freedom to protest requires careful consideration of these parameters. However, 
before specifying them, it is important to recognise that his comments are premised by two 
observations: the Church as the irrevocable place of God’s grace in light of the Paschal 
Mystery, and the inability of humanity to realise its end through its own resources alone.  
In Israel, prophets were freely chosen by God alongside the Temple and hereditary 
priesthood. The faith placed in the law, worship and institution lived alongside the “free” 
word of God’s prophetic voices. Prophetic criticism protested against the self-sufficiency of 
institutions who substituted ritual for conversion f human hearts. It also protested against 
abuses of the divine commission to Israel for selfih ends, thereby safeguarding God’s word 
against human distortion. As a result, prophets met with persecution by those holding power 
in the establishment but nevertheless the prophetic voices were recognised as the true voice 
                                                                                                                                                                                    




of God.57 With the coming of Christ, temple worship and the prophets have been irrevocably 
subsumed once and for all into the very person of the Son (cf. John 2:19). As one who 
suffered and endured till the end because of the repudiation of self-glorification, Christ found 
himself within the prophetic line – his own body becoming the true self-offering (cf. Heb 
10:5ff; Ps 40).58 
Despite Jesus remonstrations with the religious statu  quo of his day, he not only 
honoured the authority of Israel’s teachers to the end (Matt 23:2ff), but completed his task 
within Israel as did the apostolic preaching in the post-re urrection period. It was when the 
followers of Jesus came to understand that God’s alliance with Israel had been conditional 
upon the keeping of the “whole” Law that there came about a split between the apostles and 
Judaism which was extraordinarily painful (Rom 9-11). This had been a conditionality based 
on the letter of the Law, and was beyond solely human capability. Ratzinger argues that 
because of this painful fragmentation between the apostles and Judaism, the full bloom of the 
Church’s mystery remains to be fulfilled. He believes this confirms the need for legitimate 
criticism since “the nature of grace being absolute implies, of itself, human inadequacy and 
the capacity to criticise those to whom it relates.” 59 Therefore, it is impossible to contemplate 
                                                          
57 Ratzinger points out that this was the case even with someone like the King of Babylon who became the 
Lord’s “servant” when the destruction of the Temple was to become an act of God’s word over and above the 
purity of pharisaical homage in the sanctuary (Jer 25:9; 26: 1-15). 
58 Ratzinger suggests that Stephen’s preaching (cf. Acts 7:1-53) was an early attempt at a Christian theology that 
continued in a similar vein to that of the prophets. Stephen’s discourse states that God sides with those suffering 
against the institution. In this regard Jesus is placed on the side of the family of the persecuted which, from the 
scriptural viewpoint, was the family of the prophets. Jesus is viewed as fulfilling the prophecies, not because 
several prophecies are attributed to having been fulfilled by him but because he endured suffering to the end for 
the repudiation of the self-glorification carried on within the levitical institutions. Therefore, Stephen’s 
preaching, while in line with the prophetic stream, introduces the prophetic to a changed context of “always 
bursting open the ceremonial form to demand from people – instead of the rites – their obedience, their art,” 
(Ratzinger, Das Neues Volk Gottes, 252 [own translation]). Ratzinger repeats these christological fulfilment 
formulas with regard to the status of the temple and expands on them in Jesus of Nazareth. Holy Week, 28-41. 
He also makes comments on the role of prophecy in Jesus of Nazareth. From the Baptism in the Jordan, 1-4, 
122-27. See this dissertation § 3.2.1. See also God and the World, 210-11, 289-90, 357-62. See also Oscar 
Cullman, The Christology of the New Testament, trans. Shirley C. Guthrie and Charles A.M. Hall (Norwich: 
SCM Press Ltd., 1963), 13-50.  
59 Ratzinger, Das Neues Volk Gottes, 256 [own translation]. 
351 
 
the Church independently of the people in it – an idealised Church divorced from the human 
element does not bear a truthful resemblance to the actual historical reality: 
Die Kirche lebt durch die Menschen in dieser Weltzeit, sie lebt trotz des göttlichen 
Geheimnisses, das sie in sich trägt, doch auf wahrhaft menschliche Weise. Auch die 
Institution als Instutition trägt an der Last der Menschlichkeit mit; auch die Institution  
trägt mit an der unheimlichen Eigenmacht des Menschlichen, Strauchelstein zu sein – 
wer wüßte das nicht? Und dennoch, ja gerade so ist die Kirche, die heilige, die 
sündige Kirche, Zeugnis und Wirklichkeit der durch nichts zu besiegenden Gnade 
Gottes, seiner allzeit größeren Huld,  die uns mitten in unserer Unwürdigkeit liebt. 
Gerade in ihrer Schwachheit ist und bleibt die Kirche Evangelium Gottes, 
Frohbotschaft von einem Heil, das all unser Begreifen und Hoffen übersteigt.60 
Significantly then, the new christological structure of faith implies that obedience as 
obedience becomes the obligation to bear witness, to strive for the integrity of the Church, 
and to counter the descent into Babylon. The prophetic line in the Church, then, is irrevocably 
transformed from that which previously existed. The Good News is that anguished humanity 
is in need of, and able to receive grace from an irrevocable source through the law of 
                                                          
60 Ratzinger, Das Neues Volk Gottes, 259-60 (“The Church lives through people in this world in a truly human 
way, despite the divine mystery which it carries within itself. The institution as institution also bears the burden 
of humanity, and the institution bears the uncanny power of human self-possession to be the stumbling lock – 
who does not know that? And yet, even so the Church remains the holy and sinful Church, witness and 
realisation of the fact that nothing conquers God’s grace, his ever-greater benevolence that loves us in the 
middle of our unworthiness. Especially in its weakness, the Church is and remains God’s Good ews, glad tidings 
of a salvation which exceeds all our understanding a d hope” [own translation]). To help explain this oly-sinful 
dynamic, see Das neues Volks Gottes, 257-61, 62-63, where Ratzinger takes the example of Peter and the 
exegetical difficulty of the close proximity of Πέτρος (“Rock”), Σατανᾶ (“Satan”) and σκάνδαλον (“stumbling 
block”) in the Gospel of Matthew. He says that while this may be a cause of scandal for some, it contains no 
impossibility per se for the biblical way of thinking (cf. Matt 16:18, 23). In real life, so to speak, the story of 
“rock” and “block” are often intertwined with one another. He alludes to this through the quite dramatic 
example of the mentality that designates King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon as “God’s Servant” (Jer 25:9; 26:1-
15). With regard to Peter, Ratzinger describes the biblical mentality as follows: “When it comes to Peter alone, 
speaking from ‘flesh and blood,’ then he may be Satan nd a stumbling block. But if he is not dependent on 
flesh, if God takes him into his service, then he can really be God's instrument, truly the ‘cosmic rok’” (258 
[own translation]). Today, Ratzinger says, we seem to have lost the biblical mentality, preferring instead the 
triumph of man to God and the non-admittance of the power of grace. For example, he says we create an 
idealised figure of the apostle when we say that the “Peter of the denial” is “Peter prior to Easter” and the “post-
Pentecost Peter” is the “rock.” Yet in both it is the identical Peter – stumbling-block and rock in one. Peter who, 
after Pentecost, compromises his Christian freedom (Gal 2:1f) for fear of the Jews is the same person who, in 
the face of apostolic apostasy, exclaimed “Lord, to wh m shall we go? You have the words of eternal life” (John 
6:68). On another occasion, Ratzinger used the image of “stumbling block” to express the prophetic 
contradiction or “scandal” which the Church is called to exhibit in the world. From the perspective of the 
Church as witness, Ratzinger says it is always a matter of differentiating the primary from the secondary 
scandal: “The secondary scandal consists in our actal mistakes, defects, and over-institutionalisations, but the 
primary scandal consists precisely in the fact thatwe stand in opposition to the decline into the banal d the 
bourgeois and into false promises. It consists in the fact that we don’t simply leave man alone in his self-made 
ideologies” (Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 124).   
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superabundance.61 Nevertheless, the prophetic posture remains a difficult, unpopular one 
unlike the attitude of false prophets who, to Ratzinger’s mind, tend to prize “undisputed 
convenience”62 and the avoidance of conflict:  
Der Gehorsam, der im Zeugnis des Leidens dennoch Gehorsam bleibt, der Gehorsam, 
der Wahrhaftigkeit ist, der von der eifernden Kraft der Liebe beseelt wird, ist der 
wahre Gehorsam, der die Kirche befruchtet hat die Jahrhunderte hindurch und sie 
immer wieder zurückgeführt hat aus der babylonischen V rsuchung an die Seite ihres 
gekreuzigten Herrn.63  
Here Ratzinger is drawing upon, and connecting, the themes of truth and love with the 
freedom to bear witness within God’s vehicle of grace. The Church requires people who 
understand freedom in a way that allows their humility and obedience to be equal in stature to 
their passion for truth. Ratzinger goes further andsays that the Church can ill-afford persons 
who unconsciously extol the status quo, but needs, above all else, “people who give witness 
in spite of all possible misunderstanding and challenge, people who, in one word, love the 
church more than convenience and the unruffled course of their own destiny.”64  
Consequently, Ratzinger says, one who is impelled to give critical protest, or witness 
within the Church needs to consider various aspects of the question. In this context he puts 
forward his five points for consideration.65 Firstly, one must consider whether a criticism can
be rationally justified. Secondly, one must equally consider the theological importance of the 
proposed criticism – the deposit of faith itself cannot be opposed. 66 Thirdly, criticism itself 
must be open to reassessment and criticism of itself – subjecting one’s own opinions to 
thorough and candid inspection is an act of obedience that liberates. Fourthly, the person 
                                                          
61 See this dissertation § 6.2. 
62 Ratzinger, Das Neues Volk Gottes, 263. 
63 Ibid. (“The obedience which remains obedient [even] in the witness to suffering is true obedience. True 
obedience is motivated by the crusading force of love which has enriched the Church through the centuries, and 
has returned the Church again and again from the Babylonian temptation to the side of her crucified Lord” [own 
translation]). 
64 Ibid. [own translation]. 
65 See ibid., 263-65. See this dissertation § 5.3.3. 
66 The setting of the deposit of faith as the threshold beyond which theological dissent must not go is a central 
part of the rationale of Donum Veritatis. The fact that we can point to a 1963 essay by Ratzinger on this topic 
offsets still further the view that he began as a “liberal” and turned into something else after the ev nts of 1968.        
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contemplating critical witness within the Church needs to bear in mind that an incredulous 
world surrounds us and personal faith is not immune from this influence. In fact, he says, due 
to the infirmity of one’s own faith, there is the temptation to adopt a self-righteous posture of 
victimhood, to become frustrated by the undervaluing of one’s motives by others. As a 
consequence, he says, the fragile nature of faith implies that it “can too easily lapse when a 
person withdraws behind the barrier of criticism, finally deteriorating into the resentment of 
one misunderstood.”67 These four criteria encourage varying degrees of discretion of the part 
of the one voicing a specific criticism of the ecclesial way of life. However, Ratzinger’s fifth 
criterion applies to every member of the Church, rega dless of whether or not they feel duty-
bound to give voice to a critique of Church life: the search for the truth takes precedence over 
utility. This requires every member to bear public w tness to the forgiveness that transforms 
the daily life of the Church into its truest self.68  
In 1990, revisiting his study of the hierarchic and prophetic traditions which the 
Church inherited, Ratzinger suggested a three-point framework for how the pneumatological 
cooperates with the institutional in ecclesial life. At the heart of it is the freedom of 
pneumatological movement which the episcopal ministry must allow for in the governance of 
the Church. His aim is to contribute to an ecclesiology that moves beyond portrayals of the 
Church grounded on a dualism based on an implied irr concilability between the streams of 
prophetic and apostolic tradition.69 The three-point framework helps contextualise the 
                                                          
67 Ratzinger, Das Neues Volk Gottes, 264 [own translation]). There are echoes here of an issue which Ratzinger 
frequently revisits, namely the “simple faith” of believers which can contrast with the arrogance of the 
intellectual elite. “Simple” in this context does not mean simplistic but rather, unpretentious. See his Zeitfragen 
und Christlicher Glaube: Acht Predigten aus den Münchner Jahren (Würzburg: Naumann, 1982), 19-22; 
Principles of Catholic Theology, 322-31. 
68 Ratzinger is keen to stress that the restrictions which he advocates are not meant to muzzle the prophetic 
element within the Church. Such restrictions are necessary, only in so far as they serve to integrate f ee 
expression into the organism of Christ’s body where the law of truth is equal to the law of love. And even in this 
regard, he says there can be “no absolute rule except for the call to an obedient decision [made] in the
knowledge of faith" (Ratzinger, Das Neues Volk Gottes, 264). 
69 See Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 118-20. See also Ratzinger Report, 151-53. 
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perspective required of the episcopal ministry when co fronted with critical protest from 
within the Church. 
Firstly, insofar as it is possible to inquire into the deepest essence of the prophetic 
beneath the great variety of guises in which it reveals itself, Ratzinger says the prophet has a 
direct mission from God and ultimately can appeal only to this specific commission. 
Therefore prophecy can be had only at the price of false prophecy. The fact of the matter is 
that only in retrospect does it become clear who the authentically prophetic voices are.  
Secondly, in relation to the Church’s magisterial office, it is clear that truly prophetic 
figures have been given to the Church of every age.Hence the ministerial office “is exposed 
to the risk of disregarding prophetic voices on account of their being uncomfortable.”70 In 
this environment, the discernment of spirits, already  commission of the Church in 
Thessalonica (cf. 1Thess 5:9ff), remains a permanent task of the Church:  
[. . .] müssen wir alle uns immer wieder wachsam durch solche Anrufe befragen 
lassen und offen bleiben für die Gegenwart des Geistes, die durchaus unbequem sein 
kann. . . . Zu ihr gehört sowohl das Annehmen berechtigter Kritik oder neu sich 
auftuender Wege für die Kirche wie der Schutz der Gläubigen vor den 
Verfälschungen des Evangeliums, vor einer Verwässerung des Glaubens durch 
Weltgeist, der sich als Heiliger Geist ausgibt.71 
Thirdly, learning to discern can only be “in a deep interior union with Christ, in an 
obedience to the Word of God which finds ever-new expr ssion in our lives and in an inner 
rooting in the living Church of all places and times.”72 Overall, it is evident here again that 
Ratzinger invokes three primordial characteristics of the bishop’s office – ordering God’s 
people towards the sacramental life and encounter wi h the living Christ, towards obedience 
                                                          
70 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 120. 
71 Ratzinger, Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie, 107 (“[W]e must all allow ourselves, in an attitude of vigilance, 
to be called into question again and again by such challenges and must remain open to the presence of th  Spirit, 
who can be altogether uncomfortable. . . . Both the acceptance of justified criticism and the protection of the 
faithful from falsifications of the Gospel, from an dulteration of the faith by the spirit of the world which 
passes itself off as the Holy Spirit, are integral p rts of this discernment” [Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of 
Theology, 120]). 
72 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 120. 
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to the Scriptures, and towards communio in the Church. This recalls very clearly the 
architecture of pilgrimage for which the bishop is re ponsible.73 In addition, it behoves us all 
to admit the constant need for forgiveness and corre tion. Obedience to what is true and 
trustworthy is liberation even in spite of the conflict and suffering which it may entail.  
In the context of both the institutional and pneumatological aspects of ecclesial life, 
the claim which the Church makes upon a person is all-embracing, but it becomes fruitful 
through the equally all-embracing assent of the person to this “claim.” In his view, the 
question must also become one about the status of the Church’s prophetic voice amidst the 
movement towards the “standardisation of man” which modern rationalism promotes. 
Therefore, he argues, it is important for believers to be mindful that critical protest and 
witness cannot be reserved to the Church’s inner workings alone.74 For example, he asks 
whether the Church is merely one societal voice among others, whose authority is limited by 
personal conscience, or whether it is of a different order whose freedom is essential for the 
prosperity of humankind.75 His answer rests on the fact that the Church is the sphere in which 
the human person can come to the meaning of oneself and the human community, above and 
beyond one’s network of concurrent roles in society – something often believed to convey the 
order of freedom in the modern age: 
Wenn jeder Sozialkörper nur relativ ist, wenn jeder nur Gehorsam innerhalb seines 
Ordnungsbereichs und der damit verbundenen sozialen Rolle verlangen darf, muß das 
nicht auch für die Kirche gelten? Muß dann nicht auch sie als Verband unter 
Verbänden gesehen werden und ihre Autorität entsprechend begrenzt verstehen? Muß 
dann nicht auch für die Kirche das Gewissen, das Letzte und Eigentliche der 
Persönlichkeit, oberhalb aller sozialen Rollen als unantastbar und unberührbar gelten? 
Muß sie sich nicht auf den von ihr vertretenen Interessen- und Bedürfnisbereich, die 
                                                          
73 On the nature of pilgrimage and its structural aspects for which the bishop is responsible, see this dis ertation 
§§ 6.3 and 7.2 respectively. 
74 For example, he says the Church is called to be a sign of contradiction in the world, but its protest must be 
rational: “[O]pposition ought not to arise from a tas e for contradiction in principle. Nor indeed from a 
reactionary attitude, nor from an incapacity to adjust to the contemporary world or to face the future. [The 
Church] must always preserve the capacity to be open to what is good in any period, to whatever new 
possibilities it opens up – which will always reveal ntirely new dimensions of the Word of God” (Ratzinger, 
God and the World, 358).        
75 See Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 76. 
356 
 
Regelung des religiösen Bedürfnisses zurückziehen? Hier entsteht freilich die 
umgekehrte Frage: Was ist religiöses Bedürfnis, religiöses Interesse? Ist es ein 
begrenztes Bedürfnis neben und mit anderen, dem Bedürfnis nach Nahrung, nach 
Kleidung, nach Erholung, nach beruflicher Erfüllung usw.? Oder ist nicht etwa das 
religiöse Bedürfnis gerade der Ausdruck der eigentlichen, letzten Bindung des 
Menschen, in der es nun ganz und gar um ihn selber geht? Und ist dann nicht von 
selbst die Gemeinschaft, die diesem letzten Bedürfnis zugeordnet ist, in dem die 
Identitätsfindung des Menschen auf dem Spiele steht, auch der eigentliche 
Identifikationsort des Menschen, in dem er alle Rollen überschreitet? Wo sonst und 
wie sonst sollte er sie überhaupt überschreiten und irgendwann und irgendwo dann 
doch in allen Rollen er selber sein? Muß also die Gemeinschaft, die diesem Bedürfnis 
zugeordnet ist, nicht notwendig ganz anderer Art sein als alle übrigen 
Gemeinschaften?76  
An important point emerges here for Ratzinger about the freedom inherent in the 
formation of the Church community: “[. . .] unlike the state, to which I belong without my 
consent prior to joining any association and which, n this sense, is a compulsory corporation, 
the Church is a voluntary society which is unmistakably characterised by a certain content 
without which it would be purposeless.”77 In general terms – assuming this content exists – 
the Church “receives her contours from a faith which is defined by content and . . . owing to 
this, she can embrace only those who are willing and able to accept this content as their 
own.”78 This difficult path of assenting to the content of faith was addressed by Ratzinger in 
1962 when he claimed it consisted of “an obedience that comes from truth and leads to 
truth.”79 
                                                          
76 Ratzinger, Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie, 64 (“If every social body is merely relative, if it is entitled to 
demand obedience only within its legitimate competence and the social role connected with it, must this not also 
apply to the Church? Must not even the Church, then, regard herself as one association among others possessing 
a correspondingly limited authority? Must it not follow that the conscience, the ultimate and most intima e 
element of personhood, counts even for the Church as something inviolable above every social role? Must not 
the Church keep to the sphere of interests and needs delegated to her, that is, the regulation of the religious 
need? At this point, however, the opposite question arises: What is this religious need, this religious interest? Is 
it a circumscribed need alongside of and together with others, like the need for food, clothing, recreation, 
professional fulfilment and so on? Or is not the religious need the expression of man’s ultimate characte istic 
bond, which affects his very being in its entirety? Consequently, is not the community ordered to this ult mate 
need – a need which brings into play the discovery of man’s identity – also ipso facto where man truly finds out 
who he is and thereby proves himself superior to every role? In what other setting and by what other mans 
could man ever transcend his roles and always maintain his own identity no matter where and when he plays 
them? In fact, must not the community established to provide for this need be wholly different in kind from all 
other communities?” [Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 74-75]). 
77 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 83. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes, 263 [own translation]. 
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In the tension between the prophetic and hierarchic arisms, Ratzinger concludes 
that it is incumbent upon the Church today to trust more readily the binding claim which truth 
makes on humanity. He repeats his sensitivity to overt institutionalism in the Church by 
asking whether it could be rebuked “for sometimes having too little confidence in the 
victorious power of the truth that lives in faith, for barricading itself behind external 
safeguards, instead of trusting the truth which lives in freedom and has no need of such 
defences?”80 Ratzinger calls for Freimut, the “boldness” or “frankness” which is one of the 
basic Christian attitudes of the New Testament.81 He says that one cannot but look to Paul’s 
account of his rebuke of Peter’s conduct with observant Jews in Antioch (cf. Gal 2:11-14). In 
the exchange Peter stands self-condemned (v.11). Ratzinger says Paul’s attentiveness to the 
binding force of the truth of the Gospel allowed him, with sincere forthrightness, to 
demonstrate a boldness which transformed the historical course of the Church’s life. Peter 
too, Ratzinger points out, was liberated enough by the truth to remain open to Paul’s 
admonishments: 
Wenn es die Schwäche Petri gewesen war, die Freiheit des Evangeliums aus Furcht 
vor den Jakobusleuten zu verleugnen, so war es seine Größe, daß er die Freiheit des 
heiligen Paulus hinnahm, der ihm, “ins Angesicht widerstand.” Die Kirche lebt heute 
noch von dieser Freiheit, die ihr den Weg in die Heidenwelt erstritten hat.82  
There is no easy resolution to the tensions raised here. Ratzinger’s view is that by 
acknowledging the presence of the various charisms that make up the life of the Church, 
including those in tension, we diminish the possibility of overlooking their inner promptings. 
The Church as sphere of growth in freedom is, at least to some degree, dependent upon the 
sincere and collective discernment of its leaders.              
                                                          
80 Ibid., 265 [own translation].  
81 See ibid., 266. Ratzinger says that in a time when t  thirst for freedom has been palpable and generations 
have walked out of the Church for the sake of freedom, what a powerful phenomenon it would be if St. Paul’s 
words were to become a visible expression of the Church’s faith: “Wherever the spirit of the Lord is, there is 
freedom” (2Cor 3:17).     
82 Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes, 265 (“If it had been the weakness of Peter to deny the freedom of the 
Gospel for fear of James's people, it was his greatness that he accepted the freedom of St. Paul, who ‘resisted 




7.5.  Being Ready to Suffer 
A fifth element of the bishop’s mission pertaining to authentic freedom, to 
Ratzinger’s mind, is the readiness to suffer. In his view, this readiness reveals the concrete 
content of love and it flows from the love dimension of his ecclesiology – namely, that one 
will give everything for that which one loves. The inner freedom to reach this level of 
preparedness can only be on the basis of love. It is an unintended, but anticipated 
consequence of the bishop’s work. In point of fact, the readiness to suffer, in Ratzinger’s 
analysis, is a primary characteristic of the bishop’s life, even though the martyrological 
profile of the Church is most certainly not reserved solely to those in episcopal ministry. By 
following Ratzinger’s analysis of this aspect of the bishop’s commission, the manifestation of 
the martyrological dimension of faith is equally hig lighted for all in the Church.   
The perspective from which Ratzinger approaches the topic is the question of whether 
love may have grown cold in the Church, with less people willing to suffer for the good of 
the other. He looks again to the historical entry of the Church into the world through the 
pattern of the prophetic: 
Die Kirche hat das Erbe der Propheten übernommen, das Erbe derer, die um der 
Wahrheit willen gelitten haben. Sie ist selbst als Kirche der Martyrer in die 
Geschichte eingetreten, sie hat als ganze die prophetisc e Funktion des Leidens für 
die Wahrheit getragen. So kann das Prophetische nict tot sein in ihr, es hat vielmehr 
in ihr seine eigentliche Heimat.83 
The readiness, motivated by love, to suffer for the truth is particularly important in the 
context of the bishop’s exercise of governance. Ratzinger fears that the call to personal 
responsibility in governance is in danger of destabilising because it is becoming detached 
from this “readiness.” It is generally accepted today, he says, that even if a person with 
responsibility for governance acts with the greatest of ethical responsibility, monocracy – the 
                                                          
83 Ibid., 261 (“The Church took over the inheritance of the prophets, the heritage of those who had suffered for 
the truth. The Church itself entered history as a Church of the martyrs, and has, as a whole, borne the prophetic 
function of suffering for the truth. Thus the prophetic is not dead in the Church, but has rather made its true 
home in it” [own translation]). 
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sole rule of one person – is always dangerous, becaus  rigid, unilateral positions are always a 
possibility. Therefore, while acknowledging that governance in society generally has moved 
towards collegial structures, with their affiliated checks and balances, Ratzinger wants to 
stress that there are drawbacks here too because responsibility can slip into anonymity: “[i]n 
the end, no one has to answer for what is done, becaus  it is the group that has decided, and 
everyone knows that he is not wholly identical with the group.”84 Ratzinger’s major concern 
is that the occasional majorities upon which collegiality depends “are products of chance and 
are too unstable to be the ultimate source of rights.”85 Administrative anonymity, he believes, 
can weaken the willingness to suffer out of love for the best interests of those whom one 
governs.86 
 In response to this new situation, Ratzinger says that the Church’s universal nature 
means that the bishop is called to service in the name of universality – for the “whole.” 
Therefore, episcopal governance can never be contemporaneous with merely the present 
moment. In Ratzinger’s ecclesiology, universality is the deepening of the ramifications of the 
“we” character of the Church of all times. The bishop’s service in this regard, ensures that the 
Church can never be enslaved by the trends or impulses of a particular generation. The 
episcopal ministry extends diachronically as well as synchronically with regard to time. 87 
The Church is therefore, in a manner of speaking, a diachronic democracy: 
Eine Mehrheit, die sich irgendwo gegen den Glauben der Kirche aller Zeiten bilden 
würde, wäre keine Mehrheit: Die wahre Mehrheit in der Kirche ist diachron, die 
                                                          
84 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 87. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Episcopal anonymity is inimical to Ratzinger’s understanding of petrine and episcopal ministries. See this 
dissertation § 5.3.2.; Salt of the Earth, 257; Ratzinger Report, 61-63.  
87 See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 99-100; Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 143; Salt of the Earth, 189. To put 
it another way, Ratzinger says, death is no longer a limit to the Church’s mission: “in this Body [that is, the 
Church], past, present and future interpenetrate. Th  bishop never represents himself alone, and he does n t 
proclaim his own ideas; he is an emissary and, as such, is the messenger of Jesus Christ” (Ratzinger, Called to 
Communion, 99).  
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Zeiten übergreifend, und nur wenn man auf diese ganze Mehrheit hört, bleibt man im 
apostolischen Wir.88 
Therefore, to Ratzinger’s mind, the freedom that we rightly expect from and in the Church 
cannot be achieved by observing the simple majority p nciple. The Church lives 
sacramentally in obedience to Christ, not democratically in submission to the will of the 
prevailing majority: 
[Die Freiheit] beruht nicht darauf, dass sich möglichst viele gegen möglichst wenige 
durchsetzen. Sie beruht darauf, dass niemand seinen g en Willen den anderen 
auferlegen darf, sondern alle sich gebunden wissen an Wort und Wille des Einen, der 
unser Herr und unsere Freiheit ist.89 
Ratzinger anticipates here the requirement on the part of all believers for a free 
personal response in, and amongst, as it were, the diachronic “we” structure of faith because 
the Church’s diachronic “reach” is able to liberate th  individual ego from itself while also 
opening the person to one’s authentic future: “[f]aith explodes the self-absolutization of 
individual presents; by opening them to the faith of all times, it liberates them from 
ideological delusion and at the same time holds open th  future.”90 A distinguishing 
characteristic of the bishop’s mission in this context is to be “spokesman of this diachronic 
majority, of the voice of the Church that unites all epochs,”91 and never merely the voice of 
one particular epoch or sectorial interest. This view of governance is not intended to clash 
with the secular authority per se but rather to uphold the voice of the voiceless.92 In 
                                                          
88 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 97 (“A majority that formed at some juncture against the faith of the 
Church of all times would be no majority: the true majority in the Church reaches diachronically across the ages, 
and only when one listens to this plenary majority does one remain in the apostolic ‘we’”[Ratzinger, Called to 
Communion, 99]). 
89 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 141 (“[. . .] freedom does not rest on the fact that as many as possible 
prevail against as few as possible. Its basis is rathe  that no one may impose his own will on the others, since all 
know themselves to be bound to the word and will of the One who is our Lord and our freedom” [Ratzinger, 
Called to Communion, 146]). 
90 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 99. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See Ratzinger, Zeitfragen und Christlicher Glaube, 22-23, where he further elaborates on what he calls the 
Church’s true “demokratisher Auftrag” or democratic mandate. Those holding ministerial office are the voice of 
those who do not have a voice in society. A group which Ratzinger is particularly keen to acknowledge, as has 
become evident in the course of this chapter, are those who are not professional theologians, trained orators or 
commentators. They depend on the episcopal ministry to epresent them and their “simple,” unpretentious faith 
in Christ in the face of cursory fashions and trends.  
361 
 
particular, this creates a certain tension between bishops and the political rulers of the day, 
and leads to a degree of suffering on the part of the ormer, who may stand for the minority 
view.  
In terms of the Church’s constitution, Ratzinger believes it contains important 
differences when weighed against the contemporary conception of governance. In fact, he 
believes that there is a parallelism between the episco acy and the primacy that expresses 
“the mutual implication of the personal and the community dimensions” of the Church’s 
constitution.93 He suggests that they provide   
[. . .] ein Zusammenspiel des Gemeinschaftsprinzips und der personalen 
Verantwortung auf allen Ebenen, wenn auch mit ganz unterschiedlicher rechtlicher 
Qualität. Der Pfarrer ist mit seiner Gemeinde verbunden; der Bischof mit seinem 
Presbyterium und mit den Mitbischöfen; der Papst mit der Gemeinschaft der 
Bischöfe. Aber zugleich gibt es eine letzte persönliche Verantwortung, die 
unabtretbar, unersetzbar und in kein Kollektiv hinein auflösbar ist – auf der Ebene der 
Pfarrei, auf der Ebene des Bistums, auf der Ebene dr Gesamtkirche.94 
Consequently, Ratzinger strongly advocates viewing Church governance – which used to be 
regarded as monarchical episcopacy – in terms of personal responsibility: 
Die Kirche wird in Personen greifbar und haftbar. Diese Personen können nicht 
willkürlich entscheiden, sondern sie müssen es tun aus ihrer Gewissensbindung an 
den Glauben der ganzen Kirche heraus. Die Kirche als Gemeinschaft, die auf dem 
Gewissen steht, kann es sich leisten, das Gewissen in ihrer Verfassung in Anspruch zu 
nehmen und darin Gemeinschaft und Personen aneinandr zu binden.95 
The bishop’s call to personal responsibility, then, which Ratzinger puts forward, is to 
be understood in conjunction with a readiness to suffer. Given the centrifugal force, so to 
speak, operative in the bishop’s mission as the one call d to robustly represent the local to the 
                                                          
93 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 86. 
94 Ratzinger, Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie, 75 (“[. . .] a harmonious cooperation between the principle of 
community and the principle of personal responsibility at every level, even though there is a wide difference in 
juridical character from level to level. The parish priest is linked to his community; the bishop to his 
presbyterate and to his fellow bishops; the Pope to the communion of bishops. At the same time, there is a final 
personal responsibility which cannot be waived, substituted or dissolved into any collective, whether at the level 
of parish, of the diocese or of the universal Churc” [Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 87]). 
95 Ratzinger, Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie, 76 (“The Church becomes tangible and answerable in p rsons; 
these persons cannot make decisions arbitrarily but only insofar as they are bound in conscience to the faith of 
the universal Church. Since the Church is a communion which stands on conscience, for purposes of 
government, she can legitimately requisition conscien e in order to establish a bond between the community and 
individual persons” [Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 87]). 
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universal Church and the universal in the local Churc , to serve truth in a world of lobbyists 
and ideologues, to be an advocate of creation, to live life as a witness and in the obedience of 
personal responsibility, Ratzinger says it is abundantly clear that the readiness to suffer 
belongs to the episcopal office and to understand it in any other way is to disregard its 
essence:  
Man redet heute viel von der prophetischen Aufgabe der Kirche. Das Wort wird 
manchmal mißbraucht. Aber wahr ist doch, daß die Kirche sich nie einfach mit dem 
Zeitgeist liieren darf. Sie muß die Laster und Gefährdungen einer Zeit ansprechen; sie 
muß den Mächtigen ins Gewissen reden, aber auch den Intellektuellen, denen auch, 
die banausisch und gemütlich an den Nöten einer Zeit vorbeileben wollen und so fort. 
Als Bischof fühlte ich mich verpflichtet, mich diesr Aufgabe zu stellen. Zudem 
waren die Defizite zu offenkundig: Ermüdung des Glaubens, Rückgang der 
Berufungen, Sinken des moralischen Standards gerade auch unter den Menschen der 
Kirche, zunehmende Tendenz zur Gewalt und vieles andere. Mir klingen immer die 
Worte der Bibel wie der Kirchenväter im Ohr, die di Hirten mit großer Schärfe 
verurteilen, die wie stumme Hunde sind und, um Konflikte zu vermeiden, das Gift 
sich ausbreiten lassen. Ruhe ist nicht die erste Bürgerpflicht, und ein Bischof, dem es 
nur darauf ankäme, keinen Ärger zu haben und möglichst alle Konflikte zu 
übertünchen ist für mich eine abschreckende Vision.96 
In contrast to the modern ideals of unfettered liberty, the occupational constraints 
which Ratzinger outlines here can seem irrelevant to the point of the ridiculous. Nevertheless, 
Ratzinger wants to insist that “in the exercise of [its] authority [the Church] must also take 
Christ’s suffering upon herself. What – let’s put it in a purely human way – gives Christ 
credibility is, in fact, that he suffered. And that is also the credibility of the Church. For this 
reason, she also becomes most credible where she ha martyrs and confessors. And where 
things go comfortably, she loses credibility.”97 Therefore, as is highlighted through the 
                                                          
96 Ratzinger, Salz der Erde, 87-88 (“There is a lot of talk today about the Church’s prophetic task. The word is 
sometimes misused. But it is true that the Church may never simply align itself with the Zeitgeist. The Church 
must address the vices and perils of the time; she must appeal to the consciences of the powerful and of the 
intellectuals, not to mention of those who want to live narrow-minded, comfortable lives while ignoring the 
needs of the time, and so forth. As a bishop I felt ob iged to face this task. Moreover, the deficits were too 
obvious: exhaustion of the faith, decline in vocations, lowering of moral standards even among men of the 
Church, an increasing tendency toward violence, and much else. The words of the Bible and of the Churc 
Fathers rang in my ears, those sharp condemnations of shepherds who are like mute dogs; in order to avoid 
conflicts, they let the poison spread. Peace is not the first civic duty, and a bishop whose concern is ot to have 
any problems and to gloss over as many conflicts as pos ible is an image I find repulsive” [Ratzinger, Salt of the 
Earth, 82]).  
97 Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 193-94. 
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martyrological structure of the Church in Ratzinger’s cclesiology, the bishop, as overseer of 
the sphere of growth in freedom, occupies a space in the Church accompanied by suffering 
and ridicule:   
Wer es vor allem als Ehre oder als einflussreiche Stellung ansehen würde, ginge an 
seinem Wesen vorbei. Ohne die Bereitschaft des Leidens kann diese Aufgabe nicht 
wahrgenommen werden. Gerade so steht der Bischof in der Gemeinschaft mit seinem 
Herrn; gerade so weiß er sich als “Diener eurer Freude” (2 Kor 1:24).98   
 
7.6.   Conclusion 
Chapter 7 has examined the ways in which Ratzinger se s the figure of the bishop as a 
constitutive part of the Church’s capacity to uphold and foster the space where growth in 
authentic freedom becomes a reasonable and realisable prospect. In a societal matrix that is 
noticeably anti-institutional, the bishop, as the on  charged precisely with bearing the 
necessary tension between the charismatic and institutional aspects of Christian tradition, 
upholds an office that is latent with potential forbeing misunderstood. This brings about an 
element of personal suffering which is to be embraced. Significantly, Ratzinger does not view 
the diversity of the charismatic and hierarchic charisms as the consequence of two lines of 
separate, and separating, tradition (cf. Matt 5:17; 1 :13; 22:40). In fact, he seems to be 
suggesting that a healthy tension between the prophetic and the hierarchic is precisely the 
response to both anti-charismatic and anti-institutional sentiment.  
Overarching this view in Ratzinger is that idea that religious liberty is a necessary part 
of the Church’s constitution because through it, those who love the faith give their assent to 
its contents and work for excellence, both internally nd with regard to the ecclesial mission 
in the world. The striving for a faith that is reasonable, that has a mature relationship with 
those in authority and that is sensitive to the flow of charisms within the Church are all 
                                                          
98 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 100 (“Whoever regarded this office above all as an honour or as an 
influential position would misunderstand its essential nature. Without the readiness to undergo suffering, this 
task cannot be exercised. Precisely in this way, the bishop is in communion with his Lord; precisely in this way 
he knows himself to be a ‘servant of your joy’ (2Cor 1:24)” [Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 103]). 
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constituent parts of how the Church exists as sphere of growth in authentic freedom. The 
bishop is at the heart of this in a sacramental way th t is transparent to God’s plan of 
salvation. If the apostle is always sent to the ends of the earth (cf. Matt 28:19), then the 
mission of the bishop cannot be exhausted solely within the Church. This is further enhanced 
by the fact that “[t]he Church can never stop at the circle she has gathered.”99 Thus, while the 
bishop may be an overseer of freedom ad intra – of the internal ordering of the Christian life, 
– his mission also shares in a responsibility for the “whole,” ad gentes – as an advocate of the 
Catholic understanding of the goodness of creation to all peoples of the earth. 
In Chapter 6, we saw that Ratzinger’s vision is onef believers growing in authentic 
freedom by means of prayer and a holistic lifestyle of dialogical worship. This ought to be 
supported by God’s gift of the successio framework so that believers can trustingly keep to a
path of pilgrim fellowship, while simultaneously becoming an attractive invitation to the 
whole world to actively participate in a life lived in trust and surrender to the truth of human 
nature. Ratzinger invokes the mystical tradition by describing the ecclesial pilgrimage as one 
that is centred on the primacy of inwardness that makes known God’s will. He believes this 
comes about when the human person strives to harmonise themselves with the inner rhythm 
of Sunday celebration and freedom, thereby coming to know their need for reconciliation 
with their Creator and Redeemer.   
The study of the figure of the bishop in this chapter opens up key aspects of 
Ratzinger’s vision of an ecclesiology of liberation. Through episcopal oversight, the Church 
is sustained according to God’s will as the sphere or meeting place of the personal and 
communal levels of the “I” and the “thou.” The personal relationship of a believer with the 
local Church is of great consequence but remains incomplete unless open to the whole body 
of Christ in, and through, time. The gift of faith deepens through communal encounter with 
                                                          
99 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 231. 
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the Lord in prayer and this demolishes the lie of human self-sufficiency. This simultaneously 
opens the “I” to the “thou” at a personal and communal evel.  
However, the Church in history is not self-serving and an end in itself. This facet of 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology began to emerge in the final subdivision of Chapter 7. At a societal 
level, the Church opens itself up for the benefit of the whole human family. Ratzinger’s 
vision remains incomplete and lacking in a vital component unless we attend more 
comprehensively to the Church’s societal role in the world at large. In the ecclesiology of 





















CHAPTER 8: The Church as Witness: Practising Freedom in the World  
8.0.  Introduction 
As a consequence of contemporary value systems, Ratzinger believes Christianity 
must acknowledge the fact that the psyche of believrs, no less than that of other members of 
society, is possessed of a desire to safeguard personal autonomy. In and of itself a good and 
noble development, he points out that for members of the Church it can lead to “a flight from 
the demands of Christianity and an attempt to have as much of the powers of religion as 
possible and to give as little of oneself as possible, to have to commit oneself as little as 
possible.”1 At the same time, he says it has to be remembered that “God does not want to 
have slaves, whom he simply renders righteous and whom he himself does not take at all 
seriously. It is, rather, a matter of his making men into genuine partners, into real conscious 
agents, who then on the basis of this beginning that he has given them, become capable 
themselves of cooperating and who are also responsible in this cooperation.”2  
The challenge for the Church as witness is to come to t rms with the notion of how 
“our manner of thinking and our actions become thinking and action with Christ and of 
Christ.”3 In the face of this, Ratzinger believes there is a need for a growing awareness of 
“that none-too-easy balance between a proper incarnation in history and the indispensable 
tension toward eternity.”4 This chapter is divided into three sub-divisions dealing with how 
                                                          
1 Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 235. 
2 Ratzinger, God and the World, 452. 
3 General Audience of 13 April 2011 in Benedict XVI, Holy Men and Women of the Middle Ages (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 240.  
4 Ratzinger, Ratzinger Report, 116-17. These comments were made in the context of at empting to build a 
spirituality suitable for the present time. Ratzinger says the early post-conciliar era’s desire for openness to the 
world was sincere, albeit somewhat extremist in its fervour. For him, Christianity has to acknowledge its 
difference with respect to cultural trends and fashions in society. In language that can be interpreted as a 
pessimistic outlook on surrounding cultures, he cautions against naïve conformity with the spirit of the times: 
“Here, too, we must discover the courage of nonconformism in the face of the trends of the affluent world. 
Instead of following the spirit of the times, we ourselves must witness that spirit of nonconformity with 
evangelical seriousness. We have lost the sense that Christians cannot live just like ‘everybody else.’ . . . Today 
more than ever the Christian must be aware that he belongs to a minority and that he is in opposition  
everything that appears good, obvious, logical to the ‘spirit of the world,’ as the New Testament calls it. Among 
the most urgent tasks facing Christians is that of regaining the capacity of nonconformism, i.e. the capacity to 
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the Church can bear witness in the world through fidelity to its own values, including that of 
authentic freedom. To Ratzinger’s mind, this witness commences with a conscientious assent 
to God’s will on the part of the person who then engages with the world by embarking upon a 
life of martyrdom and sanctity. This, in turn, challenges others to contemplate following the 
same path of conscientious assent to the Church’s mis ion. As a result, Ratzinger proposes 
that the Church’s life of worship and its visible social framework would be incomplete and 
self-serving without the acknowledgement of Jesus’ commission to the apostles: “Go into all 
the world and proclaim the good news to the whole creation” (Mark 16:15). His vision is that 
each human person at worship, who becomes a living sacrifice of praise together with all 
others in communion with Christ and with one another, is capable of transforming the world 
by means of a credible pattern of Christian witness.       
8.1.  The Personal Level of Conscience 
At the level of personally undertaking witness in the name of the Church, Ratzinger 
gives primacy to conscience. In the present time, personal conscience is often pitted against 
the authoritative Church. Ratzinger seeks resolution to this in the inner workings of 
conscience which, he says, can be found through contemplation of the “subjectivity” and 
“interiority” that originate in the intellectual and spiritual processes of the human person. He 
understands subjectivity as the responsibility for decision-making from which the free 
creature cannot shrink, and interiority as the taking root within oneself of a certainty about 
something that is true. This sub-division researches how Ratzinger understands that the 
Church’s capacity to witness is, to some extent at least, predicated on the individual believer 
coming to terms with a life of interiority. It is the challenge of harmonising in oneself the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
oppose many developments of the surrounding culture. In other words, today we must revise this euphoric view 
of the early post-conciliar era” (114-15). In the new cultural environment facing the Christian, Ratzinger speaks 
of the need for “[o]ases of true life [that arise] in the desert” (116). See his reflections on civil religion in this 
dissertation § 8.3. 
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subjectivity inherent in the law of freedom and theint riority that facilitates the assimilation 
of truth. In Chapter 5, we have seen Ratzinger view the Church as the receptacle of the 
ecclesio-knowledge of the primacy of God, as the sphere of the sacramental community of 
revelation.5 We now turn to the significance of conscience in establishing that the Church, as 
this receptacle, lives in, and with, the fallible human community of history. Conscience 
stipulates that the law of freedom and the truth of uman nature be observed in a manner 
consistent with the communication of the divine will.   
In the first instance, and notwithstanding the factthat subjectivity is unavoidable in 
the moral decision-making process, Ratzinger points ou  that if it becomes isolated as the 
moral agent’s sole criterion, it orients the human co science on a course that is increasingly 
self-referential. This is inimical to Ratzinger’s understanding of authentic freedom because it 
excludes the human person from a wealth of external resources and means of knowledge 
above and beyond the powers of self-governance and the autonomous individual. With a 
purely subjective conscience, “[n]o door or window would lead from the subject into the 
broader world of being and human solidarity.”6 Ratzinger’s difficulty with the subjective 
approach is that there is little or no chance of prioritising God in the lived conscience. On the 
other hand, interiority, which is the inner journey to the heights of God, and defines the 
human person as a pilgrim, is founded on letting the priority of God take root in us. As Pope, 
he has described “interiority” as something which enables people to break through “the sound 
barrier of finitude” by means of the interior realis tion that I am more than material life.7 At 
this personal and intimate level, Ratzinger believes the space is found whereby human 
subjectivity can grow in its assent to the primacy of God. In such a context, the “yes” of faith 
                                                          
5 See this dissertation § 5.2.1.  
6 Joseph Ratzinger, On Conscience (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 12. 
7 Benedict XVI, Light of the World, 179.  
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is always an event that happens in freedom.8 Such interior freedom, Ratzinger says, is vital 
for believers: 
[. . .] Christentum zum Ersticken verurteilt sein würde, wenn wir nicht etwas von 
Verinnerlichung erfahren, in der der Glaube persönlich in die Tiefe des eigenen 
Lebens hinabsinkt und in ihr mich trägt und erleuchtet. Bloße Aktion und bloß 
intellektuelle Konstrucktion reichen nicht aus. Besinnung auf Einfachheit und auf 
Innerlichkeit und auf die außer- und überrationalen Wahrnehmungsformen von 
Realität ist sehr wichtig.9  
In dealing with subjectivity and interiority as modes of human reasoning, both of 
which are indispensable in the life of freedom, Ratzinger believes the issue of conscience 
reveals the acute challenge facing the Church today. He says that conscience is too often 
depicted as “the bulwark of freedom in contrast to encroachments of authority,”10 such that a 
morality of conscience and a morality of authority are viewed as opposites. However, he 
classifies it as undeniable that judgements of consie ce can contradict each other. Therefore, 
there can be no real freedom in a scenario that assumes the impossibility of there being such a 
thing as an erroneous conscience: “placing freedom in opposition to authority overlooks 
something. There must be something deeper if freedom and, therefore, human existence are 
to have meaning.”11  
In looking for what this something deeper might be, Ratzinger turns to John Henry 
Newman’s famous toast in his letter to the Duke of N rfolk.12 For many people today, the 
“toast” represents an accurate rendering of the opposition between (subjective) conscience 
and (ecclesiastical) authority. However, Ratzinger points out that for Newman the midway 
                                                          
8 See ibid., 174-75; cf. 62-63, 155-58, 179. Interiority is an idea which Ratzinger regularly mentions. He draws 
it from the mystical tradition of prayer but doesn’t ever really develop it in any significant detail. See Ratzinger, 
Ratzinger Report, 116; Salt of the Earth, 267, 269-70. 
9 Ratzinger, Salz der Erde, 284 (“[. . .] Christianity will be doomed to suffocation if we don’t learn something of 
interiorisation, in which faith sinks personally into the depths of one’s own life and in that depth sustains and 
illuminates. Mere action and mere intellectual construction are not enough. It’s very important that we recall 
simplicity and interiority and the extra- and supra-rational forms of perceiving reality” [Ratzinger, Salt of the 
Earth, 267]). 
10 Ratzinger, On Conscience, 11. 
11 Ibid., 13. 
12 Newman’s toast: “Certainly if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not 
seem quite the thing), I shall drink – to the Pope, if you please, – still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope 
afterwards.” Quoted in Ratzinger, On Conscience, 23. 
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point which establishes the connection between authority and subjectivity is truth. In 
Ratzinger’s terminology, this would imply the “necessity to obey recognised truth [rather] 
than [one’s] own preferences.”13 To his mind, this is the awakening of interiority in the 
human person:  
Conscience for Newman does not mean that the subject is the standard vis-à-vis the 
claims of authority in a truthless world, a world tha  lives with a compromise between 
the claims of the subject and the claims of the social rder. Much more than that, 
conscience signifies the perceptible and demanding presence of the voice of truth in 
the subject himself. It is the overcoming of mere subjectivity in the encounter of the 
inferiority of man with the truth of God.14 
 
Ratzinger points to this interior recognition of truth as the primal level of 
conscience.15 Calling it anamnesis, he describes it as akin to “an original memory of the good 
and the true (they are identical) [that] has been implanted in us . . . an inner ontological 
tendency within man, who is created in the likeness of God, toward the divine.”16 While it is 
not a conceptually articulated knowing, it is a capacity to recall and hear an echo of that 
which one’s nature points towards and seeks. It is anamnesis of the Creator, which is 
identical to the ground of one’s existence. In short, Ratzinger suggests, “[c]onscience also 
signifies in some way the voice of God within us.”17 At the primal level, Ratzinger interprets 
                                                          
13 Ratzinger, On Conscience, 25. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See ibid., 30-41 for a full account of Ratzinger’s rendering of the two levels of conscience. The first, 
ontological level of conscience was known as synderesis in the Middle Ages.  The focus of this dissertation is 
on this first level of conscience as distinct from the second narrower level which comes into play as the act of 
judgement in a particular situation and is, of its nature, always unique. Ratzinger tries to recover a gre ter focus 
on this first level, prefering to define it by the platonic term anamnesis (recollection, primal memory). The 
second level, conscientia, proceeds from the anamnesis, as the faculty of judgement and decision. While the 
modern understanding has focused largely on the second level, Ratzinger tries to reaffirm the medieval tr dition 
of two levels of conscience. Otherwise the necessary decision-making process of every free creature is 
decoupled from knowledge and truth and what remains is the virtual impossibility of free actions performed by 
responsible moral agents. For an exhaustive analysis of Ratzinger’s understanding of conscience, see Twomey, 
Pope Benedict XVI, 80-137. It is to be noted, however, that Twomey dscribes the “Gordian knot at the heart of 
[the] contemporary crisis in the Church and in the world [as] . . . the triumph of subjectivity, the dnial of man’s 
capacity for truth, and so, for God” (Twomey, Benedict XVI, 121). This may seem contradictory to the 
constructive definition of subjectivity which I attribute to Ratzinger, namely, the responsibility in decision-
making from which the free creature cannot shrink. From the perspective of the human will, of course, it is 
correct to say that the subject is responsible for their choices but the point that Twomey puts across is that when 
the subject is the sole factor in moral decision-making, then it leads precisely to the denial of any uthoritative 
voice beyond the self. The exclusion of such a voice would indeed turn into a triumph for subjectivity.   
16 Ratzinger, On Conscience, 32. 
17 Ibid., 59.  
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Newman’s “toast” by saying that namnesis “expresses the thought of a kind of co-
knowledge of man with God, and precisely from here there emerges the absoluteness with 
which conscience asserts its superiority over any and all authorities.”18 What Ratzinger calls 
“anthropology of conscience” consists in a double-tiered anamnesis. In the first place, 
anamnesis needs help “from without” to become aware of itself;  secondly, it has a “maieutic 
function” imposing nothing foreign but bringing to fruition “from within” what is proper to 
anamnesis, namely, its interior openness to the truth.19 Again Ratzinger believes this is 
consistent with the meaning of Newman’s “toast” andthe papal mandate not to exert external 
constraint but to support the “sureness of Christian memory” from within: 
The true sense of the teaching authority of the pope consists in his being the advocate 
of the Christian memory. The pope does not impose from without. Rather, he 
elucidates the Christian memory and defends it. For this reason the toast to conscience 
indeed must precede the toast to the pope, because without conscience there would 
not be a papacy. All power that the papacy has is power of conscience. It is service to 
the double memory on which faith is based – and which again and again must be 
purified, expanded, and defended against the destruction of memory that is threatened 
by a subjectivity forgetful of its own foundation, as well as by the pressures of social 
and cultural conformity.20 
Following closely a distinction made by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann 
(b. 1927), Ratzinger says conscience is an organ, not an oracle.21 An organ is part of one’s 
essence, it is not something made outside of us, and yet it requires growth, training and 
practice. Hence, to Ratzinger’s mind, the human beig is a speaking essence but becomes so 
only in so far as one learns speech from others: “Conscience requires formation and 
                                                          
18 Ibid., 51-52. 
19 See ibid., 34-36. When Ratzinger speaks about truth in this context, he is speaking about the truth of who we 
are, the truth of human nature. This recalls the cat gories of monotheism and creatureliness which Ratzinger 
calls upon when coming to terms with human freedom. See this dissertation §§ 4.1.3. to 4.1.3.2.  
20 Ratzinger, On Conscience, 36. Memory is an important term for Ratzinger. He believes that “memory” plays 
a significant role in the anthropological foundation f the concept of tradition. Through the operation of human 
intellect, memory allows the cumulative wisdom of human experience to accompany us through history. In other 
words, memory generates tradition by realising it in history. As a result, tradition is constitutive of that which is 
truly human. In fact, he argues that memory actually becomes tradition through communication, through the 
“sharing-with” (Mit-teilung) of memory. To his mind, tradition is the trans-temporal passage of memory in 
history. Tradition is, in effect, the transcendence of “today” in both directions – past and future. However, in the 
modern-age tradition has come to be regarded as the binding of humanity to the past – as something opposed by 
the human orientation to the future. See Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, 88-106.     




education. It can become stunted, it can be stamped out, it can be falsified so that it can only 
speak in a stunted or distorted way. The silence of conscience can become a deadly sickness 
for an entire civilisation.”22 According to Ratzinger, it is this “silencing” of the primal level 
of conscience that is the primary locus in the struggle for an authentic philosophy of freedom. 
He highlights the contemporary logic that stands in the way of the Christian understanding of 
truth: “Is not the truth, at least as the faith of the Church shows it to us, too lofty and difficult 
for man?”23 In reply to such logic, Ratzinger believes that tru h requires the Church to 
recognise itself as “the advocate of the reason of creation” in the maelstrom of society where 
there is confusion about the nature of the world’s origin and its freedom.24 
Ratzinger says a tension accompanies the Church’s task because the temptation 
inherent in modern rationalism is to believe that “freedom, like reason, is a by-product of the 
self-construction of the world.”25 Contrary to this, to his mind, the presentation of a Christian 
synthesis that listens to creative reason via the “link to the Logos, guarantees freedom as the 
structural principle of what really exists.”26 To Ratzinger’s mind, this is the heart of the 
Church’s vocation – to accompany conscience as the human person strives towards authentic 
freedom. Ultimately, he concedes, the repudiation of the authentic philosophy of freedom by 
the Church would be the renunciation of its guardianship of being and its own moral 
significance – “the Church would betray, not only her own message, but the destiny of 
humanity.”27 The Church, he says, “must set standards, and she must awaken both the will 
                                                          
22 Ratzinger, On Conscience, 62. There are echoes here of Ratzinger’s image of the maternal Church forming 
our voice to dialogue and pray. See this dissertation § 6.1. 
23 Ratzinger, On Conscience, 38. 
24 Ibid., 67. In practice, this extends the bishop’s role of oversight to the whole Church. See this disertation § 
7.2. 
25 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 115. It may be helpful here to recall Ratzinger’s vision of modern 
rationalism as an intellectual synthesis formed from the assumptions of belief in progress, an absolutization of 
scientific-technical civilisation, and the promise of the new humanity within time and history. See ibid. 114-16; 
this dissertation § 2.2.4.  
26 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 116. 
27 Ratzinger, On Conscience, 67-68. 
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and the power of people to respond to these standards.”28 The task of the Church is concretely 
realised when it strives to awaken the primal level of conscience.    
If it is the Church’s task to awaken this primal level of conscience, in what way does 
it endeavour to fulfil this commission? Ratzinger say  that Christian morality requires a “we” 
– which, in terms of the diachronic nature of the Church, means “it requires a link with the 
experience of past generations and with the primitive wisdom of humanity.”29 Consequently, 
the question of moral theology and its relationship with divine revelation is one that he is 
anxious to address. Ratzinger points to four sources of moral knowledge which ensure that 
human civilisation permanently has the prospect of living in a manner consistent with its 
nature: an examination of reality and the reason which knows and explains reality, 
conscience, the wisdom of tradition, and the will of G d. These cooperate with each other, 
broadening out a debate in danger of being restricted to a struggle for freedom premised on 
the impossibility of there being such a thing as an erroneous conscience in the face of 
external authority. 
Ratzinger says that just as an exclusively subjectiv  conscience can be an erroneous 
organ, similarly “the various concrete community exp riences of different races and peoples 
are valuable as signposts for human behaviour, but by themselves cannot be considered 
sources for morality.”30 In other words, notwithstanding the fact that the community is 
undoubtedly an aid to morality, the experience of the community alone cannot provide a sure 
and lasting basis to sustain moral reasoning. Consequently, Ratzinger says  
[i]t is impossible in the long run to have a society that lives, as it were, only as a 
reaction from what is negative and evil. If a society wishes to survive, it must to a 
certain extent return to the primitive virtues, to the basic standard models of 
humanity.31 
                                                          
28 Ibid., 45.  
29 Ibid., 54. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid.  
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Therefore, while he acknowledges the value of reliance on common historical experience and 
custom, Ratzinger believes there are limits to its efficacy. It can happen that “important areas 
of life in a society . . . become corrupt, so that t e predominant custom of men and women 
does not guide but seduces, as in a society with the custom of cannibalism, slavery, or the 
dependence on drugs.”32 Consequently, he says, there is an unconditional chara ter to 
morality which must, ultimately, have recourse to the unconditional character of God’s will: 
in its origins “morality was founded on a divine revelation of will, out of which alone a 
community could emerge and in accord with which the survival of the community as such 
was guaranteed.”33 To Ratzinger’s mind, the Church, as the sphere of the sacramental 
community of revelation dwelling in and with this fallible human community of history, 
sustains the law of freedom in moral decision-making. The Church supports growth in 
authentic freedom through its advocacy of a synthesis of understanding, will and heart on the 
part of the human person. Thereby, the Church upholds that  
[. . .] God alone can be the measure of man and . . . only the divine will can 
unconditionally oblige man. Christian faith is further convinced that revelation 
situates us in the community life model of a “we” whose nature and direction cannot 
be explained simply in terms of the human will alone.34 
The Church, Ratzinger believes, anticipates an important confirmation of its divine 
commission in the fact that, within it, the four sources of moral knowledge interpenetrate and 
illuminate each other. Were any of these to be isolated, they would be insufficient to act as 
the pathway to moral decision-making. Alongside conscience, as the voice of the Creator 
within, there is the need for an examination of the concrete world, even though, as Ratzinger 
says, “reality” alone is not enough. The wisdom of tradition is a third and necessary source 
which is formed by the living “we” which, for the believer, is concretely realised via the 
diachronic community of the Church. These three sources together, Ratzinger says – 
                                                          
32 Ibid., 54-55. 
33 Ibid., 55. 
34 Ibid.  
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“objectivity, tradition, and conscience – in turn point to the divine commandments.”35 The 
fourth source, the will of God, is what makes for true morality because “only the will of God 
can establish the boundary between good and evil, which is something different from the 
boundary between what is useful or not or what is proved and what is unknown.”36 
Through this four-fold configuration, the Church’s teaching “brings conscience to 
expression.”37 At the level of personal being, Ratzinger’s presentation for coming to terms 
with conscience accords very well with the concept of human ecology and the need to respect 
human nature. Of the two forms of synthesis that Ratzinger proposes as marking the axis of 
tension in the modern intellectual history of freedom, the Christian synthesis, as opposed to 
modern rationalism, affirms the equation that “the language of being, the language of nature, 
is identical with the language of conscience.”38 The Church, as advocate for the reason of 
creation, upholds that“[t]here is a reason for being, and when man separates himself from it 
totally and recognises the reason only of what he himself has made, then he abandons what is 
precisely moral in the strict sense.”39 
Few theologians today doubt that the medieval and metaphysical Christian self-
understanding has altered in the course of the modern era and that it remains a development 
which theology has still not systematically comprehended.40 Ratzinger is convinced that the 
basis for a resolution lies in the observance of the Creator Spirit that marks the universe. This 
is possible he says, because, “[o]ne can point out that human freedom gives us a glimpse of 
the original creative freedom, of God; or that human seeking and questioning cannot come to 
                                                          
35 Ibid., 57. 
36 Ibid. See also Ratzinger, “The Church’s Teaching Authority – Faith – Morals,” in Heinz Schürmann et al.,
Principles of Christian Morality, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Pre s, 1986), 47-73.  
37 Ratzinger, On Conscience, 57. 
38 Ibid., 67. 
39 Ibid.  
40 See Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 77-82. His description of this medieval view is that “God had his fixed 
place in the gradated structure of the world: the firmament; metaphysics was tangible, as it were, in the 
hierarchy that led from the nethermost and dullest evel, the earth, to ever higher and more spiritual spheres and 
finally to the pure light, to the Mover of the universe” (78).  
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rest in positivistic findings alone and urges us on to the creative ‘Thou’ without whom the ‘I’ 
remains inexplicable.”41 For the Church as witness, proclaiming a Creator God means 
affirming him as the universal “yes” to creation. This ought to be central to the life of faith 
because Christianity is secure in the knowledge of the unity of the Father and the Son, of 
Creator and Redeemer, and understands God as both the origin and measure of all that is.42  
From the perspective of an ecclesiology of liberation, Ratzinger holds the personal 
level of conscience as essential for ecclesial life. This is true because conscience, to his mind, 
is where one grows in a life of interiority, whereby subjectivity and truth mutually interpret 
and purify each other. The free creature is bound to the responsibility of decision-making, but 
must seek external supports which guide the freedom to seek the truth. A believer engaged 
with what Ratzinger elucidates as a double-tiered anamnesis becomes a significant part of the 
Church’s commission to witness by drawing society’s notice to the primacy of God in 
creation.  This primal level of conscience accepts help from outside itself to become aware of 
its situation, on the one hand, and it lives an inter or openness to the truth from within itself, 
on the other. The truth to which Ratzinger refers is both the encounter with the original 
creative freedom upon which life is grounded, and the consequent truth inherent in human 
nature to which humanity and its prosperity is ordere . Growth in authentic freedom 
manifests itself through this ordering of human life. A human person who engages with 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 81. 
42 Christology forms the ground of Ratzinger’s reflections on the theology of creation. From an ecclesioogical 
perspective, his account of conscience is grounded in the belief that ecclesial communion grows through the life 
of interiority in each believer, since Christ, the logos in creation, is the perfect form of one’s own humanity: “[. . 
.] what is universal about creation connects with what is quite personal about conscience: in the conscie ce, in 
the quiet knowledge that man shares with the inmost foundation of creation, the Creator is present as Creator to 
the man. The Christian God is a God of conscience: he is the completely interior God, because he is the 
completely universal One. As the Lord, he is at the same time the deepest centre of our self. . . . [A]s Logos, 
God is ‘over all’ and ‘in all’ at the same time. He is not a foreign exterior for things but, rather, their inmost 
interior. . . . But precisely in this most profound i -being [In-sein], his infinite transcendence [Über-sein] 
remains. In Jesus of Nazareth I encounter the most authentic features of my self, and therefore I can speak with 
him, therefore I can understand him, therefore I can become one body, that is, one single existence with him and 
those who are his. Therefore, however, I also remain ever on the way to him, because he is always infinitely 
more” (Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 93-95). 
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subjectivity and with truth in this way is sincerely living in a way consistent with the will of 
the Creator and is thereby witnessing to a positive force for good in the world.  
8.2. The Communal Level of Martyrdom and Sainthood 
Alongside the indispensable personal assent of conscience required of those 
participating in the life of the Church, Ratzinger highlights the compelling nature of 
communal witness as a presence in society. Here, he proposes the need for a two-fold 
manifestation of martyrdom and sainthood. In the modern world, Ratzinger believes the 
combined witness of martyrdom and sanctity proposes a precise principle to the world: “[l]ife 
reaches farther than our biological existence.”43 This principle serves to remind the world of 
the widest possible dimensions of truth and the full st dimensions of the human person’s 
freedom. For this to be meaningful, Ratzinger’s ecclesiological assertion is that the Church 
must exhibit authenticity born out of conviction and ot coercion: 
[Die Kirche] muß überzeugen, denn nur, indem sie Übrzeugung schafft, öffnet sie 
den Raum für das, was ihr übergeben ist, und immer nur auf dem Weg der Freiheit, 
das heißt über Verstand, Wille und Gefühl zugänglich werden kann. Die Kirche muß 
leidensbereit sein, nicht durch Macht, sondern durch den Geist, nicht durch 
institutionelle Stärke, sondern durch Zeugnis, durch Liebe, Leben, Leiden dem 
Göttlichen den Raum bereiten und so der Gesellschaft helfen, ihre moralische 
Identität zu finden.44 
Firstly, with regard to the ground of witness, Ratzinger believes the Church manifests 
itself through its martyrological profile of call and response.45 Consequently, if it is the case 
that the bonds of communion in ecclesial life reach farther than our biological existence, then 
Ratzinger believes that rendering witness entails a twofold internal-external dynamic. Where 
there is no longer  anything worth dying for –  anything worth the effort of total self-
                                                          
43 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 155. 
44 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 126 (“[The Church] must convince, for it is only b convincing that she 
opens up space for what has been entrusted to her; and this can be made accessible only along the path of 
freedom, which means via reason, will and emotion. The Church must be ready to suffer. She must prepare 
space for the divine, not through power but through spirit, not through institutional strength but through witness, 
through love, life and suffering: and in this way she must help society to find its moral identity” [Ratzinger, A 
Turning Point for Europe, 179]). 
45 See this dissertation § 5.3.2. 
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dispossession –  then even life itself is no longer worth living. Ratzinger wants to show that 
the task for the Church is to create a sphere of ablatio within the person whereby the martyr, 
for the sake of the “whole”, dies to self and lives for Christ. This also echoes the purificatory 
role of prayer.46 However, sustaining faith on this scale requires a community of purpose. 
Ratzinger invokes St Paul, saying that the one “communion-ing” with Christ has one’s eyes 
opened enough to learn that “[n]one of us lives for himself, and no one dies for himself. If we 
live, we live for the Lord; if we die, we die for the Lord; whether we live or die, we are the 
Lord’s” (Rom 14:7f).47 In the setting of ecclesial communion, the martyr reveals that 
suffering which subjects itself to a concrete application of ablatio carries meaning for the 
whole and thus turns to rejoicing as the fulfilment of God’s will. Hence, in the midst of a 
two-fold invisible-visible dynamic, the martyr is true to self, while the Church, as a whole, is 
completed as God, in Christ, willed it: 
In der Gemeinschaft mit Christus wird der Schmerz sinnvoll, nicht nur für mich 
selbst, als Prozess der “ablatio,” in der Gott die Schlacken von mir nimmt, die sein 
                                                          
46 See this dissertation § 6.1. 
47 In relation to Ratzinger’s presentation, it is important to appreciate that blatio incorporates the burden of 
suffering which people carry. In the structure of faith, he maintains that “[a] world-view that is incapable of 
giving even pain meaning and value is good for nothi g. It falls short precisely at the hour of the most serious 
crisis of existence” (Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 155). He says people who have nothing else to add except 
that we must fight against suffering deceive us. While it is true that everything should be done to lessen the 
needless suffering of innocent people, he points ou that it is also true that there is no human life without 
suffering. To his mind, ablatio reveals the deep Christian meaning of suffering as purificatory. Consequently, 
“he who is incapable of accepting suffering is refusing himself the purifications that alone allow us to reach 
maturity” (ibid.). From the ecclesiological perspective, martyrdom expresses the Christian meaning of suffering, 
and it is a concrete realisation of ecclesial communion. The martyr’s external witness for the sake of the 
Church’s visible unity is combined with their internal witness for the sake of the Church’s invisible union with 
the Father. The former is conducted within an oft-times sceptical and unreceptive world; the latter as a process 
of on-going reconciliation and personal renewal. While Ratzinger does not use the language of the invisible and 
visible dimensions in relation to martyrological witness, I have introduced them here because, it seems to e 
that both dimensions, which are necessarily and mutually inclusive in the martyr, render present a concrete 
application of the visible and invisible elements of ecclesial communion. As is the case with the Eucharist, 
martyrdom is not the beginning of ecclesial communion. Rather, it is its lived expression: “The celebration of 
the Eucharist . . . cannot be the starting-point for communion; it presupposes that communion already exists, a 
communion which it seeks to consolidate and bring to perfection. The sacrament is an expression of this bond of 
communion both in its invisible dimension, which, in Christ and through the working of the Holy Spirit, unites 
us to the Father and among ourselves, and in its visible dimension, which entails communion in the teaching of 
the Apostles, in the sacraments and in the Church's hierarchical order. The profound relationship between the 
invisible and the visible elements of ecclesial communion is constitutive of the Church as the sacrament of 
salvation” (John Paul II, Encyclical Letter on the Eucharist in its Relationship to the Church, Ecclesia de 
Eucharistia [17 April 2003], 35: AAS 95 [2003], 457; cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to 
the Bishops of the Catholic Church on Some Aspects of he Church Understood as Communion, Communionis 
notio [28 May 1992], 4: AAS 85 [1993], 839-840). 
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Bild verdecken, sondern über mich hinaus fürs Ganze, so dass wir alle mit St. Paulus 
sagen können: “Nun aber freue ich mich meiner Leiden für euch und ergänze so in 
meinem Fleische, was an den Drangsalen Christi nochfehlt für seinen Leib, die 
Kirche (Kol 1:24).48  
With regard to the effects of ablatio, Ratzinger looks at the concept of forgiveness 
and authentic renewal rendered to the Church and the world by the action of martyrs. He says 
that renewal and reform in the community comes through the act of forgiveness and 
reparation on the part of each individual member. Grounded in the faith dimension of his 
ecclesiology, whereby faith requires community, Ratzinger says “[f]orgiveness, together with 
its realisation in me by way of penance and discipleship, is first of all the wholly personal 
centre of all renewal.”49 And because true forgiveness touches the very core of the person, it 
gathers people together and becomes the “centre of he renewal of the community.”50 Only 
with such self-sacrificing faith can the Church witness in the world to the place of true life: 
“It is only then that [the Church] will become a spacious house with many mansions; it is 
then that the multiplicity of the gifts of the Spirit will be free to operate in her.”51 Ratzinger 
says the Church comes into being ever anew as a communion that binds in life and death 
through the deep and personal renewal rendered by mart rdom. Indeed, to his mind, it is the 
martyrological that brings us to see the Church in the right order of magnitude: 
Die Kirche, das ist nicht nur die kleine Gruppe von Aktivisten, die sich an einem Ort 
zusammenfinden, um gemeindliches Leben in Gang zu bringen. Die Kirche – das ist 
auch nicht bloß die Schar derer, die sich sonntags zur Eucharistiefeier 
zusammenfinden. Endlich – die Kirche ist auch mehr als Papst, Bischöfe und Priester, 
                                                          
48 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 149 (“In communion with Christ, pain becomes meaningful, not only 
for myself, as a process of ablatio in which God purges me of the dross that conceals his image, but beyond me, 
for the whole. So that we can all say with St. Paul: ‘But now I rejoice in my sufferings for you and so complete 
in my flesh what is still lacking in the afflictions of Christ for the sake of his body, the Church’ [Col 1:24]” 
[Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 155]). 
49 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 153. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 156. The theme of death to self and rebirth in Christ is not an optional course of action when co sidered 
from the viewpoint of the New Testament evidence, nor is it confined to pauline texts. Taking up and following 
Christ’s cross (Matt 16: 24-26; Mark 8:34-9:1; Luke 9:23-34) is the beginning of saying goodbye to self-
sufficiency (Luke 14:25-33), and of putting our passions and desires in proper perspective (Gal 5:34; 1Pet 2:24).  
Considering oneself dead (Col 3:3-7; Rom 6:11-14; 7: -6; 8:12-13) is sharing in Christ’s death which is not 
optional for the one following him (John 12:24; Rom 6:2-4; 12:1-2; Gal 6:14). This dying with Christ (Rom 6:5-




die Träger des sakramentalen Auftrags. Alle die Genannten gehören zur Kirche, aber 
der Radius der “Weggenossenschaft,” in die wir mit dem Glauben eintreten, reicht 
weiter – über die Grenzen des Todes hinaus.52 
In the important area of justice and peace in the world – something that very much 
concerns the martyrological – Ratzinger believes it i  very important to distinguish between 
what the Church “must do . . . and what she neither can nor should do.”53 The Church’s great 
task is “to keep alive, in fidelity to her holy tradition, the basic criterion of justice and to 
detach it from the arbitrariness of power.”54 This, in turn, consists of a responsibility for the 
Church to carry conviction and to help every generation to see with and through Jesus what 
they cannot see by their own powers, so that, in the conflict between utility and truth, truth 
does not suffer. It equally requires that the Churc be an educator to “break open the prison 
of positivism and awaken man’s receptivity to the truth, to God, and thus to the power of 
conscience.”55 Ratzinger says that collectively, as believers, witness to this receptivity 
operates in a two-fold manner. On the one hand, believers are themselves inspired and 
formed in the Church to witness in the world. On the other hand, through their witness, 
believers form and inspire non-believers towards belief or civil religion or both.56 Thus we 
can say that the Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom consists of an internal 
movement within believers and an external movement from believers. In large measure, this 
captures the essence of our research so far in this chapter.  
 With regard to what the Church must not do in society, Ratzinger urges the 
renunciation of direct political action. In other words, the Church must accept it is not the 
                                                          
52 Ratzinger, Zur Gemeinschaft gerufen, 147- 48 (“The Church is not only the small group of activists who come 
together in a given place in order to set parish life in motion. Nor is the Church merely the crowd of those who 
meet on Sunday to celebrate the Eucharist. Finally, the Church is also more than the pope, bishops and priests, 
the holders of sacramental office. All those whom we have mentioned belong to the Church, but the radius of 
the ‘company’ (compagnia) into which we enter by faith reaches farther – beyond the limits of death” 
[Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 153-54]). 
53 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 60. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid., 61. 
56 See this dissertation § 8.3. 
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sole arbitrator of political reason – the autonomy of political reasoning is to be respected. It 
must therefore bear in mind that highlighting the foundational sources and principles of 
secular law forms part of its responsibility, whereas formulating specific answers to concrete 
political questions does not: “[the Church] points out paths for reason to follow, and yet 
reason’s own responsibilities remain.”57 The Church forms people in accordance with the 
basic criterion of truth and inspires them to witness and live by it. The Church, therefore, 
cannot enforce peace and harmony in the world, nor have Church leaders any authority to 
take direct political action. Ratzinger says the Churc  “must not be transformed into a kind of 
political peace movement, whose only raison d’être would be the attaining of perpetual world 
peace. . . . [A] God who becomes the means to supposedly higher ends is no longer God; in 
fact, he has given away his divinity to something higher, whose cause he must serve.”58  
An important ecclesiological insight which emerges h re from Ratzinger’s reflections 
on the relationship between the Church and society is that “[o]nly when [the Church] respects 
her limits is she limitless.”59 In other words, the collective witness of the Churc  and its 
members must come to terms with their rightful place in the civic space, thereby helping all 
members of society to make a positive contribution o the common good.60 Otherwise, “[t]he 
Church does less, not more, for peace if she abandons her own sphere of faith, education, 
                                                          
57 Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe, 63. 
58 Ibid., 64-5. Ratzinger says that the key role in the building up of peace is to instil an ethos of reconciliation in 
a world where there are immensely complex and difficult political conflicts between people and nations. The 
Church “must give men the strength to survive and, with the power of forgiveness, awaken the capacity to make 
a new start. Only a man who can forgive can build an  preserve peace” (64).   
59 Ibid., 65. 
60 He believes the “challenge of the hour” is that, “despite all the Christian self-criticism which has become ever 
more intense and radical since the Enlightenment, we ought to find our way back to an awareness of the great 
moral tradition of Christianity, to the pre- or meta-dogmatic core (so to speak) of its moral constant, and to 
recognise this as our spiritual and intellectual identity, on the basis of which we can live” (Ratzinger, A Turning 
Point for Europe, 177). Against this background he asks that the Church be true to its nature and not allow itself 
to be downgraded to a mere means for morality – something the liberal state wished for. To try to justify he 
Church’s presence in the world through the usefulness of its social works would be self-depreciating: “The more 
the Church aims directly at what in her ought to be something ‘of itself extraneous,’ so to speak, the more she 
will fail in this attempt” (ibid.). For Ratzinger, to attempt to “sneak past the faith, removing the provocatory 
character of the Trinity and life beyond death as well as the biblical narratives by reducing these to the level of 
symbols” is to “bracket off dogma” because it is viewed as invalid. It is “to bow to that ‘fear of the truth’ in 
which the spiritual and intellectual decline of thepr sent day has its roots” (178).  
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witness, counsel, prayer, and serving love in order to transform itself into an organisation for  
direct political action.”61   
In order to achieve this, Ratzinger says, the Church as witness must be mindful of its 
prerogatives and limitations in the commission to preach the Gospel by conviction and not 
coercion. From the perspective of an ecclesiology of liberation, the Church-society question 
entails the prospect of a believer being able to freely and fruitfully witness to their beliefs for 
the good of society. Ratzinger’s opposition to promises of inner-worldly realisations of 
perfect liberation is precisely because it sterilises any such prospect of freely communicated 
witness beyond the mandatory political narrative of the day. His view is that “there is no 
definitive human condition within history.”62 A freedom brought about by historical necessity 
in that way would not be freedom and, in this respect, Ratzinger maintains that to attempt to 
create the “natural laws of freedom” is self-contradictory. The human person, at every 
moment, remains free to accept or reject the mantle of martyrdom in the world – there cannot 
be coercion: 
[. . .] kann es innerhalb der menschlichen Geschichte niemals eine endgültig stabile, 
unumkehrbare Gesellschaftsordnung geben, weil der Mensch frei bleibt und daher 
auch die Freiheit behält, Gutes zu Negativem zu verändern. Würde ihm diese Freiheit 
von irgendeiner Gesellschaft endgültig genommen, so wäre diese Gesellschaft die 
absolute Tyrannei und damit gerade keine gut geordnte Gesellschaft.63   
Such a definitively liberated society, Ratzinger says, could only be definitive slavery. Were 
such a definitively structured milieu the norm, acknowledging and witnessing to the capacity 
of Christian love and virtue, above and beyond one’s externally assembled environment, 
would be irrational. For that reason the freedom to decide for or against expressing oneself in 
Christian witness always remains an open question. Only as an “open question” can there be 
                                                          
61 Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa, 43 [own translation]. 
62 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 253. See this dissertation §§ 2.1 to 2.2.4. 
63 Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 229 (“[A] definitive[ly] stable, irreversible social order can never 
exist within history because man remains free and thus retains his freedom to change the good into the negative. 
Were this freedom to be taken from him by some society, this society would be an absolute tyranny and, thus, 
not a well-ordered society at all” [Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 241]). 
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any concept of martyrological outreach in the name of the Church. If freedom is to be free, so 
to speak, it has to contain the capacity to act above and beyond the prevailing cultural and 
socio-economic conventions of the day. To Ratzinger’s mind then, the collective witness of 
the Church’s presence in society upholds the fact that the Christian philosophy of freedom 
opposes a deterministic society devoid of divine and human initiative.  
The law of freedom, then, makes room for God’s action in the world and, to 
Ratzinger’s mind, the foremost example of this in the course of the Church’s history is found 
in the witness of human sanctity. In the context of the Church’s witness, Ratzinger believes 
the “communion of saints” is a fitting attribution to describe its demeanour and mission. In 
fact, the saints demonstrate that the universal call to holiness is the basis for the life of joy 
and freedom.64 He points out that, contrary to one-sided hagiographical narratives that leave 
us with the impression of other-worldliness, the saints are not self-sufficient beings. He 
describes them as windows that look onto God’s eternity. He says one ought to consider them 
as “older brothers and sisters in the family of God. They want to take us by the hand and lead 
us, and their lives tell us: ‘If this person or that could do it, why can’t I?’”65 Ratzinger has 
long held the belief that saints are signs that tell h  world that sanctity is real, giving people 
the strength to strive in that direction.66 In other words, a believer’s everyday goodness 
demonstrates the truth of faith. 
In the context of a general audience that concluded two years of Catecheses on the 
saints, Benedict XVI said that in the great plurality amongst the communion of saints, there 
exists an openness to the Holy Spirit which transforms them “like small pieces in the great 
mosaic of holiness that God continues to create in history, so that the face of Christ may shine 
                                                          
64 See Chapter 5 of Lumen gentium. See also Benedict XVI, Meeting with the Parish Priests and the Clergy of 
Rome, February 14, 2013. See   
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2013/february/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20130214_clero-roma_en.html (assessed March 6, 2013).   
65 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 362. 
66 See Ratzinger, God and the World, 457-58.  
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out in the fullness of its splendour.”67 During the course of the audience, the Pope pointed out 
that a holy life, rather than being primarily the result of one’s own efforts, “has its deepest 
root in the grace of baptism, in being grafted on to the Paschal Mystery of Christ, by which 
his Spirit is communicated to us, his very life as the Risen One.”68 Nevertheless, while the 
Pope acknowledges that the deep root of holiness is baptismal grace and its transformative 
power in the human person, “God always respects our freedom and asks that we accept this 
gift and live the requirements it entails, and he asks that we let ourselves be transformed by 
the action of the Holy Spirit, conforming our will to the will of God.”69 Part of the drama of 
the present time, to Ratzinger’s mind, is the way in which a causality of love founded on 
freedom is confronted with a growing determinism which has lost faith in the freedom to 
choose to love.70 As Pope he quotes the Second Vatican Council to clarify that “the soul of 
holiness” is “charity lived to the full.”71  
Even in the 1970’s Ratzinger was grappling deeply with this question of the Church’s 
presence in society and had largely formulated a view on it which was based on the sanctity 
of its members. From the crisis of today, he said at the time, the Church of tomorrow will 
emerge, and while it will be smaller, it will be a more spiritualised and simplified Church 
making greater demands on its members. In fact, he forecasted that the Church that will 
                                                          
67 General Audience of 13 April 2011 in Benedict XVI, Holy Men and Women of the Middle Ages, 243. On that 
occasion, Benedict XVI described the saints as “signposts” for the Church’s life – the few great saints and the 
many inconspicuous saints make it clear, he says, that the concept of holiness must be understood in a 
sufficiently broad sense because sanctity manifests itself in many forms. In a personal note, the Pope not d that 
“[t]his goodness, which [the saints] have developed in the faith of the Church, is for me the most reliable 
apology of Christianity and the sign of where the truth lies.” 
68 Ibid., 240. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See Ratzinger, Feast of Faith, 31-32. 
71 Benedict XVI, Holy Men and Women of the Middle Ages, 240-41, quoting from LG, 42: “Indeed, in order that 
love, as good seed may grow and bring forth fruit in the soul, each one of the faithful must willingly hear the 
Word of God and accept His Will, and must complete what God has begun by their own actions with the help of 
God's grace. These actions consist in the use of the sacraments and in a special way the Eucharist, frequent 
participation in the sacred action of the Liturgy, application of oneself to prayer, self-abnegation, lively fraternal 
service and the constant exercise of all the virtues.” The same article in the constitution goes on to speak of 
martyrdom as the making of a profession of faith in the midst of persecution and the transformation of a believer 
into the image of the Master. See also Salt of the Earth, 282-83; God and the World, 278-81. 
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emerge will be more in keeping with the law of freedom and will come to be seen as “home,” 
where life and hope beyond death are found:   
Denn die Menschen einer ganz und gar geplanten Welt werden unsagbar einsam sein. 
Sie werden, wenn ihnen Gott ganz entschwunden ist, ihre volle, schreckliche Armut 
erfahren. Und sie werden dann die kleine Gemeinschaft des Glaubenden als etwas 
ganz Neues entdecken. Als eine Hoffnung, die sie ang ht, als eine Antwort, nach der 
sie im Verborgenen immer gefragt haben.72  
It is in this context that he acknowledges the lives of the saints as a principal source of 
inspiration whereby the Church can authentically resid  in the civic space. In Ratzinger’s 
broad vision of sanctity, saints – official and inco spicuous – are people drawn from the 
world who strive for holiness of life and whose hearts stretch out in hope and love. He says 
that “islands of spiritual concentration” will very much be found in the landscape of the 
Church’s future as a means of manifesting a mode of being consistent with humanity’s social 
nature:  
So wird aber sichtbar, dass menschliche Kreativität, die nicht Empfangen und 
Teilhaben sein will, ihrem Wesen nach widersinnig und nwahr ist, weil der Mensch 
überhaupt nur durch Empfangen und Teilhabe er selber sein kann. . . . In der 
Kulturkrise, die wir durchleben, kann überhaupt nura s Inseln geistiger Sammlung 
neue kulturelle Reinigung und Einigung hervorbrechen.73 
When Ratzinger speaks about the “fortuitous majorities” which can form from time to 
time in the Church but which are not mandated to decide its path, to the fore of his mind is 
the diachronic majority of the communion of saints which he proposes as an obvious and 
authentic alternative. He believes it is the saints that form “the normative majority by which 
                                                          
72 Ratzinger, Glaube und Zukunft, 153-54 (“Men in a totally planned world will find themselves unspeakably 
lonely. If they have completely lost sight of God, they will feel the whole horror of their poverty. Then they will 
discover the little flock of believers as something wholly new. They will discover it as a hope that is meant for 
them, an answer for which they have always been searching in secret” [Ratzinger, Faith and the Future, 118]). 
See also The Ratzinger Report, 114-117; Salt of the Earth, 254-275; God and the World, 441-450; Light of the 
World, 133-85.  
73 Ratzinger, Ein neues Lied für den Herrn, 163-72 (“[. . .] it becomes apparent that human creativity that does 
not want to be receptivity and participation is by its very nature absurd and untrue since humans can only be 
themselves through receptivity and participation. . . . In the crisis of culture we are experiencing, it is only from 
islands of spiritual concentration that a new cultural purification and unification can break out at all” [Ratzinger, 
A New Song, 151-59]). 
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we orient ourselves.”74 This is so because adherence to them will show us how to “translate 
the divine into the human, eternity into time; they t ach us what it is to be human and they 
never abandon us in our pain and solitude.”75 In the context of the communion of saints, 
which extends diachronically as well as synchronically with regard to time, the mission of the 
Church becomes tangible in the daily lives of real people throughout the generations.76 
Ratzinger believes that appealing to the lives of the saints draws attention to, and prioritises a 
“beauty” that points beyond itself to the transcendent source of all beauty in God: 
I have often affirmed my conviction that the true apology of the Christian faith, the 
most convincing demonstration of its truth against every denial, are the saints, and the 
beauty that the faith has generated. Today, for faith to grow, we must lead ourselves 
and the persons we meet to encounter the saints and to enter into contact with the 
Beautiful.77 
                                                          
74 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 154. Ratzinger includes the following footnote where he finds Cardinal 
Meisner of Cologne to be in agreement with his own view: “Democracy in the Church means to accord the right 
to be heard in the present-day generation of Christian  to the generations who have believed, hoped, loved and 
suffered before us” (Joachim Meisner, Wider die Entsinnlichung des Glaubens [Koln: Verlag Styria Graz, 
1990], 35). The “normative” majority in the Church is already spoken about in this dissertation § 7.5. Here it is 
consolidated in terms of the communion of saints. 
75 Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 154. 
76 Pope Benedict addressed the pupils of the catholic schools of England, Wales and Scotland in 2010 during a 
State visit by saying that among those listening to him were some of the future saints of the 21st century. He 
went on to describe how the road to sainthood begins w th an encounter with the love of God: “Not only does 
God love us with a depth and an intensity that we can scarcely begin to comprehend, but he invites us to respond 
to that love. You all know what it is like when you meet someone interesting and attractive, and you want to be 
that person’s friend. You always hope they will find you interesting and attractive, and want to be your friend. 
God wants your friendship. And once you enter into friendship with God, everything in your life begins to 
change. As you come to know him better, you find you want to reflect something of his infinite goodness in 
your own life. You are attracted to the practice of virtue. You begin to see greed and selfishness and all the other 
sins for what they really are, destructive and dangerous tendencies that cause deep suffering and do great 
damage, and you want to avoid falling into that trap yourselves. You begin to feel compassion for people in 
difficulties and you are eager to do something to help them. You want to come to the aid of the poor and the 
hungry, you want to comfort the sorrowful, you want to be kind and generous. And once these things begin to 
matter to you, you are well on the way to becoming saints” (Benedict XVI, Address to Pupils, St. Mary’s 
University College, Twickenham,  17 September 2010, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2010/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20100917_mondo-educ_en.html [accessed 27 September 2012]). 
77 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Beauty and the Truth of Christ,” L’Osservatore Romano (Weekly Edition in English), 
November 6, 2002, 6. See also Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, 38. The themes of sainthood and beauty 
as the true apologists for a Church which can be both majestic and scandal-ridden is long-standing in Ratzinger. 
In the 1970’s he said that “[t]he beauty of the great cathedrals, the beauty of the music that has grown within the 
faith, the dignity of the Church's liturgy, even the reality of festival which one doesn’t make but can only 
receive, the shaping of the year into the Church’s year in which the then and the now, time and eternity 
penetrate – all that is, in my view, not a trivial coincidence. Beauty is the splendour of truth. . . and the distortion 
of beauty is the irony of lost truth, I might add” (Ratzinger, “Warum ich noch in der Kirche bin,” in GS:ZV, 
1183 [own translation]). He also spoke of Christian s ctity, saying that “even today, if you keep your eyes 
open, you can still meet people who are a living testimony to the liberating force of Christian faith. And there is 
no shame in being a Christian and to remain so becaus  of the people who exemplify Christianity for us, making 
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The challenge for the Church, as Ratzinger perceives it, is to reintroduce the world to the 
beauty of creation, to a beauty that restores wholeness to people and gives them a glimpse of 
the meaning of authentic freedom – “freedom which does not destroy, but gathers and 
purifies.”78  
One of the ways in which Ratzinger builds an argument concerning beauty is through 
the platonic ideas taken up by the fourteenth century Byzantine theologian, Nicholas 
Cabasilas (c.1319-91). Ratzinger stresses Cabasilas’ view that beauty “wounds” like an arrow 
and, in so doing, awakens man to his ultimate destiny. Accordingly, the greatness of the 
wound already shows how the “arrow” struck its target while the longing for the beautiful 
indicates who it was that inflicted the wound.79 Far from an escape into mere aestheticism or 
irrationalism, Ratzinger believes contact with beauty liberates because it “is the very way in 
which reason is freed from dullness and made ready to act.”80 However, he says, after events 
such as Auschwitz, a simple harmonious, aesthetically pleasing beauty is no long sufficient. 
The paradox of a disfigured Christ is precisely what can speak to us in the post-Auschwitz 
world. What is often forgotten, however, is that while paradox is contrast, it is not necessarily 
contradiction: “The One who is the Beauty itself let himself be slapped in the face, spat on, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
it something credible and lovable (1183-84 [own transl tion]). The compilation of liturgical reflections in 
Ratzinger’s Images of Hope: Meditations on Major Feasts, trans. John Rock and Graham Harrison (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006) gives further testimony to his position. I would draw attention to the aesthetical 
theology which he offers on the apse mosaic of San Clemente in Rome. At the centre of the mosaic there is the 
cross of Christ which reaches into, and fructifies creation at the same time as stretching upward towards the 
hand of the Father that is descending: “The world moves from the Cross upward to the freedom and expanse of 
the promises of God” (76). See also his The Spirit of the Liturgy, 115- 156. A striking example that 
demonstrates the fact that sainthood and beauty remain strong themes for him can be found in Benedict XVI’s 
homily for the Solemnity of the Epiphany on 6 January 2012. When meditating upon the composition of the star 
that guided the wise men to Christ, he confers the ti le “stars of God” upon those men and women who help to 
guide the way of the Church to its Lord: “The wise m n from the East, who feature in today’s Gospel, like all 
the saints, have themselves gradually become constellations of God that mark out the path. In all these people, 
being touched by God’s word has, as it were, releasd n explosion of light, through which God’s radiance 
shines upon our world and shows us the path. The saints are stars of God, by whom we let ourselves be led to 
him for whom our whole being longs” 
(http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2012/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_hom_20120106_epifania_en.html [accessed 8 January 2012]).  
78 Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord, 158. 
79 See Ratzinger, “The Beauty and the Truth of Christ,” 6; On the Way to Jesus Christ, 32-41. See Nicholas 
Cabasilas, Life in Christ, trans. Margaret Lisney (London: Janus, 1995). 
80 Ratzinger, “The Beauty and the Truth of Christ,” 6. 
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crowned with thorns; . . . However, in his Face that is so disfigured, there appears the 
genuine, extreme beauty: the beauty of love that goes “to the very end.”81 
     For Ratzinger, contact with the dimension of the beautiful is an urgent task for the 
Church. This seems particularly true at the ecclesia  level of witness and sanctity when one 
considers that Christ imposes a condition on the Church: that people let themselves be 
wounded by him and believe in a “Love” who sets aside external beauty so as to proclaim, in 
this way, the authentic truth of the beautiful. If the Church is to be a liberating force that 
“humanises” the world, Ratzinger asks “how can she do that if at the same time she turns her 
back on beauty, which is so closely allied to love?”82 For him, a love that knows the truly 
beautiful – the disfigured form of Christ – leads to the holiness of life which gives the Church 
its credibility in a world that prioritises external superficiality. However, the liberating 
mission to outline the authentic meaning of beauty extends beyond the confines of the 
Church’s interior life. The Church, to Ratzinger’s mind, is the sphere that extends outwards, 
via the saints who express, ad gentes, lives of beauty that save 83: 
[Die Kirche] soll – wie es vom alttestamentlichen Tempel gesagt ist – Stätte der 
“Herrlichkeit” sein und freilich so auch Stätte, in der die Klage der Menschheit vor 
das Ohr Gottes gebracht wird. Sie darf sich nicht im gemeindlich Brauchbaren 
beruhigen; sie muß die Stimme des Kosmos wecken und, indem sie den Schöpfer 
verherrlicht, dem Kosmos seine Herrlichkeit entlocken, ihn selbst herrlich und damit 
schön, bewohnbar, liebenswert machen. Die Kunst, die die Kirche hervorgebracht hat, 
ist neben den Heiligen, die in ihr gewachsen sind, die einzige wirkliche “Apologie,” 
die sie für ihre Geschichte vorzubringen hat. . . . Die Kirche muß anspruchsvoll 
                                                          
81 Ibid. 
82 Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 124. 
83 It is worth noting  that in his Angelus Address for the Solemnity of the Immaculate Conception in 2008, 
Benedict XVI stated that one finds in Mary “the reflection of the beauty that saves the world: the beauty of God 
resplendent on the Face of Christ. In Mary this beauty is totally pure, humble, free from all pride and 
presumption.” This reflection followed a commentary by him on the presence of original sin in the world which, 
he said, was a result of the envy of the devil (cf. Wis 1: 13-14; 2: 23-24) “who, rebelling against God, deceived 
men and women and induced them to rebel as well.” In line with his post-Auschwitz sobriety regarding  good 
and evil in the world, the Pope concludes that “[t]his is the drama of the freedom which God accepts to he very 
end for love, but promises that a woman's son will crush the head of the ancient serpent (Gen 3: 15)” 
(http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/angelus/2008/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ang_20081208_en.html 
[accessed 8 January 2012]). See this dissertation §1.5.  
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bleiben; sie muß eine Heimstatt des Schönen sein, si  muß den Streit um die 
“Vergeistigung” führen, ohne den die Welt zu einem “ersten Kreis der Hölle” wird.84  
In an address to artists in 2009, Benedict XVI consolidated these reflections by 
alluding to the notion that an artist’s work can geerate an opening onto the mystery of the 
transcendent. Such beauty, he says, can “shock” us and thereby “reawaken” in us thoughts of 
our final destiny. However, he also says that beauty can find itself in opposition to a form of 
art which is designed to “dazzle” us into a blindness that deceives. To his mind, authentic 
beauty incorporates a sacred dimension which liberates nd gives a sense of direction to 
human life today:  
Too often . . . the beauty that is thrust upon us is illusory and deceitful, superficial and 
blinding, leaving the onlooker dazed; instead of bringing him out of himself and 
opening him up to horizons of true freedom as it draws him aloft, it imprisons him 
within himself and further enslaves him, depriving him of hope and joy. It is a 
seductive but hypocritical beauty that rekindles deire, the will to power, to possess, 
and to dominate others, it is a beauty which soon tur s into its opposite, taking on the 
guise of indecency, transgression or gratuitous provocation. Authentic beauty . . . 
unlocks the yearning of the human heart, the profound desire to know, to love, to go 
towards the Other, to reach for the Beyond. If we acknowledge that beauty touches us 
intimately, that it wounds us, that it opens our eyes, then we rediscover the joy of 
seeing, of being able to grasp the profound meaning of our existence, the Mystery of 
which we are part; from this Mystery we can draw fullness, happiness, the passion to 
engage with it every day.85 
It cannot be denied, as we have moved through the communal level of the Church’s 
martyrological outreach, that both witness and sanctity are intensely personal concepts. 
Ratzinger’s argument is that when one introduces th presuppositions of the social nature of 
the human person and the “we” structure of the Church, it becomes clear that the spiritual 
                                                          
84 Ratzinger, Das Fest des Glaubens, 109 (“As the Old Testament speaks of the Temple, the C urch is to be the 
place of ‘glory,’ and as such, too, the place where mankind’s cry of distress is brought to the ear of G d. The 
Church must not settle down with what is merely comfortable and serviceable at the parish level; she must 
arouse the voice of the cosmos and, by glorifying the Creator, elicit the glory of the cosmos itself, making it also 
glorious, beautiful, habitable and beloved. Next to the saints, the art which the Church has produced is the only 
real ‘apologia’ for her history. . . . It is this glory which witnesses to the Lord, not theology’s clever explanations 
for all the terrible things which, lamentably, fill the pages of her history. . . . The Church must maintain high 
standards; she must be a place where beauty can be t home; she must lead the struggle for that ‘spiritualisation’ 
without which the world becomes the ‘first circle of hell’” [Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith, 124-25]). See The 
Ratzinger Report, 129-30 where he links sanctity and beauty with the art that grows up from within it. He says 
that “[a] theologian who does not love art, poetry, music and nature can be dangerous. Blindness and deafness 
toward the beautiful are not incidental: they are reflected in his theology” (130). See also A New Song, 224-25. 
85 Benedict XVI, Address to Artists (21 November 2009): AAS 101 (2009), 1048-49. 
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forces necessary to fulfil Jesus’ commission are acquired through participation in ecclesial 
life. The qualitative effect upon the “I” of the martyr and the saint entering into the “we” of 
the Church furnishes the inner life of faith with is collective force for the good.86  
The communal level of the Church as witness deals primarily with believers’ posture 
with regard to society and how they can, as members of the Church, live in the civic space in 
a way that does not compromise their faith, on the on  hand, but makes a contribution to the 
common good, on the other. In terms of sanctity, it is Ratzinger’s conviction that the Church 
must be wary of falling into a false kind of Christian progressivism which submits itself to 
the standards of the modern or post-modern age. He says, “[i]f we Christians simply stand by 
and utter soothing words in this situation, we are completely superfluous.”87 On the other 
hand, in a time when the perception is that the Church has nothing to offer but words of 
moral prohibition, whose only real function is condemnation and restriction, Ratzinger says, 
the way the Church witnesses in the world and presents itself needs re-examination.  
In the public space today, there is an implied prohibition on talk of God, Christ and 
many of the central matters of faith because they ar  incomprehensible to it. On the contrary, 
Ratzinger believes that the proclamation of the life of faith has an inner coherence which 
warrants its presence in society. To his mind, the task for the Church today is to discern the 
differing emphases between the inner life of faith nd the public presentation of the Church’s 
words. He says such distinctions are not betrayals of God’s word, the totality of which must 
                                                          
86 There ought to be no particular surprise in the fact that Ratzinger would be drawn to the theme of personal 
sanctity in his ecclesiology. When pursued on the tension between the personal and the communal, he always 
tends to prioritise the personal aspects of ecclesial life. Hence the Church can never, he believes, exhaust itself 
in the erection of new sophisticated structures. To his mind, the real contribution of the Church comes about 
when people “strive to let what is ours disappear as much as possible so what belongs to Christ may becom  
more visible” (Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report, 53). He believes this challenging commission in the world is 
well known to the saints, who bring about reform “not by working up plans for new structures, but by refo ming 
themselves.” Above all else, therefore, he concludes that “[w]hat the Church needs in order to respond t  the 
needs of man in every age is holiness, not management” (ibid.). See also ibid., 67.  
 
87 Ratzinger, A New Song, 29. 
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always be kept alive by those mandated to do so. Intead, he says it is simply the search for 
the means of opening the channels of communication in the public space that cannot admit 
the logic of creative reason at present. Hence, the prohibition on conversations about the 
inner life of faith can be turned into an advantage. Ratzinger suggests that people of faith 
liberate themselves from trying to transmit the whole structure of faith, and focus more 
carefully on how to communicate those tenets of faith that need to be articulated for the good 
of all who inhabit the public space today:         
Im inneren Glaubensleben, dort, wo man den eigentlichen Kern des Glaubens 
verkündet, können die einzelnen Dinge richtig aufeinander bezogen werden und 
könnten dann solche Verbote auch ihren Stellenwert in einem viel größeren und 
positiven Ganzen haben. Alles möglichst öffentlich machen zu wollen, verzerrt 
sozusagen die Proportionen. Die Kirche muß überlegen, wie sie die 
Binnenverkündigung, die ein gemeinsames Glaubensgefüge aussagt, und das Reden 
in die Welt hinein, in dem nur Teilwahrnehmungen erfolgen können, in die richtige 
Proportion bringt.88  
This twofold, internal-external dynamic spans both the human person’s innermost 
conscience and social nature. By simultaneously recognising the need to honour the whole of 
the gift of faith while maintaining an authentic and respectful dialogue in the world, 
Ratzinger suggests that a new mode of ecclesial lifestyle is called for today. He himself takes 
up the challenge to rethink the Church’s presentation of itself in the public space by reflecting 
on its mission to be a “convincing community.”89 To this we now turn.  
8.3.  The Societal Level of Civil Religion 
The context for Ratzinger’s approach to ecclesial life in the public space is 
predominantly that of the Church’s contribution to the common good. It was summarily 
stated by him in 1970: “[The Church] cannot exchange her message for social service, but the 
                                                          
88 Ratzinger, Salz der Erde, 182-83 (“In the inner life of faith, where the real core of faith is proclaimed, 
individual elements can be correctly related to one a other, and in that case such prohibitions could have their 
proper place in a much larger and positive whole. To want to make everything as public as possible distorts, you 
might say, the proportions. The Church has to consider how to establish the right proportion between internal 
proclamation, which expresses a common structure of faith, and how she speaks to the world, where onlypart of 
what she says will be understood” [Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 171-72]). 
89 Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 171. 
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power of this message will again and again bring forth new social initiatives, just as she 
surpasses the scope of these initiatives and leads to that greater good which will continue to 
be a requirement for man even in a technological society.”90 However, it was the fortuitous 
encounter with Marcello Pera in 2004 on the theme of Europe’s future that clarified 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology regarding how the Church can present itself in the civic space 
without losing its fundamental identity.91 To his mind, the Church’s visible fidelity to its true 
nature is likely to take shape through the idea of “creative minorities” in society.92 He 
attributes the context for his remarks to what he calls the “Spengler-Toynbee debate” 
regarding the possible future direction of Europe. Out of the dialogue with Pera grew 
Ratzinger’s understanding of civil religion.  
The German historian and philosopher, Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), identified a 
progressive life cycle in the history of cultures as a movement from birth to a gradual rise 
towards a period of high flourishing followed by slow decline and death. Ratzinger describes 
it as a “biologistic” thesis which attracted much opp sition, not least from the British 
historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) who defined the difference between technical 
progress and true progress as spiritualisation. While Toynbee, like Spengler, saw the West as 
undergoing something of a cultural crisis, he attributed it to the abandonment of its religious 
roots in favour of a cult of technology, nationalism and militarism.  
Ratzinger says that while the “Spengler-Toynbee debate” necessarily remains open 
because none of us knows the future, Toynbee foresaw it  resolution in the rekindling of the 
                                                          
90 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 217. 
91 See Ratzinger and Pera, Without Roots. This book records an exchange which originally took place in 2004 
between the then Cardinal Ratzinger and Marcello Pera (b. 1943), an Italian philosopher and president of the 
Italian Senate from 2001 until 2006. In May 2004, the wo men delivered lectures at separate events on their 
concerns about the spiritual, cultural and political situation today in the West, and particularly in Europe. They 
also made some tentative suggestions towards a solution. When they realised the common cause of their 
reflections, they exchanged letters in the form of a response to the approach taken by the other and cl rified 
further the expression of their own respective positions. See also Marcello Pera, Perché Dobbiamo Dirci 
Cristiani (Milian: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A., 2008).  
92 See Ratzinger and Pera, Without Roots, 67-69, 80, 95, 106, 120-23, 126. 
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West’s Christian heritage. Ratzinger is more agreeabl  to the latter’s optimism for the future 
because “[r]ather than a biologistic vision, [Toynbee] offered a voluntaristic one focused on 
the energy of creative minorities and exceptional idividuals.”93 The fate of society, 
Ratzinger says, “always depends on its creative minorit es” and, for this reason, “Christian 
believers should look upon themselves as just such a creative minority, and help Europe to 
reclaim what is best in its heritage and to thereby place itself at the service of all 
humankind.”94 In the context of the search for the source of spiritual strength in a society 
suffering from a steady, disconcerting loss of vitality, Ratzinger sets out his vision of civil 
religion, outlining it in four principal theses. They include the nature of a creative minority as 
a motivating force oriented beyond the Church and for society; the presence of a sphere of 
contact and a reference point that leavens the whole; the creative minority itself that lives 
from the Church’s divine origins; and the opportuniy for dialogue among people passionate 
about the search for truth. 
                                                          
93 Ibid., 68. See Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History. Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D.C. Somervell (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
94 Ratzinger and Pera, Without Roots, 80. In the course of the written exchange between th  two men, Pera 
describes Ratzinger’s invocation of Toynbee’s idea as “courageous and dramatic” (95). Pera enthusiastically 
agreed with Ratzinger’s view that the secularity aimed at by the biologistic vision cannot deal with the spiritual 
condition of the human person: “[a]bsolute profanity, supposing that there is such a thing, is an absolute vacuum 
in which neither the happy majority nor the creative minorities can exist” (106). On 12 December 2011, 
Jonathan Sacks delivered a lecture at the Gregorian University in Rome entitled “Has Europe lost its Soul?” In 
similar fashion to Ratzinger and Pera, his point was that if Europe is severed from its Judeo-Christianity 
heritage, then its identity is in danger of annihilation. During the course of the lecture he warned about the 
precarious situation Europe faces today: “For the task ahead of us is not between Jews and Catholics, r even 
Jews and Christians in general, but between Jews and Christians on the one hand, and the increasingly, even 
aggressively secularising forces at work in Europe today on the other, challenging and even ridiculing our faith. 
If Europe loses the Judaeo-Christian heritage that gave it its historic identity and its greatest achievements in 
literature, art, music, education, politics, and as we will see, economics, it will lose its identity and its greatness, 
not immediately, but before this century reaches its end. When a civilisation loses its faith, it loses its future. 
When it recovers its faith, it recovers its future. For the sake of our children, and their children not yet born, we 
– Jews and Christians, side-by-side – must renew our faith and its prophetic voice. We must help Europe 
recover its soul.” See 
http://www.unigre.it/eventi/Lord_Sacks/documenti/1112 2_PUG_BEA_testo_Lord_Sacks_en.pdf (accessed 12 
May 2012). A helpful collection of essays on the theme of Europe in Ratzinger/Pope Benedict’s thought has 
recently been published. See Clemens Sedmak and Stephan O. Horn, eds., Die Seele Europas: Papst Benedikt 
XVI und die europäische Identität (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2011). See also David L. Schindler, “Truth, 
Freedom, and Relativism in Western Democracies: Pope Benedict XVI’s Contribution to Without Roots,” 
Communio (2005): 669-81; William Newton, “Two Trials, One Truth – Benedict XVI on Church and State,” 
The Furrow (2012): 81-86.   
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Firstly, Ratzinger defines civil religion as that which “overcomes the boundaries 
between denominations and gives voice to values that sustain society rather than console the 
individual.”95 He says this approach presupposes the existence of cr ative minorities. Such a 
minority, which he also refers to as a “convinced minority,” is a motivating force of “human 
beings who in their encounters with Christ have discovered the precious pearl that gives value 
to all life (Matt 13:45ff), assuring that the Christian imperatives are no longer ballast that 
immobilizes humanity, but rather wings that carry it upward.”96 These creative minorities, 
while in the Church, are oriented “beyond the Church and for society” because “through their 
persuasive capacity and their joy, they reach other people and offer them a different way of 
seeing things.”97 Creative minorities are not sectarian in nature but rather through them a 
convincing model of life emerges which also becomes, over time, an opening towards a 
knowledge that cannot emerge from life’s repetitive routine. As Pope, Benedict XVI also 
spoke about the need for protective zones which support the believer’s effective participation 
in the public space: 
Tatsächlich brauchen wir gewissermaßen Inseln, wo der Glaube an Gott und die 
innere Einfachheit des Christentums lebt und ausstrahlt; Oasen, Archen Noahs, in die 
der Mensch immer wieder fliehen kann. Schutzräume sind die Räume der Liturgie. 
Aber auch in den unterschiedlichen Gemeinschaften und Bewegungen, in den 
Pfarreien, in den Feiern der Sakramente, in den Übungen der Frömmigkeit, in den 
Wallfahrten und so weiter versucht die Kirche, Abwehrkräfte zu geben und dann auch 
Schutzräume zu entwickeln, in denen im Gegensatz zu dem Kaputten um uns herum 
auch wieder die Schönheit der Welt und des Lebendürfens sichtbar wird.98 
Secondly, creative minorities are the concrete realisation of the Church as “salt,” 
“light” and “yeast” (cf. Matt 5:13-14; 13:33) for believers and “God-fearers” alike. When the 
                                                          
95 Ratzinger and Pera, Without Roots, 120. 
96 Ibid., 120-21. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ratzinger, Licht der Welt, 206 (“It is true that we need something like islands where faith in God and the 
interior simplicity of Christianity are alive and radiant; oases, Noah’s arks, to which man can always come back 
for refuge. Liturgical spaces offer such protective zones. But there are also various communities and 
movements, the parishes, celebrations of the sacraments, exercises of piety, pilgrimages, and so forth, in which 
the Church attempts to instil powers of resistance as well as to develop protective zones in which the beauty of 
the world, the gift of being alive, also becomes visible in contrast to the rampant brokenness around us” 
[Ratzinger, Light of the World, 176-77]). See also ibid., 184; God and the World, 388-89. 
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credibility of a minority group is sufficiently great, spheres of contact, of reference and of 
belonging, which we all need, are automatically created. Ratzinger suggests that the Church 
may have forgotten to be a hospitable place for all – members and seekers alike – who can 
see in it “a reference point that indicate[s] the way of life.” In this way, Ratzinger says, 
“[m]eeting places that become ‘yeast’ – a persuasive force that acts beyond the more closed 
sphere until it reaches everybody – should therefore be formed around the minorities that 
have been touched by faith.”99 He says a “minority Church . . . will live in small vital circles 
of really convinced believers who live their faith. But precisely in this way she will, biblically 
speaking, become salt of the earth again.”100 
Thirdly, “these creative minorities can clearly neith r stand nor live on their own” but 
“live naturally from the fact that the Church as a whole remains and that it lives in and stands 
by the faith in its divine origins.”101 Such origins are not manufactured by human will but are 
recognised as a gift that the Church community is duty-bound to transmit. In a two-way 
process, “[t]he minorities renew the vitality of this great community at the same time as they 
draw on its hidden life force, which forever generat s new life.”102 To Ratzinger’s mind, in 
the upheaval the Church is experiencing in some parts of the world  – moving from being 
identified with great societies to these steadfast and pioneering groupings –  the importance 
of keeping what is essential to humanity from being destroyed is of the greatest importance:  
Der Kirche hat deshalb einerseits die Flexibilität nö ig, veränderte Einstellungen und 
Ordnungen in der Gesellschaft annehmen und Lösungen von bisherigen 
Verflechtungen vornahmen zu können. Andererseits hat ie um so mehr die Treue 
nötig, um das zu bewahren, was den Menschen Mensch sein läßt; was ihn überleben 
läßt, was seine Würde bewahrt. Sie hat dieses festzuhalten und ihn nach oben hin, 
                                                          
99 Ratzinger and Pera, Without Roots, 122. See also T. Howland Sanks’ work Salt, Leaven and Light: The 
Community called Church (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1992). After a historical survey of 
the Church in a western-European context, Sanks reflects on the challenges and possibilities facing ecclesiology. 
In a chapter entitled “Liberating Ecclesiology,” headvocates that the Church in the U.S.A. should not ad pt, but 
can learn from Latin American liberation theology so as to become “a sign, a sacrament of integral salvation in 
and for the world” (185).        
100 Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 222.  
101 Ratzinger and Pera, Without Roots, 122. 
102 Ibid., 123. 
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nach Gott hin, offenzuhalten; denn nur von dorther kann die Kraft des Friedens in 
dieser Welt kommen.103 
Finally, he says there is no reason why secularists and believers should not move 
towards each other in openness. Believers never relinquish the search for truth, while 
“seekers” are also people touched by truth, often in the most conscientious way and thus 
cannot be classified as unbelievers. Because both are partakers of the truth, the distinction 
between Catholics and secularists is relative. To Ratzinger’s mind, secularists are not a 
denomination or a rigid block but rather are very often 
[. . .] uomini che cercano appassionatamente la verità, che soffrono per la mancanza 
di verità dell’uomo, riprendendo proprio così i conte uti essenziali della cultura e 
della fede e spesso rendendoli, con il loro impegno, a cora più luminosi di quanto 
possa fare una fede scontata, accettata più per abitudine che per conoscenza 
sofferta.104 
                                                          
103 Ratzinger, Salz des Erde, 237 (“The Church therefore needs, on the one hand, the flexibility to accept 
changed attitudes and laws in society and to be able to detach herself from the inter-connections with society 
that have existed until now. On the other hand, she has all the greater need for fidelity in order to preserve what 
enables man to be man, what enables him to survive, what preserves his dignity. She has to hold fast to this and 
keep him open toward what is above, toward God; for only from there can the power of peace come into this 
world” [Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 222]). 
104 Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera, Senza radici: Europa, Relativismo, Cristianesimo, Islam (Milano: 
Mondadori, 2004), 112 (“[. . .] people who passionately seek the truth, who are pained by the lack of truth in 
humankind. Consequently, they return to the essential contents of culture and faith, and through their 
commitment often make these contents even more luminous than an unquestioned faith, accepted more out of 
habit than out of the sufferings of the conscience” [Ratzinger and Pera, Without Roots, 123-24]). For Benedict 
XVI, the present time exhibits the clash of two spiritual worlds – that of faith and secularism. He poses two 
questions from this: “[w]here is secularism right? Where can and must faith adopt the forms and figures of 
modernity – and where must it offer resistance?” (Benedict XVI, Light of the World, 57). From his perspective, 
particularly through his encounter with bishops in Third World countries, he is of the opinion that “[t]his great 
struggle pervades the whole world today” (ibid.). He says “the great task of this hour” is to help peopl  
recognise the great treasure that they have – “the sight of God” – so that “they themselves, then, as a result of 
the strength of their own faith, [can] enter into conflict with secularism and are capable of carrying out the 
discernment of spirits” (ibid.). From this view, Benedict XVI sets out his vision for people of faith n society: 
“We can only hope that the inner strength of the faith that is present in people will then become powerful public 
thinking too, and that society does not simply fallinto the abyss” (58). To the Pope’s mind, there is a 
fundamental symbiosis between the presence of God in the world and human prosperity. Nine years before 
becoming Pope, he explained that a healthy society – such as one from the modern period founded upon 
Christian democracy – “rests upon the sacrality of values guaranteed by faith, values that are beyond the reach 
of man’s arbitrary will” (Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 226). Ratzinger is at his most apocalyptic when he speaks 
about the “abyss” which results from the total absence of the sacral element in the life of humanity. Even for 
pre-Christian paganisms, he says, there were ties with the gods which still embodied fundamental values that set 
limits to evil. However, he is personally convinced by the empirical evidence of the history of the grat atheistic 
dictatorships of the twentieth-century that “the fall of the Church, the disintegration and the absence of the faith 
as a formative power, actually does drag the world down into the abyss. . . . [I]f the ethical power rpresented by 
Christianity were suddenly torn out of humanity, mankind would lurch to and fro like a ship rammed against an 
iceberg, and then the survival of humanity would be in greatest jeopardy” (227). Returning to his comments as 
Pope, he reflects on the way forward through the “clash” of spiritual values by presenting his belief that 
prioritizing God is the way to come to an authentic understanding of the human person: “I think that our major 
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If the Church is to be a witness to authentic freedom through its convinced and convincing 
minorities, then he says “the Christian model of life must be manifested as a life in all its 
fullness and freedom, a life that does not experience the bonds of love as dependence and 
limitation but rather as an opening to the greatness of life.” Then, even though living the great 
values of Christian tradition remains a major challenge, the creative minorities can “instil the 
courage needed to live it.”105 
Civil religion then, is a means of dialoguing with civil society groupings who do not 
necessarily share the common convictions of faith held by the Church. In light of this, a 
source of potential conflict for the Church is the challenge to uphold the truth of faith in the 
face of an intellectual climate which sees the claim to any possession of truth as arrogance.106 
For Ratzinger, this is actually a missiological issue centred on the intricate concept of “the 
right to evangelise.” It is a matter of the convinced minorities of the Church striking a 
balance between their responsibility before the gift of truth and the avoidance of “spiritual 
colonialism” that would subject others to “my” culture and “my” ideas. As a response to the 
view that recipients of truth are either arrogant or ignorant or both, Ratzinger says one has to 
distinguish and unpack the search for truth that is be ng critiqued here, as well as the nature 
of the truth-claim made by Christianity: 
[. . .] was ist das für eine Suche, die nie ankommen darf? Sucht sie wirklich, oder will 
sie in Wahrheit gar nicht finden, weil es das Gefundene nicht geben darf? . . . 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
task now, after a few fundamental questions are clarified, is first of all to bring to light God’s priority again. The 
important thing today is to see that God exists, that God matters to us, that he answers us. And conversely, that 
if he is omitted, everything else might be as clever as can be – yet man then loses his dignity and his authentic 
humanity and, thus, the essential thing breaks down. That is why, I think, as a new emphasis we have to give 
priority to the question about God” (Benedict XVI, Light of the World, 65).  
105 Ratzinger and Pera, Without Roots, 126. It is important to note in this instance that R tzinger uses the words 
“dependence” and “limitation” as they are more commonly understood nowadays, that is, with the contemporary 
connotation of constraint, and domination by another. Throughout the course of his own reflections on human 
freedom, on the other hand, he has attempted to imbue these words with the positive Christian meaning of 
dialogical relationship with God. See this dissertation § 4.3.1. 
106 See Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, 68-72. With regard to the intellectual climate within which the 
Church operates, he says: “Today it has become an irresistibly forceful prejudice to dismiss as simplistic and, at 
the same time, arrogant, those who are reputed to believe that they ‘have’ the truth.  Such people are supposedly 
incapable of dialogue and ultimately cannot be taken seriously. For nobody ‘has’ the truth. All of us, the 
argument goes, can only be searching for it” (68-69). 
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Natürlich kann die Wahrheit keine Habe sein; das Verhältnis zu ihr muß immer 
demütige Annahme sein, die um die eigene Gefährdung weiß und Erkenntis als 
Geschenk annimmt, dessen ich unwürdig werden kann, dessen ich mich nicht rühmen 
darf, als sei es meine eigene Sache. Wenn es mir gegeben ist, so ist es Verantwortung, 
die mich auch für den anderen in Dienst nimmt.107 
What emerges for Ratzinger here is that a believer cannot abdicate the freedom that comes 
with the responsibility of gift – the gift of truth concerning God. To other groupings who do 
not confess Jesus as true God, this position can seem, at best, presumptuous. However, it is 
precisely this perspective, Ratzinger says, that places a great urgency on Christians to 
[. . .] wir solche Erkenntnis nicht als unsere Leistung ansehen, sondern der Wahrheit 
treu bleiben, daß die Begegnung mit dem Wort auch für uns nur Geschenk ist, das uns 
gegeben wurde, damit wir es weitergeben, umsonst, wie wir es empfangen haben. 
Gott hat eine Wahl getroffen, die einen für die anderen und alle füreinander 
eingesetzt, und wir können nur in Demut uns als unwürdige Boten erkennen, die nicht 
sich selber verkündigen, sondern mit heiliger Scheu von dem sprechen, was nicht das 
Unsrige ist, sondern von Gott kommt.108 
 While the primacy of truth is something Ratzinger b lieves needs to be retrieved as a 
central tenet of Christian life, he also says that holding Jesus Christ as the unique and 
                                                          
107 Ratzinger, Unterwegs zu Jesus Christus (Sankt Ulrich Verlag GmbH: Augsburg, 2005), 69 (“[. . .] what kind 
of search is this that can never reach a conclusion? Is it really searching or is it just an unwillingness to find, 
because what is found is not supposed to exist? . . . Naturally, truth cannot be a possession; my relationship to it 
must always be a humble acceptance, in the awareness that I myself can endanger it; I accept the knowledge as a 
gift of which I am unworthy, about which I may not boast, as though it were my own. If it is given to me, then 
that is a responsibility that puts me in the service of others as well” [Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, 69]). 
This was an issue that came to the fore in the year 2000 with the publication of the declaration, Dominus Iesus 
during Ratzinger’s stewardship of the CDF. The declaration reiterated the uniqueness and salvific universality 
of Christ and the Church. See Dominus Iesus (6 August 2000): AAS 92 (2000), 742-765. Most of Ratzinger’s 
reflections on this issue are found in his book Truth and Tolerance. See also Stephen J. Pope and Charles 
Hefling, eds., Sic et Non: Encountering Dominus Iesus (New York: Orbis, 2002). To Ratzinger’s mind, there is 
a tension today between what he calls habitual Christianity (being content “with mere ritualised observances and 
the customs with which [people] were brought up” [On the Way to Jesus Christ, 76]) and the responsibility of 
gift in the truth. He says St Paul felt this responsibility of gift (1Cor 9:16) as did Jeremiah long before that (Jer 
20:8-9). The parable of the fearful servant who hid his master’s talent because he was afraid (Matt 25:14-30) is 
also ultimately to be understood from this perspectiv . Ratzinger says that the “talent” – the treasure of the truth 
– given to us must not be hidden. Instead, it is meant to be spent boldly so that it can take effect. Knowledge of 
God passed on in this way becomes the “leaven” that permeates and renews humanity. Ratzinger says that he 
observes the West busily burying this treasure out of cowardice and laziness because we do not want to be
illuminated by it ourselves. This way of living, by the least line of resistance, seems to consist in living a life 
untroubled by the burden of the r sponsibility of gift. But the gift should urge us on so that the ends of the earth 
might see the power of God (Isa 52:10; Ps 98:3). See On the Way to Jesus Christ, 71-72. 
108 Ratzinger, Unterwegs zu Jesus Christus, 70 (“[. . .] not view such knowledge as our own accomplishment but 
that we instead remain loyal to the truth that the encounter with the Word is a gift for us, too, which was given 
to us so that we might give it to others, freely, as we have received it. God made a choice, established ome for 
others and all for one another, and we can only acknowledge in humility that we are unworthy messengers who 
do not proclaim ourselves but rather speak with a holy fear about something that is not ours but that comes from 
God” [Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, 70]). 
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universal mediator of salvation is not a call to disparage other perspectives.109 His guiding 
principle here is that we should not fear the truth for it “does not destroy; it purifies and 
unites.”110 For him, the acknowledgement that Christ satisfies th  deepest longing of the 
human person stands “opposed to the resignation of those who say that man is incapable of 
truth and to the convenient inaction of letting everything continue as before.”111 In actual fact,  
[. . .] sagt auch der Glaube, daß die Unähnlichkeit zw schen dem von uns Erkannten 
und der eigentlichen Wirklichkeit in sich selbst immer unendlich größer ist als die 
Ähnlichkeit (DS 806). Aber diese unendliche Unähnlichkeit macht doch Erkenntnis 
nicht zur Nichterkenntnis, Wahrheit nicht zur Unwahrheit. Mir schient, man müsse 
die Sache mit der Anmaßung umkehren: Ist es nicht Anmaßung zu sagen, Gott könne 
uns nicht das Geschenk der Wahrheit machen? Er könne u s die Augen nicht öffnen? 
Ist es nicht eine Verachtung Gottes zu sagen, wir seien nun einmal blind geboren, und 
Wahrheit sei nicht unsere Sache? Ist es nicht eine Degradierung des Menschen und 
seiner Sehnsucht nach Gott, uns nur als ewig im Dunkel Tastende anzuerkennen? Und 
damit geht dann Hand in Hand die wirkliche Anmaßung, daß wir eben selber Gottes 
Stelle einnehmen und bestimmen möchten, wer wir sind und was wir tun und aus uns 
und der Welt machen wollen.112  
In Ratzinger’s understanding, the truth can and must have no other weapon other than 
itself. Today, he says, a key insight which we need to recover is the idea that “knowing and 
searching are not mutually exclusive.”113 If this is true in general, then it is true in particular 
for the life of faith. Knowledge of the truth, while not excluding further deepening in one’s 
understanding, can set one free to cooperate with Christ’s mission in society over and above 
any egotistical predispositions. Ratzinger concludes that one who both believes and says “we 
have found love” has to pass this gift on, knowing that it does not do violence, nor destroy the 
                                                          
109 See DV, 2.  
110 Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, 74. 
111 Ibid., 76. 
112 Ratzinger, Unterwegs zu Jesus Christus, 69-70 (“our faith says that the dissimilarity betw en what we know 
and the true reality in itself is always infinitely greater than the similarity [Lateran Council, DS806]. But this 
dissimilarity still does not turn knowledge into ignorance, truth into falsehood. It seems to me that we should 
turn this question about presumption the other way round: It is not presumptuous to say that God cannot give us 
the truth as a gift? That he cannot open our eyes? Does it not show contempt for God to say that, once we have 
been born blind, truth is not our concern? Is it not degradation of man and of his longing for God to claim that 
we human beings are merely groping in the dark forever?  Hand in hand with us, furthermore, goes the real 
presumption, namely, that we and we alone would like to take God’s place and determine who we are and what 
we do and what we want to make out of ourselves and the world” [Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, 69]).  
113 Ratzinger, On the Way to Jesus Christ, 69-70. 
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identity of the other, nor disrupt cultures. Ratzinger believes this gift sets people and cultures 
free to realise their potential. This “passing on” is the fulfilment of a responsibility. 
Only in this way can the Church’s missionary task be understood today as 
responsibility and accountability before the primacy of truth but never as spiritual 
colonialism. There is always the freedom to assent to the gift of truth, initially through a 
creative minority, and subsequently in the passing o  of the “Love” that has been received. 
The Church's witness conducted in the name of truthin e public space, must never be 
severed from the practice of freedom on the part of the missionary, nor in relation to the 
potential recipients of the grace to believe. The love dimension of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology is 
operative here, for one is prepared to give only to the extent to which one loves. Ratzinger 
says that participating in the Church’s witness requires, 
[. . .] zuallererst Martyriumsbereitschaft, Bereitschaft, sich selbst um der Wahrheit 
willen und der anderen willen zu verlieren. Nur so wird sie glaubwürdig; . . . Denn 
nur dann wird der Primat der Wahrheit aufgerichtet. Und dann ist auch die Idee der 
Anmaßung von innen her überwunden.114  
 
8.4.  Conclusion 
Chapter 8 has looked at Ratzinger’s view of the Churc  in the public space in terms of 
his understanding of human freedom. He addresses a number of discernible levels. They 
consist of the personal, communal and societal. Ultimately, they are interrelated. The 
personal level holds the primary place in his ecclesio ogy of liberation because without 
conscientious assent to the primacy of God, the Church does not have a witness, nor does 
society have someone wilfully proposing the Christian patrimony for the common good. With 
this free assent, Ratzinger believes the human person participates in an internal-external 
dynamic which nourishes the faith life of the indivi ual person and contributes to the well-
                                                          
114 Ratzinger, Unterwegs zu Jesus Christus, 71 (“[. . .] in the first instance readiness for martyrdom, a 
willingness to lose oneself for truth's sake, and the sake of others. Only then will [Christians] be cr dible; . . . 
[b]ecause only then is the primacy of truth erected. And then also, the idea of the presumption [of truth] is 
overcome from within” [own translation]).   
401 
 
being of the social dimension of the whole human family. Furthermore, by renouncing direct 
political action, the Church trusts that every informed conscience is capable of contributing to 
the shaping of a just society. For Ratzinger, the Curch must ground its life on its truest 
nature – on maintaining the priority of God and human access to him. He is convinced that a 
morally credible and fruitful society flows from this prioritisation.   
In the modern world, where the medieval view of fixed coordinates for the divine in 
the heavenly firmament is no longer revered, Ratzinger believes the human freedom to say 
“yes” to creation is an act of the greatest importance. At all times, however, because of this 
very freedom, the decision to be a witness always remains an open question tested by the 
prevailing cultural environment in which one dwells. As a creature with the faculties of will, 
intellect and heart, conscientious assent to God involves an openness to creative reason 
which, from the Christian perspective, is openness to the Logos. For Ratzinger, this openness 
is encounter with Christ who leads into the inner lif  of God – the human person’s truest 
happiness and authentic freedom.  
Ratzinger has a strong interest in the lives of the saints as a concrete entry point into 
the theme of freedom. If it is the great calling of the creature endowed with freedom to 
choose to live relationally, then, he says, the saint  demonstrate the delicate balance of 
fidelity to the promise of eternity alongside a genuinely incarnate way of life in history. There 
is a noticeable tendency in Ratzinger to put a higher premium on the personal realm more 
than on the communal in ecclesiological debates. When he deals with the saints, he does this 
to the extent that personal holiness counts for more in the Church than management or 
structures. Such a vision is oriented towards a Church based on the law of freedom and this 
will necessarily mean a smaller group who, with a full heart, strive for the holiness to which 
they assent. To his mind, therefore, indifference is the recipe for a lack of credibility in the 
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Church, while a convinced minority can transparently i volve itself in what Ratzinger calls 
civil religion.  
From an ecclesiological perspective, Ratzinger believ s the presence of these 
minorities concretely manifests “salt,” “light” and “yeast” in the world. It is the level of 
credibility manifested by the minority that leads to the further voluntary building-up of these 
spheres of contact and of relationality. However, h is careful to emphasize that these spheres 
are not self-sustaining, but live from the Church as a whole which stands by the faith in its 
divine origins. Therefore, the minority draws on the hidden life-force of the universal Church 
while simultaneously contributing to its renewed vitality.  
Section III has brought together personal, communal a d societal aspects of the 
Church through the prism of worship, oversight and witness. Arguably, what has been 
presented is a proposal mapping out the importance of the theme of an ecclesiology of 
liberation in Joseph Ratzinger’s writings. From theChristian perspective, Ratzinger has 
argued that growth in authentic freedom is bound to an inner, personal assent to God’s will 
which comes towards us and is overseen through the divinely instituted social framework of 
the Church. Moreover, he argues that such growth expresses itself in terms of a common 
witness, manifesting itself for the good of the whole. This is a concentric approach to the 
Church that becomes possible when Christ the Son is the centre of the Church which is ever 
his Body. The witness of believers who have been lovingly formed in the Church is an 






CONCLUDING EVALUATION  
In order to bring this research to a conclusion, it is mportant to undertake an overall 
assessment of Ratzinger’s thought as it relates to the thesis of the Church as sphere of growth 
in authentic freedom. Primarily, I propose to do this by evaluating the significance of his 
contribution, highlighting both its constructive aspects as well as its limits. In order to 
achieve this, I will focus on six broad themes which demonstrate the chief characteristics of 
Ratzinger’s line of reasoning as it pertains to an ecclesiology of liberation. One may loosely 
(but not entirely as there is some overlapping) characterise these themes in terms of the three 
main sections of the dissertation – there are two subdivisions dedicated to each section. 
Secondly, I will briefly highlight three potential venues of enquiry which Ratzinger opens 
up to the reader but doesn’t fully exploit. These th mes merit further ecclesiological 
investigation. 
9.1. The Significance of Ratzinger’s Contribution 
9.1.1. Cultural, Ecclesial and Existential Contexts Underpinning Ratzinger’s Approach 
This dissertation has argued that, in order to avoid misunderstanding Ratzinger’s 
approach to freedom, it is necessary to contextualise h s ecclesiology within the cultural, 
ecclesial and existential contexts that shape his life’ work. By gathering together these 
contexts in an integrated way, it is possible to determine that both Ratzinger’s personal and 
public life have fostered in him a specific interest in the ecclesiology of liberation.     
As demonstrated in Section I, Ratzinger’s formative years saw his familiarity with an 
idyllic and religious Bavarian homeland juxtaposed with the experience of national socialist 
and marxist politics. These memories remained with him throughout his studies of patristic 
and medieval theology, forming in him the belief that the Church had an essential 
contribution to make to any liberation from human aberration: 
404 
 
[Ratzinger’s] was a twilight (literally a two-light) childhood and adolescence, in 
which there existed a communal reality that could be trusted and a communal reality 
that clearly could not be trusted. The first, of course, was the Church, the second the 
Nazi authorities. The first was ever more experienced as the guarantor of human 
freedom, the second, however, as its indisputable enemy. The first embodied the 
wisdom of God and told the truth about human beings; the second embodied the false 
wisdom of a destructive ideology that completely effaced the truth about human 
beings.1 
Furthermore, throughout the course of this dissertation, we have seen Ratzinger 
promote an ecclesial faith. He envisages that such a faith should permeate and empower the 
whole of one’s existence, tempering, on the one hand, the human yearning for autonomous 
expressions of freedom while, on the other, cautioning against irresponsible naivety in respect 
of human sinfulness. This dissertation proposes that the pervasive influence of lived, as well 
as erudite Catholicism in Ratzinger’s own life means that he is one who is not oblivious to 
the “bitterness” people experience with the Church – particularly when recounting feelings of 
constraint, even subjugation by its agencies. He views his theological mandate in terms of 
contributing to an illumination of the redemption of the Church’s Exile in Babylon. He is 
motivated by the need for a liberating ablatio as the core personal centre of reform of all 
institutional reality in general, and the Church in particular. This concentration on the 
“personal core” explains why there is such a pronounced tendency in Ratzinger to give 
precedence to the personal aspects of ecclesial life. To his mind, institutional restructuring 
without personal reform offers, at best, temporary espite from the inescapable responsibility 
of each person to strive for a personal integrity consistent with the truth of human nature. 
                                                          
1 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 22. Corkery says the growing opposition between the wisdom 
of God and the wisdom of the world in Ratzinger’s outl ok fuels his passion for truth, giving him “an eye to 
what is going on in the world and to what Christian f ith has to say about it” (20). As an example of the deep 
impact his formative years had on him, Ratzinger’s own cousin who was diagnosed with Downs Syndrome was 
taken by the Nazis and murdered because his was considered a “life not worth living.” See Georg Ratzinger, 
Mein Bruder, der Papst (Munich: F.A. Herbig, 2011), 139. Nonetheless, Corkery, for his part, remains 
unconvinced by Ratzinger’s preference to accentuate so strongly the negative in the human person. Thatis not 
to say, however, that Corkery denies such a need: “[. . .] there are theological roads taken and roads not taken; 
and a direction, a signposted road, emerges for this young theologian’s developing mind. His will be a theology 
less inclined to seek for ‘seeds of the Word’ or for grace hidden in the human mess of things and more inclined 
to identify the pollutants that distort and seduce a humanity that is constantly in need of healing and conversion. 
It will, on the whole, be a theology more attuned to the tensions between what is godly and what is worldly 
rather than to the harmonies between the two” (26). See also this dissertation §§ 1.1., 1.2. and 1.5. 
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Maximilian Heim refers to Ratzinger’s approach as “existentielle Kirchlichkeit” or 
“existential ecclesiality,”2 namely, the lived habit of an ecclesial lifestyle that is acquired over 
time and is indispensable for constructive ecclesioog cal reflection. Heim considers this 
point fundamental to understanding Ratzinger’s contribution on two counts. On the one hand, 
there is Ratzinger’s own personal longevity at the centre of the upheaval and renewal in 
Christian theology that has taken place over the course of the twentieth-century. On the other 
hand, he has the experience of contributing to these theological developments from the 
differing perspectives of professor, peritus, pastor, prefect and, finally, as Pope. Heim rightly 
concludes that Ratzinger cannot be accurately understood apart from the course of the 
twentieth-century, the turbulent history of which has marked him so deeply and which he, in 
return, has dedicated his life to interpreting from the Christian perspective, above all in terms 
of the course set for the Church by the Second Vatican Council: 
No serious survey or Ratzinger’s ecclesiology can ignore the historical theological 
background in response to which his theology takes on its own contours. In his life in 
the Church, Ratzinger directly confronted the tensio  of the controversies that broke 
out in the wake of Vatican II and made it clear that t e Church herself is going 
through a time of transition. Concretely this means that we must inquire into the 
central issues of intellectual history that, on the on  hand, informed this ecclesial 
assembly and, on the other hand, had an important influence on Ratzinger’s reception 
of the Council.3 
 
In the upheaval experienced by theology in the first half of the twentieth-century, 
existentialism, a school of philosophy that treats the existence of the subject as a preeminent 
determinant, exerted a major influence on Ratzinger. H  says the “philosophy of dialogue” of 
Martin Buber (1878-1965) was “a spiritual exercise that left an essential mark” on him 
because of its philosophical personalism.4 Over the course of this dissertation, the centrality 
of dialogue in Ratzinger’s presentation has been evident, even to the point where human 
freedom forms the ground for the basis of divine-human relationality. There is even a sense in 
                                                          
2 Heim, Joseph Ratzinger – Kirchliche Existenz und existentielle Theologie, 144.  
3 Ibid., 467-68. This English translation is taken from Heim, Joseph Ratzinger: Life in the Church and Living 
Theology, 509.  
4 Ratzinger, Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977, 44. 
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which Ratzinger can be described as an existential theologian, albeit with some qualification. 
His is a “personal existentialism grounded in Jesus Christ.”5 He employs this relatively recent 
form of philosophical scholarship to re-examine the Church’s tradition as it encounters 
modern day theological and anthropological impasses.  
Ratzinger employs existentialist insight to develop a ersonalism which does not 
ignore the communal but anchors it, ontologically, in freedom. Ratzinger is able to bring his 
expertise as a historian of dogma to bear on the topic of freedom when he discusses neo-
chalcedonian christology.6 Erwin Dirscherl, Professor of Dogmatics and the History of 
Dogma in Regensburg University, says that Ratzinger was able to demonstrate “the 
existential level of ‘koinonia’.”7 To Ratzinger’s mind, the issue of human freedom is fully 
determined in the person of Christ as had already been established at Constantinople III. 
Ratzinger is an existentialist in so far as he engages this school of philosophy as an 
interpretative guide for communicating the Church’s christological teaching on issues of 
freedom pertaining to the divine and human wills in Christ. From an ecclesiological 
perspective, Dirscherl says Ratzinger formulates an ontology of freedom by means of 
existential analysis. Such an ontology shapes a unity in communion between God and his 
                                                          
5 See De Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI, 20. Both Corkery and Rowland have highlighted the 
influence of key nineteenth and twentieth-century philosophers upon Ratzinger at a time when existentialism 
was increasingly coming to the fore. As well as the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965) Ratzinger 
was impressed by the personalist scholars, Ferdinan Eb er (1882-1931) and Alois Dempf (1891-1982) because 
their insights were so compatible with Augustine. Se Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 23-2; 
Rowland, Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed, 3-4, 13ff; Jankunas, The Dictatorship of Relativism, 40. 
Christopher Collins, in particular, is of the view that the religious existentialism found in Martin Buber’s 1923 
landmark essay, “Ich und Du,” had an important influence on theology in general and on Ratzinger in particular. 
Collins says that Buber spoke of an isolation, anxiety and alienation amongst his contemporaries, the antidote to 
which lay in humanity’s return to the dialogue with “ e Eternal Thou.” See Christopher S. Collins, The Word 
Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 2013), 13. 
Ratzinger himself, however, is aware that “[t]he admission of existentialism into theology . . . was not without 
its dangers for theology.” In particular, he saw in it the potential for “the existentialist reduction, especially in 
the doctrine about God . . . [which] took biblical hope as its basis but inverted it by keeping the religious ardour 
but eliminating God and replacing him with the political activity of man”  (Ratzinger, Milestones: Memoirs 
1927-1977, 137). Nevertheless, Ratzinger is clearly attracted to the potential which dialogical theology presents 
for a personalist existentialism founded in Christ a  a way of engaging contemporary culture in the sphere of its 
own concerns. Nowhere is this more evident than in his treatment of the theological topic of freedom.    
6 See this dissertation § 3.2.2. 
7 Erwin Dirscherl, “Gott und Mensch als Beziehungsween: Die theologische und anthropologische Denkfigur 
Joseph Ratzingers ausgehend von der Christologie” in Frank Meier-Hamidi & Ferdinand Schumacher, eds., Der 
Theologe Joseph Ratzinger (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2007), 62.  
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people. In other words, a unity via the freedom of a reciprocal “yes” that always respects the 
difference and otherness between God and humanity.  
In retrospect, when one engages with the evidence – be it the deep cultural and 
political impressions made on him in his formative years in Germany, the enquiring nature of 
his unwavering faith, or his prolonged engagement with intellectual history – it seems 
inevitable that Ratzinger would be someone who would develop a keen interest in exploring 
an ecclesiology of liberation. 
9.1.2. The Value of Etiology in Theological Research  
The relevance and dependability of etiological research in the theological sciences is a 
question very much raised by the way Ratzinger approaches the issue of freedom. He tends to 
rely heavily on his own interpretation of the genesis of human freedom in the modern era. 
Consequently, the accuracy of his etiological narrative is significant because, generally 
speaking, the inferences he makes form the basis for his theological arguments, or at least 
they form part of the dialectic upon which he posits the Christian notion of freedom. He has 
been charged in the past with a lack of attention to detail in this regard.8 For his part, it can be 
said that Ratzinger presents a sort of “timeline” of the intellectual history of freedom, but 
without deeming it definitive.9 For him, the priority is to arrive at a point where his cultural 
diagnosis confirms the effects of the modern synthesis – that triptych of modern-day issues 
which he believes collaborate over time in generating an anarchic form of human freedom.  
The approach of Charles Taylor in his book, A Secular Age, is instructive for 
analysing the merits of Ratzinger’s “timeline.” Arguably the most ambitious articulation of 
the conditions of religious and cultural trends of the modern age that has been published in 
                                                          
8 For example, Ratzinger’s own former student, Hansjürgen Verweyen, has critiqued him for his 
misrepresentation and lack of awareness of the actual ontent of Karl Marx’s politico-economic views. See 
Hansjürgen Verweyen, Joseph Ratzinger – Benedikt XVI. Die Entwicklung seines Denkens (Darmstadt: Primus 
Verlag, 2007), 124-25.  
9 See Ratzinger, Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 166, 172. 
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recent years, Taylor’s study takes account of  the incomplete nature of all attempts to chart 
the “cross pressures” of intellectual and social history in analytical narrative form. However, 
he equally acknowledges the necessity of such attemp s if one is to reach an understanding of 
“how we got there.” He cautions that etiological scholarship is a hazardous, albeit essential 
task to undertake: 
[. . . ] our sense of where we are is crucially defined in part by a story of how we got 
there. . . . And just because we describe where we are in relating the journey, we can 
misdescribe it grievously by misidentifying the itinerary. . . . Our past is sedimented 
in our present, and we are doomed to misidentify ourselves, as long as we can’t do 
justice to where we come from. This is why the narrative is not an optional extra, why 
I believe I have to tell a story here. . . . I can only give the barest bones of the story, 
and touch on some of the major transitions. My hope is that a general picture of the 
dynamic involved will emerge from this skeleton account. But such a diachronic 
account is indispensable.10 
 
Therefore, while Taylor avoids framing his etiological projections in definitive terms, 
he remains clear that “telling the story can’t be elided; but it isn’t sufficient of itself. In fact, 
the whole discussion has to tack back and forth betwe n the analytical and the historical.”11 
In this context, Ratzinger’s approach is a valid way of coming to understand the historico-
cultural dynamics of freedom. While there is undoubtedly more “tacking” to be observed in 
Taylor’s work than with someone such as Ratzinger, n vertheless, the latter is just as keenly 
aware of the advantages of the etiological narrative of “how we got there” – i.e. of a 
diachronic reading of how the past resides in the present.12 
It is helpful to note a third voice in this debate – that of Robert Barron (b. 1959), 
                                                          
10 Taylor, A Secular Age, 29. Ruth Abbey, Political Science Professor at the University of Notre Dame, has 
demonstrated the limitations in Taylor’s attempt to narrate the past conditions of experience in “A Secular Age: 
The Missing Question Mark,” in Ian Leask, ed. The Taylor Effect: Responding to a Secular Age (N wcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 8-25.   
11 Taylor, A Secular Age, 29. 
12 It could further be noted that Taylor’s time frame is virtually identical to that of Ratzinger, namely the 
preceding five hundred years. While the former set himself the task of charting how “for the first time in history 
a purely self-sufficient humanism came to be a widely available option. . . . [that is] a humanism accepting no 
final goals beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing,” (Taylor, A 
Secular Age, 18), the latter was focused on coming to terms withhow freedom has become a veritable 
magisches Wort for many things, despite the problematic and inscrutable nature of the concept (cf. Ratzinger, 
Kirche, Ökumene und Politik, 165). In many respects they share the concern of wanting to understand more 
comprehensively the gradual autonomisation of society, even though Ratzinger’s ecclesiological focus carries 
him onto the meaning of the martyrological – that which precisely takes one beyond a solely temporal 
flourishing towards the good of the whole.  
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rector of Mundelein Seminary and President of the University of Saint Mary of the Lake in 
Chicago. In his book, The Priority of Christ: Towards a Post Liberal Catholicism, he offers 
an etiological analysis of the shift from the pre-modern to the modern that bears a striking 
resemblance to Ratzinger’s presentation.13 What is significant here is to observe how 
Barron’s etiology is capable of broadening the context of the “shift” more comprehensively 
than Ratzinger by introducing Duns Scotus (1266-1308) and William of Ockham’s (1287-
1347) univocal conception of being which was opposed to Thomas Aquinas’ (1225-74) 
analogical understanding of being. While Thomas held that God was the sheer act of being in 
itself and creatures were secondary analogues for wh m God is inescapably mysterious, 
Scotus, in an attempt to make God more immediately intelligible, shifted the focus onto 
describing God and human creatures as being of the sam  basic metaphysical category – 
differing only in degree but not in essence. Such a onflation of distinct entities into one had 
the tendency to make one of the parties, man, impatient of all views of a divine realm 
governing the human one. In this way, Scotism contributed to the human being growing ever 
more antagonistic to divine being, who is now seen as a rival. Hence, it played its part in 
paving the way for the exacerbation of such antagonism in the modern period of the 
Enlightenment and beyond.14  
                                                          
13 See Robert Barron, The Priority of Christ: Towards a Post Liberal Catholicism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos 
Press, 2007), 12-18.  
14 See ibid., 13-14. However, it cannot be claimed that Ratzinger is completely unaware of the contribution 
made by Scotus or that he deliberately excluded the medieval philosopher from his deliberations. For example, 
it is worth noting that as Pope he devoted part of his general audience of 7 July 2010 to Duns Scotus’ treatment 
of human freedom. See http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2010/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_aud_20100707_en.html (accessed 8 December 2012). On that occasion, Benedict XVI said Scotus 
explained a point to which modernity is very sensitive, namely human freedom and its relationship with the will, 
and the mind or intellect. Benedict said Scotus “underlines freedom as a fundamental quality of the will,
introducing an approach that lays greater emphasis on the will. Unfortunately, in later authors, this line of 
thinking turned into a voluntarism, in contrast to he so-called ‘Augustinian and Thomist intellectualism.’ For St 
Thomas Aquinas, who follows St Augustine, freedom cannot be considered an innate quality of the will, but, the 
fruit of the collaboration of the will and the mind. Indeed, an idea of innate and absolute freedom - as it evolved, 
precisely, after Duns Scotus - placed in the will that precedes the intellect, both in God and in man, risks leading 
to the idea of a God who would not even be bound to truth and good. The wish to save God's absolute 
transcendence and diversity with such a radical and impenetrable accentuation of his will does not take into 
account that the God who revealed himself in Christ is the God ‘Logos,’ who acted and acts full of love for us. 
Of course, as Duns Scotus affirms, love transcends k owledge and is capable of perceiving ever better than
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By extending his etiological analysis back from Luther into the thirteenth-century, 
Barrow helps to broaden out the line of reasoning. I  turn, this helps to inform the student of 
the topic more comprehensively. Lacking this furthe layer of analysis, Ratzinger does not lay 
out his etiology with the same clarity. However, it should also be said that ultimately there is 
no contradiction between the findings in Section I f this dissertation, and Barron’s 
conclusion that the enemy of freedom “[f]or many of the fathers of modernity . . . is nothing 
other than those traditional institutions (supported by the voluntarist conception of God) that 
bind the will and quash individual initiative and imagination.”15 
With regard then to the value of etiological research, Ratzinger demonstrates that it is 
an important part of approaching a theological topic. His expertise in the history of dogma 
helps him in this regard. However, his actual handling of the genesis of the modern history of 
freedom is neither detailed enough nor exhaustive enough to be deemed definitive. As 
Barron’s etiological research makes evident, the fact that it surpasses Ratzinger’s 
investigation demonstrates the evolving nature of contemporary scholarship and its 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
thought, but it is always the love of the God who is ‘Logos.’ In the human being too, the idea of absolute 
freedom, placed in the will, forgetting the connection with the truth, does not know that freedom itself must be 
liberated from the limits imposed on it by sin. All the same, the Scotist vision does not fall into these extremes: 
for Duns Scotus a free act is the result of the concourse of intellect and will, and if he speaks of a ‘primacy’ of 
the will, he argues this precisely because the will always follows the intellect.” In light of these comments, it is 
possible to argue that Ratzinger’s etiology of the genesis of the modern notion of freedom extends backw rds, 
prior to Luther, into mediaeval theology. However, because this is a papal teaching, I did not include it in the 
main deliberations on Ratzinger’s theology. Nonethel ss, it is worth noting that Benedict XVI still regards the 
issue of freedom very much alive and worthy of inclusion in the weekly papal catechesis sessions in Rome. 
15 Barron, The Priority of Christ, 15. Barron gives time to analysing the emergence of voluntarism – the primacy 
of the [divine] will at the cost of [divine] knowledge or reason: “Whereas in Aquinas’ participation metaphysics 
the created universe is constituted by its rapport with God, on Occam’s reading it must realise itself through 
disassociation from a competitive supreme being. A further concomitant of this individualistic ontology is 
voluntarism. Since the metaphysically dense and natural link between God and creatures has been attenut d, 
any connection between the divine and the nondivine has to be through will. God’s relation with his rational 
creatures is therefore purely legalistic and arbitrary. This understanding of divine power influenced Occam’s 
conception of the human will as well. Finite freedom is, for him, absolute spontaneity, an action promoted by 
nothing either interior or exterior to the subject. Accordingly, human power is a distant mirror of divine power: 
both are self-contained, capricious, absolute, and finally irrational. The most obvious practical consequence of 
this nominalist and voluntarist metaphysics is thatdivine and human freedom find themselves pitted against one 
another, God imposing himself arbitrarily on a necessarily reluctant and resentful humanity” (14). Barron’s 
contention from this is that modernity and decadent forms of Christianity – often portrayed as opposites – are 
both unsound. He says that in most of the disputes, th re are “advocates for the prerogatives of the voluntarist 
God facing down advocates of the voluntarist self.” He says both “need to be saved, precisely by that person 
who throws everything off, including and especially the competitive understanding of God and the world that 
produced the conflict between them in the first place” (16). Ratzinger is certainly not unaware of the voluntarist 
idea and his emphasis on the advocacy of creative reason by the Church is a counterbalance to it. 
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understanding of historico-cultural contexts. Despite any shortcomings, Ratzinger’s 
etiological investigation functions by bringing him to the point where he commences his 
constructive proposal for a Christian understanding of freedom, As Taylor points out, in this 
inexact science, so to speak, there is a balance to b struck between the historical and 
analytical which can enhance or even rework our understanding of the past. 
9.1.3. Nuanced Christocentricity 
A major characteristic of Ratzinger’s approach to aChristian understanding of 
freedom, as demonstrated by Section II of this dissertation, is a christocentricity which he 
repeatedly draws upon to build up of his arguments. This is the consequence of his long-time 
interest in promoting and perfecting the nuances of a christological hermeneutic.16 However, 
the central role played by Christ does raise a query as to whether Ratzinger achieves an 
overarching christocentricity to the detriment of the place of the Father, the Holy Spirit and 
Mary in the Christian economy. In addressing this mi giving, it is important to point out that 
we are simply dealing with emphases within Ratzinger’s theology, without in any way 
suggesting that he makes deliberate exclusions of mariological or pneumatological 
considerations. 
An initial remark to be made with regard to trinitarian theology as a whole is that 
Ratzinger’s priority is the presentation of a treatise on human freedom. Consequently, he 
lacks a detailed investigation of the metaphysical nature of divine freedom, in and of itself. 
He considers the relationality between divine and human freedom only to the extent that it 
takes in the human subject. Unlike a theologian such as von Balthasar, who gives substantial 
time to dealing with freedom in the context of the analogy of being, Ratzinger’s priority is 
specifically pastoral.17 
                                                          
16 See this dissertation § 1.6.  
17 See Thomas G. Dalzell, The Dramatic Encounter of Divine and Human Freedom in the Theology of Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, 2nd ed. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000), 59-100. Despite the diff rence in emphasis, Ratzinger’s 
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 One of Ratzinger’s key christological criteria is that “[w]ithout Jesus, we do not know 
what ‘Father’ truly is.” And since he considers thefilial relationship with the Father to be at 
the foundation of Jesus’ being, Ratzinger says that “[a] Jesus who was not continuously 
absorbed in the Father and was not in continuous intimate communication with him would be 
a completely different being from the Jesus of the Bible, the real Jesus of history.” Such 
“uninterrupted prayerful communication” is equally essential to the Father, because God the 
Father would also be someone else if he were not addressed in this way.18 It is significant 
here that Ratzinger’s intent is pastoral. One finds him correlating what he describes as the 
precarious status of fatherhood in society with humanity’s overarching need and prerequisite 
for divine fatherhood. For Ratzinger, divine fatherood furnishes human fatherhood with 
appropriate meaning. In reality, he says, it is not G d’s existence which is endangered today 
but humanity’s: 
Wo menschliche Vaterschaft verschwindet, ist Gott nicht mehr sagbar und denkbar. 
Nicht Gott ist tot, sondern im Menschen ist das weithin erstorben, was die 
Voraussetzung dafür wäre, dass Gott lebt in der Welt. Die Krise der Vaterschaft, die 
wir heute erleben, gehört zum Kern der Krise der Humanität, die uns bedroht. Wo 
Vaterschaft nur noch entweder als biologischer Zufall ohne menschlichen Anspruch 
oder als Tyrannis erscheint, die man abwerfen muss, da ist etwas am Grundgefüge des 
Menschseins verletzt. Zur Gänze des Menschseins bedarf s des Vaters in jenem 
wahren Sinn, in dem er durch den Glauben in Erscheinung getreten ist: als 
Verantwortung für den anderen, die ihn nicht beherrscht, sondern ihn freigibt zu sich 
selbst: als Liebe, die den anderen nicht vereinnahmen öchte, aber ihn auch nicht 
einfach in seiner Vorfindlichkeit bestätigt und das für Freiheit ausgibt, sondern ihn für 
seine innerste Wahrheit will, die in seinem Schöpfer ist. Solches Vatersein ist freilich 
nur möglich unter der Voraussetzung der Annahme des eigenen Kindseins.19 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dialogical worship argument is in substantial agreem nt with Dalzell’s account of Balthasar’s work: “Human 
freedom . . .  is the power to accept the measure God has set for one. By proportioning himself or herself to 
Christ and participating in his relationship of proortionality with God, the individual subject is enabled to be 
what God wants him or her to be and to progressively reveal God in the world” (287). 
18 See Ratzinger, The God of Jesus Christ, 33-34. To Ratzinger’s mind, Jesus’ prayer life reveals the fatherhood 
of God in the life of the Trinity: “Jesus does not merely touch [God the Father] from the outside; he belongs to 
the divinity of God, as Son. Before the world was made, God is already the love of Father and Son. He can 
become our Father and the criterion of all fatherhood precisely because he himself is Father from eternity. In 
Jesus’ prayer, the inner life of God becomes visible to us: we see how God is. Faith in the Triune Godis nothing 
other than the exposition of what takes place in Jesus’ prayer” (34). 
19 Ratzinger, Der Gott Jesu Christi, 39-40 (“Where human fatherhood disappears, it is no longer possible to 
speak and think of God. It is not God who is dead; what is dead (at least to a large extent) is the precondition in 
man that makes it possible for God to live in the world. The crisis of fatherhood that we are experiencing today 
is a basic aspect of the crisis that threatens mankind as a whole. Where fatherhood is perceived only as a
biological accident on which no genuinely human claims may be based, or the father is seen as a tyrant whose 
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His prioritisation of the filial relationship in God and his interest in the pastoral implications 
of divine paternity are important indicators highliting the fact that Ratzinger does not 
neglect God the Father in his theology. For the most part, however, he views the Father 
through the eyes of the Son. This is very much consistent with his attraction to Johannine 
theology, such as is found in John 14. As a consequence of his emphasis on this “Father-Son” 
relationality, he penetrates the synergy of wills at the core of the person of Christ very 
effectively and from there, he is able to justify the dialogical orientation which he believes 
underpins authentic human freedom and the way to the Father.       
 
An initial reading of Ratzinger’s work could also leave one with the impression that 
pneumatology is also eclipsed by the dominant christocentric narrative. Emery de Gaál has 
compiled an exhaustive account of Ratzinger’s contribution to the retrieval of the 
christological focus of theology over the course of the 20th century. In it, he laments the 
“comparative paucity of references to the Holy Spirit” in Ratzinger’s theology. However, this 
is a somewhat questionable, albeit quantitatively justifiable analysis of Ratzinger’s 
christocentric approach.20 While it is true that Ratzinger’s concentration on Christ is more 
voluminous, it is Ratzinger’s wariness of excesses in any direction which gives him the 
natural instinct to never speak pneumatologically without it being rooted in Christ and in the 
Church.21 For example, he naturally leans towards the universal, towards the “whole,” in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
yoke must be thrown off, something in the basic structure of human existence has been damaged. If human 
existence is to be complete, we need a father, in the true meaning of fatherhood that our faith discloes, namely, 
a responsibility for one’s child that does not dominate him but permits him to become his own self. This 
fatherhood is a love that avoids two traps: the total subjugation of the child to the father’s own priorities and 
goals, on the one hand, and the unquestioning acceptance of the child as he is, under the pretext that this is the 
expression of freedom, on the other. Responsibility for one’s child means the desire that he realize hs own 
innermost truth, which lies in his Creator. And natur lly, a fatherhood of this kind is possible only if one accepts 
one’s own status as a child” [Ratzinger, The God of Jesus Christ, 29-30]). See Jean-Pierre Batut, “Calling 
Fathers ‘Father’: Usurping the Name of God?,” Communio 36 (2009): 295-308, for valuable distinctions on the
intrinsic nature of human paternity and maternity. In fact this entire issue of Communio contains a series of eight 
articles on various aspects of paternity which are helpful in light of Ratzinger’s concern for fatherhood in 
contemporary society. 
20 See De Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI, 303, n.4.  
21 See Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 29-35. 
414 
 
disputes between the universal and the particular in ecclesiology. He then tries to interpret 
and safeguard the particular from the perspective of the universal. So, for example, he will 
acknowledge the positive advances made by science and technology, while also cautioning 
against the temptation to supplant God with them. Liberation theology is a good example of 
such a “particular” development in the Church which Ratzinger seeks to interpret from the 
perspective of the universal Church. On the other hand, when it comes to personal 
membership of the Church he never departs from the beli f that the true reform depends upon 
the liberating ablatio or “removal” undertaken in the human person with a free heart.  
The wariness of an isolated pneumatology divorced from the mission of the Son 
explains the strong emphasis which Ratzinger places on the sacramental aspect of the 
successio principle. From the perspective of human freedom, his desire to purify pneumatic 
anarchy is the clearest example of his approach.22 When, for example, Ratzinger sets about 
arguing in great and discriminating detail for the episcopal principle in the Church, he lays 
himself open to the charge of maintaining the statu q o of top-down Roman regulation.23  
However, such a charge fails to see his argument as having its context in an overall 
christocentric framework which has, in fact, sought to mitigate any perception of monarchical 
or hierarchal dominance in the Church and has in this way constituted a very valuable 
contribution to catholic ecclesiology. Nevertheless, the broader trinitarian context is also 
required here in order to perceive the full breadth of Ratzinger’s perspective of self-
dispossession, whether at the level of the divine persons in God, the crucified Christ’s prayer 
posture of extreme submission, or the believer’s dialogical orientation with regard to God and 
one another. Only by recognising Ratzinger’s examintio  of the institutional and prophetic 
charisms from the perspective of “not my will but your will” (Luke 22:42), does one come to 
                                                          
22 See this dissertation § 5.2.2. 
23 For a good guide to Ratzinger’s time as head of the CDF and the charge against him of sponsoring a 
centralisation of the Church through hierarchical domination, see Jesús Martínez Gordo, The Christology of J. 
Ratzinger-Benedict XVI in the light of his Theological Biography (Barcelona: Edicions Rondas, 2009), 17-19. 
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understand his original intention. He is repeatedly reassured by the pauline pneumatological 
dictum whereby the human person is being transformed and liberated as a result of a 
dialogical orientation that beholds the divine: “The Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of 
the Lord is, there is freedom. And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord 
as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of 
glory to another, for this comes from the Lord, theSpirit.” (2Cor 3:17-18; cf. Exod. 34:34).24  
On the issue of mariology, it is particularly noteworthy that one does not find more 
direct references to Mary in the present research.25 As I explored the topic, the presence of 
Mary didn’t impact to any great extent upon the natur l flow of Ratzinger’s presentation, 
such is the all-encompassing christocentric nature of his work. While Ratzinger’s 
mariological reflections contain some of his most stimulating exegetical analyses and are 
interspersed with patristic references, they demonstrate a good example of the weakness of 
the largely occasional nature of his theology, the consequence, no doubt, of his increasing 
responsibilities in Church governance throughout the course of his lifetime. Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding their fragmentary nature, there are th e collections of lectures and addresses 
on mariology which are relevant to the present discus ion.26  
For the most part, Ratzinger’s interest in mariology is entirely consistent with the 
direction set by the Second Vatican Council, which was to shape a more complete 
                                                          
24 See, for example, GS: ZV, 60, 211, 233, 348, 369, 467, 1026, 1224.   
25 See this dissertation §§ 6.2., 6.4. and 8.2. 
26 See Joseph Ratzinger, Die Tochter Zion: Betrachtungen über den Marienglauben der Kirche (Einsiedeln: 
Johannes, 1977); Maria: Gottes Ja zum Menschen (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1987); Joseph Ratzinger and 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Maria: Kirche in Ursprung (Einsiedeln, Freiburg: Johannes, 1997). Ratzinger’s 
writings have been classified as “fragmentary” by Vincent Twomey. See his Pope Benedict: Conscience of our 
Age, 41, 44, 59. He says Ratzinger’s writings are “fragmentary and mostly unfinished, but taken together, they 
nonetheless constitute a single, unified body of work. . . . Like his university lectures, all his writings are 
contributions to an on-going debate, first the scholarly debate within his own discipline – theology – and, later, 
as he became more pastor than scholar, the public debate about the future of society and, above all, the Church’s 
role in it” (36). According to Twomey, the largely occasional nature of Ratzinger’s theological writings is the 
consequence of his onerous life as a curial cardinal in Rome. Twomey also describes Ratzinger as an “original 
thinker” (42) whose writings are, in many instances, “seminal” (44).  
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understanding of the nature of the Church through Mary.27 Ratzinger is keen to heighten 
awareness that, from the New Testament era until the time of Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-
1153), the content of mariology had been conceived primarily in terms of ecclesiology. After 
that time it emerged with an integrity of its own within theology, while the idea of an isolated 
marian piety gathered momentum. For his part, Ratzinger believes that “we cannot assign 
Mariology to Christology alone or to ecclesiology alone (much less dissolve it into 
ecclesiology as a more or less superfluous exemplification of the Church).”28 Even with this 
                                                          
27 See Ratzinger and Balthasar, Maria: Kirche im Ursprung, 14–30. The correlation of ecclesiology and 
mariology was a key debate of the Second Vatican Council. The Fathers voted in favour of placing its teaching 
on Mary within the context of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church. In a lecture at a Congress which e 
attended in 2000, Ratzinger briefly sets out the path of mariology in the deliberations of the Council. In this text, 
Ratzinger acknowledges the wisdom of the Council Fathers in seeking to gain a more precise correlation 
between Mary and the Church. See “The Ecclesiology of the Constitution, Lumen gentium,” in Ratzinger, 
Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 150-51. In this correlation, Ratzinger says, one can come “to comprehend the 
supra-individual nature of the person and the supra-institutional nature of the community, as the very point at 
which both person and community are taken back to their origins through the power of the Lord, of the new 
Adam.” On the issue of mariology at the Council, see also Thomas Norris, “The Church’s Marian Profile and 
the Reception of Vatican II’s Ecclesiology” in Proceedings of the International Symposium of Theology: The 
Ecclesiology of Communion Fifty Years after the Opening of Vatican II, vol. 2 of 50th International Eucharistic 
Congress (Dublin: Veritas, 2013), 362-81. 
28 Ratzinger and Balthasar, Mary: The Church at the Source, 29. For more on Ratzinger’s understanding of 
Mary as ecclesial person, see ibid., 21-25, 30, 61-79; Daughter Zion, 67-8, 77-81; Mary: God’s Yes to Man, 33-
37. The heart of his approach to the personification of the Church in Mary can be seen in the following 
statement which is worth quoting at length: “Everything said about the cclesia in the Bible is true of her, and 
vice versa: the Church learns concretely what she i and is meant to be by looking at Mary. Mary is her mirror, 
the pure measure of her being, because Mary is wholly within the measure of Christ and of God, is through and 
through his habitation. And what other reason could the ecclesia have for existing than to become a dwelling for 
God in the world? God does not deal with abstractions. He is a person, and the Church is a person. The mor  
that each one of us becomes a person, person in the sens  of a fit habitation for God, daughter Zion, the more we 
become one, the more we are the Church, and the mor the Church is herself. The typological identification of 
Mary and Zion leads us then, into the depths. . . . [Mary] does not wish to be just this one human being who 
defends and protects her own ego. She does not regard life as a stock of goods of which everyone wants to get as 
much as possible for himself. Her life is such that she is transparent to God, ‘habitable’ for him. Her lif  is such 
that she is a place for God. Her life sinks her into the common measure of sacred history, so that what appears in 
her is, not the narrow and constricted ego of an isolated individual, but the whole, true Israel. This ‘typological 
identification’ is a spiritual reality; it is life lived out of the spirit of Sacred Scripture; it is rootedness in the faith 
of the Fathers and at the same time expansion into the height and breadth of the coming promises” (Mary: The 
Church at the Source , 66-7). However, he emphasizes that the “typological” is not at the cost of history: “The 
cavalier divorce of ‘biology’ and theology omits precisely man from consideration; it becomes a self-
contradiction insofar as the initial, essential point f the whole matter lies precisely in the affirmation that in all 
that concerns man the biological is also human and especially in what concerns the divinely-human nothing is 
‘merely biological.’ Banishment of the corporeal, or sexual, into pure biology, all the talk about the‘m rely 
biological,’ is consequently the exact antithesis of what faith intends. For faith tells us of the spirituality of the 
biological as well as the corporeality of the spiritual and the divine. On this point the choice is betwe n all or 
nothing. The attempt to preserve a spiritual, distilled remainder after the biological element has been alienated 
denies the very spiritual reality which is the principal concern of the faith in the God become flesh” (Daughter 
Zion, 52-53). See also Mary: The Church at the Source, 29. It is also interesting to note Ratzinger’s presentation 
of the Church and Mary in his most recent book. Despit  the relative prominence of Mary in the infancy 
narratives, he makes only one short reference to Mary as the image of the Church (cf. Jesus of Nazareth: The 
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noble intention, however, it is arguable that Ratzinger fails to fully exploit the Marian 
dimension of the Church in his theory of authentic freedom. This is despite the fact that the 
means by which to do so can readily be found in his wr tings. Nevertheless, Ratzinger’s 
mariological reflections are in basic agreement with the findings of this research – namely, to 
magnify God (which was Mary’s song of dialogical worship) is to free ourselves for him and 
orient ourselves towards the will of the Father. Again, it is only a question of emphasis here 
because one most certainly cannot accuse Ratzinger of not addressing the figure of Mary in 
the life of the Church.  In fact, Ratzinger simply exchanges the liturgical language of posture 
and worship for that of Mary in the scriptures:    
Den Herrn groß machen – das bedeutet: nicht sich selbst, den eigenen Namen, das 
eigene Ich groß machen wollen, sich ausbreiten und Platz verlangen, sondern ihm 
Raum geben, daß er mehr anwesend sei in der Welt. Es bedeutet, das wahrer zu 
werden, was wir sind: nicht eine verschlossene Monade, die nur sich selbst darstellt, 
sondern Bild Gottes. Es bedeutet, frei werden von dem Staub und dem Ruß, der das 
Bild undurchsichtig macht, es verdeckt und in der reinen Verwiesenheit auf ihn 
wahrhaft Mensch werden.29 
 
One of Ratzinger’s key points is that the person of Mary underscores the logic that 
unites christology, ecclesiology and soteriology. She operates at the level of the “the n xus 
mysteriorum - the intrinsic interwovenness of the mysteries in their irreducible mutual 
otherness and their unity.”30 By the same token, Ratzinger says “[m]ariology is an essential 
component of a hermeneutics of salvation history,” thereby ensuring that a one-sided solus 
Christus is not overstated. 31 Such an ordering of salvation history is essential to the theme of 
freedom. Ratzinger is clearly aware of this, even if it is not something he regularly commits 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Infancy Narratives.  126). In fact, in general terms, there are only two other explicit references to ecclesiology in 
the book as whole (cf. 33, 86).      
29 Ratzinger and Balthasar, Maria: Kirche im Ursprung, 65-66 (“To magnify the Lord means, not to want to 
magnify ourselves and take up more space, but to give him room so that he may be more present in the world. It 
means to become more truly what we are: not a self-enclosed monad that displays nothing but itself, but God’s 
image. It means to get free of the dust and soot that obscures and begrimes the transparency of the image and to 
become truly human by pointing exclusively to him” [Ratzinger and Balthasar, Mary: The Church at the Source, 
75]). In this context also, Ratzinger mentions once again, albeit in passing, the work of Maximus the Confessor 
and his contribution to greater understanding of the synergy of wills in Christ.   
30 Ratzinger and Balthasar, Mary: The Church at the Source, 29. 
31 Ibid., 31.  
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to writing. It forms the basis of the nuptial mysticism which is an explicit part of his 
sacramental, “body of Christ” ecclesiology: 
[. . .] [Christologie] von einem Christus sprechen muß, der “Haupt und Leib” ist, das 
heißt, der die erlöste Schöpfung in ihrer relativen S lbständigkeit mitumfaßt. Dies 
weitet aber zugleich den Blick über die Heilsgeschichte hinaus, weil es einer falsch 
verstandenen Alleinwirksamkeit Gottes gegenüber die Realität des Geschöpfes in den 
Blick bringt, das von Gott zur freien Antwort berufen und befähigt ist. In der 
Mariologie wird sichtbar, daß die Gnadenlehre nicht auf Rücknahme der Schöpfung 
hinausläuft, sondern das definitive Ja zur Schöpfung ist: Mariologie wird so zur 
Gewähr für die Eigenständigkeit der Schöpfung, zur Bürgschaft des 
Schöpfungsglaubens und zum Siegel einer recht gedachten Schöpfungslehre.32 
 
There is an admission here by Ratzinger of the necessity to focus on the type of 
freedom inherent in creation. For his part, he speaks about Mary’s “yes.” While, it is not the 
same as the “yes” of Jesus Christ, neither can it be severed from it. In his Jesus of Nazareth 
series, Ratzinger invokes Bernard again here to speak of the radical nature of Mary’s role in 
the plan of salvation – namely, God’s dependence on human obedience to his will:  
Nach dem Versagen der Stammeltern ist die ganze Welt verdunkelt, unter der 
Herrschaft des Todes. Nun sucht Gott einen neuen Eingang in die Welt. Er klopft bei 
Maria an. Er braucht die menschliche Freiheit. Er kann den frei geschaffenen 
Menschen nicht ohne ein freies Ja zu seinem Willen erlösen. Die Freiheit erschaffend, 
hat er sich in gewisser Weise vom Menschen abhängig gemacht. Seine Macht ist 
gebunden an das unerzwingbare Ja eines Menschen. So zeigt Bernhard, wie Himmel 
und Erde in diesem Augenblick der Frage an Maria gleichsam den Atem anhalten. 
Wird sie ja sagen? Sie zögert . . . Wird ihre Demut sie hindern? Dies eine Mal – so 
sagt Bernhard zu ihr – sei nicht demütig, sondern hochgemut! Gib uns dein Ja! Das ist 
der entscheidende Augenblick, in dem aus ihrem Mund, aus ihrem Herzen die 
Antwort kommt: “Mir geschehe nach deinem Wort.” Es ist der Augenblick des freien, 
demütigen und zugleich großmütigen Gehorsams, in dem sich die höchste 
Entscheidung menschlicher Freiheit ereignet.33 
                                                          
32 Ratzinger and Balthasar, Maria: Kirche im Ursprung, 25 (“Christology must speak of a Christ who is both 
‘head and body,’ that is, who comprises the redeemed creation in its relative subsistence. But this move 
simultaneously enlarges our perspective beyond salvation history, because it counters a false understanding of 
God’s sole agency, highlighting the reality of the cr ature that God calls and enables to respond to him freely. 
Mariology demonstrates that the doctrine of grace do s not revoke creation; rather it is the definitive yes to 
creation. In this way, mariology guarantees the ontol gical independence of creation, undergirds faith in 
creation, and crowns the doctrine of creation, rightly understood” [Ratzinger and Balthasar, Mary: The Church 
at the Source, 31]). 
33 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth. Prolog: Die Kindheitsgeschichten, 46 (“After the error of our first parents, the 
whole world was shrouded in darkness, under the domini n of death. Now God seeks to enter the world anew. 
He knocks at Mary’s door. He needs human freedom. The only way he can redeem man, who is created free, is 
by means of a free ‘yes’ to his will. In creating freedom, he made himself in a certain sense dependent upo  
man. His power is tied to the unenforceable ‘yes’ of a human being. So Bernard portrays heaven and earth as it 
were holding its breath at this moment to the question addressed to Mary. Will she say yes? She hesitat  . . . 




For Ratzinger, Mary’s “yes” has three discernible features. In the first instance, there 
is God’s “pure ‘yes’” to Mary in her immaculate state. In her freedom from original sin, 
“Mary reserves no area of being, life, and will forherself as a private possession: instead 
precisely in the total dispossession of self, in giving herself to God, she comes to the true 
possession of self. Grace as dispossession becomes response as appropriation.”34 This leads 
to the second aspect – Mary’s free, wholehearted “ys” to the Father’s will, whereby she 
“makes her body, her very self, into the place of Gd’s presence. In this Yes, therefore, 
Mary’s will and the Son’s will coincide.”35 And thirdly, Mary is called to accept her passion 
– the sword shall pierce her heart and she must learn to release the Son she bore:  
Sie muß das Ja zu Gottes Willen, das sie Mutter werden ließ, zu Ende führen, indem 
sie zurücktritt und ihn in seine Sendung entläßt. . . . Das Aufnehmen und das 
Verfügbarsein ist der eine Schritt, der von ihr verlangt wird; das Lassen und das 
Freigeben der andere. Erst so wird ihre Mutterschaft ganz: Das “Selig der Leib, der 
dich getragen” wird erst wahr, wo es eingeht in das andere Selig: “Selig, die das Wort 
Gottes hören und es befolgen,” (Lk 11:27f.). So ist Maria vorbereitet auf das 
Geheimnis des Kreuzes, das an Golgatha nicht einfach endet. Ihr Sohn bleibt Zeichen 
des Widerspruchs, und sie bleibt so bis zuletzt in de  Schmerz dieses Widerspruchs 
hineingehalten, in den Schmerz der messianischen Mutterschaft.36 
 
Hence, while Ratzinger does not give mariology an explicit place in his overall 
theology of freedom, the elements to allow one synthesize the best merits of his ecclesiology 
of liberation can be found in it. It is a relatively short step to identify Mary as the pre-eminent 
example of the Christian synthesis which he is endeavouring to formulate. The figure of 
Mary contributes to the formulation of the content of he human “yes” that stands at the heart 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘yes’! This is the crucial moment when, from her lips, from her heart, the answer comes: ‘Let it be to me 
according to your word.’ It is the moment of free, humble yet magnanimous obedience in which the loftiest 
choice of human freedom is made” [Ratzinger, J sus of Nazareth: The Infancy Narratives, 36]). 
34 Ratzinger, Daughter Zion, 70. 
35 Ratzinger, Mary: God’s Yes to Man, 25-26. 
36 Ratzinger and Balthasar, Maria: Kirche im Ursprung, 67 (“She must complete the Yes to God’s will that 
made her a mother by withdrawing into the background a d letting Jesus enter upon his mission . . . . To accept 
and to be available is the first step required of her; to let go and to release is the second. Only in this way does 
her motherhood become complete: the ‘blessed is the womb that bore you’ comes true only when it enters into 
the other beatitude: ‘Blessed rather are those who hear the word of God and keep it’ (Luke 11:27-28). By this 
means Mary is prepared for the mystery of the Cross, which does not simply end on Golgotha. Her Son remains 
a sign of contradiction, and she is thus kept to the very end in the pain of this contradiction, in the pain of her 
messianic motherhood” [Ratzinger and Balthasar, Mary: The Church at the Source, 76]). 
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of one’s dialogical orientation with regard to God. This “yes,” as exemplified in Mary, is 
acceptance and availability, followed by surrender and release for God’s will, even to the 
point where one can assent to the suffering that can a company fellowship with Christ who 
remains a sign of contradiction in the world. Ultimately, Ratzinger’s presentation of Mary’s 
“yes” concretely demonstrates the dynamic of the martyrological profile of the Church – a 
dynamic integral to his ecclesiology of liberation. 
There can be no doubting the christological core of Ratzinger’s work. However, this 
ought not to be read as a displacement of trinitarian or mariological perspectives. It is a case, 
rather, that in the gift of the Son, Ratzinger believes the face of God is revealed in and for the 
world. For Ratzinger, the sacrificial nature of thelif  of Jesus of Nazareth opens up the 
martyrological contours of faith, and of freedom. Miroslav Volf points out that in the face of 
his Christus totus, there is no “hierarchology” in Ratzinger the theologian.37 Instead his 
concern for the “whole” expresses itself in a “spirituality of divestment” that corresponds to 
Ratzinger’s basic understanding of communality.38 In effect, Ratzinger’s nuanced 
christocentricity is his doorway unto incomprehensible mystery. Not without merit, therefore, 
one finds Christopher Ruddy of Catholic University of America, going so far as to state that 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology exhibits the tone of a mystic:             
Contrary to popular impression and even caricature, his ecclesiology is not a 
repressive “hierarchology,” but thoroughly sacramental, centred above all on the 
eucharistic celebration. Its dominant tone is mystical, even romantic, in its emphases 
upon the communal, the interior and intuitive, the familial. Most fundamental 
perhaps, is his sense of divine gift: the church and its liturgy are to be received by 
men and women in wonder, rather than actively made or constructed.39 
   
    
                                                          
37 See Volf, After Our Likeness, 53.  
38 Ibid., 60-61. See this dissertation § 0.3. 
39 Ruddy, The Local Church, 100. On the charge of “hierarchology,” Ruddy cites Thomas Weiler, Volk Gottes – 
Leib Christi: Die Ekklesiologie Joseph Raztingers und ihr Einfluβ auf das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil (Mainz: 
Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1997).   
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9.1.4. An Opening-up of Affective Ecclesiology 
Faith is comprised of both objective and subjective characteristics. From a 
sacramental perspective, the terms ex opere operato and ex opere operantis are used to 
capture the same reality. When coming to terms withthe life of the Church, it is possible to 
speak of a similar dynamic through the notions of effective and affective ecclesiology. In 
other words, there are objective and subjective aspct  in the life of the Church which define 
the dynamics of our relationship with it as a whole.  
The effective aspect implies that the Church objectiv ly fulfils its purpose. This 
purpose is the same today as always, namely the definitive gathering of God’s people and the 
revelation of God’s glory in the world. Ratzinger’s ecclesiology has a strong effective 
quality. This is particularly evident in his approach to the scriptures through a christological 
hermeneutic. Furthermore, his unmistakable alignment of the Church’s mission with truth 
gives effective and binding force to his ecclesiology by making a claim on the creaturely 
status of the human person.   
Alongside the notion of truth in his writings, the equally dominant theme of love 
ensures that the dignity of being created free can never be circumvented or disregarded. The 
specific theme of human freedom opens up the field of affective theology and is potentially 
of great importance for the study of an ecclesiology f liberation. Affectivity, concerned as it 
is with the recognition of our emotions or feelings, is something very common in the study of 
psychology. However, it has not been given so much attention in the present-day study of the 
Church. Nevertheless, the attempt to come to terms with authentic freedom has led Ratzinger 
to include “feeling” or “heart” as part of the Christian synthesis. This opens up the possibility 
of a greater emphasis upon the affective on the part of the human person, particularly in the 
approach to the Church and, in turn, in the Church’s significance for the world.  
In terms of the findings of this dissertation, Ratzinger’s position is that the free 
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creature orients oneself towards God through the maturation of believing affectivity. He 
considers the whole-hearted human “yes” to God as the relational analogue of God’s “yes” to 
creation. In this lies the human person’s authentic freedom. Assistant professor of theology at 
St Louis University in Missouri, Christopher Collins, has studied Ratzinger’s dialogical 
theology and he points out that the dynamics of our relationship with God are ultimately, and 
necessarily, asymmetrical: 
Ratzinger see God as the one who speaks. Humanity is best understood as those who 
listen to God’s Word and then are able to respond. God and humanity are dialogue 
partners. But this is not a dialogue of equals; it is necessarily asymmetrical. It matters 
who speaks the first word. For Ratzinger, God is always the one taking the initiative, 
and humanity is always in the posture of responsiveess. So for Ratzinger all of 
reality is dialogical, but dialogical in an asymmetrical manner.40  
 
This is a very helpful contribution to the terminology which can be used when 
discussing Ratzinger’s dialogical approach, particularly on the topic of freedom. Collins says 
that Ratzinger has an “affective sensibility”41 which has accompanied him through life. In 
fact, Collins substantiates the findings of this disertation, particularly when he describes 
Ratzinger’s vision of Christian freedom in terms of the worshipping posture that was already 
anticipated in biblical antiquity (Exod 7:16): “the essence of God’s call to his people, and 
therefore the fullness of the freedom God has in mid for them, is ultimately rooted in their 
capacity to enter into this worship, into this dialogue with the living God.”42 Growth in 
freedom resides in the human assent which, ultimately, is ordered to the Church’s effective 
role in the plan of salvation. Taken together, the eff ctive and affective characteristics of 
ecclesial life are integral to Ratzinger’s vision of the Church as sphere of growth in authentic 
freedom. He says “inner agreement with God,” which to is mind follows the pattern of 
ablatio, “has its inner way: forgiveness is healing, that is to say, it demands the return to the 
                                                          
40 Collins, The Word Made Love, xii. Gerald O’ Collins offers a similar interpretation of freedom through God, 
and in reciprocity in “What is Real Freedom?,” The Pastoral Review 7 (November/December 2011): 10-15.    
41 Collins, The Word Made Love, 4. 
42 Ibid., 9. See this dissertation § 4.1.4.  
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truth.”43 This is Ratzinger’s vision for an ecclesial lifestyle: 
Zum glücklichen Leben gehört also das innere Einverehmen mit Gott. Nur wenn 
diese Grundbeziehung stimmt, können auch alle andere  Beziehungen richtig werden. 
Deswegen ist es wichtig, ein Leben lang und von Jugend auf das Denken mit Gott, 
das Fühlen mit Gott das Wollen mit Gott zu lernen und einzuüben, damit daraus Liebe 
werde und damit Liebe der Grundton unseres Lebens wird. Wenn das der Fall ist, 
versteht sich die Nächstenliebe ganz von selbst. Denn wenn der Grundton meines 
Lebens Liebe ist, dann kann ich den Mitmenschen gegenüber, die Gott mir auf den 
Weg gestellt hat, wiederum nur aus dem Ja, aus dem Vertrauen, der Zustimmung und 
der Liebe leben.44  
 
While Ratzinger invests time into highlighting the three elements of thinking, willing 
and feeling, proposing that they combine to bring about a Christian philosophy of freedom in 
the human person, he does not engage in any meaningful epistemological analysis of how the 
affective – the heart – relates to knowledge, nor does he explicitly investigate or seek 
assistance from previous treatments of affectivity in the Christian tradition. Despite his desire 
to promote the affective aspect, his lack of deeper analysis on this point does leave him open 
to the potential charge of not adequately substantiati g his theological propositions on the 
topic of Christian freedom.  
On this issue of the affective in the Christian tradition, the Eastern Orthodox 
Metropolitan of Pergamon, John Zizioulas, makes an insightful contribution. On the 
epistemological level, he points out that it was Makarius the Egyptian (300-90) who 
introduced early Christian theology to the faculty of heart. Makarius had been responding to 
the work of Origen (185-254) and Evagrius Ponticus (345-99) who had expressed the view 
that there is a direct relationship between God and the human mind. This implied that the 
mind is the link between God and man, and consequently, the means of our knowledge of 
                                                          
43 Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 94. 
44 Ratzinger, Auf Christus schauen, 124 (“Inner agreement with God thus belongs to the happy life. Only if this 
fundamental relationship is right can all the other relationships be right. For that reason it is important 
throughout one’s life and from one’s youth onwards to learn and to practice thinking with God, feeling with 
God, willing with God, so that love may grow from this and become the keynote of our life. If that is the case, 
love of neighbour becomes self-evident. For if the keynote of my life is love, then as far as concerns tho e 
whom God has placed on my way I can once again only live on the basis of this assent, this trust, this 
agreement, and this love” [Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 112]). 
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God. Zizioulas points out that such an idea ran the risk of excluding from our knowledge of 
God everything perceived by the human senses. In such a situation, the confession of the 
Word became flesh is not easily reconcilable with the view that the human mind appears to 
be able to perceive God directly, without any interaction with the material world. Even 
though Makarius’ introduction of the faculty of heart  did not seek to create a division 
between the notions of mind and emotion in the human person, his contribution to the 
epistemological debate was largely misinterpreted because the classical Greek view 
understood that the heart was the source of emotions. In the theology of Israel, on the other 
hand, the heart was understood as the faculty of cogniti n precisely because it was the 
instrument of obedience. The following words by Zizioulas clarify that the affective is very 
much a Christian ideal from the beginning, and essential for understanding human freedom: 
The heart represents man’s obedience and so it knows God as God, since the pure in 
heart “shall see God” (Matthew 5:9). The heart is the place of freedom, where we say 
“yes” or “no” to one another and to God. The obedient heart does God’s will. So 
knowledge of God is not an issue simply of intellect or of emotion but of obedience. 
For those formed by the Greek worldview and coming the terms with the teaching of 
Scripture this was not obvious. For Greeks, knowledge had to point towards the 
identity and existence of something. An object must be much more than a moral 
summons, to which I respond with a “yes” or “no.” Through obedience we 
acknowledge that someone truly exists, so for Makarius there was an ontological 
aspect to this knowledge.45   
In the final analysis, there are no contradictions between Zizioulas presentation and 
Ratzinger’s relational vision of Christian freedom, but again, from the etiological perspective, 
the promotion of the affective benefits from being set within the broader context of the 
                                                          
45 John Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, ed. Douglas H. Knight (London:  T & T Clark, 2008), 23. It 
is of note here that both Ratzinger and Zizioulas consider Maximus the Confessor as the one responsible for a 
significant epistemological move in christology through the promotion of the eternally loving relationship that 
exists between the Father and the Son. Maximus cameto th  conclusion that the Christ is the Logos of G d. 
Through the Logos we come to know God. Consequently, we have all have our logoi and reason within the one 
Logos and Word of God. This replaced the earlier ida that the mind is the sole conduit of knowledge. It is the 
eternal love of the Son for the Father that makes God known. It is personal relationship, not the knowledge of 
objects that reveals true knowledge: “No true knowledge of God comes through the mind or the heart, by either 
intellectual or spiritual exercises. . . . All knowledge that is truly ours must relate in some way to our experience. 
. . . A person is identifiable only within a relationship with another person. There is no person outside 
relationship with other persons, so one person is no person at all” (24-25). 
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Christian tradition.46 Indeed, Zizioulas himself believes there is a case to be made in 
theology, from an epistemological perspective, thate affective is not an irrational faculty 
incapable of being trusted. On the contrary, to his mind, the history of theology shows that 
the human person is brought to knowledge of God through the unity of mind and heart: 
The mind cannot acquire knowledge on its own, withou  the whole person, so the 
heart and mind were understood as a unity. The heart knows, and the mind loves, and 
because it loves it is able to know. This meeting of heart and mind was referred to as 
the “descent of the mind in to the heart.”47  
Indeed, in the search for the most appropriate place in which to discuss the person of 
Mary in Ratzinger’s study of the Church, the case can be made that Mary has the ability to 
express and, in a positive sense, accentuate the affectivity that is integral to creaturehood. The 
content of Mary’s “yes” in particular, and the human “yes” in general, as discussed in the 
previous subdivision, receive greater clarification through the opening up of affective 
ecclesiology. In Mary, Ratzinger believes one finds “creaturely cooperation in the work of 
the Redeemer.”48 Although Ratzinger doesn’t exploit this aspect of mariology sufficiently, 
nevertheless, he seems to be aware that the affective aspect of creatureliness makes a key 
contribution to the ecclesial discussion of human freedom, particularly in light of “today’s 
intellectual climate [where] only the masculine principle counts.”49 He points out that Mary’s 
presence as the “confluence of the streams of Israel” and her place as the “soil for the Word” 
means that the soil “must allow itself to be absorbed y the seed, to be assimilated by the 
seed, to surrender itself for the sake of transforming the seed into life.”50 One can conclude 
that Mary represents a pre-eminent example of Ratzinger’s portrayal of the Christian 
                                                          
46 See this dissertation § 9.1.2. 
47 Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 24. 
48 Ratzinger, Mary: The Church at the Source, 55. 
49 Ibid., 16. See also Daughter Zion, 23. 
50 Ratzinger, Mary: The Church at the Source, 15. This is where Ratzinger’s typological approach to mariology 
has some remarkably beautiful illustrations. In particular, he points to the typological identification f Mary 
with Zion in the Bible. He says this forms the scriptural basis for calling humanity to rejoice at the
personification of Israel in Daughter Zion (cf. Zeph 3:14; Joel 2:21; Zech 9:9; Lam 4:21). See Daughter Zion, 
79-61; Mary: The Church at the Source, 65-75. This mirrors Jesus’s identification with Yahweh and hence, 
retroactively, so to speak, she is enabled to becom God’s indwelling – “the place of God’s inhabitation” (cf. 
Zeph 3:14). See Mary: The Church at the Source, 88.  
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synthesis of freedom through willing to be absorbed y the Logos whom she has a deepening 
knowledge of, and who purifies her heart for the other.51 In this context, Ratzinger believes 
that Mary stands between believing affectivity and theological rationality: 
Marianische Frömmigkeit wird immer in der Spannung von theologischer Rationalität 
und gläubiger Affektivität stehen. Das liegt in ihrem Wesen, und es geht in ihr gerade 
darum, keines der beiden verkümmern zu lassen, im Affekt das nüchterne Maß der 
Ratio nicht zu vergessen, aber auch in der Nüchterneit eines verstehenden Glaubens 
das Herz nicht zu erdrücken, das oft mehr sieht als der bloße Verstand. Nicht umsonst 
haben die Väter Matt 5:8 als Mitte ihrer theologischen Erkenntnislehre gefaßt: “Selig 
sind, die ein reines Herz haben; denn sie werden Gott anschauen” – das Organ, Gott 
zu sehen, ist das gereinigte Herz. Marianischer Frömmigkeit könnte es zukommen, 
Erweckung des Herzen und seine Reinigung in den Glauben hinein zu wirken. Wenn 
es das Elend des heutigen Menschen ist, immer mehr in bloßen Bios und bloße 
Rationalität auseinanderzufallen, so könnte sie solcher “Dekomposition” des 
Humanen entgegegwirken und helfen, die Einheit in der Mitte, vom Herzen her, 
wiederzufinden.52 
 
On the other hand, her “heart” does not unilaterally supersede her will or her knowledge of 
the Logos. This is consistent with an authentic human freedom. She was able to “keep” the 
words and actions of the Son in her heart (cf. Luke 2:19; 2:51; cf. 1:29). Hence, Mary 
becomes the one capable of internalising and preserving the whole meaning and nature of 
God’s will for creation: 
Maria sieht in den Ereignissen “Worte,” ein Geschehen, das von Sinn erfüllt ist, weil 
es aus Gottes sinnstiftendem Willen kommt. Sie übersetzt die Ereignisse in Worte und 
dringt in die Worte ein, indem sie sie in das “Herz” hineinnimmt – in jenen inneren 
Raum des Verstehens, in dem Sinn und Geist, Verstand und Gefühl, äußeres und 
inneres Anschauen ineinandertreten und so über das einzelne hinaus die Ganzheit 
sichtbar und ihre Botschaft verständlich wird.53  
                                                          
51 See Ratzinger and Balthasar, Mary: The Church at the Source, 14-15. 
52 Ratzinger and Balthasar, Maria: Kirche im Ursprung, 29-30 (“Marian piety will always stand within the 
tension between theological rationality and believing affectivity. This is part of its essence, and its task is not to 
allow either to atrophy. Affectivity must not lead it to forget the sober measure of ratio, nor must the sobriety of 
a reasonable faith allow it to suffocate the heart, which often sees more than naked reason. It was not for nothing 
that the Fathers understood Matthew 5:8 as the centre of heir theological epistemology: ‘Blessed are th  pure in 
heart, for they shall see God.’ The organ for seeing God is the purified heart. It may just be the task of Marian 
piety to awaken the heart and purify it in faith. If the misery of contemporary man is his increasing 
disintegration into mere bios and mere rationality, Marian piety could work against this ‘decomposition’ and 
help man to rediscover unity in the centre, from the heart” [Ratzinger and Balthasar, Mary: The Church at the 
Source, 35-36]). 
53 Ratzinger and Balthasar, Maria: Kirche im Ursprung, 62 (“Mary sees the events as ‘words,’ as happenings 
full of meaning because they come from God’s meaning-creating will. She translates the events into words and 
penetrates them, bringing them into her ‘heart’ – into that interior dimension of understanding where sense and 




This interpretation of Mary’s affectivity enables Ratzinger to speak of a “dialogical 
reciprocity,”54 a “lived penetration into the Word . . . an existenc  in the realm of the Holy 
Spirit,”55 an “embodied existence”56 and an “abiding exchange of creaturely existence with 
the Creator.”57 Such language is entirely consistent with the langu ge of dialogical posture 
that shapes the ground of his discussion on growth in authentic human freedom. From the 
ecclesiological perspective, the figure of Mary provides the important linchpin for the 
promotion of the affective aspect of the Christian sy thesis. While it still remains arguable as 
to whether or not Ratzinger has fully exploited this fact, certainly he opens up the reader to its 
possibility. 
Therefore, with regard to the affective aspect of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology, what is 
significant is his advocacy for the acknowledgement of “feeling” or “emotion” as part of the 
Christian synthesis of freedom.58 His concentration on the fundamental pattern of human 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
see the totality without getting lost in individual details and to understand the points of the whole” [Ratzinger 
and Balthasar, Mary: The Church at the Source, 70-71]). See also Maria: Kirche im Ursprung, 28. 
54 Ratzinger and Balthasar, Mary: The Church at the Source, 26. 
55 Ibid., 75. 
56 Ibid., 83. 
57 Ibid., 73.  
58 Modern sensibility theory puts forward the idea tht there can be no ethical model complete without an 
adequate theory of emotions. Martha Nussbaum of the University of Chicago is a major advocate of a “modified 
version of the ancient Stoic view, according to which emotions are forms of evaluative judgement that ascribe to 
certain things and persons outside a person’s control great importance for the person’s own flourishing.” She 
consequently believes that emotions are, “in effect, a knowledgements of neediness and lack of self-
sufficiency” (Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions [New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001], 22). Her view is that human emotions should be understood as highly discriminating responses to what is 
of value and importance while simultaneously realising that emotions are not immune from rational criticism 
because they may be no more reliable than any otherset of entrenched beliefs. Philosophical and theological 
theory has been slow to countenance affective forms of discourse because of their highly subjective nature 
which can lock people into their own individual moral universe. Nussbaum sketches the difficulty which lies 
behind the classical sciences’ reticence to engage with the affective nature of human thought processes: “their 
urgency and heat; their tendency to take over the personality and to move it to action with overwhelming force; 
their connection with important attachments, in terms of which a person defines her life; the person’s sense of 
passivity before them; their apparently adversarial relation to ‘relationality’ in the sense of cool cal ulation or 
cost-benefit analysis; their close connection with one another, as hope alternates with fear, as a single event 
transforms hope into grief, as grief, looking about f r a cause, expresses itself as anger, as all of these can be the 
vehicles of an underlying love” (ibid.).  The work of scholars like Nussbaum, and David Konstan in The
Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2001), can help alleviate some of the reticence that is felt and, thereby, help expand the merits of affective 
theory into a worthwhile anthropological discussion. For example, Konstan says emotions for the ancient 
Greeks were significantly different from the contemporary understanding. Consequently, the ancients have
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freedom leads him to call for an endorsement of “feeling” alongside the intellect and will.59 It 
is very interesting to note that Church documents relating to the specific issue of religious 
freedom during the course of the last century reveal a negligible recognition of the affective 
dimension of the “heart” on the part of the human subject.60 The basic tenor of the Church’s 
teaching is typified in Dignitatis humanae which points out that “the right to religious 
freedom has its foundation not in the subjective attitude of the person, but in its very 
nature.”61 The evidence from surveying a range of these documents is that they seek to 
harmonise the human intellect and will, but the notion of a synthesis which includes 
affectivity in the act of freedom is absent. Certainly, the documents speak eloquently about 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
something to tell us about our own views on particular emotions and on the category of emotion itself. Konstan 
says “[w]e cannot take it for granted that the Greek words map neatly onto our own emotional vocabulary” (x). 
See also Juha Sihvola & Troels Engberg-Pedersen, eds., The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers,1998); Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to 
Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); William Harris, Restraining Rage: The Ideology 
of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Susanna Braund & 
Glenn W. Most, Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Robert Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2007). When it comes to the 
Christian perspective on the theme of authentic freedom, the caution exhibited by Konstan and others regarding 
the dichotomy between the original and contemporary meaning of the emotions may be very useful for 
removing theology’s reticence to engage with theories of affectivity. A very novel contribution to this debate, 
from an epistemological perspective, is Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski’s Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, 
Authority and Autonomy in Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Zagzebski traces the possibility 
of coming to trust an external authority and the possibility of coming to accept, on trust, the knowledg  that a 
trustworthy authority exhibits. Her work is most certainly not an ecclesiological study and yet it offers an insight 
into the possible future direction for ecclesiology in this area. In simple terms, she points to the importance of 
building up and maintaining trust between people and societal institutions.    
59 It is of note that Aquinas said that faith in Christ is principally constituted by the Holy Spirit in people’s 
hearts. The “new law” of the Gospel, so to speak, is in the service of this inner transformation. See T I, IIae, q. 
106, a. 1. This is not to denigrate the visible constitution of the Church but underlines an inner conversion 
consistent with the contours of affective ecclesiology.   
60 Leo XIII, Encyclical on the Church in Bavaria, Officio Sanctissimo (22 December 1887), 8-9: ASS 20 (1887): 
262-65; Pius XI, Encyclical on the Church and the German Reich to the Venerable Brethren the Archbishop  
and Bishops of Germany and other Ordinaries in Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See, Mit
Brennender Sorge (14 March 1937), 27-29: AAS 29 (1937), 157-59; DH, 2. By the time the CDF issues the first 
of its two documents on freedom in 1984, Libertatis nuntius, there is mention of heart and will and the need for 
internal conversion (LN, I, 3; XI, 8) but still no explicit acknowledgment that the heart is capable of assisting the 
intellect in reaching the fullest dimensions of freedom in the subject. In its1986 document  Libertatis 
conscientia, there are sections on will, nature and reason (LC, 25-26, 35), alongside an extensive section on love
as it is operative in the world (LC, 55-58), and how the Church is motivated by love (LC, 63). For is also an 
acknowledgement of the fact that freedom and love are mutually inclusive and grounded in each other. The
document says that “the freedom of man is a shared fre om. His capacity for self-reliance is in no way 
suppressed by his dependence on God” (LC, 29). Once love is included in the freedom debate, it inevitably 
points in a social, ecclesial direction with all the potential this contains for communicating a doctrine of the 
Church which has relevance in the lives of people today. 
61 DH, 2. 
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the nature of Christian love and its social responsibility on the part of Christians but there is 
no explicit connection akin to Ratzinger’s idea that the heart cooperates with the intellect and 
will in bringing human freedom into proper perspective. Undoubtedly, the magisterial 
emphasis is correct, albeit incomplete. This is where Ratzinger helps to open up the idea that 
the affective dimension cannot be excluded from the discussion of authentic freedom. 
Matthew Lamb, Professor of Theology at Ave Maria University, says the affective approach 
to faith remains a major task to be assimilated by contemporary catholic theology: 
One of the greatest challenges the Catholic theologian faces is the need to acquire a 
combination of linguistic skills, along with scholarly, philosophical, and theological 
habits of mind and heart, in order to appreciate and appropriate the truth and wisdom 
of the two millennial tradition of Catholic teaching.62 
 
However, I have found two statements from recent Church documents which leave 
open the possibility of developing the affective in catholic ecclesiology. Firstly, in the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church t ere is a seminal acknowledgement of the need for a
broader synthesis that incorporates affectivity into the expression of Christian life. Set in the 
context of the desire for God, the Catechism leaves th  discussion on freedom open for 
further development in the direction that Ratzinger proposes. It points towards the “heart” in 
the making of a decision with regard to God: “The spiritual tradition of the Church also 
emphasizes the heart, in the biblical sense of the depths of one's being, where the person 
decides for or against God.”63 It is this element of “feeling” or heart alongside intellect and 
                                                          
62 Matthew Lamb, “The Challenges of Reform and Renewal within Catholic Tradition,” in Matthew Lamb and 
Matthew Levering, eds., Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 440. 
63 CCC, 368. See also CCC, 30:“‘Let the hearts of those who seek the LORD rejoic ’ (Ps 105:3). Although man 
can forget God or reject him, He never ceases to call every man to seek him, so as to find life and happiness. But 
this search for God demands of man every effort of intellect, a sound will, ‘an upright heart,’ as well as the 
witness of others who teach him to seek God: ‘You are great, O Lord, and greatly to be praised: great is your 
power and your wisdom is without measure. And man, so small a part of your creation, wants to praise you: this 
man, though clothed with mortality and bearing the evidence of sin and the proof that you withstand the proud. 
Despite everything, man, though but a small a part of your creation, wants to praise you. You yourself 
encourage him to delight in your praise, for you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests 
in you’” (Conf. I, I, I: PL 32, 659-661). Cf. CCC, 26, 89, 1431-32, 1764, 2517-19. In CCC, 176-184, the 
effective and the affective aspects of faith are brought together. Here, faith is emphasised as requiring “a 
personal adherence of the whole man to God who reveals himself. It involves an assent of the intellect and will 
to the self-revelation God has made through his deeds and words” (176). See also CCC, 143, 154-55. 
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will which has allowed Ratzinger to extend his ecclsiology into the martyrological profile of 
the Church. In the present-day environment, a formal acknowledgement of “feeling” in 
ecclesiology may be very beneficial, having the potential to shape the Church’s contribution 
to the future well-being of the human race.   
The second instance is in Benedict XVI’s encyclical letter, Deus caritas est. The 
conclusion to the first half of the letter contains a ubtle but nonetheless explicit call for a 
heightened theological awareness of the affective capa ity on the part of the human subject. 
He opens the encyclical by saying the fundamental decision of the Christian “is not the result 
of an ethical choice or a lofty idea but the encounter with an event, a person, which gives life 
a new horizon and a decisive direction.”64 He is striving here to illustrate the holistic nature 
of Christian affectivity through the category of “event.” He says that when the human person 
is fully integrated at the existential level, he or she is “an arena for the exercise of freedom.”65 
In contrast to an indeterminate, insecure form of searching for love, he says an experience 
which involves a real discovery of the other reveals that love is fundamentally sacrificial. To 
his mind, rather than being “self-seeking [and] a sinking into the intoxication of happiness . . . 
[love] seeks the good of the beloved; it becomes renunciation and it is ready, and even 
willing, for sacrifice.”66  
                                                          
64 DCE, 1. 
65 DCE, 5. 
66 DCE, 6. The German-born Jewish psychologist and social theorist, Erich Fromm (1900-80), who has worked 
on theories of affectivity from a social and political perspective, points to the challenge of what can be involved: 
“love is not a sentiment which can be easily indulged in by anyone, regardless of the level of maturity reached 
by him. . . . [A]ll attempts for love are bound to fail, unless [one] tries most actively to develop [ne’s] total 
personality, so as to achieve a productive orientation; hat satisfaction in individual love cannot be attained 
without the capacity to love one’s neighbour, without true humility, courage, faith and discipline. In a culture in 
which these qualities are rare, the attainment of the capacity to love must remain a rare achievement. Or – 
anyone can ask himself how many truly loving persons he has known (The Art of Loving [London: Unwin 
Paperbacks, 1976], 5). Freedom is an issue which Fromm has dealt with in several of his writings. He emigrated 
from Germany in 1934 to the United States. His writings on freedom are, like Ratzinger, focused on the human 
person’s well-being, both personally and socially. They are also marked by the turbulence which engulfed his 
homeland in the first half of the twentieth century. See for example, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt, 
1941); The Fear of Freedom (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1942); Man for Himself: An Enquiry into the 
Psychology of Ethics (New York: Holy, Rinehart and Winston, 1947); The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good 
and Evil (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); On Disobedience: Why Freedom means saying “No” to Power, 
repr. (New York: Harper, 2010).     
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This form of self-dispossession is immediately recognisable as a key Ratzingerian 
category. However, it is what is found in DCE 16-18 that demonstrates the Magisterium’s 
increasing awareness of affectivity. In the first instance, the Pope points out that love cannot 
be commanded: “it is a feeling that is either there or not, nor can it be produced by the 
will.” 67 From the biblical perspective, it is God who loved first (1John 4:10). As a 
consequence of this, Benedict XVI says, God does not demand of us a feeling which we 
ourselves are incapable of producing; but rather, h makes us capable of loving. Secondly, he 
says that while love is a sentiment – which in itself i  a “marvellous first spark” –sentiment 
alone cannot reach the fullness of mature love. In other words, love as a “feeling” or 
“emotion” doesn’t engage the whole of a person’s potentialities. The “yes” of the human 
person is an event that also involves the will and intellect: 
Contact with the visible manifestations of God’s love can awaken within us a feeling 
of joy born of the experience of being loved. But this encounter also engages our will 
and intellect. Acknowledgement of the living God is one path towards love, the “yes” 
of our will to his will unites our intellect, will and sentiments in the all-embracing act 
of love.68 
 
In love’s maturation process, which the Pope says is always open-ended, and 
therefore never “finished,” love grows through love. This means that by definition, love is 
social. As such, love of God and love of neighbour are inseparable. Returning to the initial 
basis of event and encounter in Christianity, the Pope says the love of a neighbour whom I 
may or may not like can take place “only on the basis of an intimate encounter with God, an 
encounter which has become a communion of will, even affecting my feelings. Then I learn 
to look on this other person not simply with my eyes and my feelings, but from the 
perspective of Jesus Christ.”69 The depth of such love means that “I can give to others much 
more than their outward necessities; I can give them the look of love which they crave.”70 For 
                                                          
67 DCE, 16. 
68 Ibid., 17. 
69 Ibid., 28. 
70 Ibid., 18. 
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Benedict, the ecclesiological significance of this – of the view that“[l]ove is ‘divine,’ because 
it comes from God and unites us to God” – is that “through this unifying process it makes us 
a ‘we’ which transcends our divisions and makes us one.”71 From his remarks, it can be 
discerned that the Church is the sphere where the affective appropriation of God’s will meets, 
so to speak, the effective means of salvation: 
[The Lord] encounters us ever anew, in the men and women who reflect his presence, 
in his word, in the sacraments and especially in the Eucharist. In the Church’s 
Liturgy, in her prayer, in the living community of believers, we experience the love of 
God, we perceive his presence and thus learn to recognise that presence in our daily 
lives.72 
 
9.1.5. Theology of Relation: Orienting Grace and Freedom  
A particular sphere of contact between the effectiv and affective aspects of faith is 
found in the correspondence between grace and freedom. The correspondence arises from the 
datum that both the human person’s independence and provenance from God are 
simultaneously given, but are logically prior to the fact becoming the object of our reflection. 
Karl Rahner captures the issue at hand, namely: “how to maintain that man is really free in 
his salutary acts and could therefore refuse the grace offered for such an act, and that at the 
same time he necessarily requires interior divine grace for this salutary action.”73 
In the first instance, Ratzinger attempts to move away from a type of theological 
language which confines the issue of freedom to a narrowly defined discussion of nature and 
grace. This has been a growing phenomenon among theologians in the twentieth-century, 
                                                          
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 17. At the heart of what Benedict XVI says about encounter and event is conversion to Christ. Gerard 
Collins and Mario Farrugia highlight this same approach as an imperative for the Church in the third 
millennium: “we share the dream . . . that more andmore Catholics and others will let themselves be drawn into 
a deep, life-transforming experience of Jesus. Thatkind of experience of him in prayer and community will give 
vigour to their faith, which will then radically reshape their behaviour” (Catholicism: The Story of Catholic 
Christianity [New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], 384). The form of ecclesiology being expressed in 
Benedict XVI’s encyclical tries to accommodate effective and affective elements. It is what Benedict XVI refers 
to as “sacramental ‘mysticism’” (DCE, 13-14), whereby God’s condescension towards us operates so as to lift 
us up to beyond anything that any human elevation al e could achieve. 
73 Karl Rahner, “Grace and Freedom,” in SM, 2:426. 
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who have tried to cut through the complexities of the western doctrine of grace.74 In similar 
fashion, Ratzinger doesn’t overly concern himself with making traditional pedagogic 
distinctions between efficacious and sufficient grace; nor do we observe him seeking out 
explanations for the concepts of prevenient, habitul and actual grace. That is not to say that 
Ratzinger rejects the value of these distinctions nor does it mean that the Church doesn’t use 
them anymore in a formal way.75 Rather, his attention is upon expanding the horizon, s  to 
speak, of Christian freedom, moving it towards a broader relational and pastoral perspective. 
He attempts to engage the present-day context in a fresh way, entering into constructive 
                                                          
74 The traditional western teachings on grace are lucidly set out in Charles Journet, Entretiens sur la Grâce 
(Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959) and in Cornelius Ernst, The Theology of Grace (Notre Dame: Fides, 1974).  
For a comprehensive history of the concept of grace in western theology with an emphasis on the attemp to 
assert the primacy of the notion of uncreated grace (i.e. the Holy Spirit itself) over the various classifications of 
created grace (the effects of the Spirit’s operation), see Stephen Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in 
Theological Anthropology (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2007). Karl Rahner also outlines a traditional 
western understanding of the tract on grace in “Grace and Freedom,” in SM, 2:415-422. Like Duffy, he outlines 
the traditional doctrine while attempting to broaden it out into the context of the free relation of the Absolute 
communicating itself: “The customary post-Tridentine division of the treatise into actual grace and habitu l 
grace will not do, because it makes questionable assumptions. The starting-point must be a theological statement 
about man in the unity of his whole nature. This must be the source from which the distinction between nature 
and grace and possible distinctions within the concept of grace itself are drawn, and which will themslves serve 
as principles on which a treatise of this kind can be composed. In this sense we are starting from the theological 
proposition (of dogmatic anthropology) that the human being who is a Christian believer must understand 
himself to be called in history to God’s own most intimate life, by the effective word of God’s free and absolute 
self-disclosure; and that he is so called in his character as creature, and despite it, and despite his recognition of 
himself as a sinner by his very origin” (415). See also Karl Rahner, Gnade als Freiheit: Kleine theologische 
Beiträge (Freiburg: Herder, 1968); “Theologie der Freiheit,” in Schriften zur Theologie, VI (Einsedeln: Benziger 
& Co., 1965), 215-37; and a collection of Rahner’s s ays gathered in Meditations on Freedom and the Spirit 
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1978). See also Karl Lehmann & Albert Raffelt, eds., Rechenschaft des 
Glaubens. Karl Rahner – Lesebuch (Zurich: Benziger Verlag, 1979), 400-403; Carmichael C. Peters, A 
Gadamerian Reading of Karl Rahner’s Theology of Grace nd Freedom (New York: Catholic Scholars Press, 
2000). Throughout the twentieth-century, other theologians have also approached the grace and freedom debate 
from the perspective of God’s self-communication to, and in the world. See Romano Guardini, Freiheit, Gnade, 
Schicksal (München: Kosel-Verlag, 1961); Edward Schillebeeckx, God and Man, trans. Edward Fitzgerald and 
Peter Tomlinson (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969); Hans Urs von Balthasar, Sponsa Verbi (Einsiedeln: 
Johannes Verlag, 1971); Alexander Schmemann, Church, World, Mission (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press, 1979); Neil Ormerod, Creation, Grace, and Redemption (New York: Orbis, 2007). 
75 The Catechism of the Catholic Church uses this traditional language, albeit within a broader, personalist  
context. See CCC, 1987-2029, 2670. We can note also that the Interna io al Theological Commission, in its 
2012 message for the Year of Faith, quoted from its 2011 document, Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles 
and Criteria. The Commission spoke of prevenient grace, which is t e divine grace that precedes human 
decision-making. It is the gratuitous gift of God and it entirely unmerited: “[. . .] there exists a profound unity 
between the act by which we believe and the content to which we give our assent. The theologian highlights the 
great human significance of that act, investigating how God’s prevenient grace draws out from the very heart of 
human freedom the ‘yes’ of faith, and showing how faith is the ‘foundation of the entire spiritual edifice,’ in that 
it informs all the various dimensions of Christian life, personal, familial and communitarian.” See 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_20111129_teologia-
oggi_en.html (accessed 12 October 2012). The traditional teaching on prevenient grace was set out at the Sixth 
session of the Council of Trent in the context of the debate on justification.  
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dialogue with the contemporary landscape.76 
Recent comments made by Ratzinger confirm his stance. He says there are two 
extremes in the grace-freedom debate, neither of which fully attests to the Christian Creed: on 
the one hand, there is the idea of the absolutely exclusive action of God whereby everything 
is dependent upon predestination and, on the other hand, there is the moralising position 
according to which everything is decided through the good will of the human person. 
Ratzinger realises that both effective and affectiv considerations inevitably form part of the 
divine-human encounter at the heart of scriptural testimony: 
Gnade und Freiheit durchdringen sich, und ihr Ineinander können wir nicht in klare 
Formeln auflösen. Es bleibt wahr, dass wir nicht lieben könnten, wenn wir nicht 
zuerst von Gott geliebt wären. Gottes Gnade geht uns immer voraus, sie umfängt und 
trägt uns. Aber es bleibt auch wahr, dass der Mensch zum Mitlieben gerufen ist, dass 
er nicht willenloses Werkzeug von Gottes Allmacht bleibt, sondern mitlieben oder 
sich auch der Liebe Gottes verweigern kann.77 
 
If anything, Ratzinger believes theology has been too much inclined to 
instrumentalise grace.78 For him, rather, a starting point must be found which seeks to avoid 
the “truncated Thomism that rightly became the object of polemical attack by Reformation 
thought.”79 His approach is to look towards a specifically christological anthropology that is 
                                                          
76 Consistent with the relationality at the core of his writings, Ratzinger presents a dialogical orientation as the 
linchpin, so to speak, between activism and pure grace, law and gospel. Rahner and Ratzinger seem to share in 
this approach. As we know from this dissertation, Ratzinger defines authentic freedom as the human person’s 
orientation with regard to God through a posture of w rship and prayer. In similar fashion, Rahner says the 
following: “In order really to ‘understand’ the problem grace-freedom, to let it have its proper weight and to 
accept it, it is necessary to return to the frame of mind of a person at prayer. He receives himself, is, and gives 
himself back to God, by accepting the acceptance as an element in the gift itself. If one assumes thatattitude of 
prayer (and by so doing in fact accepts the ‘solutin’ of the problem), there is no begging of the question, nor 
flight from it” (Rahner, “Grace and Freedom” in SM, 2:427).  
77 Ratzinger, Jesus von Nazareth. Prolog: Die Kindheitsgeschichten, 84-85 (“Grace and freedom are thoroughly 
interwoven, and we cannot unravel their interrelatedness into clear formulae. It remains true that we could not 
love if we were not first loved by God. God’s grace always precedes us, embraces us and carries us. But it also 
remains true that man is called to love in return, he does not remain an unwilling tool of God’s omnipotence: he 
can love in return or he can refuse God’s love” [Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: The Infancy Narratives, 76]).   
78 See Ratzinger, Mary: The Church at the Source, 67; The Yes of Jesus Christ, 117-18; cf. 62-63.  
79 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 143. This quotation comes from a preface which Ratzinger wrote in 1973 
for an article he originally composed in 1962. It was published under the title “Gratia praesupponit naturam” in 
Joseph Ratzinger and Heinrich Fries, ed., Einsicht und Glaube, Festschrift für G. Söhngen (Freiburg: Herder, 
1962), 134-49. The article sees Ratzinger at his mot analytical in an attempt to uncover the enduring 
contribution of scholastic theology. To his mind, the issue of grace and nature is falsely predicated upon two 
extreme positions. On the one hand there are people who expound a “supernaturalism” that rests upon the 
theological denial of nature, whereby an eschatology is logically required which is premised on liberating a 
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necessarily ecclesial – that is ordered to communion with Christ and with one another. An 
ecclesiology that pays no attention to the affective nature of humanity excludes the very 
possibility of communion because it discounts the nature of love as something which must be 
assented to in freedom. Dirscherl concurs with this interpretation of Ratzinger, and endorses 
both its freshness and its efficacy from an ecclesio og cal perspective. He says that 
Ratzinger’s desire to focus on the key category of relationality, which he grounds in the 
scriptures and in neo-chalcedonian theology, allows him to express a divine-human 
communio in terms of a unity in diversity mediated in and through Christ: 
Here is born community and thus the Church is created. Participation in the obedience 
of the Son is the true transformation of people and, for Ratzinger, is the only effective 
and powerful act for the renewal and transformation of society and the world in 
general. It is clear, therefore, that God-talk, anthropology and ecclesiology come 
together with Christology as a focal point. Christology is the ultimate reference point, 
and because of that Ratzinger develops his relational theology; and understanding it as 
relationship between God and man, the decisions of Chalcedon and Constantinople III 
are indispensable. Only in differentiation can difference in unity ultimately happen.80 
 
From the perspective of liberation ecclesiology, the stress on relationality is Ratzinger’s 
attempt to interpret the balance to be struck betwen God’s grace and human freedom. This 
leads him into a discussion of worship and prayer which are, to his mind, a life-style choice 
as opposed to an act of piety. This attempt to orient the human posture with regard to God is 
Ratzinger’s way of proposing the Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom.        
9.1.6. Multifaceted Nature of the Ecclesial Landscape 
 The findings of this dissertation demonstrate the consciousness which Ratzinger’s 
ecclesiology exhibits of the multifaceted nature of the ecclesial landscape. Section III makes 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
disastrous world. On the other hand, there is the error of “naturalism” which counts all distinctions between 
nature and grace as meaningless. Only the “real” – that which is perceptible, in a narrow sense, is tru tworthy, 
while talk of the supernatural is deemed ideologically incoherent. For Ratzinger, both naturalism and 
supernaturalism are precarious intellectual positions: “In the end the naturalism that melts grace down into 
nature leads to the same result as the supernaturalism that disputes the existence of nature and, by den ing 
creation, makes grace meaningless as well. The fanaticism of those homilists who mock nature, presumably for 
the sake of grace, is always frighteningly close to the cynicism of the atheists who mock God for the sake of his 
creation” (Dogma and Preaching, 144).      
80 Dirscherl, “Gott und Mensch als Beziehungswesen,” in Der Theologe Joseph Ratzinger, 63 [own translation]. 
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the case for his attempt to present a coherent portrait of the Church as the sphere for growth 
in authentic freedom. Such an approach to ecclesiology, where no portion of the Church 
exists in isolation – be it its prayer life, its institutional form, or its missionary activity – is 
fully consistent with the on-going reception of theS cond Vatican Council. Brendan Leahy 
has highlighted three key categories from the Council which consolidate this. He believes the 
Council is directing the Church via “three inter-relating motifs in all programming, doing and 
evaluating of evangelising activities . . . [namely] mystery, communion and mission.” Leahy 
frames the inter-relation of the three motifs very succinctly when he says “the mystery of 
God is experienced in a life of communion that, if authentic, is itself missionary.”81  
From the perspective of the Church as sphere of growth in authentic freedom, Leahy’s 
template is also distinctly discernible in Ratzinger’s presentation. The prayer-life of the 
Church, by way of cooperating with Christ’s assent to the Father, facilitates and deepens the 
“yes” humanity makes to God. Because this “yes” can never be issued in isolation, the 
visible, as well as the diachronic reality of God’s people is safeguarded by the successio 
principle. All of this motivates the Church’s members to fulfil their mission in the world as 
witnesses to God’s will for creation. As the Council said, “the Church both prays and labours 
in order that the entire world may become the People f God, the Body of the Lord and the 
                                                          
81 See Brendan Leahy, “‘Mystery, Communion and Mission’: A Summary Formula for Evangelisation,” in 
Brendan Leahy & Séamus O’ Connell, eds., Having Life in His Name: Living, Thinking and Communicating the 
Christian Life of Faith (Dublin: Veritas, 2011), 272-73. In an attempt to contextualise the Church’s reception of 
the Council, Leahy refers to the Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Christifideles laici, 8, which states the 
following: “The Church herself, then, is the vine in the gospel. She is mystery because the very life and love of 
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the gift gratuito sly offered to all those who are born of water and the Holy 
Spirit (cf. John 3:5), and called to relive the very communion of God and to manifest it and communicate it in 
history (mission): ‘In that day,’ Jesus says, ‘you will know that I am in my Father and you in me, and I in you’ ( 
John 14:20).” Leahy points out the inter-linking approach to ecclesiology present in this teaching: “Veering too 
much in the direction of missionary activities, isolated from a vibrant life of communion and immersion n the 
many sources of God available to us, leads to a hollow and exhausting apostolate of social works. Focusing 
exclusively on servicing the communion of the Churc, neglecting mystery and mission, results in merely 
horizontal and static group dynamics. Pointing only to mystery while neglecting communion-building and 
missionary outreach ends up encouraging a vertical, private and individualistic piety. In reflection, planning and 
activities, remembering the three directions and the fact that they are essentially inter-relating motifs helps 
maintain the vertical-horizontal tensions in balance. Recalling how these directions are intrinsically linked and 
mutually clarifying provides a common summary starting point for bringing approaches to mission into 
conversation” (Leahy, “Mystery, Communion and Mission,” in Having Life in His Name, 279-80).     
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Temple of the Holy Spirit, and that in Christ, the H ad of all, all honour and glory may be 
rendered to the Creator and Father of the Universe.”82 Ratzinger develops an ecclesiology 
consistent with the Council’s view that, by its very nature, the Church is missionary – not in 
an aimless or egoistical fashion, but by way of self- acrifice and witness, by way of 
preaching and assembly of God’s people, by way of word and event, so as “to proclaim 
Christ to non-Christian fellow countrymen and help them towards a full reception of 
Christ.”83 
Ratzinger’s efforts to orient the Church towards a place where it can fulfil its mission 
of unity in the changed and changing environment of the twenty-first century is best 
summarised by the Church’s martyrological profile. While he does not demand a smaller 
Church per se, he says that the prospect of becoming the “leaven” in society is being 
proposed to believers in a new way today. In more rec nt years, he has been particularly keen 
on the idea of creative minorities and of civil religion – both of which are, to his mind, 
manifestations of the Gospel “leaven” in the civic space.84 In a sense these two ideas are the 
product of his multifaceted ecclesial landscape. The former demands courageous witness, 
while it is hoped the latter will be enthused by witness. Ulrich Ruh highlights the close 
connection between both of these ideas in Ratzinger’s attempt to engage with the modern 
world. On the one hand, creative minorities are “meeting places for the like-minded,” while 
on the other, civil religion requires that “the believer must enter into the struggle for the 
presence of reason.”85 Furthermore, Ruh points out that what connects thee two ideas in 
                                                          
82 LG, 17; AG, 7. 
83 AG, 15; cf. ibid., 1, 5, 10-18. 
84 See this dissertation § 8.3.  
85 Ulrich Ruh, “Joseph Ratzinger – der Kritiker der Moderne” in Meier-Hamidi and Schumacher, eds., Der
Theologe Joseph Ratzinger, 126. Ruh, an editor at Herder-Korrespondenz who studied theology at Freiburg 
University, is interested in Ratzinger’s response to modern cultural trends. Ruh comments on the fact that 
Ratzinger’s cultural and historical analysis is conducted in broad strokes, but that his theology is not satisfied 
with such analyses only. He says Ratzinger views culture in three phases: firstly, through the lens of the 
providential synthesis created in the encounter betwe n the Bible and Greek philosophy, then via its severance 
in the empirical and technocratic rationality of modernity and political upheaval of the French Revoluti n and, 
finally, in the need for the Christian community to c ntribute to the search for a way of bringing faith and reason 
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Ratzinger’s analysis of European culture is a belief in the Church as the instrument of God’s 
will. What Ruh finds fascinating about Ratzinger’s contribution to the faith and culture 
debate is the way he juxtaposes “very far-reaching, sombre verdicts on the ethical, religious 
and political status quo in Europe (especially in comparison with other cultures) and equally 
far-reaching hopes for a new causal connection between Christian faith and secular reason, 
freedom and truth.”86 
In fact, it is a striking feature of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology that he assimilates the ideas 
of creative minorities and civil religion into his viewpoint. These ideas are not dissimilar 
from the call for base-communities in Latin America. In fact, in his engagement with 
liberation movements, Ratzinger is more open to their insights than is often presumed to be 
the case, and more influenced by them than he himself would care to admit.87 Liberation 
theology, in fact, has made a constructive contribuion to Ratzinger’s own reflections in 
ecclesiology, and has, arguably, helped refine his own thinking and his engagement with the 
modern world.  
It is true that Ratzinger has never conceded that he has been challenged into re-
examining his own perspective in light of the issues raised by liberation theology. 
Nevertheless, he has assimilated the impasse which occasioned its inception, by making an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
together again so as to counter the negative relativistic and godless features of modernity and give str ngth to 
the present. He says Ratzinger’s attempt at such a comprehensive analysis is daring but somewhat “ambivalent.” 
Nevertheless, Ruh suggests that it is this ambivalence and the given tensions of Ratzinger’s position which 
deliver food for thought in theology as it attempts to evaluate modernity and its legacy. Ruh’s belief is that 
Ratzinger’s work is an important addition to the debat  about the appropriate contribution of Churches and 
individual Christians to this shared future (cf. ibid., 119-28). What grounds the attractiveness of civil religion for 
Ratzinger is that when it is correlated with creative minorities, the universal call to holiness is clear y delineated 
in terms of convinced witness. Gaudium et spes and Humane personae dignitatem were instinctively 
progressing in this direction. The latter document was issued by the Secretariat for Unbelievers which ad been 
established by Paul VI in 1965 to acknowledge the growing challenge of unbelief and religious indifference. It 
was united with the Pontifical Council for Culture by John Paul II in 1993.     
86 Ruh, “Joseph Ratzinger – der Kritiker der Moderne,” in Meier-Hamidi and Schumacher, eds., Der Theologe 
Joseph Ratzinger, 128 [own translation].    
87 As this dissertation has demonstrated, no-one could doubt Ratzinger’s distinct unease with liberationist 
movements. He believes that such movements can change people’s expectation of religion, turning it into an 
instrument merely for advocating freedom, peace and the conservation of creation. See Ratzinger, Salt of the 
Earth, 132. What Ratzinger recoils from is anything that resembles “1968 [where] there was a fusion of the 
Christian impulse with secular and political action and an attempt to baptise Marxism” (Ratzinger, Introduction 
to Christianity, 6). See his views on liberation theology in this disertation §§ 1.2. and 3.2. 
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attempt to incorporate the human desire for freedom into his ecclesiology. What he does say 
is that freedom can be considered “the common denominator of the modern mind and of our 
century” and, from a theological perspective, the basic idea of liberation theology “has found 
an echo on every continent . . . and it must be said, too, that it can be given a very positive 
expression.”88 What he fears are viewpoints that conceive of Christianity as an instrument for 
refashioning the world politically. In terms of christology and ecclesiology, he would recoil 
from Frederick Herzog’s contention that “in liberating men, Jesus offers them a fulfilment of 
life they cannot find in the organisation church, the religious fold.”89  
Within this context, there are undeniable parallels between Ratzinger’s work on 
freedom and that of liberation theology. Like many liberation theologians, Ratzinger places 
great significance upon the Exodus.90 Furthermore, both liberation theologians and Ratzinger 
make extensive use of ecology, even though the ultimate emphasis for the former is at the 
level of nature in an eco-friendly sense, and the latt r, at the level of person in a soteriological 
sense. However, perhaps the most interesting parallel e ates to the concept of 
ecclesiogenesis. A term in its infancy in some respects, ecclesiogenesis is the call for local 
base communities who, as it were, live at the coal-face of the Church’s life within society. 
                                                          
88 Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 132.   
89 Frederick Herzog, Liberation Theology: Liberation in the Light of the Fourth Gospel (New York: Seabury 
Press, 1972), 147. One of the voices cautioning against some of the liberationists in the early days was Brazilian 
Franciscan, Bonaventure Kloppenburg. In a short monograph, where he outlined eleven temptations facing 
theologies of liberation, he said – somewhat glibly, “God grant that the theology of liberation may not become  . 
. . a liberation from theology” (Temptations for the Theology of Liberation [Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 
1974], 35). See also Kloppenburg’s The People’s Church: A Defence of MY Church, trans. Matthew O’ Connell 
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978). It is a sharply critical investigation of liberation theology’s advocacy 
of the “Church of the People.”  
90 For example, Ratzinger, like so many liberation theologians, places great significance upon the Exodus. See 
Antonio Pérez Esclarín, Ateísmo y liberación (Caracas: Fuentes SRL, 1974); Norman K. Gottwald, “The Exodus 
as Event and Process: A Test Case in the Biblical grounding of Liberation Theology,” in Marc H. Ellis and Otto 
Maduro, eds., The Future of Liberation Theology (New York: Orbis, 1989), 250-260. It is interesting to note 
that over the course of this dissertation, Ratzinger’s focus on the Exodus as an explicit part of his narrative 
christology comes to the fore at around the time that he was reflecting on the emergent liberation theologies of 
the Americas. By the time he comes to writing the first volume of his Jesus of Nazareth series, the binary of 
Jesus as the true Moses is a very strong theme. See “Freiheit und Bindung in der Kirche,” Verein der Freunde 
der Univeristät Regensburg 7 (1981): 5-21; “Freiheit und Befreiung: Die anthropologische Vision der 
Instruktion ‘Libertatis conscientia’,” Internazionale katholische Zeitschrift Communio 5 (1986): 409-24; 
“Freiheit und Wahrheit,” Internazionale katholische Zeitschrift Communio 24 (1995): 526-42. A case for a 
greater typological reading of the Exodus theme in the Scriptures is made by Richard J. Clifford in “The Exodus 
in the Christian Bible: The Case for ‘Figural’ Reading,” in Theological Studies 63 (2002): 345-361.  
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Ratzinger has decried the overpowering level of burea cratic machinery in the Church and 
has expressed his preference for local ecclesial life as the ordinary form of the Church’s 
existence.91 This echoes Leonardo Boff’s observation that modern society has led to an 
unprecedented uniformity, amounting to a general anonymity of persons lost “in the cogs of 
the mechanisms of the macro-organisations and bureaucracies.”92 Boff says local base 
communities are able to recast their institutional structures so that “they [can] respond to the 
ever-present needs that communities have – needs for union, universality and bonding with 
the great witnesses of the apostolic past.”93 What perturbs Ratzinger in this would be the 
inference that the “apostolic past” implies an exclusive bond to the activity of the nascent 
Christian community without recourse to the Church’s development in history. He will 
invariably reproach horizontalizing tendencies because, to his mind, they are an aberration 
from the diachronic lifeblood of the Church. For Boff, “[t]o preserve tradition means to do as 
the first Christians did.”94 Ratzinger, on the other hand, will never speak about the local 
situation without reference to the universal Church. To his mind, a solution to excessive 
uniformity can never be realised by circumventing the unity of the whole. Excessive cultural 
adaptations of the Church’s life at the local level wil , if uninhibited by diachronic 
considerations, lead to disparate, isolated communities unrecognisable to one another. For 
that reason, Ratzinger believes the way the Church will carry out its mission today will be 
through faithful, convinced believers who seek dialogue at the frontline between Christian 
faith and secular reason. In this sense, the creative m nority is a base community, while its 
counterpart – civil religion – as promulgated through believers, can never be authentic 
without its reference point in, and from the “whole.” 
                                                          
91 See this dissertation § 2.3.1. 
92 Leonardo Boff, Ecclesiogenesis: The Base Communities Reinvent the Church, trans. Robert R. Barr (New 
York: Orbis, 1986), 1. 




In summary, and taking his entire intellectual journey into account, it can be seen that 
Ratzinger’s experience with liberation theology and the subconscious integration of it into his 
own ecclesiology is significant. Liberation theology has been a catalyst, so to speak, in 
assisting him in his ecclesiological deliberations. While he is not someone who innovates in 
theology for innovation’s sake, he displays an aptitude for grappling with controversial issues 
confronting not merely Christianity, but society in general. Indeed, his writings are capable of 
conveying a keen and perceptive sense of contemporary issues to the reader, including young 
idealistic minds surrounded by the many competing voices of the modern intellectual 
landscape.95 For this reason, Ratzinger is a theologian motivated by the objective of 
representing and articulating the Christian tradition for the upcoming generation. Benedict 
XVI’s letter to Irish Catholics in 2010 demonstrated much of his concern for the questions of 
a new generation, on the one hand, and his belief that Christ’s Church makes available the 
doorway to the realm of life’s most satisfying meaning, on the other: 
Your experience of the Church is very different from that of your parents and 
grandparents. The world has changed greatly since they were your age. Yet all people, 
in every generation, are called to travel the same path through life, whatever their 
circumstances may be. We are all scandalized by the sins and failures of some of the 
Church's members, particularly those who were chosen e pecially to guide and serve 
young people. But it is in the Church that you will find Jesus Christ, who is the same 
yesterday, today and for ever (cf. Heb 13:8). He loves you and he has offered himself 
on the cross for you. Seek a personal relationship with him within the communion of 
his Church, for he will never betray your trust! Healone can satisfy your deepest 
longings and give your lives their fullest meaning by directing them to the service of 
others. Keep your eyes fixed on Jesus and his goodness, and shelter the flame of faith 








                                                          
95 Is it interesting to note the comment in Ratzinger’s doctoral dissertation where he says the greatest th ology 
often grows out of the polemic against error: “Wie jede große Theologie wuchs auch die Augustins 
aus der Polemik gegen den Irrtum . . .” (Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes, 124). 
96
 Benedict XVI, Pastoral Letter to the Catholics of Ireland (19 March 2010): AAS 102 (2010), 214. 
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9.2. Potential Avenues of Future Enquiry 
 
This final subdivision outlines three important themes which have emerged from the 
exploration of Ratzinger’s writings. It aims to give an indication of a number of potential 
avenues of future enquiry which are beyond the scope of this dissertation but which would 
benefit the field of ecclesiology. These are themes which Ratzinger has touched upon to a 
degree, but did not develop sufficiently, and so they present a roadmap for future scholarship 
in the area. They include an examination of the merits of understanding the Church from the 
perspective of the theological virtues, a rediscovery of the reality of original sin, and an 
exploration of the Church as the universal sacrament of salvation.  
 
9.2.1. Engaging the Theological Virtues in Ecclesiology  
Chapter 5 of this dissertation has shown how the theological virtues of faith, hope and 
love are an interpretative key to Ratzinger’s ecclesiological writings and open up avenues of 
reflection which respect the integrity of the human person, while also preserving the Church’s 
nature as a gift which humanity receives from outside itself. “Doing” theology, so to speak, 
from the perspective of faith, hope and love, is at le st as old as the pauline corpus, but this is 
not so for the relatively new genre of ecclesiology, which is now recognised more and more 
as a discipline in its own right. In his Aus Christus Schauen: Einübung in Glaube, Hoffnung, 
Liebe, Ratzinger attempts to promote an ecclesiology that explicitly engages with the 
theological virtues. In this book, Ratzinger sketchs a new kind of neo-thomistic 
ecclesiology, liberally – albeit loosely – citing Aquinas to guide his reflections. Given 
Ratzinger’s own views on thomistic thought, as one who has been consistently associated 
with the move away from the neo-scholasticism of the early twentieth-century, new and 
interesting possibilities open up here. In Ratzinger’s own words, he had “difficulties in 
penetrating the thought of Thomas Aquinas, whose crystal-clear logic seemed to me to be too 
closed in on itself, too impersonal and ready-made.” However, this admission is not 
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necessarily licence to view him as anti-scholastic or anti-thomistic. For the most part, his 
reflections on the virtues are mediated through the work of Josef Pieper and, from the 
ecclesiological perspective, are a rudimentary first attempt by Ratzinger at such an 
approach.97 By his own admission, Ratzinger worked in this way and, while initially 
somewhat circumspect, felt that the linking of the philosophical, theological and spiritual 
aspects of the virtues could be useful in opening up new avenues of scholarship.98 Indeed, the 
fact that he uses the theological virtues as one of his primary theological keys has been put 
beyond question, given that he reached for them consistently when compiling the papal 
encyclicals of his pontificate. 
Ratzinger is not someone who concerns himself with theological “methods” as such, 
but nevertheless a prism such as the theological virtues does present ecclesiology with a 
                                                          
97 See Ratzinger, Milestones, 44. Ratzinger partially attributes his lack of enthusiasm for Thomas to Arnold 
Wilmsen: “the philosopher who taught us Thomas, presented us with a rigid, neoscholastic Thomism that was
simply too far afield from my own questions” (ibid.). At the same time however, there is no doubting 
Ratzinger’s respect for the contribution of Thomas to western thought. See, for example, Ratzinger’s homily on 
Aquinas delivered in 1987 at the Angelicum University in Rome: “Consecrate them in the Truth: A Homily for 
St Thomas’ Day,” New Blackfriars 68 (1987):112-24. It is interesting to see how Robert Tilley decries an 
attempt by Paul Collins to designate Ratzinger as a pessimist and Karl Rahner as an optimist with regard to the 
modern world because the former is Augustinian and the latter is thomistic (cf. Benedict XVI and the Search for 
Truth, 203-25). Tilley says Ratzinger’s remarks about Thomas’ scholasticism being closed in on itself are unfair 
to the Dominican but, nevertheless, Ratzinger’s “project can be described as one that aims at making the 
thomistic telos explicitly personal, or at least more so” (222). See Paul Collins, God’s New Man: The Election of 
Benedict XVI and the Legacy of John Paul II (London: Continuum, 2005), 54-77. It is Tracey Rowland in 
particular who says that when Ratzinger did take an interest in Thomism, it was through the work of Josef 
Pieper, “whose interests untypically extended to the p ilosophy of history” (Benedict XVI: Guide for the 
Perplexed, 4). Rowland has also conducted a very interesting sudy which charts a philosophical and theological 
reading of culture in the latter twentieth-century. She then puts forward the proposal of a contemporary 
Augustinian Thomism. See Tracey Rowland, Culture and Thomist Tradition: After Vatican II (London: 
Routledge, 2003). 
98 See Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 133-34. Gerard Mannion is an example of an ecclesiologist attempting 
such an approach, describing his work as “virtue ecclesiology.” See his Ecclesiology and Postmodernity: 
Questions for the Church in Our Time (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2007). Dominic Doyle and Richard Lennan 
have followed him, with a particular focus on the virtue of hope. Their work appears in Theological Studies 
under a subtitle “Hope and the Church: A Trilogy.” See Richard Lennan, “The Church as a Sacrament of Hope,” 
Dominic Doyle, “Post-Traumatic Ecclesiology and theR storation of Hope,” and James Gerard McEvoy, 
“Hope, Modernity, and the Church: A Response to Richard Lennan and Dominic Doyle” in Theological Studies 
72 (2011): 247-308. See also Dominic F. Doyle, “Spe salvi on Eschatological and Secular Hope: A Thomistic 
Critique of an Augustinian Encyclical,” Theological Studies 71 (2010): 350-79; The Promise of Christian 
Humanism: Thomas Aquinas on Hope (New York: Crossroads Publishing Company: 2012). It is interesting to 
note that in moral theology, invoking the framework f the theological virtues from a scriptural and thomistic 
perspective is already very much under way through the work of Servais Pinckaers. See Les Sources de la 
morale chrétienne: Sa méthode, son contenu, son histoire (Fribourg: University Press, 1985); La Morale 
catholique (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1991).   
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framework of possibility that respects the giftedness of the Church to humanity without 
losing the personal, albeit analogous, nature of that giftedness. A glimpse of the approach 
may be caught from Aquinas’s statement in a commentary on 1Timothy where he says "faith 
shows the end, hope moves to the end, charity unites on  with the end."99 Ratzinger’s own 
equally optimistic view is a template for future scholarship in the endeavour to propose an 
ecclesial lifestyle that respects the giftedness of the virtues: 
Die Hoffnung ist Frucht des Glaubens . . . ; in ihr streckt sich unser Leben nach der 
Ganzheit alles Wirklichen aus, auf eine grenzenlose Zukunft hin, die uns im Glauben 
zugänglich wird. Diese erfüllte Ganzheit des Seins, zu der der Glaube den Schlüssel 
schenkt, ist eine Liebe ohne Vorbehalt – eine Liebe, die ein großes Ja ist zu meiner 
Existenz und die mir in ihrer Weite und Tiefe die Fülle allen Seins erschließt. . . . Die 
Liebe, auf die die christliche Hoffnung im Licht des Glaubens zugeht, ist nicht bloß 
Privates, Individuelles, sie verschließt mich nicht in eine kleine Eigenwelt hinein. 















                                                          
99Aquinas, In Epistolam I ad Timotheum, cap.1, lc. 2, in Expositio in Omnes S. Pauli Epistolas, in Opera Omnia, 
Parma ed., 25 vols. (New York: Musurgia, 1949), 13:587. Quoted in Dominic Doyle, “Post-Traumatic 
Ecclesiology and the Restoration of Hope,” 279.  
100 Ratzinger, Auf Christus schauen, 81 (“Hope is the fruit of faith . . .; in it our life stretches itself out towards 
the totality of all that is real, towards a boundless future that becomes accessible to us in faith. This fulfilled 
totality of being to which faith provides the key is a love without reserve – a love that is an immense affirmation 
of my existence and that discloses the fullness of all being to me in its breadth and depth. . . .The lov  that 
Christian hope approaches in the light of faith is not something purely private and individual: it does not enclose 
me in a little world of my own. This love opens up to me the whole of everything, which through love becomes 
‘paradise’” [Ratzinger, Yes of Jesus Christ, 69]). Doyle believes that Ratzinger’s attempt to mve from an 
integrated, developmental account of the theological virtues to the consequential assertion of their inseparability 
“suggests a harmonious development from faith to hope. But these pleasing images suggest a continuity tha , in 
fact, overlooks some critical internal tensions with the experience and structure of faith itself thatonly the 
advent of hope can resolve” (Doyle, “Post-Traumatic Ec lesiology and the Restoration of Hope,” 279). Hence 
we find here a cautionary note against any simplistic consignment of the theological virtues to the models of 
Church we may have in mind. Doyle suggests the analogy of being needs to be borne in mind. This is not 
necessarily negative, he says, because faith’s incompleteness can be the beginning of hope. Furthermor, h pe 
can rework the limits, even the contradictions, of faith. In other words, hope springs from faith’s imperfections.        
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9.2.2. Rediscovery of the Authentic Reality of Original Sin 
 
Any clear-eyed, realistic view of history cannot buperceive the sense of alienation 
which has accompanied the human race. The empirical evidence throughout the course of 
world history confirms an inconsistency at the heart of human nature. In the Christian 
tradition, this alienation has been explained through the doctrine of original sin. At its core, it 
is the theological attempt to come to terms with the question of how human persons, who are 
created as both good and free, have become embroiled in a spiral of malevolence over the 
course of history. In the more positive idiom of contemporary theological language, it 
remains a challenge to foster a credible anthropology that assists human civilisation in its 
self-awareness.  
Ratzinger himself has not managed to accomplish a det iled study of the topic, even 
though it is he avowed aspiration to do so should providence allow him.101 Nevertheless, 
original sin is a theological issue that corresponds to a very important prerequisite in 
theology, namely, the coming to terms with the human yearning for, and the existential lack 
of a sense of personal freedom. It is clear, especially from Chapter 4 of this dissertation, that 
Ratzinger is convinced that authentic human freedom is dependent upon acknowledging the 
truth of human nature and, in order for this to happen, we have to acknowledge the true depth 
of our existential and historical reality, as well as our metaphysical origins.102 In fact, it seems 
legitimate to extract a couple of core factors from Ratzinger’s treatment of freedom which 
could contribute to a lengthier treatise on the topic. The two factors of paramount importance 
from his perspective are the prioritisation of interior conversion, and an anthropology of 
relation.    
Firstly, with regard to interior conversion, human freedom guarantees that personal 
initiative and subsequent responsibility cannot, ultimately, be usurped by structural or 
                                                          
101 See this dissertation § 1.5.; Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report, 79. 
102 See this dissertation §§ 4.1.3 to 4.1.3.2. 
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communitarian concerns. The 1984 Vatican Instruction Libertatis nuntius makes the point 
that the primary liberation is liberation from the radical slavery of sin. It also calls for the real 
meaning of sin to be kept in mind by the Church andtheology.103 This does not preclude the 
existence of unjust, sinful structures nor their effect in leading people into sin. Nevertheless, 
the Church teaches that personal conversion of the human person can never be superseded by 
forms of materialist anthropology: 
The acute need for radical reforms of the structures which conceal poverty and which 
are themselves forms of violence, should not let us lose sight of the fact that the 
source of injustice is in the hearts of men. Therefore it is only by making an appeal to 
the 'moral potential' of the person and to the constant need for interior conversion, that 
social change will be brought about which will be truly in the service of man. For it 
will only be in the measure that they collaborate freely in these necessary changes 
through their own initiative and in solidarity, tha people, awakened to a sense of their 
responsibility, will grow in humanity. The inversion of morality and structures is 
steeped in a materialist anthropology which is incompatible with the dignity of 
mankind.104 
  
As this dissertation has established, particularly in Chapters 4 and 6, it is Ratzinger’s 
view that the truly personal heart of human freedom extends beyond the strictly cultic sphere 
of the Church’s liturgy, so that it is the human person who becomes a living sacrifice of 
praise in harmony with the truth of the divine will for creation.105 This can be interpreted as 
an attempt on Ratzinger’s part to bolster the meaning of original sin in the face of materialist 
anthropologies that prioritise structural change ovr interior conversion, and downplay the 
nature of the individual person’s responsibility for themselves and their actions: 
To demand first of all a radical revolution in social relations and then to criticize the 
search for personal perfection is to set out on a road which leads to the denial of the 
meaning of the person and his transcendence, and to des roy ethics and its foundation 
which is the absolute character of the distinction between good and evil. Moreover, 
since charity is the principle of authentic perfection, that perfection cannot be 
conceived without an openness to others and a spirit of service.106 
 
                                                          
103 LN, Prologue, IV/12, X/7, XI/17. See also LC, 22-23, 37-42, 53.   
104 LN, XI/8. 
105 See this dissertation §§ 4.1.4. and 6.3. 
106 LN, IV/15. Cf. Jer 2:14-26. 
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This stark either-or situation of “personal perfection” over “social reations” may 
seem to undermine Ratzinger’s argumentation on human freedom, which has been a 
commendable attempt to balance many seemingly opposing factors in a carefully worked-out 
equilibrium as in, for example, the case of Father-Son, monotheism-creatureliness, 
subjective-affective, and personal autonomy-ecclesia  institution. However, the point here is 
that the undermining of the reality of free and responsible persons destabilises the raison 
d'être that stands behind the doctrine of original sin, namely, the coming to terms with the 
empirical evidence of humanity’s existential nature from its origins. Hence, as a further 
avenue of enquiry it would be beneficial that we continue to explore the question of the 
tension between the necessities of interior personal conversion and communal endeavour. 
This is also the question of whether one starts with the individual in relation to the Creator or 
with the community which “socialises.” Ultimately, personhood is a relational reality ordered 
to both individuality and community. Therefore the human person can never be reduced to 
deterministic and impersonal structures or forces.  
This is where the second factor – an anthropology of relation – becomes relevant to 
the discussion. Ratzinger appears to suggest that a chronological reading of human history is 
not sufficient today for coming to terms with the authentic meaning of original sin. Notably, 
Ratzinger believes that Mary holds the key to this for she demonstrates the relational 
existence which he considers to be at the heart of authentic freedom. In fact to his mind, 
original sin only makes sense in the context of “an anthropology of relation.”107 Because 
Mary is “preserved from original sin,” the alienation between God’s “is” and humanity’s “is 
not” is lacking in Mary and consequently, Ratzinger says, “God’s judgement about her is 
pure ‘Yes,’ just as she herself stands before him as a pure ‘Yes.’ This correspondence of 
                                                          
107 Ratzinger, Die Tocher Zion, 69. 
448 
 
God’s ‘Yes’ with Mary’s being as ‘Yes’ is the freedom from original sin.”108 He says the 
attempted isolation of the Adam-New Adam strand of biblical narrative leaves theology in a 
“muddle” unless one contemplates a transferral of justification that goes beyond chronology. 
Only this can present theology with an “axiological meaning transcending temporal 
anticipation.”109 Because Mary’s freedom from sin refutes the idea that original sin has 
something to do with the biological composition of God’s creature, Ratzinger says a 
constructive point of departure is relationality: 
Man wird von hier aus sagen müssen, Erbsünde sei nicht eine Aussage über einen 
naturalen Mangel im oder am Menschen selbst, sondern eine Relationsaussage, die 
allein im Beziehungszusammenhang Gott-Mensch sinnvoll formulierbar ist. Was 
Sünde ist, kann aus dem in sich geschlossenen und isolierten Menschen nicht 
verstanden werden, sondern nur in einer Anthropologie der Relation; für Gnade gilt 
notwendig und verstärkt dasselbe. Erbsünde könnten wir dann als eine Aussage über 
die Ästimation des Menschen durch Gott bezeichnen; dabei muß freilich klar sein, 
daß diese Ästimation dem Menschen nichts Äußerliches ist, sondern erst sein 
Allerinnerstes aufdeckt. Das Auseinanderfallen dessen, was der Mensch von Gott her 
ist und dessen, was er in sich selber ist, der Widerspruch zwischen dem Wollen des 
Schöpfers und dem empirschen Sein des Menschen, das ist die Erbsünde. 110 
 
Marian relationality, so to speak, demonstrates that authentic freedom is the human 
assent to God’s definitive yes to his creature. Hence sin is a relational reality, whose solution 
lies in the “reorientation” which the one who has sinned takes up with respect of divine 
mercy. This, in turn, requires that theology must reflect on the “how” of human salvation. For 
all intents and purposes, this means that a contemporary treatise on original sin would involve 
a study of the entire domain of theological disciplines. Hence, coming to terms with the 
                                                          
108 Ratzinger, Daughter Zion, 70.  
109 See ibid., 66-71, at 69. Ratzinger notes here Karl Rahner’s observation that the point at issue with Mary 
being “preserved from original sin” cannot be a chronological one since she is justified earlier than others (in 
terms of Paschal Mystery). Therefore the “muddle” of chronology left by the first and the new Adam is g ven a 
helpful, interpretive key in the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.    
110 Ratzinger, Die Tocher Zion, 69 (“One can say that original sin is not a statement about a natural deficiency 
in, or about man per se, but a relational statement that is meaningfully formulated only in the context of the 
God-man relationship. Sin cannot be understood by looking to the self-contained and isolated human beig, but 
only in an anthropology of relation; this is even more so in the case of grace. We can therefore refer to original 
sin as a statement about God’s appraisal of man: an appraisal that is nothing external, but a revealing of man’s 
innermost being. Original sin is the disintegration of what man is, both [in his origin] from God and what he is 




contemporary meaning of original sin may be a vast and daunting task, but it is one that 
presents the theologian with tremendous opportunity. In the words of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, the fundamental affirmation of peccatum originale, or the sin of origin, is a 
socially transmitted deprivation which, on the one hand, must be carefully distinguished from 
the concept of personal sin or guilt, and which, on the other, must be recognised as the 
decision against God on the part of one individual which has plunged the whole human 
family, not into personal sin, but into a lack of grace.111 Such a vision of human existence 
truly places the doctrine of original sin at the heart of a relational understanding of life. It also 
acknowledges the historical fact that all human attempts to manufacture a redeemed existence 
have been found wanting. Balthasar sketches the helpful starting point of beyond the self for 
coming to terms with the asymmetrical nature of the divine-human encounter that is based on 
freedom: 
Although we cannot deny that finite freedom has no absolute aspect, it has power over 
neither its own ground nor its own fulfilment. It does possess itself, yet it is not its 
own gift to itself: it owes itself to some other origin. Thus it can never catch up with 
its own ground, nor with its essence; it can only attain fulfilment beyond itself. 
Moreover if it is to be itself, it must be continually setting forth for that yonder shore, 
which initially can be described as the pure manifestation of the totality of being, the 
manifestation of sheer truth and goodness.112      
    
                                                          
111 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Action (vol. 1 of Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, trans. 
Graham Harrison [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994]), 183. Balthasar develops the marian principle of the 
Church in detail, counting Mary as the recipient of a special grace. Von Balthasar views the doctrine of the 
Immaculate Conception as central to ecclesiology precisely in relation to the concepts of freedom, grace nd 
original sin. See, for example, Spouse of the Word (vol. 2 of Explorations in Theology [San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1991]), 161-84. See also Brendan Leahy, T e Marian Profile in the Ecclesiology of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar (New York: New City Press, 2000). It is conceivable that Ratzinger’s ecclesiology might have 
developed on the basis of his “marian relationality” insights if he had been able to pursue further his reflection 
on the marian dimension of the Church.    
112 Balthasar, The Action, 139. He subsequently expanded this view from the divine perspective, demonstrating 
the relational nature of man’s situation before God which is resolved in Christ: “From God’s point of view, 
‘original sin’ does not cause any interruptions to the offer of grace: it only transforms it. No longer is the form 
of this grace based on the Son’s mediatorship in creation (and the creation of man) but on the redemptive grace 
of the Cross and on the Son’s bearing of the world’s sin. It is only on mankind’s side, at most, that we can speak 
of an ‘interruption,’ since mankind cannot originally have been created in a state of estrangement from G d (this 
is the heart of the doctrine of man’s original state), even if grace was required from the very outset if the proper 
‘selfless’ choice was to be made. Now, however, because of its sinful determination to ‘be itself,’ mankind is 
turned away from God, and this makes it difficult for it to lay hold of grace (which is the grace of the Cross). To 
that extent, we can talk only “dialectically” of original sin” (190).  
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9.2.3. Revisiting a Second Vatican Council Teaching: The Church as Universal 
Sacrament of Salvation 
 
One of the Second Vatican Council’s designations for the Church is “the universal 
sacrament of salvation.” It was the result of, and reason for, a reinvigorated understanding of 
sacramental theology.113 While it must be acknowledged that, throughout the course of the 
twentieth-century, work in this area of theology has yielded a major contribution to 
broadening out the understanding of the Church in terms of its mystical,114 comparative,115  
ecumenical,116 and mariological117 dimensions, nevertheless, from the perspective of an 
ecclesiology of liberation, this characterisation of the Church remains far from being 
exploited to its fullest potential. In other words, there has been much energy devoted to a 
                                                          
113 See LG, 1, 9, 48; GS, 42, 45; AG, 1, 5. See also SC, 5, 26. The interpretative key comes in LG, 1, stating that 
“[s]ince the Church is in Christ like a sacrament or as a sign and instrument both of a very closely knit union 
with God and of the unity of the whole human race, [the Council] desires now to unfold more fully to the 
faithful of the Church and to the whole world its own inner nature and universal mission.” Bonaventure 
Kloppenburg describes this as a definition of the Curch which implies two effects. Firstly, there is communion 
with God, by which the Church is the sign and instrument “given to men by God so that they can unite 
themselves to His life, glory and blessedness,” and secondly, there is communion with others, i.e. the unity of 
the human race. Kloppenburg concludes by saying: “[s]ince the Church’s mission is to unite in one Spirit all 
men of all nations, races and cultures, she ‘stands forth as a sign of that brotherliness which allows honest 
dialogue and invigorates it’ (GS, 92). In this way she will be ‘a lasting and sure se d of unity, hope, and 
salvation for the whole human race’ (LG, 9)” (Kloppenburg, The Ecclesiology of Vatican II, trans. Matthew O’ 
Connell [Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1974], 24).    
114 For example, see Henri de Lubac, Catholicism (London: Burns & Oates, 1950); Otto Semmelroth, Die
Kirche als Ursakrament (Frankfurt: Knecht, 1953); Edwards Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the 
Encounter with God (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963); Karl Rahner, “Membership of the Church,” Theological 
Investigations 2 (Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 1-88; “The Church and the Sacraments,” Inquires (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1964), 191-257; Jan Groot, “The C urch as Sacrament of the World,” Concilium 31 (1967): 
51-66; Pierre Smulders, “L’Eglise, sacrement du salt,” in Guillermo Baraúna, ed., L’Eglise de Vatican II, vol. 2 
(Paris: Cerf, 1967), 313-38; Yves Congar, The Church that I Love, trans. Lucien Delafuente (Denville, N.J.: 
Dimension Books, 1969), 39-61; Gustave Martelet, “De la sacramentalité  propre à l’Eglise,” Nouvelle Revue 
Théologique 95 (1973): 25-42; Johann Auer, Die Kirche: Das allgemeine Heilssakrament (Regensburg: 
Friedrich Pustet Verlag, 1983); Kevin McNamara, ed.The Church: A Theological and Pastoral Commentary 
on the Constitution of the Church (Dublin: Veritas, 1983), 75-102; Paul McPartlan, The Eucharist makes the 
Church. Henri de Lubac and John Zizioulas in Dialogue (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993); George Kaithholil, 
Church. The Sacrament of Christ: Patristic and Modern Theology (Munbai: St Paul’s, 1997). 
115 See Avery Dulles, Models of the Church, rev. ed. (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 55-67.  
116 See George H. Tavard, The Church, Community of Salvation: An Ecumenical Ecclesiology (Collegeville, 
Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992); Paul McPartlan, Sacrament of Salvation: An Introduction to Eucharistic 
Ecclesiology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995).  
117 See Oliver Treanor, “Mary as the Sacramental Matrix of Ecclesial Personhood in Christ,” in Leahy & O’ 
Connell, Having Life in His Name, 91-120; Mother of the Redeemer, Mother of the Redeemed (Dublin: Four 
Courts Press, 1988). 
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ressourcement of the predicate without necessarily always fully combining it with the 
subject, which is “salvation” and the Church’s liberating mission in the world.118  
An important avenue of future enquiry for ecclesiology will be to look more closely at 
the basis for the Church’s presence in, and relationship with the world – in other words, to 
locate the Church-world binary within their mutually inclusive and exclusive spheres of 
interest. Particularly in more recent years, as Section III demonstrates, Ratzinger makes an 
attempt to address this. The issue is one of how ecclesiology can “touch” the world without 
losing its basis in divine revelation and without devaluing human freedom. When the Second 
Vatican Council proclaimed “the Church is in Christ l ke a sacrament or as a sign and 
instrument both of a very closely knit union with God and of the unity of the whole human 
race,”119 an understanding of the Church as born of the diffrence between, as well as the 
inseparability of, “sign” and “instrument” became vry necessary. Francis Sullivan points out 
that 
[t]he new aspect of catholicity that is expressed when the church is described as 
“universal sacrament of salvation” is that all grace of salvation is not only ordered 
toward the church, but in some way comes from and through the church. As sign and 
instrument of all salvation, the church is not merely the goal toward which grace is 
directed, it is the channel or medium through which grace is given.120 
 
The Church fully expresses itself as instrument through the personal assent of the 
individual as respondent.121 In this way it becomes a sign for others. At the beginning of 
                                                          
118 For example, Neil Ormerod of the Australian Catholic University has pointed out that faith in the Church is 
both gift and invitation, the latter symbolically captured by missio Dei rather than by communio – by our sharing 
in the divine missions of Word and Spirit. For Ormeod, it is through both communio and missio that we share in 
the divine life of the Trinity, even though, as he notes, “much communio ecclesiology is weak in its examination 
of the mission of the church. Mission becomes subsumed within communion” (Ormerod, Creation, Grace, and 
Redemption, 134, n. 3). 
119 LG, 1. 
120 Francis A Sullivan, The Church We Believe In: One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic (New York: Paulist Press, 
1988), 110. 
121 The important issue of respondents other than those who belong to the Church is in the background here. The 
Church remains the disseminator of grace while all the means of creation cooperate with the sacramental 
economy of salvation (cf. GS, 22). Even the familiar example of the initiation f an adult into the Catholic faith 
reveals that grace is operative outside the confines of actual Church membership. See Sullivan, The Church We 
Believe In, 121-31, who approaches the question from a sacramental perspective, asking: “Is the Church the only 
means of salvation?” For a more thorough historical overview of the issue, see his Salvation Outside the 
Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic Response (New York: Paulist Press, 1992). Sullivan’s basic thesis 
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Advent 2012, Benedict XVI said as much: “[Christ] came into the world, becoming a man 
like us, to bring to fulfilment [God’s] plan of love. And God asks us, too, to become a sign of 
His action in the world. Through our faith, our hope, our love, He wants to enter into the 
world again, to make His light shine again in our night.”122 
 
Part of ecclesiology’s task today is the challenge of combining union with God and 
the unity of mankind, the mystery of salvation and mankind’s pursuit of liberation, the 
eschatological and the temporal dimensions of salvation. Consequently, it must avoid what 
Francis Sullivan describes as “the tendency on the part of some to reduce the mission of the 
Church to a purely temporal project, as though the salvation of which the Church is the 
messenger could consist in merely material well-being.”123 The Church as universal 
sacrament of salvation is uniquely positioned to face the task of moving from a situation of 
extrinsicism where there is an artificial separation between the “sacred” and the “secular,” to 
a greater understanding that the whole economy of salvation is “sacramental.” In terms of the 
worshipping posture of an authentic human freedom, the challenge is to take up an 
orientation that unites both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of salvation in such a way 
that one is orientated from “here” to “there,” so to speak – from the secular to the sacred, and 
from the temporal to the transcendent – while all the time being formed in the ways of faith, 
hope and love by participating in the economy of salvation that is “sacramental.”124 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is that the negative and potentially misleading axiom extra ecclesiam nulla salus i  the same truth that receives 
positive theological expression in the designation of the Church as the universale salutis sacramentum.  
122 Benedict XVI, General Audience, 5 December 2012, http://www.zenit.org/article-36102?l=english (accessed 
6 December 2012).  
123 Sullivan, The Church We Believe In, 145. It is particularly significant that Libertatis conscientia, for its part, 
makes a number of attempts to acknowledge and authentically link the mystery of salvation and temporal efforts 
towards liberation. See especially its fifth chapter. In its conclusion, it states that “[i]t is the truth of the mystery 
of salvation at work today in order to lead redeemed humanity towards the perfection of the Kingdom which 
gives true meaning to the necessary efforts for liberation in the economic, social and political orders and which 
keeps them from falling into new forms of slavery” (LC, 99). 
124 Sullivan puts forward the thesis of the Church as “s crament of integral salvation,” supplying evidenc  from 
numerous magisterial and synod of bishops’ documents which acknowledge a concept of “integral salvation.” 
See Sullivan, The Church We Believe In, 141-51. Bonaventure Kloppenburg, a member of the secretariat for the 
1974 synod of bishops, presents a much more turbulent account of the proceedings than does Sullivan. For 
Sullivan, the 1974 Synod marked not only the first appearance of the term “integral salvation” but also the 
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former Regensburg professor of Dogma and the History of Dogma, Johann Auer (1910-
1989), captures eloquently the centrality of the Churc  in harmonising the numerous 
considerations for believers who are seeking out the correct posture with regard to God. What 
is at issue here is the need to shape a realistic understanding of the Church-world relationship 
on the one hand, and a correlation of soteriology and ecclesiology on the other: 
Nowhere indeed does the Christian faith reach so deeply into the reality of the world 
as it does in this faith reality of the “Church,” which speaks of the Christian person in 
his or her common life in the midst of the world. This renders intelligible the tensions 
that arise not only within the biblical idea of creation, but also, and even more so, in 
the historical mystery of sin and redemption, and, finally, in the promised judgement 
and glorification of the entire world: tensions that convey the foundational theme of 
the divine history of salvation in this world.125 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
moment of widespread unanimity with regard to its meaning. Kloppenburg, on the other hand, says its meaning 
was not at all clear, particularly with regard to the difference between “salvation” and “liberation.” In The 
People’s Church: A Defence of My Church, 158-71, Kloppenburg goes through the vast array of submissions 
and speeches which formed part of the synod’s deliberations in order to come to some clarification of the 
distinction. In an attempt to clarify the relationship between liberation and salvation, Bishop Schmitz, auxiliary 
bishop in Lima, introduced the distinction of “being more” and “having more” into the debate about the 
Church’s mission. His point was that the progress of humanity (liberation) goes along with, but is distinct from 
the salvation of souls (salvation). The bishop said that “having more” can lead to a “developmentalist” at itude 
that does not necessarily lead to the advancement of man’s dignity as a person. On the other hand, a “liberation” 
that prioritises “being more” looks to the very core of personal dignity, reaching the highest point of the 
Christian worldview – the human person as an adopte son or daughter of God. Therefore, human liberation or 
progress in the direction of “being more” is part of he mission of the Church in the sense that seeking first 
God’s kingship over you means that “all these things will be given you” also (cf. Matt 6:33).Therefore, the 
bishop suggested “if ‘human progress’ is understood solely along the lines of ‘having more,’ and ‘Christian 
salvation’ is understood solely as a plenitude of divine blessing in eternity, then the relation between the two 
will be purely extrinsic.” From this, Kloppenburg takes up the argument: “If however, ‘human progress’ (or 
better ‘liberation’) is understood in terms of ‘being more,’ that is, as a process by which man overcomes 
everything (from the sin that dwells in him to the social effects of sin) that keeps him from being fully a man, 
then progress or liberation, and salvation are one and the same reality, viewed from different angles. Liberation 
is an essential part, though not the whole, of Christian salvation and therefore a direct object of evangelisation.  
Evangelisation is precisely the means which will assure that man’s liberation is not conceived in a purely 
immanent manner as a merely political, social, and economic liberation, but will include the more profound and 
radical liberation from sin and will be open to thefull transcendent communion with God the Father and the 
fraternal communion of men as brothers” (171).   
125 Johann Auer, The Church: The Universal Sacrament of Salvation, trans. Michael Waldstein (Eugene, 
Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2005), xviii. In the course of his analysis he makes five assertions. He says “salvation” 
is always the mean and goal of the sacrament; that the Church’s mission is “universal,” extending to all human 
beings of all times and places; that as sacrament of unity, the Church points to the final ground of the Church in 
the Triune God; the nature of the unity of the one Church cannot be simply deduced from the Church’s 
existential life of the its eucharistic offering; “sacrament” does not refer to a certain pattern of thought in 
theology but, rather to a certain reality in creation understood as a history of salvation. To his mind, then, 
sacramental reality cannot be fully grasped by symbolic thinking but only in the acceptance and celebration of 
faith. See ibid., 94-100. In this doctoral thesis on Ratzinger’s soteriology, James Corkery demonstrates the 
connection between salvation and freedom in Ratzinger’s writings, showing the latter as being prerequisite for 
the former. However, the soteriological aspects of the Church as universal sacrament do not form part of 
Corkery’s demonstration. Perhaps, this is an indication of Ratzinger’s lack of attention to this important teaching 




Auer praises the merits of the conciliar definition because it establishes the correct measure 
for gauging the vertical and horizontal dimensions in the life of the Church. To his mind, it 
actually allows us to come to terms with the fact that  
[t]he essential thing is that when “sacrament” is chosen as a model or dogmatic 
concept for describing the Church, more is meant than a “structural-functional” view 
of the Church. What is intended is a “categorical-ontological” view, and, at the 
deepest level, a “transcendental-theological” view of the Church (Body of Christ).126 
 
Certainly, in Ratzinger’s case, there is unease about giving any impression of a 
theological imbalance that overstates the horizontal, or the value of earthly or inner-worldly 
liberations. When he specifically discusses the Church as universal sacrament of salvation, he 
moves rapidly towards the position of someone such as de Lubac, asking about the origin of 
the formula from the perspective of sacramental and nuptial communio.127 However, now that 
the communio perspective is a widely accepted ecclesiological premise, greater attention 
ought to be given to the liberating horizontal ramifications of the nuptial union of Christ and 
his Church. And if we incorporate Ratzinger’s perspctive, this is a task that can be 
undertaken without excessive inner-worldly representations of human creatureliness.  
The way forward which Ratzinger suggests regarding the Church’s role in the world 
rests on the premise that humanity’s greatest desolation is found in insecurity, uncertainty, 
the lack of freedom, and the pain that makes life hat ful. The root of this, he believes, is 
loneliness and the absence of love; it is the consequence of the fact “that my existence is not 
accepted by a love which makes it necessary, and is strong enough to justify it through the 
                                                          
126 Auer, The Church: The Universal Sacrament of Salvation, 97. 
127 See Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, 45-57. The focus tends to be on the realisation of how
Eucharist and Church can become interchangeable terms: “Kirche ist Eucharistie-Feiern, Eucharistie ist Kirche; 
beides steht nicht nebeneinander, sondern ist dasselbe; von da strahlt alles andere aus. Die Eucharistie ist das 
Sacramentum Christi, und weil die Kirche Eucharistia ist, darum ist sie Sacramentum, dem sich alle andre  
Sakramente zuordnen” (55). This translates as: “TheC urch is eucharistic celebration, the Eucharist is the 
Church; both are not adjacent to one another but are, in fact, the same; from there everything else emanates. The 
Eucharist is the Sacramentum Christi, and because the Church is Eucharistia, so she is Sacramentum, the 
sacrament to which all the other sacraments are ordred” ([own translation]). Note the final clause of the first 
sentence – von da strahlt alles andere aus [“from [Eucharist/Church] everything else emanates”] – did not 
appear in Mary McCarthy’s English translation of Ratzinger’s text. This is an unfortunate dilution of the 
sacramental argument which Ratzinger is making for it excludes the centrality of the Eucharist in the 
sacramental economy.  
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pain and all the other limitations.”128 In other words, the limits of belonging are fully tested 
by belonging to the human race. The challenge for mankind is the reorientation from 
alienation in original sin to unification in God. This will test the bonds of every temporal 
collective to which humanity belongs. To Ratzinger’s mind, Christianity is a mystery of 
union and the Church is sphere of growth in the unity of humanity. Therefore, Christ’s 
Church is the response to individualistic humanism: 
The essence of original sin is the fragmentation in[to] individuality, which knows 
only itself; the essence of salvation is the assemblage of the shattered image of God, 
the union of humanity through the one and in the on that stands for all and, in the 
word of St. Paul (Gal 3:28),  in whom all are one: J sus Christ. . . . Unification is 
redemption, because it is the realization of our cor espondence to God, the three in 
one; but unity with him is linked with our own unity and occurs through it. . . . 
Without this christological mediation, the self-designation [of the Church] as the 
people of God is presumptuous, if not downright blasphemous. Among the crucial 
tasks in the reception of the conciliar heritage today is the development anew of the 
sacramental character of the Church in order to open ur eyes to the point that is truly 
at issue: the unification with God, which is the condition of humanity’s unity and 
freedom.129
                                                          
128 Ibid., 54. 
129 Ibid., 51-57 [own translation]. Here is the original German text: “Das Wesen der Erbsünde ist die 
Zerrissenheit in die Individualität, die nur sich selber kennt; das Wesen der Erlösung ist die Zusammenfügung 
des zerschlagenden Gottesbildes, die Vereinigung der Menschheit durch den einen und in dem einen, der für alle 
steht und in dem nach einem Wort des heiligen Paulus (Gal 3:28) alle ein einziger werden sollen: Jesus Christus. 
. . . Die Vereinigung ist die Erlösung, denn sie ist d e Verwirklichung unserer Entsprechung zu Gott, dem Drei-
Einigen; aber die Einheit mit ihm ist danach an unsere eigene Einheit geknüpft und erfolgt durch sie hindurch. . . 
. Ohne diese christologische Vermittlung ist die Selbstbezeichnung als Volk Gottes Anmaßung, wenn nicht 
geradewegs blasphemisch. So wird es heute zu den entsch idenden Aufgaben in der Verarbeitung des 
konziliaren Erbes gehören, den sakramentalen Charakter der Kirche neu zu erschließen und damit wieder den 
Blick zu öffnen für das, worum es eigentlich geht: um die Vereinigung mit Gott, die die Bedingung für die




Ratzinger’s vision of Haltung, the holding together of all things – self, others and God 
– is that of a mystic. His assertion that the Churc is Raum der Freiheit is designed to point to 
this great universal vision that seeks to permeate the human person’s entire existence. At the 
same time, his writings are manifestly pastoral, conveying his great desire to communicate 
and clarify this all-embracing perspective. He is atheologian for whom gift and responsibility 
mark his overall frame of reference. Accordingly, the Church is the sphere that acts like a 
mirror held up to the human person. It ought to help one acknowledge the immediate self in 
the present, and endorse the fact that some more tangible fruition, to which we are ordered, 
lies ahead. 
The context for Ratzinger’s treatment of human freedom is the attempt to frame an 
authentic relationship between the finite creature and God the Creator. While on the one 
hand, human freedom would be no freedom at all if it were not the freedom to choose even 
what is wrong. On the other hand, it is that which is other than indeterminacy. As such, 
human freedom is not self-referential; its source lies beyond the self, and is ordered to that 
which is beyond the self. The “gentleness” of God des not usurp the inner workings of 
human freedom and yet, the ground of its possibility l es with him as Creator and Redeemer. 
Each person is called to accept oneself as “pro-exist nce” – as existence “for” others. Only in 
this way, as perfectly exemplified through the synergy of wills in Christ, does one reach that 
sphere whereby one’s existence and one’s end achieve a harmonious unity worthy of an 
imago dei.  
Ratzinger sees the Church as God’s invitation to pilgrimage, as the invitation to 
ecclesial and social formation in the pilgrim fellowship of faith. The act of faith is the making 
available of one’s own existence as a place for God’s work. Faith is not merely one posture 
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among others but the orientation of one’s whole being towards the will of God and thus 
towards the will of truth and love. The dynamic of call and personal response marks the life 
of the one who embraces the gift of faith. The Churc  then realises itself ever anew in the 
human heart as the sphere where a person is schooled in holiness and formed for a life of 
witness. The entire Church community is to offer its own life as a “test case,” so to speak, 
demonstrating that the kingdom of God is present and operative in the world today. This is 
achieved not by belonging to some type of exclusive group which adopts a posture of odium 
generis humani, or hatred for humanity, but rather by belonging to the Church that is 
constantly renewed through inner conviction and the fre  consent of individuals. Ratzinger’s 
universal vision envisages an ecclesial social system which functions so well that even non-
Christians can be supported by it. Such solidarity makes an impression even upon outsiders. 
The ultimate source of the Church as sphere of growth in human freedom is fraternal love, 
and its ultimate location is the eucharistic celebration of the communities who assemble on 
the Lord’s day.  
Ratzinger has a passionate desire to engage with the great questions of his generation. 
His engagement with the pressing issue of freedom attests to this characteristic in the man. 
He has been absorbed by such questions. Indeed, he has had a lifelong engagement with the 
complex issues of our time, issues he has debated from his student days to his final days as 
Pope, from the vigorous energies of the young man to the failing powers of the octogenarian. 
In one of his final public actions – announcing his intention to resign as bishop of Rome – 
this concern for the intellectual turmoil of modern times was to the fore of his mind and a 
motivating factor in his decision. In the papal declaration, he used the expression, “[. . .] in 
mundo nostri temporis rapidis mutationibus subiecto t quaestionibus magni ponderis pro vita 
fidei perturbato . . .” (“[. . .] in the world of our day, subject to rapid changes and troubled by 
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questions of great significance for the life of faith . . .”).1 He went on to say that engagement 
with the gravity of the world’s questions requires strength of mind and body which he no 
longer possesses. These are moving words from one who has spent a lifetime grappling with 
complex questions to the point of exhaustion, and who now feels unable any longer to engage 
them with the necessary vigour. Always striving to balance the rightful claims of faith and 
reason, religious observance and the freedom to believe, he contributed the wealth of his 
learning to elucidating these questions, in a way th t might be said to constitute an admirable 
attempt at an apologetics of the Christian faith for our time. We have examined here his 
approach to one of these complex questions: reconciling humanity’s aspiration to be fulfilled 
and free with God’s own wish that this be indeed so.
                                                          
1Benedict XVI, Declaration made on 11 February 2013, see 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speech s/2013/february/documents/hf_ben-
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